Women in court: the property rights of brides, heiresses and widows in thirteenth-century England by Lu, Shengyen
		
	
1	
Women in Court: The Property Rights of 
Brides, Heiresses and Widows in Thirteenth-
Century England 
 
 
 
 
Sheng-Yen Lu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Institute of Historical Research, School of Advanced 
Study 
University of London 
September 2018 
 
 
 
 
		
	
2	
Declaration of Authorship 
I, Shengyen Lu, declare that the research presented in this thesis is entirely my own 
work carried out for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Institute of Historical 
Research and has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree. 
 
Signed: 
 
Date:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		
	
3	
Abstract 
The research targets women in court – those who were frequently recorded in legal 
documents managing or protecting their property rights. The main concern is the change 
and development of the legal status and property rights of women, namely hereditas 
(inheritance), maritagium (marriage portion) and dos (dower) from the end of the 
twelfth century to the thirteenth century in England, and how they strove for their rights 
in court. While the thirteenth century is significant in England for the crucial 
development of the common law, the evolving common law also enacted a few 
prominent pieces of legislation which had huge impacts for women’s property rights. 
A number of important questions should be addressed at this point - How did women 
strive for their rights and what difficulties did they encounter in court? What strategies 
and claims did they and their representatives use in court in order to cope with the new 
regulations? Also, in a rather primitive age, what was the gap between the law and 
practice?  
      While recent scholarship has paid more attention to medieval English women’s 
property rights, very few works compare the differences between inheritance, 
maritagium and dower and the dynamics between them in thirteenth-century England, 
which is the focus of this research. Through case studies, I will examine women’s 
experiences of pursuing their property rights in court in order to elucidate the effects 
which the legislation brought, and what difficulties they might have encountered in 
court. The research uses case studies of women’s experiences not merely covering 
noblewomen but also wider groups of women in society, and by looking at court cases 
I aim to create a more comprehensive picture of medieval women’s property rights. 
More importantly, despite the focus in this research on women, it is impossible to 
discuss women without either putting them into the context of family or involving their 
menfolk; therefore, the research will not only discuss women’s participation in court 
but also the reactions of and dynamics among their family members when it came to 
property rights. 
      Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 consist of the introduction, and historiography 
methodology respectively. Chapter 3 will primarily examine heiresses. Unlike the male 
heir, who, according to custom, inherited the whole of the father’s inheritance 
(primogeniture), most daughters inherited by means of an equal division of the property. 
The equal division of inheritance between daughters makes the cooperation and conflict 
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between them worthy of discussion, and this will be one of the focuses of this chapter. 
Through examining the dynamics between co-heiresses and their family members, this 
chapter will also explore the difficulties heiresses encountered when claiming their 
inheritance. 
      Chapter 4 discusses maritagium. This chapter will show that claiming a certain 
amount of land as maritagium was a strategy often used by both plaintiff and defendant. 
However, the strategy as such would be of more benefit to women in courts. Next, 
Claire de Trafford’s idea of ‘maritagium as women’s land’ will be challenged, since 
maritagia in most cases served as families’ property. This study suggests that, 
maritagium was easily disposed of during the marriage, rather than a woman being able 
to keep it intact for it to descend to her children; and the idea of ‘maritagium being 
women’s land’ could be misleading, because there was no social consciousness to 
suggest that maritagia should be passed on to women’s daughters as their maritagia. 
      In Chapter 5 this study will reach the final stages of women’s lives – widowhood. 
Although the common law stipulated that widows were entitled to either a nominated 
dower, or one third of their late husbands’ property, claiming their dower in court, in 
fact, was a difficult task for widows to accomplish. These rights were reluctantly 
documented in law, thus offering no guarantee that they would be received, 
unconditionally, when they survived their husbands. This chapter will also show that 
dower was as much ‘family’s business’ as ‘women’s business’. The early development 
of jointure will be briefly examined as well because it not only concerned women’s 
dower. Finally, the rights of the most powerful group of women, widowed heiresses, 
will be looked at. Through case studies, I hope to offer a glimpse of how capable, 
influential, but vulnerable widowed heiresses could be.   
      This study will conclude by comparing the property rights of heiresses, brides and 
widows. Dower might have been the only property that a woman could have sole 
control over, but the significance of inheritance and maritagium should not be 
underestimated. I shall clarify their position by exploring the differences and 
similarities between herediatas, maritagium and dos as the common law developed.  
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Chapter One: Introduction  
 
The 15th of June 2015 marked eight hundred years since the sealing of the 1215 Magna 
Carta by King John. The unpopular king was forced to agree to Magna Carta at 
Runnymede by rebellious barons in 1215. The document was significant because it 
constituted a rudimentary kind of English constitution, setting out various rights of 
various classes and, in particular, delineating the jurisdiction of the king himself. The 
1215 Magna Carta named thirty-four clauses pertaining to men but only three clauses 
relating to women are mentioned.1 As historian David Carpenter points out, the limited 
part women played in public affairs in particular reflects the inequalities between men 
and women.2  Thus, the only three Magna Carta chapters that related to women - 
Chapters 7, 8, and 54 – protected the rights which most concerned medieval English 
women, namely maritagium, inheritance and dower. Developing upon recent 
scholarship, which mainly sheds light on the subordinate status of women in the Middle 
Ages, this study seeks to explore the issue of women’s rights regarding their property 
in thirteenth-century England.3    
 
1.1 Research topic    
      My research concerns women in court, in particular those who were frequently 
recorded in legal documents in cases that involved managing or protecting their 
property rights. The main concern of this thesis will be the changes to, and development 
of, both their legal status and their rights to (i) hereditas (inheritance), (ii) maritagium 
(marriage portion) and (iii) dos (dower), and the evolution of laws from the end of the 
twelfth century to the thirteenth century.4 Common law, known as ‘case law’, has no 
fixed form because it is based on precedents; hence any case that becomes a precedent 
is legally binding for any future similar cases. However, in thirteenth-century England, 
                                                
1 Although Magna Carta was first agreed by King John in 1215, it was annulled soon afterwards. In this 
thesis I will consistently use Magna Carta 1225, which was reissued by Henry III, and combined the 
original Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 in the version of Magna Carta 1217 into a single Chapter 8.    
2  ‘Politics,’ accessed on 20 July 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/frances-scott/magna-
carta_b_7583406.html?utm_hp_ref=tw.  
3 While there are many exceptional scholars working on medieval women, there is not space to list all of 
them here. I will just mention a few to whom I refer most in this research: Barbara A. Hanawalt, Henrietta 
Leyser, Janet Senderowitz Loengard, Kathleen Hapgood Thompson, Linda E. Mitchell, Louise J. 
Wilkinson, Claire de Trafford and Sue Sheridan Walker.  
4 I will give a detailed introduction to these three property rights later on in this chapter.  
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there were no references for legal practitioners to refer to, which meant there was 
relatively less pressure to follow them. As a consequence, people could fight court cases 
with greater flexibility, since a case might have been affected by a newly-made statute, 
legal practitioners’ claim or local customs. The common law system was originated in 
England, and met a turning point in 1066, when William the Conqueror ushered in the 
Norman reign of Britain. It did not undergo another significant revolution until the reign 
of Henry II at the end of the twelfth century, which had a profound impact on the 
common law. The next section will explain why this study focuses on the thirteenth 
century. 
      The thirteenth century has been chosen for the following reasons. Firstly, the 
thirteenth century is regarded as a crucial period for the development of the common 
law by historians. In 1176, Henry II launched a significant itinerant system of justice 
that entailed collecting different local customs in England in order to consolidate 
scattered local customs into a common rule of law that could be applied to the whole 
country.5 Secondly, it is when the English legal profession started to significantly 
develop. Whilst the new royal court - the Common Bench – had been developing at 
Westminster during Henry II’s reign, it came under the control of a small group of 
professional, full time royal judges.6 More importantly, by the end of the thirteenth 
century, professional lawyers were recognised as men who not only had professional 
skills, but were also essential components in litigation. Henceforth, the royal courts 
became national courts, run by a small core of long-serving royal justices, who observed 
national laws and local customs. As a result, a nascent legal treatise emerged - 
Glanvill’s Tractatus de legibus et consuetudinibus regni Anglie qui Glanvill vocatur 
(The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England Commonly Called 
Glanvill). 7  Furthermore, the courts now kept written records, not only of final 
judgments, but also of the various stages in litigation. These records have contributed 
not only to this study, but also to general legal history, since they allow historians to 
trace the timeline of litigation proceedings and examine how the common law 
developed from an inchoate state into its modern counterpart.8 Most importantly for our 
                                                
5 Paul Brand, The Making of the Common Law (London: Hambledon Press, 1992), 80-84. 
6 For the details of the development of the English legal profession, see Brand, The Making of the 
Common Law, 1-20. 
7 Glanvill and Bracton are the first two English common law treatises. A more comprehensive description 
of them will be discussed in the next chapter.  
8 Paul Brand, The Origins of the English Legal Profession (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 14-18.   
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study, certain statutes of great significance relating to women’s property rights were 
enacted during the thirteenth century, such as the 1225 Magna Carta and the 1285 
Statute of Westminster II. Thus, the thirteenth century was highly significant, not only 
in legal history, but also for the subject of this research, namely, women’s inheritance, 
maritagia and dower.    
      This study has limited its remit to the study of the class of women who possessed 
property, that is, freewomen or the wives of freemen. Because of the comparatively 
greater power, they were able to own and dispose of their property. More importantly, 
they were people who could afford to sue in courts, having their cases documented, and 
left their mark on the historical record. Unfree villeins, on the other hand, did not have 
the same rights as freemen and freewomen.9 As a case in point, villeins were not 
allowed to sue in the king’s courts, although they could in the manorial courts, which 
meant there was a need for maintaining separate records. Villeins are discussed at some 
points in the research in order to make the women’s property rights arguments more 
comprehensive, but they are not the main focus.  
      With regard to what ‘property’ means in the context of this study, it will be limited 
to ‘estates or land-like things’ rather than ‘immovable goods and chattels’; for the 
transactions concerning the latter were less likely to be recorded,10 and neither were as 
well documented as estates. For example, a London husband might have preferred a 
dowry in real estate because the transfer of real property was recorded in the city 
records.11 The significance of estates could be inferred in the form of inheritance, 
maritagium and dower, which, at least before the fourteenth century, often consisted of 
land rather than money. Furthermore, all the chattels women brought to a marriage 
passed to their husbands, which made it difficult to examine how wives disposed of 
movable goods.12 Although women could own property via acquisition and purchase, 
                                                
9 Villeins worked for the lord on his land and were bound to meet a set of customary expectations, such 
as providing three days of work on the lord’s land per week. They had to plough and harrow the lord’s 
land, or collect firewood or nuts. In return for their service, they could use some of the lord’s land by 
paying rent, but essentially everything villeins produced belonged to their lords. See Christopher Dyer, 
Standards of Living in the Later Middle Ages: Social Change in England c.1200-1520 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 216-223.  
10  Transactions relating to chattels are seen more often in manorial court rolls. Most of them related to 
‘heriot’, a customary fine of a villein’s best beast, or most valuable chattel, which his heir had to submit 
to the lord upon the villein’s death.  
11 Barbara A. Hanawalt, The Wealth of Wives: Women, Law, and Economy in Late Medieval London 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 60.  
12 Judith M. Bennett, Women in the Medieval English Countryside: Gender and Households in Brigstock 
before the Plague (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 109-111.  
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this research will exclude those methods of obtaining property, since the nature of dos, 
hereditas and maritagium was either inheritance or gift.   
 
1.2 The classification of people and the categories of tenures in thirteenth-century 
England 
      As discussed, due to the focus on women in this study we necessarily exclude 
women from certain classes. Aside from ‘free’ and ‘unfree’, there were further 
subcategories to describe a person’s status. If we perceive medieval society as a 
pyramid, where the highest and most influential sit at the top and the poorest sit the 
bottom, we have a good understanding of the time. The king, naturally, sat on the top. 
Right after the king were the men of higher status, including earls, counts, barons and 
knights. The majority of the population, sitting on the lower social rung, was made up 
of free and unfree peasantry.13  Freemen might be different kinds of tenant, but the 
unfree, as John Hudson points out in The Oxford History of the Laws of England 
Volume II 871-1216, were far from homogenous and it is hard to describe them in 
simple terms. Usually ‘villein’ was used to describe one’s unfree status, but it can also 
be used to refer to anyone whose rank is below knight. Whilst, by the Angevin period 
(c. 1154-1216), unfree status was better defined, the law defining villeinage was 
subjected to constant change.14  
      Apart from one’s legal status, different kinds of landholding were crucial to defining 
a person’s obligations and his relationship with his lord. As with people’s statuses, there 
were free and unfree tenements. The latter was villeinage, which will not be 
investigated in this thesis. The former, however, consisted of numerous different kinds 
of tenures as follows: (i) knight service (knight service could be fulfilled by a monetary 
payment called scutage, charged per knight’s fee in lieu of service);15 (ii) socage, free 
farm and serjeanty. These three tenures required money payments and a variety of 
personal services to the lords. Socage was the most common residual tenure in medieval 
England, involving payment in money and produce; a fee farm, however, was a tenure 
which was held heritably and allowed the tenants the opportunity to collect revenue in 
                                                
13 John Hudson, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 750-751. The other group which is not discussed in this thesis is the clergy. Because they are not 
the focus of this research, they have been excluded.  
14 Ibid., 752-753.  
15 Ibid., 632-633.  
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return for a fixed rent. The most salient feature of fee farms, which differentiated them 
from socage, was wardship. In fee farms, the wardship might have gone up to the lord 
but in socage, it went to the family;16 serjeanty, which overlapped socage and fee farms 
in many ways, distinguished itself by the service of rendering a form of personal service 
to the king. Serjeanty did not develop as a particular form of tenure until the last decade 
of the twelfth century, and it was likely caused by royal administrative action17 
      Other regional tenures also existed in medieval England, such as gavelkind. 
Gavelkind was mostly found in Kent and was characterised by partible inheritance and 
its custom of dower and curtesy.18 There was also burgage, which refers to a town in a 
formerly ancient borough held by the king or the lord. It was, in effect, a kind of town 
socage. However, boroughs distinguished themselves from towns by having the right 
of sending members to Parliament.19  
 
1.2 Being a woman in medieval England 
      Medieval women are rarely discussed without mentioning the family; likewise, they 
are more often referred to in terms of their affiliation to men – their husbands and male 
family members.20  Their subordinate status is often apparent in many ways; their 
representation in court being just one. Only widows and heiresses were eligible to be 
present at court as ‘femmes sole’, whilst married women had to be accompanied by their 
husbands or sons and present themselves as ‘femmes covert’. ‘Femmes sole’ were 
‘unmarried women, divorced women, widows or women who could execute legal rights 
independently, especially in relation to their right to own property or carry on a 
business’, while ‘femmes covert’ applied to all other women who were legally 
subordinated to their husbands, who ‘covered’ them in such a way they lived like 
shadows.21 The following questions arise: 
                                                
16 Ibid., 634.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid., 635.  
19 Robert Maugham, Outlines of the Law of Real Property (London, 1842), 38.  
20 It is inevitable that men are always involved when we discuss medieval women, due to their inferior 
status in society. Two cases in point are Henrietta Leyser, Medieval Women: A Social History of Women 
in England, 450-1500 (London: Phoenix Giant, 1996) and Hanawalt, The Wealth of Wives. Both hinge 
upon or start with the roles women played during their lives – as daughter, as mother, as wife and as 
widow. Women had different identities, and all of them related to family and men. 
21 Although scholars frequently use femme sole and femme covert to describe a medieval woman’s legal 
status, the terms did not emerge until the sixteenth century. See ‘OED,’ accessed on 5 June 2018, http://0-
www.oed.com.catalogue.libraries.london.ac.uk/view/Entry/69167?redirectedFrom=feme+sole#eid  
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(i) How did such a relationship affect a woman’s life?  
(ii) Once married, would each partner remain the owner of their respective 
properties?  
(iii) Post-marriage, did their respective properties belong to him or her, or was it 
theirs, in the sense of dual ownership?22  
      When a suit was brought forward in relation to the wife’s land, the couple was 
regarded as a ‘unity’. If the disputed land belonged to the wife, the husband could not 
appear in court without the wife being present, and neither could the wife be present 
without the husband. However, when the property in question was recognised as 
belonging to the husband, the husband could be heard without his wife being present. 
In theory, therefore, the husband was the guardian of his wife. According to Maitland 
and Pollock, this guardianship was often abused, which meant that a wife could become 
fully subject to her husband’s power.23 So, in terms of the general notion of ‘unity’ in 
law, how did a conjugal couple dispose of their property in practice? 
      With regards to the land a wife held in fee, her husband had a right to enjoy the land 
and also held a power of alienation24 without her concurrence during the marriage. On 
the contrary, the wife could not legally alienate her land without her husband’s consent 
since her land would be under the control of her husband.25 If they had produced a child, 
the husband could enjoy the curtesy, a tenure by which a husband, after his wife’s death, 
held certain kinds of property that she had inherited.26 If the land belonged to her 
husband, she, as a widow, could only enjoy one-third of the land under the name of 
dower after her husband’s death. Dower could be classified into two different types – 
nominated dower and reasonable dower.27 The former referred to the land ‘a free man 
gives to his wife at the church door at the time of his marriage’,28 that is, the husband 
                                                
22  This interesting and practical question is addressed by Frederick Pollock and Frederic W. Maitland, 
The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1968), vol. 2, 400-409.   
23 Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I, vol. 2, 400-409.  
24  Alienation includes the granting and selling of land, as well as other legal actions. 
25		Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I, vol. 2, 403-404. 	
26 Hudson, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol. 2, 804-805.    
27 Reasonable dower refers to one-third of a husband’s property. The details will be discussed in the later 
part of this thesis.  
28 Ranulf de Glanville, Tractatus de Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni Angliae qui Glanvilla Vocatur. 
The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England, Commonly Called Glanvill, ed. and 
trans. G. D. G Hall (London: Nelson, 1965), 58-59. 
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assigned a specific land as her dower to his wife when they married. The latter indicated 
one-third of the husband’s land, under the right bestowed by common law.  
      Although the legal status and property rights of women were well described in 
Glanvill (c. 1190), and Bracton (c. 1210 – c. 1268), as was previously mentioned, 
thirteenth-century law was constantly changing due to new statutes and charters. In 
Glanvill, for instance, the share of dower is that which a widow should have based on 
the day she married. Conversely, the 1225 Magna Carta defined the dower share as one-
third of her husband’s property, which he held as of fee on the day of his death, or any 
time during the marriage.29 Also, both the Statute of Merton (1236) and the Statute of 
Westminster II (1285) placed new regulations on widows and heiresses. For instance, 
the Statute of Westminster II (1285) included a chapter concerning ‘resceit’, enabling 
a wife to recover her inheritance or dower if her husband lost it. What influence did this 
clause have on women’s property rights? The development of these regulations in 
relation to heiresses and widows needs more attention, as it helps to explain how 
women’s property rights changed from the twelfth to the thirteenth century.  Three 
important issues need be addressed at this point: (i) what difficulties women faced in 
the courts and (ii) what strategies and claims did women’s representatives use in court 
in order to respond to the new regulations?  
      In order to address these issues, it is necessary to understand the notion of being a 
woman in medieval England. Whilst women played subordinate roles in society, 
nevertheless their roles in family life made them as important as men - as inferred from 
their frequent presence in court with regards to property. As a means of transmitting 
property, during early medieval times in Anglo-Saxon England, women, ironically, 
were seen to be a piece of property themselves, which is reflected in the practice of 
‘bride purchase’. One of the laws of Æthelberht, king of Wessex, states that, ‘If a man 
buys a maiden, the bargain shall stand, if there is no dishonesty’.30 Nevertheless, some 
historians disagree with the notion of ‘bride purchase’. F. Mezger, for instance, 
translated that particular law as, ‘if one makes a marriage agreement with regard to a 
virgin, be it agreed through exchange of the gift to the bride, if it (the transaction) is 
                                                
29 Janet Senderowitz Loengard, ‘Rationabilis Dos: Magna Carta and the Widows’ “Fair Share” in the 
Earlier Thirteenth Century,’ in Wife and Widow in Medieval England, ed. Sue Sheridan Walker. (Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 60-79.  See also Glanvill, 58; Bracton, 265.  
30  Æthelberht, 77. See Conor McCarthy, Marriage in Medieval England: Law, Literature and Practice 
(Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2004), 52.  
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without fraud’. Further, Mezger argues that there was no cultural concept of ‘bride 
purchase’ in Germanic tribes.31 While the issue is still subject to debate, one thing is 
certain: the significance of women has never been overlooked, and this became more 
evident after a woman entered marriage. As far as noble families and families with 
estates were concerned, marriage signified a redistribution of property, and was 
regarded as a good opportunity to establish, accumulate or strengthen a family’s wealth. 
Hence it is not unreasonable that a family might wish to consider what benefits a 
marriage would bring to them financially, rather than how it might benefit the bride. 
Nevertheless, for those at the bottom of society, i.e. villeins and the poor, marriage 
would not necessarily bring financial benefits.       
      The marriage of women was regarded as a transaction not only because money was 
involved, but also due to patriarchal value. In Western Europe these values are arguably 
a cultural hang-over from Roman times. The Romans recognised two kinds of marriage, 
(i) in manu, where the bride was transferred from the authority of her father to that of 
her husband via marriage, and (ii) sine manu, where the bride did not fall under the 
authority of the husband, but remained in the guardianship of her father until he died, 
or following the birth of a third child.32 According to historian Conor McCarthy, the 
latter became the norm after the 2nd century A.D. Both kinds of marriage foreshadowed 
the contemporary perception of medieval women; in that no matter what transpired, 
women would always be subjected to the authority of men.33 This begs the question – 
was such a perception of women still evident in medieval England?  
  
1.4 Thirteenth-Century English women 
      As mentioned, thirteenth-century England was significant in many ways. Politically 
speaking, both the First and Second Barons’ Wars had a profound impact on society. 
As far as women’s property rights were concerned, the First Barons’ War, which 
culminated in the issue of Magna Carta in 1215, led to a more generous right to claim 
dower, inheritance and maritagium. The 1215 Magna Carta also had a transformative 
effect on women’s property rights. Before 1215, widows would offer money to the king 
for the right to stay single, gain access to their lands and for the wardship of their 
                                                
31 F. Mezger, ‘Did the Institution of Marriage by Purchase Exist in Old German law?’ Speculum, 18 
(1943), 369-371.   
32 McCarthy, Marriage in Medieval England, 52-53.  
33 Ibid.		
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children.34 However, after the 1215 Magna Carta, widows no longer had to pay a fine 
in order to secure their inheritances, maritagia and dowers. Moreover, Magna Carta 
(1217 and later issues) also expanded upon a widow’s dower rights by stipulating that 
her dower should consist of one-third of the land her late husband seised at any time 
during the marriage. This was a more generous dower than offered in the twelfth 
century – i.e. one third of the land her late husband held at the time of the marriage.35 
Furthermore, with the rule of equitable inheritance between heiresses that was 
established in the mid-twelfth century, daughters in thirteenth-century England were 
aware that they had a right to a reasonable share of their father’s inheritance, whether 
married or not.36 It led to an unpleasant consequence for the lords because they lost 
their discretionary power to give the land to one sister and her husband if they favoured 
them.  
      The Second Barons’ War (c. 1264 – 1267) did not have an immediate impact on 
women’s property rights, but it would. When the Provisions of Oxford were established 
in 1258, a group of barons led by Simon de Montfort forced Henry III to accept a new 
form of government. The most well-known legacy of the Provisions of Oxford was that 
it placed the king under the authority of a Council of Fifteen, to be chosen by twenty-
four men – twelve nominees of the king, and twelve nominees of the reformers. The 
Council would be held regularly, three times a year. However, Chapter 27 of the 
Petition of Barons (1258), an unpublished transcript drawn up before the Provisions of 
Oxford in 1258, mentioned the concern about the alienation of land granted in 
maritagium after the death of the husband where there was no issue of marriage; that 
is, the grantors were reluctant to see women alienate their maritagia when they had no 
issue.37  The law did not have this rule officially written down until the Statute of 
Westminster II in 1285.  
      Apart from political developments, demography in medieval England is also worth 
our attention. As Mark Bailey suggests in ‘Population and Economic Resources’, the 
population in England kept growing between 1100 and 1300, and it culminated in 
                                                
34 David Carpenter, Magna Carta (London: Penguin Books, 2015), 105.  
35 Mavis E. Mate, Women in Medieval English Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
23.  
36 Ibid. I will discuss the rule of female inheritance in detail in chapter 3.  
37 I am greatly indebted to Dr Paul Brand for discussion of the Petition of Barons. The translation of the 
manuscript has not been published yet. I shall discuss the Provisions of Oxford in detail in Chapter 4. 
For the Second Barons’ War and its background, see Michael T. Clanchy, England and Its Rulers 1066-
1307, 4th edition (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2014), 267-276.  
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almost six million people in 1300.38 Only the nobility and some peasants from the upper 
ranks held their land in freehold; most peasants held their land in customary or copyhold, 
which made them unable to defend their right to land in the king’s courts. They had to 
use manorial courts instead.39 How, then, did it affect women’s property rights? To take 
one example, if a villein’s widow went to the king’s court to demand her dower, she 
would be rejected because of her late husband’s villein status.40 
      With regards to the economy, it was mainly built on agriculture. The most important 
product was grain, including wheat, rye, barley, peas, beans, vetches and oats. As I shall 
demonstrate later in chapter 5, many widows quitclaimed their dower to have different 
grain and basic commodities in return, including wheat, rye, barley and clothes.41 Wool, 
the chief cash crop in medieval England, was of great quality and hence very much 
sought after throughout Europe. With the population rise in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries, not only the production of grain expanded perhaps twofold, but also the price 
of commodities increased. Isabel de Forz (c. 1237-1293), Countess of Devon and 
Countess of Aumale, for instance, exploited her tenants by increasing the rent because 
of a growing demand of pasture and arable land. The population growth also 
contributed to the expansion of commercial opportunities.42  
      The English economy became more robust in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, 
which led to a growth in the number of towns. These towns acquired their own trading 
privileges and legal rights, such as London, and these legal rights inevitably affected 
women’s property rights.43 For instance, widows of London citizens were ‘free’ of the 
city and could carry on their husbands’ trades. Moreover, they could also have 
apprentices and be members of the guilds.44  Furthermore, a London widow could 
remain in the house where her husband had been living when he died until she remarried 
or passed away. This custom was much more generous than the common law, which 
                                                
38 Mark Bailey, ‘Population and Economic Resources,’ in An Illustrated History of Late Medieval 
England, ed. Chrisopher Given-Wilson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 42-43.  
39 Ibid., 41.   
40 There is a detailed discussion in chapter 5 of this thesis.  
41 See sections 5.9.1 and 5.9.4 in chapter 6.  
42	Bailey, ‘Population and Economic Resources,’ 44-45. 	
43 Ibid., 47. 
44 Barbara A. Hanawalt, ‘Remarriage as an Option for Urban and Rural Widows in Late Medieval 
England,’ in Sheridan Walker, Wife and Widow in Medieval England, 141-164.  
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only gave widows forty days for the occupation of the ‘principal mansion’.45 Another 
good example is Lincoln. In Lincoln, if a widow’s late husband held his land by burgage 
tenure, she was customarily entitled to half of his property in dower on his death. 
However, according to Lincoln’s custom, she could not claim the dower from the 
inheritance which had been alienated by her husband out of necessity.46  
       
1.5 Dower        
      In recent times, the role of medieval women has attracted vigorous attention from 
historians.47 With regards to property rights, dower appears to have impacted medieval 
women the most. Dower, a life interest to a widow, did not pass to her heirs but to her 
husband’s heirs, although it gave her, as a widow, sole control over her property. Sue 
Sheridan Walker calls dower ‘women’s business’ and emphasises its significance 
because, in all major civil pleas, it required a woman to be the plaintiff, hence, only 
widows could launch dower suits.48 However, it would be quite wrong to presume that 
dower was not men’s business also. In fact, on the contrary, dower had everything to 
do with men. For one thing, dower was dependent on men; no husband meant no dower. 
It eventually would and should descend to the heir of the widow’s husband, but a delay 
in receiving the whole inheritance often resulted in resentfulness towards the widow on 
the part of the heir.49 Many legal cases reveal widows appearing at court against their 
disgruntled children, who were reluctant to assign their mothers’ dower. In terms of this 
study, dower is considered to be both ‘women’s business’ and ‘family interests’ (see 
chapter 5).  
      Indeed, dower constituted the major reason for women going to court. However, it 
was not the only property right a thirteenth-century woman was entitled to. At various 
stages she might be an heiress, a landholder, or a widow, which meant her control over 
the property could be executed not only through dower, but also via her inheritance or 
                                                
45 Caroline M. Barron, ‘Introduction: The Widow’s World in Later Medieval London,’ in Medieval 
London Widows, 1300-1500, ed. Caroline M. Barron and Anne F. Sutton (London, Rio Grande: The 
Hambledon Press, 1994), xvii.  
46	Louise J. Wilkinson, Women in Thirteenth-Century Lincolnshire (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2007), 
95. 	
47 See footnote 3.  
48 Sue Sheridan Walker, ‘Litigation as Personal Quest: Suing for Dower in the Royal Courts, circa 1270-
1350,’ in Sheridan Walker, Wife and Widow in Medieval England, 81-108.   
49 One of the best illustrations of disgruntled heirs can be seen in Linda E. Mitchell, Portraits of 
Medieval Women: Family, Marriage, and Social Relationships in Thirteenth-Century England 1225-
1350 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 169-185. 
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maritagium. Maud de Braose (c. 1224-1301), one of the most important and wealthy 
noble heiresses in the country was a case in point. Her family held a great deal of land 
in the Welsh Marches. She not only received some land as maritagium at Tetbury, but 
also held one-quarter of one-third of both the barony of Miles of Gloucester and the 
lordship of Radnor as her inheritance. After her husband’s death, she became a 
widowed heiress and spent years in dilatory litigation over dower against her son, 
Roger.50 Maud went through all the mentioned entitlements and received the most 
important three property rights a woman could have obtained over a lifetime, even 
though, over time, her identity and status may well have changed and her roles 
overlapped. Although a noblewoman, like Maud, would usually have possessed a 
considerable amount of land when entering marriage, even if she had not been an 
heiress, she would have received some land as maritagium for her upcoming marriage.  
 
1.6 Maritagium       
      Maritagium was another important source of women’s property. According to 
Glanvill, maritagium meant ‘property given with a woman to her husband’. Every free 
man who had land could give a certain part of his land to his daughters.51 Although 
maritagium was meant to be distributed to a bride’s heirs, rather than to be owned by 
her, it could be added to the property of the groom, and also to that of the groom’s 
family. Maritagium was the object of lawsuits; however, over time it changed its form. 
As Payling points out, it had evolved from ‘heritable estates’ to ‘money portions’, 
indicating a father may have thought that distributing a portion of money instead of 
land to his daughter would be better for the bride’s natal family, especially if he had 
other, non-inheriting, daughters.52 Nevertheless, ‘marriage portion’ in the form of cash 
did not become prevalent until the fourteenth century, and in thirteenth-century England 
most brides received their maritagia in land. Therefore, in this section of the present 
study, landed maritagium will be the topic mainly discussed, rather than the later 
development of ‘jointures’.  
                                                
50 Maud de Braose will be discussed again in chapter 5. Mitchell, Portraits of Medieval Women, 169-
185.  
51 Glanvill, 69. 
52 Simon J. Payling, ‘The Politics of Family: Late Medieval Marriage Contracts’, in The McFarlane 
Legacy: Studies in Late Medieval Politics and Society, ed. Richard H. Britnell and Anthony J. Pollard 
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As with dower, some scholars believe maritagium to have functioned as ‘women’s 
land’ in that it was property assigned to a newly-wed couple by the bride’s male 
relatives –  usually her father – in the knowledge that the bride would have sole control 
over it after her husband’s death. This view is borne out by some records, which show 
that land passed only to daughters in the form of maritagium.53 However, in this study 
I will challenge this concept by arguing that maritagium was not so much ‘women’s 
land’ as ‘family land.’      
      While every woman could have her maritagium on her marriage, not all women 
could become heiresses. Most heiresses usually held some pieces of land as inheritance, 
while the daughters of nobles, or of landed gentry, often inherited a considerable estate. 
Nevertheless, all heiresses were subject to wardship until they were married. At this 
point, their inheritances would be affected by both family and feudal interests. For 
instance, the crown usually owned the wardships of noble heiresses of nobles, thus 
playing a patronal role in their marriages.54  
       The custom of female inheritance changed significantly between the eleventh and 
the thirteenth centuries. Authorities on the subject, such as S. F. C. Milsom and J. C. 
Holt, opined that, prior to 1130, should a father have no son and several daughters, only 
one daughter could inherit. However, after 1130, Statutum Decretum declared that all 
the daughters were entitled to inherit.55 Glanvill also clearly stated that, ‘If a man leaves 
several daughters, then the inheritance will clearly be divided between them whether 
their father was a knight or a sokeman, but saving the chief messuage to the eldest 
daughter on the conditions set out above’.56  
      The following questions arise here: (i) if a daughter received maritagium when she 
married, would she also be entitled to a share of the inheritance? (ii) if so, would she be 
expected to put her maritagium back ‘into the pot’ with the rest of the inheritance so it 
                                                
53 Claire de Trafford, ‘The Contract of Marriage: The Maritagium from the Eleventh to the Thirteenth 
Century’ (PhD dissertation, University of Leeds, 1999), 243-245.  
54 James C. Holt, Colonial England, 1066-1215 (London, Rio Grande: The Hambledon Press, 1997), 250. 
55 S. F. C. Milsom, ‘Inheritance by Women in the Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries,’ in On the 
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chief messuage. Glanvill, 76.  
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could be divided equally – a process called ‘hotchpot’?57 and (iii) should she simply 
keep her dowry and make no claim to the inheritance?58  
      The relationship between inheritance and maritagium has been the subject of wide 
and often heated debate and it is only one of the many disputes that partible inheritance 
caused.59 As Holt points out, when several daughters became co-heiresses, female 
succession became a source of dispute.60 In order to further explore female succession, 
this study will go on to examine examples of disputes between co-heiresses, the 
dynamics these disputes created, the attitude of the common law towards such conflicts, 
and how the heiresses fought for their shares in the courts.  
 
1.7 Jointure    
      Another important development concerning women’s property rights was ‘jointure’, 
which became widely adopted from the second half of the thirteenth century into the 
fourteenth century onwards. Jointure was a joint tenancy in survivorship between a 
landholder and his wife. The husband would grant his lands to trustees, who would later 
help to grant the lands back to him and his wife, jointly. Although jointure was intended 
to provide security for a wife after her husband’s death, wives, in fact, faced more 
difficulty in inheriting the property.61 Given-Wilson indicates that by the fourteenth 
century, although most marriage contracts granted the wife a joint share in part of her 
husband’s land (in itself partly an indication of the importance of the wife), it was still 
troublesome to inherit property.62 However, since jointure did not become dominant 
until the fourteenth century, this study will not discuss it further. It is important to state 
that some cases relating to jointure will be discussed in the chapter 5, since jointure 
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evolved from both maritagium and dower, therefore it is necessary to discuss the early 
development of jointure.  
 
1.8 Women’s business or family business?      
      This study concerns how women fought for, and managed, their property rights 
through the legal mechanisms provided under the nascent legal branch of common law. 
It also queries how, between the gap of law and reality, between theory and practice, 
women tackled the many societal hindrances thrown their way in order to achieve the 
best possible outcome? Most importantly, how did courts embody the legislation?  
      I believe it would be doing a disservice if this study only addressed women without 
putting them in the context of family life and their relationships with men. As 
mentioned earlier, medieval women were a subordinate group whose lives centred on 
their husbands, children, and families. Therefore, in order to reconstruct a 
comprehensive picture of medieval women and their property rights, the study will 
emphasise the dynamics between women and their families, since women not only went 
to court to serve their own agendas, but also to protect their families’ interests.  
      Sue Sheridan Walker asserted that dower was women’s business in ‘Litigation as 
Personal Quest: Suing for Dower in the Royal Court, circa 1270-1350’,63 in tandem 
with Claire de Trafford, who wrote that maritagium was ‘women’s land’ in her ‘Share 
and Share Alike? The Marriage Portion, Inheritance, and Family Politics’.64 I wish to 
add another idea to academia on dower and maritagium – that they were as much 
‘family business’ as ‘women’s business.’  
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Chapter Two: Historiography and Methodology 
 The emphasis of this thesis is on women’s property rights, but a number of aspects 
will be discussed in order to paint a more comprehensive picture of the lives of 
medieval women. Women’s property rights are interwoven with contemporary legal, 
societal and historical knowledge and these will need to be discussed in tandem. 
Therefore, I will divide the historiography into two sections: (i) works on medieval 
English women and (ii) works on the history of common law. I will conclude with the 
Methodology. 
 
2.1.1 Historiography of medieval English women 
      The history of medieval women is one of the fastest growing fields of scholarship. 
Janet Loengard’s ‘Legal History and the Medieval Englishwoman: A Fragmented View’ 
serves as the perfect beginner’s text on medieval women. Published in 1986, this article 
not only provides an overview of the historiography of medieval Englishwomen until 
1986 but also points out that, although much work has been done, the view of medieval 
Englishwomen is still fragmented and there is much to be unearthed.65 
      Loengard indicated that whilst some historians in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries were interested in the history women’s legal rights, they put more emphasis 
on institutional history or the history of legal principles, more often discussing statutes 
and treatises, i.e. what the law should be, rather than what the law was in practice.66 
Between 1970 and the 1980s, historians began to narrow and define their topics and 
most of them were not published in law reviews or the journals of legal history. 
Women’s legal history remained concerned with their property rights, inheritance, 
criminal law and women, female perpetrators, and more importantly, the law of 
marriage. 67  As Loengard suggested, when discussing medieval England, it was 
impossible to separate the study of marriage from women’s rights or liability because 
marriage touched on every aspect of medieval women’s life.68 
      Despite all this, there were, still, some fields that required historians’ attention. For 
instance, as Loengard pointed out, we know very little about women’s commercial 
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activities, and it would be worth knowing how medieval women engaged in transactions 
and used the legal system to protect their assets.69 Although Loengard recognised that 
more work concerning medieval women’s legal history is being done, she considered 
every article akin to a piece in a mosaic, in that each of them discussed a different 
definitive topic that required some assemblage in order to have a coherent picture of 
the relationship between medieval women and law.70 
      Loengard further updated her findings on the history of English women’s legal 
history in her revised 1990 version of ‘Legal History and the Medieval English Woman 
Revisited: Some New Directions’, offering expansions on her previous article.71 She 
noticed that women’s legal history seemed to have been subsumed into family history. 
On that basis, she positively noted that whilst there were more social historians using 
legal documents and therefore touching upon legal issues, a social historian’s focus was 
always different to a legal historian’s.72 Furthermore, the tendency to link women’s 
legal history to the history of the family is not necessary productive because it 
discourages some legal research. Furthermore, Loengard believed that if the legal 
history of women was to continue being studied by social historians, rather than legal 
historians, it may change the nature of women’s legal history.73 Her opinions were not 
intended to prohibit study, but rather acted as a caution.74      
      Another earlier book, published in 1980, also provided a clear outlook on the 
historiography of women before the 1980s. The Women of England: From Anglo-Saxon 
Times to the Present: Interpretive Bibliographical Essays is representative of this 
academic movement in women’s history. Kathleen Casey’s ‘Women in Norman and 
Plantagenet England’ and Ruth Kittel’s ‘Women under the Law in Medieval England’ 
provide a brief historiography of medieval English women.75 Like Loengard, Casey 
believed there were still many important, but neglected, questions requiring historians’ 
attention, especially in the field of economic life. In particular, she emphasised the 
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reciprocal relationships between the marriage bond and the production of food, which 
played a crucial role in the ‘conjunction of women’s lives and politics in the English 
middle ages.’ 76  She was convincing in her view that women’s high visibility in 
medieval economic life alongside their subordinate status in common law, literature 
and theology, was an incongruity, which is why the history of medieval English women 
needs further attention.77 The dearth of studies may well be because of a perceived 
paucity of primary sources, but historians in the field were fortunate, in that medieval 
legal proceedings were so well documented that they actually gave good insights into 
social structures, economies, levels of mobility and tenure from a female perspective. 
Kittel also stressed the usefulness of medieval legal records and encouraged younger 
researchers to work on ‘women in action’ by studying legal manuscripts.78 However, 
her book was published in 1980, since when later works on medieval women’s history 
have flourished and diverged, thus creating a wider variety of texts for historians to 
study.      
      Apart from the overview of the historiography of medieval women’s legal history, 
there are, of course, some significant works relating to this study that should be 
introduced. I will start from wardship, which happened in a woman’s younger age, 
move to her role as wife, and conclude with her widowhood. 
      Before a woman was married, she was considered an unmarried daughter. Wardship 
occurred when an inheritance fell on a minor, and a guardian was required in order to 
manage the minor’s inheritance. A male heir stayed in wardship until he reached his 
majority, but an heiress remained in wardship until she married.79 Therefore, wardship 
concerned women considerably.  
      Scott L. Waugh gives an illuminating picture concerning royal wardship in his book, 
The Lordship of England - Royal Wardships and Marriages in English Society and 
Politics 1217-1327, by examining the reciprocal relationship between royal wardships 
and families, especially upper class families. He firstly explains the nature of wardship, 
i.e., when an inheritance fell on a minor, a guardian was needed to manage the 
inheritance. Guardians used royal wardships either to arrange marriages, to reward their 
clients, or to supplement their income by leasing or selling their wardship rights to 
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others. However, as Waugh points out, ‘Politics, law and literature all reveal their 
misgivings about the power of lords over minors and argue that kin should be consulted 
about guardianship and marriage’.80  
      Misgivings about wardship fed into popular culture. For instance, one version of 
the romance of Havelok the Dane tells the story of how an unscrupulous guardian 
disinherited the heir. The romance centres on the inherent tension between an 
aristocratic hope for a smooth inheritance of land, the proper marriage of heirs and the 
fears about the future wellbeing of the minor.81 The law clearly did not favour kin as 
guardians, which is reflected in Henry I’s Coronation Charter, which stated flatly that 
no one, including kin, who claimed an inheritance should be given custody of a minor. 
The idea was also echoed later in Glanvill.82 
      In practice, however, the king did grant some wardships to widows and kin, 
although the practice seems to have gradually declined. According to Waugh’s 
calculation in Rotuli de Dominabus, a document which records the status and estates of 
widows and wards who held land directly from the Crown in the late twelfth century, 
out of 82 grants 76 involved wards, of which widows obtained 13 grants (15.9%), other 
kin received 12 (14.6), strangers received 39 (47.6%) and the Crown successfully held 
custody of 18 (21.9%). After 1217, despite widows representing more than a tenth of 
all the recipients of wardships, their grants constituted only about seven percent of the 
total.83  
      Due to the fear of allowing blood relatives to obtain wardships, wardships were 
only granted to two groups of people. Firstly, the grant could be to the parents of the 
ward’s marriage partner. When the king acquired custody of heirs who had been 
betrothed, but were not married when their parents had died, he usually honoured the 
arrangement and turned the children over to the custody of their potential in-laws to 
complete the marriage. Secondly, though more rarely, wardships of co-heiresses or their 
descendants would be given to the elder co-heiress or her husband. However, such a 
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grant could be problematic for younger co-heiresses, who were often likely to be put 
into nunneries, or failed to receive their share of an inheritance.84  
      Waugh argues that not every guardian was interested in arranging marriage for their 
ward. Some guardians simply sold the wardship to someone with a greater interest in 
marrying the ward. Since wardship was treated as ‘movable property’, guardians also 
sold, leased, bequeathed, or used wardships as collateral for loans. With the rising 
demand for land during the thirteenth century, money could easily be raised by leasing 
lands held in wardship. Since wardships and marriages were much sought after, their 
price could increase remarkably as they changed hands. Waugh concludes that, 
although at first glance a royal grant of wardship and marriage seemed to favour a small, 
politically significant group, royal wardships were essential to build relationships and 
cooperation among landholding families. In essence, those who received grants were 
generally satisfied with the king’s assignment because they were potentially highly 
profitable.85    
       In his essay, ‘A Few Home Truths: The Medieval Mother as Guardian in Romance 
and Law’, Noël James Menuge also discusses guardianship in her investigation into 
two legal treatises – the Très ancien coutumier (1200-1300) and Bracton (mid-
thirteenth century) – and the romances of Beues of Hamtoun (1300) and William of 
Palerne (1351-61).86 In her essay, she explains why contemporary lawyers and the 
authors of romances hated the idea of birth mothers as guardians. The Pipe Rolls, Fine 
Rolls and the Patent Rolls all offer a number of examples of mothers paying to receive 
the body or the lands of the ward from the overlord or other guardian.87 Similarly, the 
Très ancien coutumier declared that a mother was not an appropriate guardian for her 
children once her husband was dead, because of the chance that the mother might 
remarry in widowhood and, under her new husband’s authority, disown the children 
from her first marriage. This text delivers an important message – the mother as 
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guardian is a menace to patriarchy.88 In the romance, Beues of Hamtoun, the mother 
tried to kill her son from the first marriage for the benefits of the son from the second 
marriage.89 
      This sentiment, expressed in romantic fiction, echoes legal treatises. Ironically, 
though, despite the hostility towards women in both legal treatises and romances, the 
mother was often the most proper candidate for de facto guardianship.90 Nevertheless, 
both romances and legal treatises reveal deep patriarchal anxiety. The legal treatise 
silenced a widow, because she was able to speak and the dead father could not. 
Therefore, in order to speak for the dead father, the law spoke for him against the mother. 
However, in reality, the court appears to have been more liberal, and more reasonable, 
by admitting mothers as guardians, and liberating her from the dictatorship of the law.91 
      Once women married, they were liberated from their wardships, becoming wives, 
and all of their property was subjugated to the control of their husbands. Numerous 
articles discuss how married women administered their own properties with limited 
power.  Rowena E. Archer, discusses how women as landholders managed their land 
in “‘How Ladies ...who Live on their Manors Ought to Manage their Households and 
Estates”: Women as Landholders and Administrators in the Later Middle Ages.’ The 
quotation in this title is from Christine de Pisan, a late medieval Italian author who 
wrote two important works on how women should manage their properties during their 
husbands’ absence. De Pisan pointed out that when barons, knights, squires and 
gentlemen travelled to and fought in wars, their wives should be wise and sound 
administrators, managing their affairs well.92 She also implied that women were less 
distracted by political and military concerns, which enabled them to devote more of 
their time than their men to property management. Echoing de Pisan, Archer 
demonstrated how noble-women dealt with property by examining some of their 
situations; she used Elizabeth Talbot, Duchess of Norfolk, Joan de Geneville, Countess 
of March, and Elizabeth Berkeley, Countess of Warwick, as examples.93 All in all, 
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Archer believed that the long absences of their lords gave these wives opportunities to 
establish rapports with their councillors, to preside over meetings and to devote 
themselves more fully to property management.94  
      An article published in 1963 by Michael M. Sheehan titled ‘The Influence of Canon 
Law on the Property Rights of Married Women in England’, sheds some light on how 
women’s property rights were dealt with in canon law, which, as a totally different 
system from common law, played a significant role during the Middle Ages. While 
widows and unmarried women could make valid wills, married women could not. 
According to the common law, married women were forbidden from making a will, 
because their property passed to their husbands. Only when they obtained their 
husbands’ permission could they make a valid will. However, canon law gave the wife 
the power to bequeath, implying that woman had the right to dispose of their property, 
and those who impeded them from doing it would be ipso facto excommunicated. 
However, such protection bestowed by canon law failed to function effectively after the 
fifteenth century, when married women fully lost the ability to dispose of their property 
by will.95 
      Similarly, Richard H. Helmholz also discusses how women lost their ability to make 
wills in ‘Married Women’s Wills in Later Medieval England’.96 He found that although 
married women may once have possessed testamentary capacity, by the fifteenth 
century they had lost it. He concluded that the change may have grown out of the 
evolution of testamentary freedom for married men and the rise of the ‘use’, by which 
women were the beneficiaries of real and personal property, rather than the owners. 
Under a medieval use, a woman only held the beneficial interest in land or chattels, 
therefore she was unlikely to make a will to dispose of the interests.97 
      Regarding women’s social roles, Henerietta Leyser’s Medieval Women: A Social 
History of Women in England 450-1500 explores the different roles women played from 
womb to tomb through a thousand years of English history.98 Starting from the Anglo-
Saxon period up to the fifteenth century, she investigated their lives from various angles, 
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examining archaeology, law, literature, family, work, and spirituality. The book not 
only provides extensive knowledge of what a medieval woman’s life was like for both 
peasants and aristocrats, but it also offers a spectrum of their roles: as daughters, wives, 
mothers, widows and workers.99 
      Equally profound is Wife and Widow in Medieval England, edited by Sue Sheridan 
Walker. This book reconstructs important aspects of what being a woman meant 
between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries. As the title suggests, it focuses on the 
two identities of women – wife and widow – which are related, but opposite, states. 
Firstly, a woman cannot be a wife and a widow at the same time, although she could 
possibly have been widowed and remarried.  Secondly, the term ‘wife’ corresponds to 
the legal description of femme covert, in which her legal existence was ‘covered’ by her 
husband. Thirdly, widows enjoyed an equivalent status to men known as femme sole. 
Hence, while a bereaved woman may have been vulnerable, she had full legal power 
and was thus at her most powerful.100 
      Jennifer C. Ward collects an abundance of primary sources related to noblewomen, 
including charters and letters, and discusses marriage, family, land, lordship and 
household matters in Women of the English Nobility and Gentry 1066-1500.101 She also 
investigates their lives in English Noblewomen in the Later Middle Ages, in which she 
not only shows how noblewomen, especially wives of knights and gentry, managed 
their families and households, but also their involvement in late medieval politics and 
the Church. In particular, she also stresses the unique status of widows in these areas. 
As mentioned earlier, because wives and daughters were regarded as affiliations to men, 
widows were able to be in charge of their lands unless they remarried, which is why, 
Ward argues, many medieval noblewomen chose to remain widows. Whilst, in her book, 
she used wills and letters, Ward reminds us not to take their words as a literal reflection 
of the authors’ thoughts and feelings because they may have been written under duress 
of their husbands. Most significantly, Ward offers a clear picture of how English 
noblewomen from the mid thirteenth to the mid fifteenth centuries administered their 
households during their husbands’ absences, by citing the documents relating to 
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Eleanor de Montfort (c. 1216-1275) and Elizabeth, Countess of Hereford (c. 1282-
1316).102 
      The last group of work I am about to discuss concerns widows. Sue Sheridan 
Walker’s edited collection, Wife and Widow in Medieval England, explores the multi-
faceted lives of widows. For instance, in ‘Fifteenth-Century Widows and Widowhood, 
Bereavement, Reintegration, and Life Choices’, Joel Rosenthal analyses the emotive 
process by which widows, recovering from grief, rebuilt their lives and reintegrated 
themselves into their community, often through remarrying. While manorial and legal 
records often presented the sad tale of the dispossessed and the impoverished, urban 
materials argue more strongly for independence and involvement in civic and economic 
life by widows.103  
      Studies of widows often discuss remarriage because it was an issue that most 
widows faced after the death of a husband. Barbara A. Hanawalt, in her essay 
‘Remarriage as an Option for Urban and Rural Widows in Late Medieval England’, 
asserted that the remarriage of widows undermined patriarchal authority.104 London-
based widows appeared to have different capabilities to what was being proposed in 
common law. For instance, if the couple had no children, the widow was entitled to 
one-half of the estate; however, her position might be more tenuous because dower 
arrangements constituted a contract between the two parties, and the dower might have 
dwindled.105 At the same time, though, the husband might have enriched the initial 
dower with further bequests in his will, because widows in London were often well 
endowed with rents and property. In addition, the widows of London citizens were free 
of the city and could carry on their husbands’ trades, and they could also have 
apprentices and be members of guilds. Whereas, for widows in the countryside, local 
conditions played a significant role in remarriage. For instance, in villages that enjoyed 
better economic conditions, it undercut the marriage market for widows, because men 
had a number of options and did not need dower lands. This appears to have been the 
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case in Northamptonshire in the fourteenth century. In Brigstock, it seems that only one 
out of every thirteen widows married for a second time.106 
      As mentioned above, the remarriage of widows has been widely studied, since 
numerous researchers are working in the field. Two significant scholars, J. Z. Titow 
and Jack R. Ravensdale, have produced different views on the subject. Titow describes 
the marriage pattern in late-thirteenth-century Winchester estates as a ‘marriage fugue’, 
in that a general scarcity of land and, consequently, of food, meant that people had to 
resort to dire straits to survive. On manors that had no vacant land, young men sought 
older widows as marriage partners. They, in turn, would seek younger wives after the 
widow died, and those young wives, in turn, would marry a younger man, and so on. 
During this period of ‘land hunger’ lords encouraged widows to remarry, since they 
would collect money from marriage fines.107 Ravensdale, however, notes that in the 
century following the Black Death, the marriage market for widows collapsed, since 
the population drastically reduced. Furthermore, wages were high, and land was vacant. 
Consequently, a young man who chose to remain on the land might easily inherit either 
his family’s land or that of a relative.108 
      Similarly, Lori A. Gates’ ‘Widows, Property, and Remarriage: Lessons from 
Glastonbury’s Deverill Manors’, contends that villein widows’ remarriages did not 
always occur as a result of land hunger – a theory that had also been put forward by 
Jack Ravensdale – and that remarriage instead involved multiple factors related to an 
individual widow’s situation and to manorial socio-economic structures. She further 
argues that once the assumption of a direct connection between community land 
availability and widow remarriage is abandoned, widows with property could be 
recognised as another separate subject, since certain elements did not directly relate to 
the availability of land for new tenants. For instance, the availability of labour, village 
industries, social hierarchy, dependents in the household, and age at widowhood 
became less indirect, and more primary, influences on widows with property. 109 
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      There were numerous rich dowagers in thirteenth-century England, some of whom 
are discussed by Linda E. Mitchell in Portraits of Medieval Women: Family, Marriage, 
and Politics in England 1225-1330. This book is another significant work that discusses 
the participation in family affairs and politics of some medieval noblewomen, such as 
Margaret de Quency (1206-1266) and her daughter Maud de Lacy (1223-1289) by 
exploring their interactions with family, marriage and community. 110  Using their 
biographies, Mitchell reveals insights into their relationships with co-heiresses, mothers, 
daughters, widows and heirs. She also highlights the widowhoods of several other 
prominent noble women during the period, which provide fascinating examples of how 
they ran their households and also managed their own properties. As the title suggests, 
Mitchell also explores the relationships between certain noble widows and their 
profound influence on politics.111   
      This thesis, although it focuses only on women’s property rights in thirteenth-
century England, is built on a wider background of social, political and economic 
development drawn from the works listed above, and would not have been 
accomplished without using these works’ knowledge. Wardship, as Waugh and 
Menuge point out, posed a threat to heiresses because their guardians could profit from 
selling the wardships or easily disinherit them. Numerous cases, which I will discuss in 
chapter 3, show that heiresses accused their guardians of disinheriting them by putting 
them into nunneries.   
      Although this thesis does not touch on women’s ability to make wills because it 
focuses on estates, and women’s wills more often dealt with chattels and movable goods, 
Sheehan and Helmholz’s works both provide a window on how women gradually lost 
their right to make wills, and reflect women’s difficulties in disposing their own goods. 
Similarly, the issue of remarriage is left out by this thesis, but it is also significant to 
not only social but also economic history. Gates, Ravensdale and Titow all try to 
provide a rationale for widows’ remarriages, and therefore build a model to explain the 
remarriage pattern. This thesis, however, will touch on only a small part of the aftermath 
of remarriage, i.e., how remarriage affected the relationship between a widow and an 
heir.  
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      There are two works in particular to which this thesis is indebted: Ward’s Women 
of the English Nobility and Gentry 1066-1500 and Mitchell’s Portraits of Medieval 
Women. The former is a compilation of abundant primary sources related to women’s 
property, such as personal charters concerning the grant of maritagium or the division 
of inheritance between noble co-heiresses, and these primary sources are frequently 
consulted in this thesis.112 Mitchell’s Portraits of Medieval Women sheds some light on 
numerous famous thirteen-century dowagers and heiresses, to which I refer often, 
especially with regards to the frustrating relationship between Maud de Braose and her 
son Roger, and the proceeding of dower litigation between them.113  
      As mentioned, this thesis focuses on a rather narrow topic, and could not possibly 
cover all aspects of medieval women’s property rights. However, with the knowledge 
of the mentioned works, women’s experiences as daughters, wives and widows can be 
well illustrated in social, economic and legal history.  
       
2.1.2 Historiography of common law 
      In order to analyse and examine women’s experiences in court, we cannot ignore 
works on the common law in medieval England, since this study has been dependent 
on both its development and legal mechanisms. Written by Frederick Pollock and 
Frederic. W. Maitland, The History of English Law before the Times of Edward I was 
published in 1898, but it is still regarded as the authority on common law history.114 
The two authors not only describe how the common law developed from Anglo-Saxon 
to Anglo-Norman times, but they also fuelled later debates.115 With regards to this study, 
their text is important as it covers the classification of people, tenures of land, 
jurisdictions of local and royal courts, criminal and private law and legal procedures. 
In spite of later criticisms from historians, it is still regarded as the historical corner- 
stone of the English legal system.  
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      Maitland and Pollock, and several other extraordinary legal historians, have all 
researched the English common law system. These include: The Governance of 
Mediaeval England from the Conquest to Magna Carta, by H. G. Richardson;116  The 
Historical Foundation of the Common Law, by S. F. C. Milsom,117  The Making of 
English Law: King Alfred to the Twelfth Century, vol. 1. Legislation and its Limits, by 
Patrick Wormald, 118  and Law, Marriage and Society in the Later Middle Ages: 
Arguments about Marriages in Five Courts, by Charles Donahue.119 All these authors 
have contributed to a comprehensive picture of the legal system in the twelfth century 
and later Middle Ages. Alongside the mentioned works, there are more significant 
works that add to our understanding of English legal history. Unfortunately, I have been 
unable to include all these scholars’ works in this thesis; therefore, I will mention briefly 
the books and essays that are relevant to this research.  
      In The Formation of English Common Law, John Hudson examines the emergence 
of common law. Some elements came from Anglo-Saxon England, some were brought 
by the Conquest in 1066, and some were the result of the interaction between the king 
and his subjects. A wide variety of subjects are discussed in this book, including the 
court framework, as well as people’s status and how the law related to them. It also 
includes work on criminal law, landholding, the forest, urban and ecclesiastical law, 
and even legal learning.120 In The Oxford History of the Laws of England Volume II 
871-1216, Hudson further paints a comprehensive picture of the development of the 
common law, spanning three centuries from the late Anglo-Saxon period to the end of 
King’s John’s reign. Divided into three parts – namely England in the late Anglo-Saxon 
period, Anglo-Norman and Angevin – Hudson not only discusses how common law 
evolved but also illustrates the economy, the classification of people, different tenures, 
and their relationship with law. This book also contains basic knowledge of how 
different courts practised, various different procedures for launching litigation and 
some particular statutes regarding certain groups of people, such as the clergy and the 
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Jews.121 Both The Oxford History of the Laws of England Volume II 871-1216 and The 
Formation of English Common Law make important contributions to legal history by 
illustrating the common law’s evolution and providing deeper knowledge of legal and 
social subjects, which this thesis unpacks. 
      As explained earlier, the thirteenth century was notable for many reasons, but 
mainly for its leap forward in the common law system122 by way of the increasing 
power of the central royal courts, which were of considerable importance, not only in 
terms of governance, but also for their effect on people’s lives. But how did these royal 
courts develop and function exactly?  
      Paul Brand’s The Making of the Common Law provides a clear picture of the origins 
of the English common law and especially its development during the thirteenth century. 
In his book, Brand credits Henry II for forging the common law from its primitive state 
to a more sophisticated legal system, mainly consisting of national royal courts.123 More 
importantly, he argues that the new royal courts were more distinguishable from the 
existing courts than most scholars believed. His theory is that the king created these 
courts deliberately to consolidate the scattered local courts to form a single royal court 
and to bring as much litigation as possible under his jurisdiction. Brand points out 
several major changes in Henry II’s time. Firstly, court sessions were now held 
regularly as part of a countrywide visitation of judges, as opposed to the irregular and 
unplanned sessions that took place under Henry I. Secondly, presiding judges were 
appointed by the king to make judgments, while the officials who ran the general eyre 
during the reign of Henry I only presided over the courts and did not make judgments. 
Brand argued strongly that Henry II had a huge impact on the English common law, 
contrary to some scholars’ views,124 not least because full litigation records were kept, 
but also because the courts could only hear litigation specifically authorised by the 
king.125 Thus, a process of integrating pre-existing local courts into a new nationwide 
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legal system commenced. Brand believes that had it not been for Henry II initiating 
these deliberate changes, a national common law would not have emerged.126  
      The origins of the Common Bench, the most significant royal court for civil 
litigation hearings, give the impression of it being a muddled legal system – possibly 
due to the different theories propounded by a variety of scholars who often disagreed 
with each other. The nineteenth-century historian William Stubbs (1825-1901) had 
posited that the Common Bench originated in 1178 when Henry II appointed three 
laymen and two clerks from his household to hear and report complaints from the 
country. However, this view was debunked by Maitland, who argued that the judges, 
who used to travel with the king, failed to create a permanent court system and it was 
only during the absence of Henry II and Richard I that the tribunal became settled at 
Westminster. Maitland’s view did not go unchallenged, though. For instance, Sayles 
and Richardson were convinced that the Common Bench grew as a branch of the 
Exchequer, after a growing number of litigation matters heard by it meant a distinction 
was required to be created between its financial and judicial work.127  
      Despite this confused beginning, more recent views offer a much clearer 
explanation of the origins of the Common Bench. For instance, Paul Brand and Ralph 
V. Turner both agree that it grew from the Exchequer. Turner, who researches the 
personnel of both the Exchequer and the Bench, concluded that the Common Bench 
grew from the Exchequer in the late 1190s, and that two different aspects had resulted 
from the process – specialization and professionalization.128 Brand, who concurs with 
this view, points out that during the reign of Henry I, the Exchequer might have heard 
ordinary litigation, although not regularly. Only after 1179 was it ascertained that 
ordinary litigation cases were no longer heard at the Exchequer but in the new royal 
court, i.e., the Common Bench.129  
      In terms of legal mechanisms, an early article by S. J. Bailey in 1944, describes the 
use of warranty in thirteenth-century England. A warranty of land makes a person liable 
                                                
126 In addition to this chapter, the book also contains other essays concerning the legal system in medieval 
England, including the development of English legal professions and the legal mechanisms such as 
distraint and formedon. Brand also discusses the Irish common law, as it was affected profoundly under 
English common law. Brand, The Making of the Common Law, 77-102.   
127	Ralph V. Turner, ‘The Origins of Common Pleas and King’s Bench,’ The American Journal of Legal 
History, 21.3 (1977), 238-241.	
128 Ibid., 254. 
129 Also, by the mid-1160s ordinary litigation was heard in a royal court at Westminster. Brand, The 
Making of the Common Law, 77-102.  
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for the defence of his or her tenants’ land against all men. Warranty could be seen 
frequently in land litigation, including dower;130 therefore it is necessary to understand 
how warranty operated in court.  
      The law of warranty profoundly influenced English land law. Bailey traced the 
bounds of the law of warranty and how it was applied in thirteenth-century land 
litigation. Starting with the clauses and language often used in warranty, either explicit 
or implicit, and moving on to the operation and the scope of a warranty, the author uses 
several pages to discuss escambium (exchange). Escambium meant that when a 
warrantor failed in his defence of his tenant, he should provide another piece of land, 
which was of the same value as the land lost. However, as Bailey suggests, the scope 
of the obligation to warranty was not as wide as might be supposed. For instance, the 
land for escambium was only obtainable from the warrantor’s land; moreover, in the 
case of an heir warranting his ancestor, only the land that descended to the heir could 
be made available for escambium. Bailey also points out that the law of warranty 
frequently became a strong weapon for litigants who wished to delay the litigation 
process for as long as possible, especially when unscrupulous lawyers combined this 
tactic with procedural rules such as essoins131 and defaults in order to hold up the 
process.132  
      While some scholars have been making efforts to study the history of common law, 
others concentrate on marriage – with which most canon law concerned – in England. 
Charles Donahue studied marriage litigation in the Archiepiscopal court of York (1300-
1500), and the episcopal courts of Ely (1374-1381), Paris (1384-1387), Cambrai (1438-
1453) and Brussels (1448-1459). Although all five episcopal courts were applying the 
canon law of marriage, there were, in point of fact, substantial differences both in the 
types of cases the courts heard and the results they recorded, due to the differences in 
local customs and legal practices. Donahue found that couples in England had more 
freedom to make their own matches than their counterparts on the Continent. For 
instance, daughters in England were prone to marry men according to their own fancy 
without consulting their parents, while in France, young women always had a choice of 
                                                
130  Bailey even points out that the warranty of dower was the most frequent form of warranty in 
thirteenth-century England. See S. J Bailey, ‘Warranties of Lands in the Thirteenth Century,’ The 
Cambridge Law Journal, 8.3 (1944), 274-299. 
131 Essoin is an excuse for non-appearance in court in medieval English law.  
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remaining celibate. 133  Donahue also argued that when it came to marriage law, 
women’s voices did get heard. Canon law gave women equality with men, and they 
were aware of this fact. In the fourteenth century, the courts of York and Ely both show 
a high proportion of female plaintiffs, which was regarded as sufficient evidence of 
female agency by Donahue.134  
      Two other works touching on medieval marriage are Frederik Pedersen’s Marriage 
Disputes in Medieval England and Conor McCarthy’s Marriage in Medieval England: 
Law, Literature and Practice.135 The former illustrates a variety of marriage disputes, 
including the validity of marriage, marital violence, the question of consent, sexual 
relations within marriage, and property issues. 136  Likewise, the latter’s discussion 
hinges upon marriage. McCarthy discusses how marriage was represented in medieval 
English legal and literary texts.137  
      Although marriage and canon law concern this thesis peripherally, admittedly the 
three property rights discussed here were interwoven with marriage. It was marriage 
that brought husbands’ interests to the lords and posed a potential threat to the heiresses’ 
inheritance; it was marriage that made women lose control of their own property; it was 
marriage, a valid one, that bestowed on a woman her dower right. Medieval women’s 
property rights are remarkably related to marriage, and remarriage. As mentioned, the 
emphasis of this thesis will be put on women’s experiences of pursuing their property 
rights in court, and will only touch on the validity of marriage when discussing the 
dower right in chapter 5. Nonetheless, the works addressed above all provide a clear 
illustration of medieval marriage in England.  
      The above works inform our understanding of the evolution of the common law and 
the operation of the courts. In particular, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, 
Volume II 871-1216 provides details of the proceeding of land pleas, the jurisdictions 
of different courts, and the relationship between them, for instance how litigation 
transferred between these courts.138 Brand and Turner put much more emphasis on the 
                                                
133 Donahue, Law, Marriage, and Society in the Later Middle Ages, 636.	
134 Ibid., 638. Agency is an individual’s capacity to act on his or her own free will. In contrast, structure 
refers to the influences which determine or limit an individual’s free will. 
135	Frederik Pedersen, Marriage Disputes in Medieval England (London: Hambledon, 2000); McCarthy, 
Marriage in Medieval England. 	
136	Pedersen, Marriage Disputes in Medieval England.	
137 McCarthy, Marriage in Medieval England.	
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development of the Common Bench and the King’s Bench, articulating how these two 
significant royal courts evolved and their important impact on common law. All in all, 
these works provide a basic understanding of the court frameworks, which enables this 
thesis to paint a clear picture when discussing women bringing their suits in court in 
practice.   
      The works listed above are only a very few of the brilliant studies of medieval 
women and the common law, and doubtlessly, there will be more extraordinary works 
from scholars. This literature review presents a non-exhaustive overview of the many 
scholars both past and present who have contributed to the field, and I am indebted to 
their research. From my analysis of the available literature it seems that there is a dearth 
of work comparing dos, maritagium, and hereditas in the context of medieval English 
women. Likewise, there is very little examining these three components of common 
law, together with a woman’s individual experiences in courts.  
 
2.2 Primary sources  
      Different kinds of primary sources have been investigated in this study, including 
legal treatises, statutes, legal records, private documents, and administrative records, 
which I will introduce in groups, as follows.  
 
2.2.1 Legal treatises      
      Two basic, but towering, legal treatises existed in thirteenth-century England, 
namely Glanvill’s Tractatus de Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni Anglie, commonly 
known as Glanvill (The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England), 
and Bracton’s De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (On the Laws and Customs of 
England).139 These two important sources for the common law, written in the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries, influenced the establishment of the customs of England. As 
the chief justiciar of England during the reign of Henry II, Ranulf de Glanvill was 
believed to be the author of the above-mentioned Tractatus, which clarified legal 
process by introducing writs and restating the common customs of England. Glanvill, 
which was the first detailed exposition of English common law, is considered to be the 
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‘book of authority’.140 Glanvill’s influence is clearly visible in Bracton as it widely 
cited Glanvill. Carrying on from Glanvill to become one of the most ambitious legal 
works in the country, it provided case studies of common law in the king’s courts by 
focusing on property and criminal law.141 Hence, its detailed illustration of cases helps 
historians to paint a vivid portrait of how people worked alongside the laws.  
      We will also consult the notable contemporary legal text, Britton. Written in ‘law 
French’, this book was completed during Edward I’s reign, under his command. The 
authorship is uncertain, but as Simon E. Baldwin suggests in the ‘Introduction’ to 
Britton: An English Translation with Notes, the author might have been one of the 
justices of an inquisitorial tribunal instituted by Edward I.142 Similar to other legal 
treatises, Britton illustrated how the different courts worked, people’s status and their 
property, and remedies for wrongdoings.  Regarding women’s property rights, Britton 
explained the procedure of dower, and discussed the inheritance and actions by heirs 
and coparceners. Britton also featured its endeavour to support royal prerogatives.143 
Moreover, it was the first law book written in a language commonly understood by 
people who took part in court proceedings.144 
 
2.2.2 Statutes and charters      
      In combination with Glanvill and Bracton, other books of authority on the common 
law, and several prominent statutes, will be examined. These include the Coronation 
Charter of Henry I (c. 1100), the 1225 Magna Carta,145 the Statute of Merton of 1236, 
the Statute of Westminster I of 1275, the Statute of Gloucester of 1278 and the Statute 
of Westminster II of 1285. These will act as watersheds in this study in order to show 
how they affected women’s property rights. The Coronation Charter of Henry I will be 
given particular prominence in that it signified a new era in governance. Not only is it 
the first surviving English coronation charter, but it also stipulated widows’ property 
                                                
140 Sarah Tullis, ‘Glanvill after Glanvill: tThe Afterlife of a Medieval Legal Treatise,’ in Laws, Lawyers 
and Texts: Studies in Medieval Legal History in Honour of Paul Brand, ed. Susanne Jenks, Jonathan 
Rose and Christopher Whittick (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 327-360. 
141 Like Ranulf de Glanvill, Henry de Bracton was regarded as a supervisor or a reviser of the work rather 
than a sole author, according to recent argument.  
142 Britton, ed. and trans. Nichols, Francis Morgan (Washington, D. C.: J. Byrne Co., 1901), Ix.   
143 Ibid., xiv-xv  
144 Ibid,, xix.  
145 The translation of Magna Carta and extensive discussion of the interplay between Magna Carta and 
medieval England can be observed in David Carpenter’s Magna Carta.  
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rights and their freedom to remarry.146 Furthermore, it was regarded as a predecessor 
of Magna Carta because it restricted the rights of the monarch.147 The issue of any 
statutes and charters from the Coronation Charter of Henry I to the Statue of 
Westminster II should be viewed in their political and social context.  
      The above provisions and statutes are of great significance because they dictated 
the development of women’s property rights, even though women were not the only 
group these laws concerned. Although this legislation originally concerned the interests 
of the crown and noblemen, it was applied to all women in general and was not only 
limited to noblewomen.  
 
2.2.2.1 The circulation and learning of statutes and legal treatises 
      A question arises here of how these statutes circulated and, more importantly, how 
people learnt the contents of the statutes in order to follow them. The engrossments of 
the 1217 Magna Carta, for instance, started to be sent to sheriffs in 1218, who were 
ordered to read them in their county courts. After that, an order to read the 1217 Magna 
Carta was made in 1225, 1255, and 1265. In 1297, the 1225 Magna Carta was sent to 
every cathedral, with the instruction that it be read in front of the people twice a year. 
By 1300, the sheriffs were made to read the Charter four times a year before the people 
in county courts.148 Apparently, the proclamations were thought to raise awareness of 
the charters’ contents. However, Carpenter doubts that the Charter’s complex details 
could have really been understood by people. He posits that some might have listened 
with full attention, but some might just as easily have gone to the ale house. He further 
points out that in order to get the details across, the actual texts became crucial. When 
Carpenter mentions that the engrossments and confirmations of different versions of 
the Charter were available in cathedrals, he implies that the populace had sufficient 
literacy to read the copies placed on public display.149 However, the majority of people 
in England were illiterate, rendering the altogether altruistic service somewhat 
redundant. It therefore fell to the clergy to teach people about the contents of the Charter.  
                                                
146 The details of the Coronation Charter of Henry I will be examined in chapter 5.  
147 Henry B. Tunis, ‘The Coronation Charter of 1100: A Postponement of Decision: What Did Not 
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      The efforts the Church made in order to publicise the Charter are thoroughly 
discussed by Felicity G. Hill in ‘Magna Carta, Canon Law and Pastoral Care: 
Excommunication and the Church’s Publication of the Charter’.150 Hill points out that 
the Church not only read the Charter aloud frequently, in the vernacular, in parish 
churches throughout England, but also decreed the automatic sentence of 
excommunication for anyone who infringed its laws and rules. Every Christian in 
England had to know not only the principles of the Charter but also the details of every 
clause.151 Hill stresses that the Church’s efforts to disseminate the Charter were not 
only because it secured the liberties and many crucial rights of the church, but also 
because the excommunication endangered one’s soul, so it was the clergy’s duty to see 
that their parishioners did not incur automatic excommunication. To be 
excommunicated for disobeying Magna Carta implied that Magna Carta was not just a 
political concern but a crucial part of parish life. Since the Bible says that priests should 
care for their flocks, the clergy would have interpreted this as taking good care of their 
parishioners, including preventing them from infringing Magna Carta 152  The 
publication of Magna Carta by the Church, and its teaching of it to parishioners, enabled 
peasants and those from lower classes in society to learn the Charter, and brought 
awareness of the Charter to all levels of the society.153 The threat of excommunication, 
and the dissemination of the Charter by the Church, should be viewed as part and parcel 
of thirteenth-century pastoral care.154  
      It made good practical sense for the government to make the Charter as widely 
available as possible. The more people who knew about it, the easier it would be to 
implement on a widespread legal, social and cultural level. Legal treatises, however, 
had a quite different fate for they were mostly only read and learned by people of the 
legal profession. For instance, there are only thirty-eight copies of the manuscript of 
Glanvill known to exist; most of them were made before the fourteenth century, and 
the last updated version dates from the early fourteenth century. Glanvill was first 
printed in 1554 and, surprisingly, was still being cited in court as late as 1992.155 Sarah 
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Tullis examines in ‘Glanvill After Glanvill: The Afterlife of a Medieval Legal Treatise’ 
how and why Glanvill was used after the thirteenth century. Looking at the later uses 
of Glanvill in early modern England and Colonial America she points out that whilst 
the first printing of the treatise was out of an interest among antiquiarian book dealers, 
it did have the bizarre effect of making the treatise increasingly read and cited by 
lawyers.156 
      Tullis argued that both legal and political uses of Glanvill in sixteenth and seventh-
century England were anachronistic because it was utilising archaic laws in a 
contemporary political context.157 Glanvill was not the only legal treatise that was 
removed from its rightful historicity. Bracton suffered the same fate and was cited more 
often than Glanvill.158 The first move to return Glanvill to its rightful historical context 
was taken up by Stuart historians, such as John Selden, who argued that it had no place 
in legal arguments and as such should constitute a historical context in its own right. In 
conclusion, Tullis believes that the various uses of Glanvill in law, politics and history 
evidence a rich afterlife for the text, with its status ranging from simple ornament to 
political weapon and then to the framework of historical understanding.159       
       Both legal treatises and statutes dictate what laws should be like; however, they do 
not reflect the practice of law as accurately as court records do. Medieval English legal 
documents are surprisingly well preserved, and they provide the historians with ample 
sources to explore what sorts of lives people lived. As mentioned earlier, the thirteenth 
century is significant in legal history because of the birth of the common law, and 
because the courts became more sophisticated in order to accord with the new form of 
government. Therefore, by their very preservation, the written records of the courts in 
the thirteenth century give us a glimpse into the dynamics of society, in particular for 
women. These can be seen in three very different types of court records: the 
ecclesiastical, the manorial and the royal.  
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2.2.3 Court records 
      The court records examined in this thesis are those from the king’s court, that is, 
the records from ecclesiastical courts are excluded. However, it should be borne in mind 
that the church courts were, in effect, as important as secular law courts because they 
had jurisdiction over all Christians in England, which was almost everyone except for 
those sentenced to excommunication. Church courts dealt with issues relating to 
religious matters, including marriage, divorce and adultery, which impinged 
considerably on women’s property rights.160 For example, the Canterbury Synod of 
1213-1214 forbade clandestine marriage and ordered a public form for marriage.161 If 
a woman’s marriage was adjudged void or illegitimate by a church court, then she 
would not be admitted to her dower share in common law.162 
      Secular law courts consisted of the king’s courts, county courts, hundred courts, the 
sheriffs’ tourns and lords’ courts.163 However, not all people had access to the same 
courts; for instance, villeins were not allowed to bring land pleas to the king’s courts, 
as we shall see in the detailed discussion in chapter 5 of this thesis, nor could they act 
as jurors. 164  Manorial court records, which are rich in local customs, focused on 
relationships between villeins and lords and concerned issues such as payment of rents 
and the performance of services owed. Although women appeared frequently in 
manorial court records, they do not reveal much about them. Only two areas of manorial 
records concerned women: marriage and inheritance. When a villein was planning to 
                                                
160 A consistent theory of what made a marriage did not emerge until the twelfth century, when the 
Church turned marriage from a civic contract to a sacrament. The basis of marriage is the consent of the 
couple, and the marriage should be celebrated in church, although clandestine marriage was still 
legitimate. This theory of marriage was finally accepted into the law of the Church by Pope Alexander 
III (c. 1159-81). Leyser, Medieval Women, 106-107. A few important synodal statues concerning 
marriage in the thirteenth century are as follows: (i) 1 Canterbury 55 (1213 X 1214): ordering that the 
betrothal should be held in public, in front of witnesses who could give their testimony if the betrothal 
was questioned. Councils and Synods with Other Documents Relating to the English Church, vol. 2, ed. 
F. M. Powicke and C. R. Cheney (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), I, 34-35; (ii) 1 Salisbury 83 
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present tense. Ibid., 87-88; (iv) 2 Salisbury 23 (1238 X 1244): ordering the church priest to interrogate 
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Salisbury 23 (1238 X 1244): accepting clandestine marriages if they were tolerated with permission. 
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marry off his daughter, he had to pay a certain amount of money, known as merchet, to 
his lord.165 However, manorial court records were kept as simple as possible, thus the 
insights into women at that level of society are rather thin. Their illuminating reports 
mostly concerned mens’ activities.166  
      On the other hand, with their jurisdiction over almost the whole of England, the 
royal court records were comparatively well documented, hence they offer much more 
detail about the women appearing before them. By combining all three forms of court 
records, it is possible to gain a comprehensive picture covering every social class. 
However, as Ruth Kittle suggests, these records are too weighty for them to be 
deciphered within a single scholar’s lifetime.167 Therefore, this study will only focus 
on women attending the royal courts with regards to their property rights, hence both 
ecclesiastical and manorial court records will not be considered.  
      Different court records relating to women’s property rights will be investigated in 
this study. This will comprise primarily the following court records: the Curia Regis 
Rolls, Plea Rolls (CP 40s), Feet of Fines, and The Year Books. Among these records, 
CP 40s are the only ones that have not been published, but they exist in manuscript 
form and will be referred to later in this chapter. Before introducing the various court 
records, and explaining their purpose and why they are so significant to this study, it is 
necessary to briefly to discuss the development of the common law.  
 
2.2.3.1 The development of the royal courts 
Medieval English courts, consisting of itinerant justices, the Exchequer, the 
Common Bench and the King’s Bench, can be dated back to the curia regis, having 
been introduced by Norman kings. Although the curia regis was the highest judicial 
institution in the kingdom, it was anything but professional because it was not 
uncommon for the king’s household officers to act as judges. Likewise, there was no 
sign to indicate that it convened on a regular basis. Under Henry I, however, its 
members were sent on circuits to hear cases in the counties, while, at the same time, its 
officers were involved in other governmental tasks. Sessions were still not held 
regularly and neither do they appear to have been planned. The pivotal moment came 
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in 1176 under Henry II when countrywide judicial visitations were made by itinerant 
justices. To enable this, the king divided the country into six circuits, each to be visited 
regularly by a group consisting of three justices.168  
After 1176, the general eyre (circuit) became a regular part of the English legal 
system. However, ‘general eyre’ is considered a modern term, coined by William C. 
Bolland. Contemporaries at the Chancery described these visiting sessions as ‘eyre of 
the justice for the common pleas’ or ‘for all pleas’. The reason to use the term ‘general 
eyre’ is to distinguish itinerant justices from those with more limited power, including 
to hear special civil or crown pleas, to conduct fiscal enquiries, or to hold forest eyres.169  
The justices sent by the king were instructed to make judgments in cases instead 
of simply presiding over them, thereby taking control of law on behalf of the king.  Thus 
sessions of the general eyre were regarded as sessions of the king’s court. This departure 
was highly significant as it became central to the development of the common law – 
the immediate consequences of which were: (i) that judgments of the general eyre no 
longer depended on local customs, but followed more universal principles established 
by the king’s justices; and (ii) the common law was applied uniformly in all different 
counties.170  
      With the application of a more consistent and nationwide set of laws, the number 
of cases heard in the king’s court increased and the formerly inchoate institution 
changed into a more professional one. Notably, it was now referred to as the Common 
Bench. As mentioned previously, recent scholarship believes that the Common Bench 
emerged out of the Exchequer.171 Paul Brand states that during the reign of Henry I the 
Exchequer did not hear ordinary litigation regularly, and there is some evidence to 
suggest that, by the late 1170s, ordinary civil litigation cases were heard at Westminster. 
Some doubt remains, therefore, regarding who was hearing civil litigation. 
Undoubtedly, by 1190, a royal court was sitting at Westminster hearing litigation, so 
might this have been the Exchequer? Paul Brand’s view is that the Exchequer might 
have been hearing common pleas by the mid-1160s, but this can be refuted by surviving 
final concords from the 1170s that reveal that civil pleas were being heard regularly at 
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171 Turner, ‘The Origins of Common Bench and King’s Bench,’ 238-254.  
		
	
50	
Westminster in the king’s court, which was referred to as ‘the king’s court at 
Westminster’. 172  After 1179, however, most final concords do not refer to the 
Exchequer (ad Scaccarium), and from this point onwards, the continuous sessions of 
the Common Bench (the king’s court) allowed it to steadily develop a judicial function. 
Most importantly, the courts had already begun to keep written records of cases, which 
enabled them to function efficiently, and at the same time leave an abundance of 
primary sources for historians to understand how the common law developed.173 
      Another prominent development emanated from the king’s court – the King’s 
Bench. Although it was officially named by Henry III (c. 1207-1272), it was originally 
developed during the earlier monarchy of King John (c. 1166-1216).174 During his reign, 
King John had created his own court and had supervised any business he was interested 
in by removing particular cases from the Common Bench to be heard in his court, an 
action that led to Chapter 17 in the 1215 Magna Carta – ‘Common pleas shall not follow 
our court, but shall be held in some fixed place’.175  
      When Henry III ascended the throne, the King’s Bench was not as powerful or 
established as the Common Bench, mainly hearing only trivial and miscellaneous cases 
because, in its early stage, it only functioned between terms set by the Common Bench, 
or when it had adjourned for an eyre. However, by 1236, the King’s Bench showed 
signs of strengthening, due both to its correcting of procedural mistakes made by the 
Common Bench and by its taking cases awaiting hearing by the Common Bench or 
assize commissioners.176  
A frequently asked question regarding the two royal courts, is that of what 
distinguishes the Common Bench and the King’s Bench. Most scholars agree that there 
was no noticeable difference between them. For instance, G. O. Sayles was of the view 
that a case would be heard at the King’s Bench if it lay within the king’s interests; while 
Alan Harding states that if it related to property rights and needed formal, unhurried 
procedure, a case would be directed to the Common Bench.177 Litigants could always 
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pay fines in order to have their cases transferred to the King’s Bench.178 Maybe the best 
clarification of the relationship between the Common Bench and the King’s Bench, 
prior to 1323, when all criminal cases were confirmed to be channelled to the King’s 
Bench, is that suggested by G. O. Sayles: ‘inasmuch as private parties might decide to 
settle disagreements in the King’s Bench, it was a court of common pleas as much as 
the Common Bench.’179  
      The twenty published volumes of Curia Regis Rolls – a series of English 
government documents dating from 1196 to 1250 – include the cases of both the King’s 
Bench and the Common Bench.180 Not only do these volumes illustrate the lives of 
many individual litigants, but they contain numerous cases that relate to women’s 
property. However, it should be noted that any litigation recorded in the Curia Regis 
Rolls was heard in the king’s courts. Consequently, the volumes do not cover 
everyone’s experiences, since, as was mentioned in the Introduction, villeins were not 
entitled to hearings in the king’s courts, so they had to turn to their lords’ court for 
litigation. There were some exceptions to this rule, however, since some villeins did 
actually appear in the king’s courts. For instance, if a villein held free land, he was 
regarded as a ‘free’ man. However, if a free man held a villein tenure, he would be 
considered to be a villein, hence he was not allowed access to the king’s courts.181  
      Alongside the Curia Regis Rolls, the Year Books, written in Latin or Anglo-Norman, 
recorded any pleas set before the Common Bench. Importantly, these contained details 
of the litigants’ arguments and assertions. Because Curia Regis Rolls mainly only 
contained the litigants’ names, the objects of dispute and the arguments of both parties 
were not always recorded; whereas the Year Books are rich in detail, even including 
the arguments of the legal practitioners and the judges’ verdicts. They also contain 
anonymous notes about the proceedings, which show how legal doctrines and concepts 
of common law developed over the period. Another major difference between Curia 
                                                
178 Turner, ‘The Origins of Common Bench and King’s Bench’, 238-254. 
179 Selected Cases in the Court of King’s Bench under Edward II, ed. George O. Sayles, vol. 4 (London: 
Selden Society, 1957), xxxii-xxxiii. See also Turner, ‘The Origins of Common Bench and King’s Bench,’ 
238-254. 
180 But cases brought before 1250 that did not close until 1272 are recorded as well. The earliest surviving 
Plea Rolls from one of the king’s courts dates to 1194, but it is highly possible that from 1176 the justices 
started keeping full Plea Rolls record. See Brand, Making of the Common Law, 87-93. 
181 Villein tenure means that villeins held land through service to their lords. It could be held by free men, 
but the danger was that they would be regarded as villeins. In contrast, if a villein held free land he could 
be regarded as a free man. 
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Regis Rolls and the Year Books is that the latter recorded the names of the serjeants,182 
the judges, and legal practitioners, which gives us a clearer picture of the development 
of the legal professions.       
      Common Pleas Rolls, unlike Curia Regis Rolls and the Year Books, are in 
manuscript form and written in highly abbreviated Latin. The publication of Curia 
Regis Rolls stopped in 1250 when the Common Pleas rolls took over, covering the years 
from 1273 to 1874. They have never been published and are preserved in The National 
Archives at Kew, London. Catalogued as ‘CP 40’, each roll covers one of four legal 
terms in the year – Michaelmas, Hilary, Easter and Trinity. Each term consisted of 
between 5,000 to 10,000 cases. Cases heard in the Common Bench were launched by 
an original writ from Chancery, and observed four main categories of jurisdiction: (i) 
‘real actions’ to assert a title to land; (ii) ‘personal actions’ including actions of account, 
covenant and debt over 40s; (iii) mixed real and personal actions, such as ejectio firmae 
(the ejection from lands held for a term of years); and (iv) cases shared with the King's 
Bench, including actions brought on breach of royal statute and trespass, or together 
with other ordinary cases in which either the king had a special interest, or the litigants 
had paid the fines to have them heard by the King’s Bench.183 
      The entries in the Common Pleas Rolls contain the names of plaintiffs and 
defendants, the details of the conflicts, the places where the disputes occurred, the 
litigants’ arguments and the judgments. The rolls show that most cases were likely to 
be adjourned to a later date as they were unlikely to be resolved in one day, and 
sometimes cases were extended for much longer, occasionally several years.184 Like the 
Curia Regis Rolls, the Common Pleas Rolls were written in Latin; however, the Curia 
Regis Rolls are published versions of the original rolls, so not only are they well 
transcribed, they also contain the notes written by the editors. In contrast, CP 40 are 
records of legal cases that were written up on parchment rolls. Each roll is made up of 
a large number of individual rotuli or rolls, and single sheets of parchment are used on 
both sides and filed together at the top in order to make up the whole unit.185 They are 
                                                
182 A member of a superior group of barristers, from whom the judges of the common law were chosen. 
The position was abolished in 1880. See ‘OED,’ accessed on 14 July 2018, http://0-
www.oed.com.catalogue.libraries.london.ac.uk/view/Entry/176417?redirectedFrom=serjeant#eid 
183 ‘BHO,’ last accessed on 3 April 2018, https://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/common-
pleas/1399-1500/introducing-common-pleas 
184  ‘BHO,’ last accessed on 28 March 2018, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/common-
pleas/1399-1500/introducing-common-pleas 
185 ‘TNA,’ last accessed on 3 April 2018, https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C5417	
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also untranslated manuscripts, written in highly abbreviated Latin, and they do not have 
indexes.  
      These deficiencies make it difficult to follow cases from beginning to end. Also, 
litigants often settled disputes out of the courts, hence the rolls are littered with sudden 
disappearances from the official record. The entries do not include what was actually 
said, word for word, by the litigants and serjeants, but many of them do contain 
important arguments and information, which offer insights into how people used legal 
mechanisms in order to establish their rights. More interestingly, a large proportion of 
the rolls show plaintiffs trying to ensure appearances over numerous entries, from 
summoning warrantors to defaults and essoins.186 Despite the difficulties of consulting 
the CP 40s, they have served as a principle source in this study, because they not only 
record individuals’ experiences but they also show the process of litigation. Most cases 
proceeded slowly, and some were even maddeningly slow, which doubtlessly affected 
both the plaintiffs’ and the defendants’ strategies. 
 The digitisation of CP 40s has revolutionised access to the rolls for researchers. 
Publicly accessible from the Anglo American Legal Tradition (AALT) website, they 
have opened up the vast majority of medieval English court records to researchers and 
the public alike.187 For this study, all the cases from the CP 40s have been accessed 
from the AALT; hence the image number of the case will act as a substitute for the 
membrane number of the roll in the footnotes.  
      Another significant source are feet of fines, which date from 1195 onwards. A fine 
(finis or finalis concordia) was a device already in use during the time of Henry II. It 
denoted an agreement between the parties to end legal action,188 that is, if the litigants 
decided to reach an agreement they would have the final concords in court, which 
survived in the form of feet of fines. Feet of fines can be divided into the following two 
groups – one was made in eyre, the other was made in the Bench (either the Court of 
Common Pleas or the King’s Bench).189 Feet of fines can also be used to help date eyres 
because the opening phrase usually gives the exact time and date. The opening line 
reads: ‘this is the final concord made in the king’s court at [place] on [date] in [regnal 
                                                
186 Ibid. 
187 ‘Anglo-American Legal Tradition,’ last accessed on 10 March 2018, http://aalt.law.uh.edu/  
188 Calendar of Kent Feet of Fines, to the End of Henry III's Reign, ed. Irene J. Churchill, Ralph Griffin 
Ralph and F. W. Hardman (Ashford: Kent Archaeological Society, 1956), xiii.   
189 Crook, Records of the General Eyre, 8.   
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year] before [names] justices and others of the king’s barons and faithful there 
present.’190 
      After a final concord to all suits and contentions was reached, neither party could 
withdraw from it. If either party did not follow the obligations written into the fine, the 
other party would need to apply to the sheriff to have the transgressing party appear 
before the king’s justices.191 The final concords would be written out three times on a 
single sheet of parchment, two copies side by side and one copy across the bottom (i.e., 
at the foot) of the sheet, separated by an indented, or wavy, line. Each party kept one 
copy and the other, known as ‘the foot of the fine’, was held as a central record of the 
conveyance, or other dispute, by the Treasury. A single piece of parchment was used in 
order to protect against fraud or forgery, for only the genuine copies would fit together. 
Feet of fines provide historians not only with the final concords, but record the agreed 
sum of money. However, by the fourteenth century, this not only constituted the actual 
price, but it was used as a guide price to the value of property on the open market.192 
The research in this study has revealed not only how women arrived at agreements with 
their counterparties by applying available legal mechanisms, but it allows us to explore 
the conveyance of inheritance, maritagium and dower.  
      This thesis is in large part built on the court records because most of them record 
the significant arguments of female litigants and their opponents, although not all of 
them record exactly what the litigants said. It is with women’s experiences that I am 
concerned, so the cases presented are those that either have as much detailed argument 
as possible or centrally concern property rights. For example, in the CP 40s, many 
dower cases are only written down in a few sentences, indicating simply the names of 
the litigants, the quantity of land and where the land was located, and usually end with 
one simple sentence saying that one of the parties rendered the land to another. The 
cases do not as such show the defence women had in court, therefore they have not been 
presented in this thesis.  
                                                
190 Ibid., 9.   
191 Ibid., xiv.  
192 The counties which have published their own Calendars of Feet of Fines are as follows: 
Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Cambridgeshire, Cornwall, Cumberland, Derbyshire, 
Devon, Dorset, Essex, Gloucestershire, Kent, Lincolnshire, Norfolk and Suffolk, Somerset, 
Staffordshire, Surrey, Sussex, Wiltshire and Yorkshire. ‘TNA,’ accessed on 16 March 2017, 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/help-with-your-research/research-guides/land-conveyance-feet-of-
fines-1182-1833/#4-what-are-feet-of-fines  
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      In contrast, cases which have detailed arguments are greatly used in this thesis, 
especially those containing legal practitioners’ different strategies for dealing with 
changing circumstances in court. More importantly, cases which concern the same issue 
but with different judgments have been presented as well, in order to illustrate the 
diversity of women’s experiences. For example, in chapter 4, I promote an idea that for 
a woman, claiming a disputed land as her maritagium would bring advantage to her; 
however, in some cases when women did this, it caused them to lose.193 Seeking to 
identify the reasons for these different results is one of the emphases of this thesis – 
looking at every case and finding their differences in order to understand the logic of 
and reasons for the final judgment. 
 
2.2.4 Administrative records     
      In addition to legal documents, some administrative records were used to track 
down the transmission of inheritance, dower and maritagium. The first group consists 
of chartularies and charters created by individuals. A chartulary, or cartulary, is a 
collection of charters, particularly in a large volume or set of volumes, which contains 
duplicate copies of charters, title-deeds, and similar documents belonging to 
monasteries, corporations, or other land-owners. 194  As such, chartularies contain 
significant information relating to patterns of descent for landed properties within 
families. For example, the Calendar of the Hobhouse Cartulary of the Hungerford 
Family not only contains most of the materials relating to transactions of lands in the 
Hungerford family, including private charters, but it also offers the researcher an 
opportunity to track how land descended through the generations and gives valuable 
information about local customs.195  
      Close Rolls, Patent Rolls, Charter Rolls and the Calendar of Inquisitions Post 
Mortem have acted as adjuncts to this study. Close Rolls, which date from 1204, contain 
copies of closed letters with an executive nature, which give orders and instructions to 
                                                
193 See chapter 4, p. 124-125.   
194 ‘BHO, ‘last accessed on 11 March 2019,   
http://0-
www.oed.com.catalogue.libraries.london.ac.uk/view/Entry/30842?rskey=DUNBx7&result=1&isAdva
nced=false#eid  
195 John L. Kirby. The Hungerford Cartulary, pt. 2: A Calendar of the Hobhouse Cartulary of the 
Hungerford Family (Chippenham: Wiltshire Record Society), 2007. 
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royal officials such as sheriffs. They were produced in the royal Chancery.196 They 
could also be sent to individuals, recording private deeds, including sales, wills, leases 
and quitclaims. Although the contents of the Close Rolls are mainly personal and 
private, they often deal with matters of great importance. For instance, the letters 
divulge both national and foreign policy.197  
      Patent Rolls, in contrast to Close Rolls, consist of copies of letters issued open, or 
patent, which expressed the crown’s will on various matters of public interest.198 The 
remit of the rolls is diverse and includes everything from royal prerogative, revenue, 
judicature, truce negotiations with foreign princes and states, and the appointments of 
ambassadors. Moreover, Patent Rolls record grants and confirmations of liberties, 
offices, privileges, lands and, more importantly as far as this thesis is concerned, 
wardships.199 The Charter Rolls cover the period from 1199 to 1517 and record royal 
charters. They cover grants of land, liberties, and privileges to towns, civil and religious 
corporations and individuals. Apart from original granting charters, charters of 
confirmation are also enrolled, which either recite the grant in the original charters in 
full or not; sometimes they have new grants added.200  
      Patent Rolls, Close Rolls and Charter Rolls collectively belong to Chancery Rolls, 
but Charter Rolls distinguish themselves from the others by having been executed in 
the presence of witnesses whose testimony assured the validity of the charters. They 
also offer more elaborate and detailed clauses.201 
                                                
196 The close rolls from 1204 to 1277 were published as Rotuli Litterarum Clausarum in Turri 
Londonensi asservati (2 vols, Record Commission, 1833-34); the close rolls from 1227 to 1272 were 
published as Close Rolls of the Reign of Henry III (14 vols, HMSO, 1902-38); however, the close rolls 
from 1272 to 1509 were published as Calendar of the Close Rolls (47 vols, HMSO, 1900-63). The 
former two series are in Latin transcript and the latter is in English. See ‘TNA,’ last accessed on 12 
March 2019, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C3614  
197 Sir Thomas Duffus Hardy, A Description of the Close Rolls in the Tower of London: With an 
Account of Early Courts of Law and Equity and Various Historical Illustrations (London: 1833), 1-3; 
‘TNA,’ last accessed on 12 March, 2019, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C3614.    
198 The patent rolls from 1202-1216 were published in Latin transcript as Rotuli Litterarum Patentium 
in Turri Londonensi asservati, 1201-1216 (Record Commission, 1835); the patent rolls from 1216 to 
1232 were published in Latin transcript as Patent Rolls of the Reign of Henry III (2 vols., HMSO, 
1901-3); the patent rolls from 1232 to 1582 were calendared in English as Calendar of the Patent Rolls 
(HMSO, 1906-), which is still continuing. See ‘TNA ,’ last accessed on 13 March 2019, 
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C3626  
199 For the content of the patent rolls in detail, see Ibid.  
200 Most of the charters rolls during the reign of John are transcribed in Rotuli chartarum in turri 
Londinensis asservati, ed., T. D. Hardy (London, 1837). Calendar of the Charters Rolls Preserved in 
the Public Office Record Office, 1256-1516 calendars a large part of the charter rolls. See Ibid.  
201 Ibid.    
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      Inquisitions Post Mortem202 were local enquiries into lands held by a deceased 
individual who held the land of the king. Their purpose was to ascertain if any income, 
or other rights, was due to the crown.203  In that sense they offer information on 
landholding and inheritance in medieval and early modern England. Because they 
mainly concerned tenants-in-chief, they involved people of considerable wealth and 
status. An inquisition post mortem was initiated when a tenant-in-chief died. The 
Chancery would then produce a writ ordering the escheator to hold an inquisition in his 
county. If this tenant-in-chief held the lands in different places, then the writs could be 
sent for multiple times. The escheators would be asked to take the lands into the king’s 
hands, and to summon a jury of local men to clarify the value of the deceased’s land 
and property.204 The Inquisitions Post Mortem have revealed much detail about the 
issues with which this thesis is concerned; they offer meticulous records of the amounts 
of land certain families held, information about the heirs, and more importantly, the 
amount of dower widows held. They have helped to clarify certain transactions 
regarding the possession of properties.  
 
2.2.5 The limitations of the sources 
      Despite the abundance of legal records, they do have their limitations. Regarding 
the Plea Rolls, the surviving records during the reigns of King John and Henry III only 
constitute a small part of the records.205 For instance, between 1201 and 1203 there 
were thirty-three eyres held, but records have only survived for seven.206 The records 
of the itinerant justices in the early thirteenth century were kept by the justices as their 
property. Not until 1257 did the barons of the Exchequer order the rolls of justices in 
eyre, of the bench and coram rege to be transmitted to the treasury.207 A dearth of the 
records of general eyre during the first half of the thirteenth century makes tracking 
cases more difficult, and the cases which historians could investigate would never be 
representative of the majority.   
                                                
202 Some inquisitions post mortem were kept in the chancery and the others were in the Exchequer. See 
Ibid.   
203 CIPM used in this thesis is the online version from ‘BHO,’ accessed on 29 June 2018, 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/inquis-post-mortem/vol2  
204 ‘TNA,’ last accessed on 13 March 2019, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/help-with-your-
research/research-guides/inquisitions-post-mortem/  
205 Crook, Records of the General Eyre, 12-14. 
206  Ibid., 13.  
207 Ibid., 12.  
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      Both Curia Regis Rolls and CP 40s seldom contain exactly what the litigants said 
or record a case from beginning to end. They need to be supplemented by other sources, 
such as Year Books. Therefore, it often happens that a lawsuit stopped abruptly at some 
point without any final result being recorded. For example, the dower dispute between 
Maud de Braose and her son Roger, which I will discuss in detail in chapter 5, had been 
going on for three years but stopped in 1286 with no final judgment made. They might 
have reached an agreement in private, which will never be uncovered. While Year 
Books provide the detail of arguments from the litigants, serjeants and justices, they 
only begin from the last two decades of the thirteenth century, and therefore can only 
reflect a small part of the objectives of this thesis. 
      It should be noted that neither the Curia Regis Rolls nor CP 40s can reflect the 
experiences of women from all classes of society because, as mentioned, villeins were 
not allowed to go to the king’s courts for land pleas. The court records I examine here 
show the experiences of people from the upper or middle classes, or those who could 
afford to have their pleas heard in the king’s court.  
      Another limitation of this thesis is the exclusion of local customs, in that the court 
records I examine are from the king’s courts. Some specific customs regarding 
women’s property rights are peripherally discussed, such as those in Winchester, 
Lincoln and London, but they are not emphasised. These local customs, certainly, have 
attracted historians’ attention, and many of them have already done excellent and in-
depth research on local customs. 208  Leaving out local customs also excludes the 
discussion of certain types of tenure such as burgage and gavelkind from this thesis. 
The main type of tenure in the court records I examine is socage, the most common 
residual tenure in medieval England. 
      A further serious limitation is the general authenticity of legal records. Charles 
Donahue points out that litigants’ arguments could be deceptive. Since it is impossible 
to prove the validity of the arguments, it is always risky to make any assumption that 
may be based on false evidence.209  
      As stated earlier, this study aims to construct a vivid picture of women in the 
medieval courts: how did they use legal mechanisms to strive for their property rights, 
                                                
208	See, for example, Wilkinson, Women in Thirteenth-Century Lincolnshire; Barron and Sutton, 
Medieval London Widows, 1300-1500; Hanawalt, The Wealth of Wives.	
209 Donahue, Law, Marriage and Society in the Later Middle Ages, 6-7.   
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and what strategies did they use to obtain, or regain, their hereditas, maritagia and dos? 
It also demonstrates how they were affected by the arguments their opponents applied 
against them. It is hoped, therefore, that by investigating the various legal documents 
that were either complementary or contradictory to each other in thirteenth-century 
England, this study will show how women exercised and protected their rights to their 
property.   
 
2.3 Methodology and the structure of the thesis 
      In order to understand how women pursued their property rights, this study will 
mainly consist of case studies focusing on individual women’s experiences in court in 
order to illuminate wider, collective experiences. Only three types of property rights 
will be looked at in order to explore the realities women faced. For instance, inumerable 
women called Maud will have to come to court to protect their property rights, but each 
of them will have their own story to tell.  
      As mentioned, the thirteenth century proved an important turning point in legal 
history as a result of the revolutionary development of the common law and the 
numerous statutes concerning property rights that were laid down by the political 
establishment through parliament. The laws regarding women’s inheritance, 
maritagium and dower profoundly impacted women’s property rights; therefore, those 
statutes should be seen as a watershed moment. Each case study will consider the 
impact of certain enactments on the outcome of the case; examine how the statutes were 
interpreted by different parties; and consider how women coped with each new law and 
how long it took for the new laws to filter through to become a standardised part of 
court practice. The arguments either made by them directly or by their legal 
representatives will be examined in order to see what efforts these women, and their 
counter-parties, made in order to comply with, to contend with, and even to avoid what 
the law dictated.  
      As mentioned, Donahue has noted that the litigants’ arguments might be deceptive, 
and therefore lead us astray. He dedicates one chapter in Law, Marriage and Society in 
the Later Middle Ages to discussing lying witnesses and attempts to tease out the 
truth.210 Indeed, litigants’ statements cannot always be true and it would be too naïve 
                                                
210 Ibid., 46-62. 
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to believe they were telling the truth. This study, however, uses this information in order 
to explore litigants’ strategies, that is, I will explore the reason why litigants have 
argued in a particular way. Whether they lied or not, their evidence shows both the legal 
problems and the social issues with which they were confronted; it also shows the level 
of their intent to win their suits. Lying, of course, is a strategy that has been used in 
courts from the distant past to the present; therefore, litigants’ statements have been 
included unconditionally in this study. For instance, a case I examine in chapter 4 
reveals that while the widow claimed a disputed land as her maritagium, her opponent 
argued that it was her dower.211 This widow might have been either lying or telling the 
truth, but it does not concern me in this thesis because what I attempt to illustrate is the 
difficulties and different scenarios women might face in court when they pursued their 
property rights, and what possible arguments they would adopt to defend their rights. 
      Case studies, of course, inevitably have limitations. As mentioned, this thesis 
highlights those cases with important or interesting legal arguments in order to explore 
wider experiences women had in court, but the cases represented in this thesis are by 
no means representative of all women’s experiences. Some cases might be exceptional, 
and cannot be applied to the majority of women litigants. As Loengard suggests in 
‘What did Magna Carta Mean to Widows?’, some widows faced the defence saying that 
they were in fact not widows because their husbands were on the Crusades.212 The 
objection as such was rare compared to the most frequent ones, such as arguing a 
widow’s husband had never been seised of the land in question. However, case studies 
provide a wide range of circumstances women could possibly encounter in court. 
Consequently, they tell us more than simply looking at what the law says and reveal the 
discrepancies between the law in theory and in practice.  
      The study will start by discussing medieval women’s property, namely hereditas, 
dos and maritagia. Legally, a medieval woman could own her own property, so I will 
explore her right to that property under the common law from the late twelfth century 
to the early fourteenth century. The theme of each chapter is as follows: (i) heiresses in 
court, (ii) maritagium as women’s land, and (iii) widows in court. These themes will be 
discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively. 
                                                
211 See chapter 4, p.121-122. The case of Alice de Lundresford.   
212	Loengard, ‘What Did Magna Carta Mean to Widows?’, 141-142.  
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      Chapter 3 will primarily examine heiresses, including those female heirs of noble 
and rich families. A daughter could only be an heir when there was no male heir in the 
same generation. However, unlike the male heir, who, according to custom, inherited 
the whole of the father’s inheritance (primogeniture), a daughter should share the 
inheritance with her sisters, if she had any. Daughters inherited by means of an equal 
division of the property. Both Bracton and Glanvill show that this principle was clearly 
regulated only after the twelfth century, and according to J. C. Holt it was the cause of 
litigation. 213  The equal division of inheritance between daughters makes the 
cooperation and conflict between them worthy of discussion, and this will be one of the 
focuses of this chapter. Another significant section will consider the conflict of interests 
between widows and heiresses. Although medieval historians have long discussed the 
conflicts between heirs and widows, this chapter will further explore the inheritance 
issue when heirs were female. In addition, the difficulties faced by heiresses in claiming 
their inheritance in the courts will be explored. 
      Chapter 4 discusses an important form of property for non-heiress daughters. 
Because not every daughter had a chance to become an heiress and inherit property, 
they were all considered to possess ‘an heiress’s potential’. When a daughter married, 
she would be granted some property from her family, whether in real estate or in 
movables. Such property, given to married women, is called maritagium, which means 
a marriage portion or dowry. For a non-heiress daughter, a maritagium would support 
her after her husband’s death. Most families offered maritagia to their daughters, 
although there were no laws to impose this as an obligation, so it would consist of only 
a small amount of property, or whatever could be afforded. This chapter will show that 
claiming a certain amount of land as maritagium was a strategy often used by both 
plaintiff and defendant. It will then be demonstrated how claims to maritagium 
benefited women.  
      Next, the thesis analyses Claire de Trafford’s ‘maritagium as women’s land’ 
concept. Maritagium in most cases served as the family’s property, including both the 
bride’s blood family and in-laws. A bride who was given maritagium could not use the 
land freely since it usually fell under the control of her husband. Thus maritagium could 
easily be taken away from her once married, rather than being kept intact to pass on to 
                                                
213 Holt, Colonial England, 1066-1215, 250.  
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her children. The chapter will conclude by querying the veracity of Claire de Trafford’s 
idea of ‘maritagium as women’s land’. Her rule delineates that maritagium was passed 
down from woman to woman, from mother to daughter, but no such rule officially 
existed and neither was there a social consciousness to suggest that maritagium should 
be passed on to a woman’s daughters as their maritagia, as she suggests. 
      In chapter 5 we discuss dower rights in widowhood. Numerous academics have 
written prolifically about this topic, including Barbara A. Hanawalt and Joseph 
Biancalana, but we expand further. Although the common law stipulated that widows 
were entitled to either a nominated dower or one third of their late husbands’ property, 
several regulations, including the 1225 Magna Carta, the Statute of Gloucester, the 
Statute of Merton and the Statute of Westminster II 1285 supported this, claiming 
dower in court was, in fact, a difficult task for widows to accomplish. These rights were 
reluctantly documented in law, offering no guarantee of them being received. This 
chapter will also show that, in addition to the obstacles widows faced when claiming 
their rights, their ability to make private agreements was also significant. Finally, the 
rights of the most powerful group of women, widowed heiresses, will be looked at. 
Although Henry I’s Coronation Charter did not impose any rule on widowed heiresses, 
they actually owned considerable amounts of property which meant that many men 
wanted to marry them. Therefore, through the cases they were involved in, I hope to 
demonstrate how capable and influential widowed heiresses could be.   
      Although the focus of this study is women, not all women went to court on their 
own, since more often than not they were represented by legal practitioners. Therefore, 
the influence of legal practitioners on women’s property under the common law will be 
discussed in this chapter. In particular, the claims that attorneys used in court, and 
whether they affected the final judgements, will be explored. For this discussion, I will 
explore two paths: (i) the contribution that practitioners brought to women’s property 
claims; and (ii) the real experiences that women had with their properties. Women 
brought cases to court because the substantive law did not cover all scenarios, and it is 
the outcomes of these cases that show how women’s property rights in common law 
developed. 
      This study will conclude by comparing the property rights of heiresses, brides and 
widows. The cases that appear most frequently in legal documents were those of women 
who went to the courts in order to secure their own property. Dower might have been 
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the only property over which a woman could have sole control, but the significance of 
inheritance and maritagium and the rights of women to dispose of them should not be 
underestimated. I will clarify the position by exploring the differences and similarities 
between herediatas, maritagium and dos as the common law developed.  
  
2.4 A contribution to history 
      Sue Sheridan Walker regards dower as ‘women’s business’; likewise, Claire de 
Trafford believes maritagium to be ‘women’s land’. Indeed, dower and maritagium 
seem to be property that belonged only to women in legal terms as specified by common 
law, but this did not extend to real-life terms. We ought also to bear in mind that both 
rights are indirectly attached to men. For example, a widow’s right to dower depended 
entirely on her husband’s decision; therefore, if her husband neither left her property 
nor gave the widow nominated dower during the marriage, she obtained nothing after 
his death. Maritagium, which a bride obtained to support her new family, was also a 
type of property that was ‘attached’ to men in that it fell under her husband’s control 
after they married – at least, this was true prior to the Statute of Westminster II in 1285. 
Likewise, a woman could only become an heiress when there was no male heir. The 
right of inheritance, maritagium and dower for a thirteenth-century English woman was 
predicated and depended entirely on the existence of men. No matter which property 
right a woman held, be it inheritance, maritagium or dower, they were all entangled 
with either a man’s interest or were related to family. When a woman pursued her 
property in court, a small part of her motive for doing so was to protect her own benefit, 
but by launching litigation it meant there were at least two of the following parties 
involved - women, men, heirs and other tenants.  
This study also aims to analyse the gap between the common law and reality. This 
will be examined by investigating various kinds of difficulties women encountered 
when they claimed their property rights in court. Although the 1225 Magna Carta 
declared that women should, after the death of their husbands, have their inheritance, 
marriage portion and dower without any additional conditions, 214  in reality they 
encountered a number of difficulties when they demanded their dower. The problem 
might have been due to the fact that the description of this particular right was abstract 
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and thus many thirteenth-century women found that they had no right to any property 
unless they resorted to legal action. Law-making is usually a tool monopolised by the 
ruling or wealthy classes, hence legal practice is a reflection of social circumstance. By 
examining the predicaments in which women found themselves because of the laws 
concerning their rights to property, this study will show how they overcame their 
circumstances and managed to secure their property rights.   
      In order to truly understand the nature of women’s property and their rights to it, it 
is necessary to examine a broad spectrum of marriage and inheritance. Hence, instead 
of only looking at noblewomen, as many researchers have previously, this study will 
look at how women from different classes pursued their property rights. It will consider 
the differences between them, and whether they were treated differently by thirteenth-
century courts or in quite similar ways. Although this study cannot encapsulate all 
medieval women, it will attempt to elucidate individual experiences by allowing 
otherwise unknown women to stand out from the obfuscation of history.  
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Chapter Three: Heiresses in Court 
    
So, why begin with heiresses’ inheritances instead of maritagium and dower? A woman 
could play as many diverse roles as a man did in his life, from a daughter to a sister, an 
heiress, a bride, a widow, and even a widowed heiress. Each role had its own obligations 
and rights cemented in law, which will be carefully investigated in this thesis. A woman 
could become an heiress at any stage of her life.  In medieval England, the eldest son 
inherited all; however, if there was a failure of male issue, a daughter, or daughters, 
would inherit.  
      Twenty-six court cases relating to heiresses are examined this chapter, concerning 
the issue of homage and service, wardship and marriage, disputes over inheritance 
shares between co-heiresses, husbands’ interests in wives’ inheritance, and 
collaboration between co-heiresses against other litigants. The study begins with an 
explanation of the notion of an heir, and the different inheritance patterns that applied 
in the thirteenth century. The discussion will then examine the form of female 
succession, which was equally divided between daughters, and it will consider what 
impact this had on co-heiresses. This will be followed by an investigation into the 
obstacles co-heiresses were faced with in court; whether in collaboration with or in 
confrontation against others. The focus will then turn to how heiresses managed their 
inheritance to sustain themselves and protected their property rights; and finally, the 
chapter will analyse how the benefits of inheritance affected women’s families, 
depending on what form of legal actions they had taken. It will consider, for example, 
the exchange of inheritance shares between co-heiresses and the effect this had on the 
family. This will be followed by an examination of the obstacles they faced when 
claiming their inheritance against others, especially in cases where husbands alienated 
their wives’ inheritance. Following a discussion of the legal status and vulnerability of 
heiresses, the focus of the chapter will move to the issue of wardship and the crown’s 
interests in noble heiresses.  
       
3.1 Who is an heir?  
      Who is entitled to be an heir? In present day common law the definition of an heir 
and heiress is one ‘who is entitled by law to succeed another in the enjoyment of 
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property or rank, upon the death of the latter’.215 Glanvill articulates that heirs could be 
near or remote. The former were the heirs of a man’s body, that is, his sons or his 
daughters.216 Concerning remote heirs, Glanvill also gives a clear answer:  
The nearest heirs of any person are those whom he has begotten of his own body, 
such as a son or a daughter. In default of such heir, the more remote heirs are called, 
such as grandsons and granddaughters descending lineally from son or daughter ad 
infinitum.217  
The inheritance would thus pass through the family line. First and preferred are male 
heirs, namely brothers; if there was no male heir it would fall to the female blood 
relative, the sisters. Following this were the uncles on the paternal side, then on the 
maternal side; and last are aunts and their descendants.218  Should a couple fail to 
produce a surviving male heir, the daughter would inherit. If the man had more than 
one daughter, then they inherited together.219  
      According to Pollock and Maitland, primogeniture was not the prevailing, or the 
sole, pattern of inheritance in pre-Norman England, that is prior to Domesday Book. 
Indeed, some Anglo-Saxon thegns held inheritance in parage, i.e., co-heirs divided the 
inheritance equally. Co-heirs did not do homage and service to the eldest heir; instead 
they were present at the king’s court, and only one heir, usually the firstborn son, would 
be present on behalf of his co-heirs, which made the collection of reliefs, aids and taxes 
easier. Patterns of inheritance in England were confused until the time of Henry II, 
when Glanvill clarified the different forms of succession according to different types of 
tenure. For instance, he declared that, if the deceased were a knight, or held the land in 
military service, his eldest son should inherit all, and the younger sons should not claim 
any part of the inheritance. If a man was a free sokeman then his sons should divide his 
inheritance after his death. However, the tradition of reserving the capital messuage to 
the eldest son, as a mark of respect for his seniority, was found in some places. 
Glanvill’s statement implies that there were at least two different rules of inheritance, 
but the ‘free sokemen’ Glanvill referred to remained a minority that gradually 
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disappeared over time – some fell into villeinage, and others into military service. Thus, 
by the end of the twelfth century, primogeniture applied to most parts of the country as 
the dominant form of inheritance.220  
      Some local customs did designate that sons divide inheritances, for instance in Kent, 
Norfolk, Suffolk, Northamptonshire and Rutland.221  Moreover, in some places the 
custom of ultimogeniture was applied, whereby the youngest son, instead of the eldest, 
succeeded as the heir. This custom, which came to the attention of English lawyers in 
1327 through a case in Nottingham, originated in France. Nottingham was divided into 
two boroughs; one was called the French borough, and the other, the English borough. 
Ultimogeniture was found in the latter, which led to the name of ‘borough English’. 
Most ultimogeniture occurred in villein tenements; hence, inheritance by the youngest 
son appears to have been more prevalent among villeins.222 Although the pattern of 
inheritance differed from place to place, even shire to shire, at the end of Henry III’s 
reign a universal common law inheritance finally prevailed.223  
Six rules applied to the general concept of succession: (i) a living descendant 
excludes his or her own descendants; (ii)  a dead descendant is represented by his or 
her own descendants; (iii) males exclude females of equal degree; (iv) among males of 
equal degree only the eldest inherits; (v) females of equal degree inherit together as co-
heiresses; and (vi) the rule that a dead descendant is represented by his, or her, 
descendants overrides the preference for the male, in that a grand-daughter by a dead 
eldest son will exclude a younger son.224  
Whilst the first rule can be easily understood, the second rule may need more 
explanation. Pollock and Maitland stated that when a man died without leaving a 
descendant this meant that, even if he had other kinfolk who would be his heir, he was 
described as dying ‘without an heir of himself’. This also explained the sixth rule that 
it was when a man died without any heir of his body that his brother or sister could 
inherit from him.225 The third and fourth rules were embodied in primogeniture, and 
the fifth explained the division of inheritances between co-heiresses.226  
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As previously stated, only when there were no male heirs could a daughter inherit 
and she would have to meet the following determining factors before she could be 
considered to be an heiress: (i) she had to be born of her father’s body; and (ii) she had 
to have been born within the marriage (if she was illegitimate, even if her father had no 
male heir, she could not be an heiress).227 As Glanvill put it, ‘no-one who is a bastard 
or not born of a lawful marriage may be a lawful heir.’228 
What made an heiress different to an heir? To understand this, it is necessary to 
examine the dominant pattern of inheritance – primogeniture. As mentioned, every 
military fee should descend as an impartible unit. This form of inheritance also avoided 
many possible disputes because all lands went to the eldest son. An equal division 
among sons, or daughters, complicated the relationship between a lord and his 
tenants,229 so making the eldest son inherit all possessions was, by comparison, a simple 
arrangement. Hence, by the end of Henry II’s reign, the courts had settled on 
primogeniture as a principle.230 Book VI of Britton, c. 3 stated the following:  
Age is material; because he who is the first born is admissible before the 
younger son of the same father and mother, and the younger brother will 
remain nearest heir to the elder, or at least a near heir, according as the elder 
shall have issue or not.231 
Given that Britton is the earliest summary of the law during the time of Edward I, it 
could be inferred that in the thirteenth century, primogeniture was well established and 
applied in England. If the eldest son inherited all possessions from his father, could this 
ever happen among daughters? Was the eldest daughter entitled as the heiress to inherit 
all her father’s possessions? Here, Glanvill states that female inheritance was different 
to that of sons, as follows: 
If anyone leaves only one daughter as his heir, then the rule stated for an only 
son clearly applies. But if he leaves several daughters, then the inheritance 
will clearly be divided between them whether their father was a knight or a 
                                                
227 None of the illegitimate children, male or female, were allowed to access the inheritance. However, 
in medieval Wales, the definition of bastard was different from that in England. Bastard only referred to 
a child who was not recognised by his or her father. All children, whether born in or out of legitimate 
marriages, who were acknowledged by their fathers could have a share in inheritance. See David Walker, 
Medieval Wales (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 143.  
228 Glanvill, 87. 
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231English Historical Documents, ed. Douglas and Rothwell, vol. 3, 969.  
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sokeman, but saving the chief meussage to the eldest daughter on the 
conditions set out above.232  
Likewise, if there was an advowson, 233  the daughter could not claim the first 
presentation as her own, rather the other daughters or parceners should have their shares 
in the presentation.234 According to Glanvill, another prominent difference between an 
heir and an heiress was that a man was obligated to the lord to do service and homage 
– an acknowledgment that the vassal was, literally, the lord’s man. By showing such 
fealty the tenant would receive, in return, a symbolic title for his new position. However, 
an heiress did not do homage and service, her husband did. Therefore, if daughters were 
co-heiresses, the husband of the eldest daughter swore homage to the lord. The younger 
daughters, on the other hand, did service to the chief lord by the hands of the eldest 
daughter, or her husband. During their lifetime, the husbands of younger daughters, due 
to interest avoidance, did not need to do homage; neither did they have to swear fealty 
or pay relief until the third generation of descendants, because the laws of inheritance 
did not allow the lord and the heir to be the same person. The three generations rule 
made it impossible for him to have been the heir.235  
 
3.2 Literature review  
      This chapter discusses our principal theme – heiresses in court. There are several 
excellent works on the subject which add to our knowledge of medieval English 
heiresses. In this section, I will start with the works which touch on the pattern of female 
succession and move on to those which discuss the more specific topic of heiresses, 
including the management of inheritance by noble heiresses and the economics of 
heiresses’ marriages.  
                                                
232 Glanvill, 76.  
233 Advowson is a term from ecclesiastical law. It concerned the right to present a member of the clergy 
to a particular benefice or living, that is, the right to nominate someone as a parish priest. Occasionally, 
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by Holt, who believes that the rules Glanvill described were not applied in the country. The detailed 
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      ‘Inheritance by Women in the Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries’, by S. F. C. 
Milsom, studies the patterns of women’s inheritance from the Norman Conquest to the 
early thirteenth century.236 He stresses how the relationship between lords and heiresses 
changed when inheritance by women went from one sole daughter inheriting to all the 
daughters inheriting. He points out that before the thirteenth century neither Norman 
nor Anglo-Saxon sources suggest that spilt or partible inheritance was applied generally 
to daughters. Rather, prior to the statutum decretum, only one daughter received the 
inheritance, and the best proof of this is to be found in Henry I’s Coronation Charter,237 
chapter 3, which implied that only one daughter could inherit her father’s possession. 
However, for unknown reasons, following the statutum decretum, inheritance by 
women became equal division. Consequently, disputes between co-heiresses increased 
noticeably, which led to the wider use of the writ nuper obit. This could be initiated by 
a sister of the co-heiresses who had been dispossessed by other co-heiresses of the 
tenements which their father, brother or any common ancestor had died seised.238  
     The statutum decretum may refer to a legislative act, or a court decision designed to 
have general effect. However, it is uncertain when exactly the statutum decretum was 
made. According to Hudson, it was probably made after the production of the 1130 pipe 
roll, when the rule of equal division between daughters had not been a standard.239  
      Milsom also discusses the husband’s interests. Since every daughter could obtain a 
share of an inheritance, a husband was unlikely to obtain the whole of it unless he, or 
his father, was able to buy the marriages of all the daughters. Milsom also analyses the 
relationship between the lord and the husband, and goes on to suggest that the husband’s 
importance to the lord is based on whether he and the heiress had a surviving legitimate 
heir. If they did, a husband’s homage took its full effect; otherwise, the husband had 
very little significance to the lord. Hence, we might conclude that although the heiress’s 
job was simply to transmit the inheritance, she and her heir were much more important 
to the lord than the husband.240 
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      In Colonial England 1066-1215, and the 1985 Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society, J. C. Holt devotes an entire chapter to the heiress and the alien,241 from the 
point of view of the family and the economy. He points out that a woman inherited, not 
because of any title, but because, in the absence of male heirs in the same generation, 
she was the only means of continuing the lineage.242 Essentially, women only received 
inheritances in order to keep their families’ property intact. This also reiterated the 
notion that women were entirely subordinate. Holt also casts doubt on Glanvill’s 
statement concerning the division of inheritance between daughters. He states that, prior 
to 1130, descent through the female line was always to a single heiress. The pipe rolls 
of 1130 record twenty-seven fines for wardship or marriage but there is no hint that the 
inheritance was divided in the female line until the statutum decretum in the 1130s, 
which declared that, ‘where there is no son, the daughters divided their father’s land by 
spindles, and the elder cannot take from the younger her half of the land without 
violence and injury’.243  
      Fifty years after the statutum decretum, Glanvill restated that all daughters should 
divide inheritance, but he further explained that the husband of the eldest daughter 
should perform homage to the lord for the whole fee. The younger daughters and their 
husbands performed homage and paid reasonable relief and services to the eldest 
daughter and her heirs. Holt argues that this might be misleading and that Glanvill might 
have written this ‘law’ because he wanted to avoid tax himself, mainly in reliefs and 
wardships, which his own daughters and their husbands had to pay to the lord. He does, 
however, state that what Glanvill described was still a fairly recent procedure. In any 
case, this meant that there was not only one way of arranging a divided inheritance.244  
      In Portraits of Medieval Women: Family, Marriage, and Politics in England 1225-
1350, Linda E. Mitchell used case studies taken from different legal documents. For 
example, chapter 2, ‘Agnes and her Sisters: Squabbling and Cooperation in the 
Extended Medieval Family’, examines how the Ferrers sisters managed their 
inheritance as co-heiresses. Agnes and her six sisters were the children of William de 
Ferrers (1193-1254) and Sibyl Marshal (1209-1245). The seven sisters had little chance 
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of inheriting William’s property because William had a legitimate male heir, Robert, 
from his second marriage to Margaret de Quency (c. 1218-1280). However, as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, every daughter was a ‘potential heiress’ throughout 
her life. For the Ferrers sisters this happened when their mother’s last surviving brother, 
Anselm Marshal (c. 1201-1245), died in 1245. His death saw the vast Marshal 
inheritance fell to thirteen co-heiresses, seven of whom were the Ferrers sisters.245  
Mitchell used the records of the royal courts and the rolls of the Chancery to find 
out what the Ferrers sisters received in their inheritance, as well as the ways in which 
they managed their property, and their interactions with people outside their immediate 
family. The Ferrers sisters acted as co-plaintiffs with other Marshal family heirs in order 
to protect their property, or to sue tenants for trespass, debt, or other proprietary actions. 
Moreover, during the 1270s and the 1280s they sometimes exchanged property with 
the heirs outside their immediate family. The Ferrers sisters also transferred property 
within their smaller family circle; and they not only exchanged property but purchased 
each other’s inheritances. For instance, in 1300 Cecily purchased Sibyl’s portion for 
£1000 and continued to hold her own and Sibyl’s shares as late as 1315.246  
Later, however, part of the Ferrers sisters’ inheritance was taken away by the three 
surviving widows of the Marshal men, and they were compelled to relinquish the most 
prestigious portion of their inheritance to the widow of Walter Marshal.247 In the end, 
Mitchell states that the experiences of the Ferrers sisters in managing and attempting to 
retain their inheritance by making business-like agreements with each other concerning 
their joint inheritance serves as a paradigm for the examination of the activity of 
heiresses in medieval England.248  
Louise J. Wilkinson, in her Women in Thirteenth-Century Lincolnshire, compares 
each class of women in Lincolnshire, from noble women to gentle women, 
townswomen, peasant women and criminal women. She discusses each group from four 
perspectives: marriage, dower, property and work. In doing so, she places less emphasis 
on heiresses’ ability to manage their inheritance than on their marriages. No matter to 
which class a medieval woman belonged, her marriage was a crucial issue for both her 
and her bridegroom’s family since the property settlements accompanying marriage 
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were particularly important for the material well-being of non-inheriting daughters. It 
was certainly important for the bridegroom’s family should the bride be an heiress due 
to a forthcoming inheritance.249 In the case of peasant women, Wilkinson points out 
that primogeniture was slower to become established and never totally superseded older 
inheritance customs in which sons equally inherited their father’s property. 
Consequently, this custom might have allowed women better opportunities to claim 
inheritances. In some Fenland manors, for example, inheritance was divided between 
both male and female descendants.250  
      Another important work is S. J. Payling’s ‘The Economics of Marriage in Medieval 
England: The Marriage of Heiresses’, which discusses the significance of marriage for 
heiresses in late medieval times from an economic perspective. In that period heiresses 
were regarded as an effective means of property transfer between families. This was 
largely due to the Black Death, which saw over 40% of daughters become heiresses at 
common law, making many young women extremely powerful. Payling stresses the 
idea that all brides were ‘heiresses-potential’, and as such, were market commodities, 
since their fathers on both sides could often stand to profit considerably from their 
marriages. He also discussed how the rise of cash-rich families impacted the pattern of 
marrying heiresses, in that these new families who held larger amounts of cash had less 
to lose than established families when heiresses married.251  
Most works concerning medieval heiresses analyse the nobility and gentry since 
they were relatively well documented in primary sources and they usually held 
significant amounts of real estate. Generally, records for lower-class women are lacking, 
meaning that upper-class women can be more easily studied. Whilst research can only 
be conducted where sufficient sources are available, by examining various legal 
documents, the following discussion of how heiresses managed their inheritance will 
not only include high-ranking women, but also ordinary heiresses who held lands, albeit 
not as extensive as those of noblewomen.252  
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A woman’s right over her inheritance drew less attention than her dower, because 
not every woman could be an heiress. As mentioned previously, noblewomen were not 
the only group of women who could be heiresses holding estates. Women of the gentry, 
rich families and free men could also be heirs and heiresses. Therefore, in order to 
provide a more comprehensive picture of heiresses and their inheritances, the women 
included in the cases investigated in this chapter are both noble and free heiresses with 
lands.  
 
3.3 Partible inheritance between daughters 
      The previous section showed that a woman was considered an heiress only when 
attempts to produce a male heir failed. The core principle of thirteenth-century 
inheritance was that males preceded females and direct lines excluded collaterals. As 
mentioned above, partible inheritance between daughters made its first written 
appearance in the statutum decretum, and one must wonder why this rule changed.  
Historians, including Holt and Milsom, have not come up with a cohesive answer, 
although Holt proposes that it might have been due to a formal and deliberate change 
of policy.253 Nevertheless, almost half a century after the statutum decretum, Glanvill 
restated the rule, indicating that by this stage partible female succession must have 
become well established. But how long did this take to come into effect? 
Whilst a date cannot be ascribed, the following case involving the whole barony 
of Pain Peverel might shed some light. The inheritance was divided among four sisters 
on the death of their father, William Peverel, at various points between 1130 and 1133. 
The eldest daughter, Matilda, died without issue so her share fell to her three sisters.254 
According to Glanvill, if one of the brothers or sisters died, his or her portion accrued 
to the remaining brothers or sisters.255 The dates of this case seem to indicate that 
partible inheritance was employed at the same time as the statutum decretum in the 
1130s. It is not possible to know whether the co-heiresses knew of the new statutum 
decretum rule, or if the equal division of property among daughters had already been 
adopted by some families. What we do know, however, is that the change of law from 
a sole daughter to all daughters inheriting did not go without a hitch. For instance, King 
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John granted the whole inheritance of William de Buckland to William’s youngest 
daughter, forcing the two elder daughters and their husbands to sue the youngest 
daughter in 1218.256  
Therefore, although the rule of partible female inheritance had become well 
established, it is not hard to find exceptions. For example, a 1226 case reveals how an 
eldest daughter, who regarded herself as a sole heir, denied her sisters’ right of 
inheritance. Julia and her husband, Thomas Cusin, made a claim that her elder sister, 
Petronilla, had disinherited Julia because Petronilla thought that, as the first-born, she 
should inherit all possession, as with primogeniture.257 Cases such as those of the 
Peverels, the Bucklands and the Cusins show discrepancies in the pattern of female 
succession. As early as 1130, the Peverel sisters shared their inheritance. On the other 
hand, by 1226, a younger sister can still be found suing the elder sister for taking the 
whole inheritance. Nevertheless, these cases suggest that at least by 1218, when the 
Buckland case was heard, people knew that all daughters were entitled to a share of 
inheritance in the absence of a male heir. 
We now turn to the question of homage and service by co-heiresses. There has 
been a lingering debate stretching back to the thirteenth century regarding how 
daughters performed homage and service to the lord. Did they even need to perform 
homage and service? According to Glanvill, only the husband of the eldest daughter 
did homage for the whole fee to the chief lord, and the younger daughters and their 
husbands did not need to until the third generation. Meanwhile, younger daughters and 
their husbands should do the service by the hand of the eldest daughter or her husband. 
A case in 1220 illustrates this rule. Geoffrey de Saukevill claimed to be the holder of 
the free tenements of Hamon de Gatton. Geoffrey inherited a tenement from his mother, 
Ela, who had two younger sisters, Sibyl and Idonea. Geoffrey produced a chirograph 
that had been made in the king’s court between William de Marcy and his wife Ela – 
Geoffrey’s mother – Robert de Hikekesham and Sibyl, his wife, and Geoffrey de 
Beleval and his wife Idonea, concerning the inheritance of Ralph de Dena, the sisters’ 
father. The chirograph showed that Sibyl and Idonea ought to hold their share of the 
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inheritance of Ela and her husband, and consequently the eldest daughter, Ela, should 
make service to the chief lords for her sisters.258  
      Nevertheless, as mentioned in the literature review, Holt considers this rule, that the 
younger daughters should hold property of the eldest and do service via her hands, to 
be a cunning ruse to avoid tax. Therefore, the de Saukevill case may demonstrate that 
Glanvill’s attempt at creating a universal law was accepted by some people. 
Nevertheless, the following case shows the opposite, suggesting that Glanvill’s rule was 
not well established, even by the 1230s.  
      In 1237, William de Forz, 4th Earl of Albemarle (d. 1260), acting as the attorney of 
his wife, Christina (d. 1246), came to court with other parceners to hear a judgment as 
to whether the county of Chester was to be divided between co-parceners, each of them 
holding part from the king in chief, or whether they should hold of William de Forz due 
to his seniority. The king’s council said that they had not previously seen such a case 
so the assize was adjourned in order to counsel the king.259 If the statement in Glanvill 
had been well established in England, the king’s council would not have counselled the 
king; however, because William de Forz and Christina were tenants-in-chief, and their 
lands were of great significance to the king, the monarch would have the final decision. 
Clearly, the pattern of female inheritance did not necessarily conform to what Glanvill 
states, and as the king’s involvement demonstrates, there appear to have been more 
choices than Glanvill had suggested.  
But why did the king make the decision? When William argued that Chester 
should be an impartible palatinate, he also claimed that, as the husband of the eldest co-
heiress, he should have the right to be the Earl of Chester and thus the holder of the 
entire land. William might have harboured an expectation from Henry III, since the 
king’s personal choice would have affected the assignment of the inheritance greatly. 
However, his claims – or the expectations of the king – were not successful. Perhaps if 
William had paid more attention to one of the king’s writs, in 1236 – the previous year 
– he might not have been so expectant. In 1236 Henry III responded to an enquiry from 
an Irish justiciar, stating that if a father held in chief of the king, then after the death of 
the father, each of his daughters would have to perform homage to the king, and every 
one of them would hold of the king in chief. The writ, which is known as the Statutum 
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Hiberniae de Coheredibus, shows a striking difference between Glanvill and Henry 
III’s opinion, at least on the issue of tenants-in-chief. 260  The writ, as the first 
unequivocal statement of the king’s practice, also contains an explicit message, namely 
that the king wished to retain his right of wardships and marriages over every co-heiress, 
so that they had to hold their shares of the king directly.261 Henry III even persuaded 
William de Forz, Christina, the other co-heiresses and their husbands, to give up their 
claims to the county of Chester and to lands elsewhere. In 1241 William de Forz and 
Christina finally quit their claims to the rights of the earldom.262  
      Arguably, had female inheritance been passed down in the form of primogeniture, 
it would have saved numerous disputes between co-heiresses, and probably the issue of 
homage and service as well. Whilst the eldest son could take all of his parents’ 
inheritance no matter how many younger brothers he had, the heiress had to share the 
inheritance with her other sisters. Regarding daughters as heiresses, Glanvill only stated 
that the inheritance should be divided among daughters, and that the eldest daughter 
could not take all.263 However, the reality was always far more complex, especially 
when the king’s interests were involved, as the de Forz case demonstrates. In the 
thirteenth century women were well aware of the sharing of inheritance among 
daughters; however, this made female succession complicated due to the number of 
disputes it engendered, mainly counterclaims to be the sole heiress. As a consequence, 
partible inheritance soon became one of the main sources of civil cases launched by 
women. The following section will examine such cases, and how co-heiresses argued 
against each other in court.  
      Relationships between co-heiresses were complicated: some were handled 
amicably, whilst others became very heated. Two heiresses might form an alliance in 
one suit against their opponents but end up in opposition against each other in another 
suit due to a conflict of interest. In thirteenth-century legal documents involving such 
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disputes, conflict appears more frequently than cooperation. Let us consider how these 
disputes arose and what common arguments emerged between co-heiresses.  
In 1227, Richard of Pirie brought a claim for himself and his wife, Sara, against 
Ralph Faber of Staunton and his wife, Avicia, and Julia of Staunton. Avicia and Julia 
were Sara’s sisters and the disputed land consisted of half of one messuage and six acres 
of land with appurtenances in Staunton, which Richard and Sara claimed as Sara’s share 
of inheritance from her brother, William of Easton Neston. They also insisted that the 
messuage should be Sara’s due to her seniority. Ralph and Julia argued that all litigants 
had agreed to the division of William’s land and that his will had instructed Sara and 
Richard to assign his inheritance to the sisters. Ralph and Julia argued that Sara and 
Richard had assigned the better part of the inheritance to themselves. Moreover, all the 
defendants argued that they had divided the inheritance according to the allotment made 
by Richard, so he and Sara had no legal grounds for claiming the disputed land as her 
share. In this case, the division of the inheritance was executed according to the will of 
the eldest sister, and it seemed that the younger sisters were not satisfied with what Sara 
and her husband arranged because she assigned herself better land.264  
Another point worth mentioning in this case is the division of the capital messuage. 
According Glanvill, the capital messuage held under a sokeman should be reserved to 
his eldest heir or heiress, but in this case the capital messuage had been divided among 
parceners. Sara claimed the messuage was hers because she was the eldest, but whether 
this was true is unclear. This case suggests that the eldest sister ‘claimed the land as 
capital messuage’ as a tactic in order to retain more land. Although she was ordered to 
compensate the other sisters in cash for the loss of their share, because land was 
generally considered to be more valuable than cash the idea of acquiring a whole 
messuage of land must have been very appealing to her.265 
      Of course, the more co-heiresses there were the smaller the share they received. 
Therefore, the last thing an heiress would want to hear about is the unexpected 
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appearance of another heiress. In 1226, Cecily de Swinetorp made a claim through an 
attorney against Thomas de Sandal’ and his wife, Maud, for a quarter of the land in 
Serlby, Tortworth and Blie, as her right and reasonable share. The land had been held 
by inheritance of Hugh of Moeles, Cecily and Maud’s brother, in the reign of King 
Richard. However, Thomas and Maud refused to respond because, after the death of 
Hugh, another brother, Gervase, enfeoffed part of the land to Maud’s son. To 
complicate matters, another unanticipated aspect was revealed – Cecily and Maud had 
other sisters who lived in Normandy, although it was uncertain if they were alive. In 
the end, Cecily took one-sixth of the inheritance, a decrease from a quarter, and Thomas 
was in mercy.266 The reason why Cecily and Maud did not mention that they had other 
sisters was not explained, but it is possible that they concealed the other sisters’ 
existence to gain a greater share.267 The case delivers a significant message – compared 
with a male heir, who could inherit a clean, whole inheritance, co-heiresses were 
relatively disadvantaged and the more co-heiresses there were, the less their share 
would be.     
Heiresses would sometimes resort to trickery in order to obtain a greater share 
from other co-heiresses. For instance, one heiress tried to disinherit her sister by 
claiming she had become a nun. Maud, daughter of Thomas Playce made a claim 
against Roger of Grimston and his wife, Joan, for a moiety268 of one messuage and 
twenty bovates269 of arable land with appurtenances in Newton, as her rightful share 
from her father. Maud said Thomas had three daughters, Joan, Alice and herself. Alice 
had entered a convent at Watton and became a professed nun so that her share 
descended to Maud and Joan as joint heirs, but Roger and Joan amassed everything, 
leaving Maud with nothing. However, Roger and Joan refused to answer this writ, 
instead claiming that Maud too had become a professed nun.270  
     In facing this claim, Maud argued that she was only four years old on her father’s 
death, and was in the wardship of Gilbert de Gant, who sold the wardship to Master 
Thomas de Grimston. Thomas had married his nephew, Roger, to Maud’s sister, Joan, 
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and then placed Maud in the house of Nun Appleton. Maud contended that she had been 
too young to understand what a profession was. Nevertheless, Roger and Joan asserted 
that Maud made her profession in front of the prioress of the convent. However, Maud 
stressed that the prioress had simply placed a black veil on her head. Despite Maud’s 
argument, the couple questioned why she only left the nunnery long after she had come 
of age.271  
      A judgment was made, which declared that neither an abbess nor a prioress was 
present to receive a profession at that time, hence the term profession was not valid. 
Despite this ruling, Maud did not receive a share of the inheritance, even though the 
profession was not binding. Roger and Joan made another clever claim. They argued 
that Alice, the other heiress, was also a professed nun, actually living in secular habit 
and having never professed, so she should have as much right to a share as Maud. Thus, 
Maud’s claim had backfired on her, even though she argued that such an exception 
against her could not be accepted, since the first exception had been peremptory. In the 
end, no conclusion was reached and an enquiry by jury was sought.272  
      Placing an underage heiress into a nunnery and making her devote her life to 
religion was a common tactic used by relatives in order to be rid of her and to gain her 
inheritance for themselves.273 There are numerous cases of heiresses claiming that they 
took the profession when they were too young and that it should be voided, in order for 
them to have access to the inheritance. In the above-mentioned case, Maud had been 
lucky that the court considered her profession to be invalid. Not every heiress forced 
into a nunnery had the same luck. A tragic story in 1195 clearly shows how vulnerable 
an heiress could be when a runaway nun claimed her share of her father’s inheritance. 
The heiress, who had been professed for fifteen years before she returned to a secular 
life, argued that she was coerced into the convent by her guardian, whom she accused 
of trying to secure her father’s property for himself. After she had been 
excommunicated, the case went to the king’s court, but unfortunately the final record 
has not survived and the outcome is unknown.274 
      Looking again at Maud’s case, one intriguing point is that the court adjudged her 
profession to be void because no abbess or prioress had been present, rather than, as 
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she maintained, because she had been forced into a religious life. It could be inferred 
that the court considered the argument of her unwillingness and her tender age to be 
insufficient. This raises questions as to whether forcing an underage child into a 
monastery or nunnery was legal, whether an underage profession could be legally 
binding, and at what age it was considered legal to make a profession. According to 
The Decretals of Gregory IX (1234),275 a true profession should be made willingly by 
an unmarried person once they had reached the age of discretion.276 The minimum age 
for a profession was thirteen for girls and fifteen for boys, therefore any profession 
made before those ages would be considered invalid. However, secular court could not 
decide whether a profession was valid or not, as this clearly came under the scope of 
ecclesiastical law. 277  This is why, in Maud’s case, the secular court could only 
investigate with due procedural justice. In Maud’s case, it is not known when she had 
made the profession, only that she did so ‘at such a tender age’. It may be assumed, 
however, that she took it before turning thirteen, since her guardians asserted that even 
after she came of age she remained in the nunnery, meaning that she must have been 
under thirteen when she professed, which was against ecclesiastical law.  
      It was common to see a co-heiress go to court to claim her reasonable share because 
other co-heiresses had taken all the inheritance and left her with nothing. A case 
recorded in Bedfordshire eyre in 1276 reflects such a situation. Isabel de Lungeville 
made a claim against John of Braybrooke and his wife, Joan, Isabel’s sister, for a moiety 
of a knight’s fee with appurtenances in Barford and Colmworth, as her share from her 
father Richard Oyldeboef. She said her father had died in his demesne as of fee, and the 
land descended to her and Joan, as daughters and heiresses, but Joan and her husband, 
John, held everything, withholding her reasonable share.278   
      Joan and John said they were not obliged to answer because Isabel had previously 
brought a writ of right patent concerning the same moiety in the county, and that it had 
subsequently been removed before the justices at Westminster. Therefore, Isabel 
withdrew her writ.279 As both this case and Maud’s show, both plaintiffs claimed that 
                                                
275 The Decretals of Gregory IX are a significant source of medieval canon law. They were designed to 
be a new, authentic and universal collection of law. F. Donald Logan, Runaway Religious in Medieval 
England, c. 1240-1540 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4.  
276 Ibid., 10.	
277 Ibid., 10-12.  
278 The Earliest English Law Reports, ed. Brand, vol. 3, 46-47 / The Earliest English Law Reports, ed. 
Brand, vol. 1, 97-98.  
279 Ibid.   
		
	
82	
they had nothing, whilst their counter-parties claimed to hold everything. This may 
suggest that while equal division was the principle of female succession, the distribution 
between sisters was frequently unfair, with the more powerful co-heiress likely to take 
the others’ shares.280  
      Numerous cases suggest that heiresses came to court with their husbands because 
married women could not act in the courts as femme sole. Also, disputes between co-
heiresses became more complicated once they were married. The following case shows 
the conflicts between three sisters concerning an inheritance which might have been 
given as a gift to one of the daughters and her husband. When an heiress married, her 
husband could dispose of his wife’s property as long as he had her consent, hence her 
inheritance meant as much to him as it did to her.  
       In 1290, John du Boys and his wife, Agnes, brought a writ of ‘de rationabili parte’, 
also called ‘nuper obiit’ in 1290, against Lucy of Heswall and Juliana, for a ‘third part 
of a third part of a certain amount of lands’ upon the death of Henry, their grandfather. 
John and Agnes said that Henry was seised in his demesne, and that from Henry the 
right descended to Agnes, as daughter and heiress. Agnes had three daughters, Lucy, 
Juliana and Agnes, John du Boys’ wife. This couple claimed that Lucy and Juliana held 
the entirety, thus Agnes was not entitled to as her share.281  
    In response to John and Agnes, Lucy and Juliana argued that Agnes and her husband 
were seised of one messuage and three acres of arable land with appurtenances from 
Robert and Agnes, to hold for her and her heirs. They further pointed out ‘that one 
messuage and three acres of land were given to John du Boys and his wife in frank-
marriage;282 and unless they put it into hotchpot with the remainder, we do not think 
that they can demand her rightful portion’.283  
      Faced with the other two sisters’ demands, the representative of Agnes and John 
said that these tenements – i.e., one messuage and three acres of land – were given to 
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John and his heirs in fee simple, and not to John and Agnes in frank-marriage. In order 
to prove his statement, the representative provided a charter with witnesses and a fine, 
showing that the gift was in fee simple, and not in frank-marriage, as they had said. 
However, Lucy and Juliana insisted that the said tenements were given to John and 
Agnes in frank-marriage. Afterwards both parties asked to summon a jury.284  
      The issue of the case was whether the disputed tenement was maritagium or not. 
Lucy and Juliana insisted that the said tenements were granted in frank-marriage, 
therefore Agnes should put her maritagium back into the inheritance pot, so that the 
three sisters could divide the whole inheritance equally.285 On the other hand, Agnes 
and her husband, John, argued that the said tenements were granted to John and his 
heirs, which meant they were not obliged to return the disputed tenements. This case 
shows that, when a husband’s interests were involved, inheritances between co-
heiresses became more complex. From the point of view of the husband, maritagium 
was the property intended for his new family and he certainly did not expect to return 
it. However, the co-heiresses, on the contrary, preferred to receive the entirety of the 
inheritance, which meant that the daughter who had already been endowed with 
maritagium from the inheritance should return it so that the inheritance could be fairly 
shared in its entirety.  
    Co-heiresses were not always sisters; sometimes the relationship could be as aunts 
and nieces. In 1278, a case involved a conflict between a great-niece and her great-aunt. 
William of Horsendon, who had three sisters, Idonea, Beatrice and Joan, held eighty 
acres with appurtenances in Shenley. Idonea had no children and it is unknown whether 
Joan had issue. Beatrice had one son, Henry, and one daughter, Margery. Henry had a 
daughter called Agnes, and Margery had one son named William. After the death of 
William of Horsendon, his sister Beatrice, and Joan and Beatrice’s daughter, Margery, 
took possession and divided the property equally. However, Agnes, the daughter of 
Henry, brought a writ of nuper obiit against Joan because Joan had received everything 
and she had received nothing.286     
      In response to Agnes’ claim, Joan said that Margery died seised so the right to her 
share descended to William, as the son and heir, who was presently in possession. She 
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did not want to answer in the absence of the parcener, William. However, Agnes argued 
that Margery had no right to inherit because Henry was the son and the heir.287 Agnes’ 
argument seems to correspond to the rule of inheritance – male precedes female – so it 
was reasonable for Agnes to win the suit. Nevertheless, Joan contended that Henry was 
born before the marriage, so he could not be the legitimate heir of Beatrice. Eventually, 
Joan said that she only held about one messuage and thirty acres of the questioned 
tenements, and she would surrender one half of what she held to Agnes as her 
reasonable share.288  
    According to the rule of inheritance, it was Henry who should inherit Beatrice’s share, 
so Agnes had good reason to claim her share; but Joan’s argument meant that Margery 
was the only legitimate heir of Beatrice, which would disinherit Agnes and ensure that 
she could no longer claim her share of William’s inheritance.289 No judgment was made 
in this case, nor did the jury declare whether Henry was born before the marriage. 
Instead, Joan and Agnes settled the dispute, which was regarded as an agreement 
between them.  
    Situations could also be complicated when there was no kinship between the 
potential heiresses. In 1285, at the Northamptonshire eyre, Maud, wife of William, 
brought a writ of mort d’ancestor against Joan, wife of Alan de Charytres. The 
inheritance in question was from a woman named Brune, Joan’s mother. Brune had 
married twice, and in the first marriage, she bore two children, Simon and Joan; in the 
second marriage, she had John, as the heir, with her husband, Peter Basset, who 
remarried after Brune’s death, and fathered Maud, the plaintiff. Brune’s inheritance 
descended to John, the heir from her second marriage with Peter Basset.290 The issue in 
this case was, to whom should John’s inheritance descend? 
      John’s inheritance came from Brune, so in this case, although both Joan and Maud 
were the half-blood sisters of John, they could not be the co-heiresses; instead, they 
were rival heiresses. The inheritance could only descend to the closest heir. The serjeant 
on Joan’s side said that the inheritance came from Brune, and as the daughter of Brune, 
Joan was the closer heir. The serjeant from Maud’s side argued that Brune had 
enfeoffed Hervey of Borham, who afterwards gave the land to Peter Basset, Maud’s 
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father. From Peter, the fee and right descended to John, and since Maud was Peter’s 
daughter, the sister and heir of John, she had the right to succeed to the land.291 
    In order to protect Joan’s right to inherit, her serjeant revealed another piece of 
evidence, a charter made by Hervey. It suggested that Hervey had given the land to 
Peter and Brune and the heirs of their bodies. Thus, if they died without any heir of 
their own, the land was to remain with Simon, the son of Simon Maunce, Brune’s first 
husband. If Simon should die without an heir the land was to remain with his sister, 
Joan, the current tenant. As if to strengthen his point, the serjeant added, ‘We also tell 
you that by law it is essential that the charter should come to court because it is 
conditional and the condition cannot be proved by a jury’.292 
      The presence of the charter was unexpected to Maud, since her serjeant said they 
knew nothing about it. The justice, Saham,293 judged that, because of the charter, Maud 
and William should take nothing.294 Although both Joan and Maud were John’s half-
blood sisters, thus potential heiresses, the inheritance had belonged to Brune, so Joan 
was considered to be a closer heir than Maud, who had no kinship with Brune. However, 
the key point that allowed Joan to win was her status as heiress, confirmed by the charter 
which clearly stated that Joan should be the heir.  
        
3.4 Collaboration between co-heiresses 
      In spite of the distressing fact that co-heiress siblings were so often set against each 
other, a number of cases do show how they cooperated in order to defeat their opponents. 
In 1220, three sisters, Idonea, Margery and Elizabeth, came to court together, with their 
husbands, to answer Roger de Sumervill for an intrusion. The sisters were accused of 
intruding on the land of Maud, who had held property in Cosinton. After Maud’s death, 
the land descended to Roger. However, the sisters retorted that they held the said land 
by inheritance from Maud. Roger was afterwards found to be their brother, so they had 
actually been born of the same parents. The judgment was that Roger should hold the 
land in question.295 It could be inferred that the sisters and Roger were half-blood 
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siblings, so they had disputes about the inheritance from Maud. The case clearly shows 
the co-operation between the sisters and that, in jointly challenging a rival heir, they 
were willing to form an alliance in order to prevent their share of the inheritance 
dwindling, or worse, being taken away. 
      Sometimes, a co-heiress would ally with another against the third. In 1236, Cecily 
and her sister, Agatha, challenged their sister, Isabel, for their share of inheritance from 
their father, William de Hardres. Isabel occupied the others’ shares, eighty acres of 
wood in Hardres. Afterwards, she admitted their rights and agreed to concede a moiety 
of the wood to them in return for which they would do her the service of two parts of a 
knight’s fee. By doing so, Cecily and Agatha quitclaimed all rights in the other half to 
Isabel and her heirs.296  
      Forming an alliance could offer an heiress a better chance of winning a suit, hence 
it was sensible for co-heiresses to form groups. In 1237, Isabel of Fleet and Gunnora of 
Fleet appeared with their husbands against Christine and her husband, and Alice, 
daughter of John, for their reasonable share – a half share of ten acres of land with 
appurtenances in East Fleet and the middle part of twenty-acres of land with 
appurtenances in West Fleet. They also claimed to be the heiresses of John of Fleet, 
who also was Alice and Christine’s father. In the end, Richard de Grenehelde, 
Christine’s husband, and Alice, gave half a mark to the plaintiffs to make an agreement. 
A year later, they reached a final concord in court. Isabel and Gunnora quitclaimed their 
rights and that of their heirs to Christine, Alice and their respective heirs. In return, 
Christine and Alice granted Isabel and Gunnora 3s 6d of rent in Smarden to be received 
every year.297 This case reveals a major difference between female and male succession. 
The ‘equal division’ among co-heiresses led to a plethora of outcomes and differences 
of opinions, because the division could never be equal, and each might have thought 
the others’ shares to be more valuable, in that they could produce greater profits.298  
      An agreement between co-heiresses about the division of inheritance is sometimes 
misleading, since they might have consented to the allocation reluctantly and had no 
choice but to agree. A confirmation made by Richard I of the division of the inheritance 
of William de Say (c. 1133-1177) in 1198 shows extremely unfair terms between co-
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heiresses which caused them to inherit a lesser share in 1218. William de Say had two 
heiress daughters, Beatrice and Maud. The land, called Brinnington, with its 
appurtenances remained forever in the hands of the younger Maud, and her heirs, 
together with the service of William de Reigny and Ralph, son of Bernard. Moreover, 
Maud ought to have ten liberates of land from the first acquisition, or escheat, of their 
inheritance to remain for her and her heirs by hereditary right. The rest of the inheritance 
had been given up by Maud and her heirs to her elder sister, when she and her heirs 
quitclaimed everything to Beatrice, including demesnes, services, homages, tenements, 
and all rights and hereditary claims that their ancestors held at any time without any 
reservation. Furthermore, the agreement demanded the sisters’ husbands, Geoffrey fitz 
Peter (c. 1162-1213) and William de Buckland (c. 1155-1216) should faithfully follow 
the agreement. Therefore, Maud, her husband and their heirs could not claim any 
right.299  
      The case was deceptive as it involved complicated politics concerning the king’s 
interests. As stated in Henry I’s Coronation Charter, the king had absolute power to 
dictate in matters concerning heiresses’ marriages and inheritances. In this case, 
Richard I showed his favouritism to the elder sister, Beatrice. Even if Maud was 
frustrated by an inequitable partition, she was not in a position to object. Jennifer Ward 
points out that this partition between Maud and Beatrice was unequal because Beatrice 
was married to Geoffrey fitz Peter, who was a justiciar between 1198 and 1213, and 
hence they received the greater share. 300  Maud eventually agreed, no matter how 
reluctantly, but in 1218, following the death of Geoffrey fitz Peter and William de 
Buckland, she claimed her reasonable share, which is testament to her frustration with 
the original partition. Unfortunately, after an adjournment, the case disappeared from 
the record, so whether Maud claimed more of her share back from Beatrice remains a 
mystery.301  
    A glimpse into the disputes and collaboration between co-heiresses shows how many 
conflicts were caused by partible inheritance, since truly equal division was practically 
impossible and it also seemed likely that women would encounter more difficulties than 
their male counterparts when managing their shares. The next section, therefore, will 
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focus on how heiresses managed their inheritance through various kinds of legal actions 
and property transactions, including grants, exchanges, purchases, leases and 
agreements. It will also examine the husband’s interests after marrying an heiress.   
 
3.5 Her inheritance and her husband’s interests 
      As a woman with property, an heiress enjoyed the right to dispose of her inheritance 
or manage it by granting, exchanging, or selling it in order to gain more profit. However, 
once married, her freedom to dispose of it dwindled. The following section will 
examine cases that show the different strategies heiresses used to manage their 
inheritance in order to accrue more profit. It will also show the means by which a 
woman and her husband might manage their property and estate to achieve maximum 
benefit.  
      The first case, however, is rather sad because the heiress unwittingly granted her 
land to another, which caused the loss of her inheritance. Christine and her sister Joan 
brought a writ of mort d’ancestor302 against Henry de Somerville, and the assize came 
to give its verdict on whether Richard Wassand, the father of Christine and Joan, died 
seised of his demesne as of fee of two acres of arable with appurtenances in 
Worthington. Henry brought a charter which showed that Christine had enfeoffed him 
with all the land that the sisters were claiming. The assize found that, after the death of 
Richard, his wife, Joan, was in seisin of the contended tenements because the couple 
had acquired the land jointly. While the said sisters were in wardship, as Richard’s heirs, 
Joan, their mother had Christine make the said charter in order to benefit Henry, her 
son by her first husband. To render the charter void, the sisters said that Joan had always 
remained in seisin, so Christine held none of the disputed land during Joan’s lifetime 
and her grant was invalid. The jurors subsequently said that Joan had surrendered land 
to Christine, so she was in seisin for two days and subsequently enfeoffed Henry on 
lease through the charter.303 The judgment was:  
It was then said that even shorter seisin would have been quite sufficient to 
grant an estate to another because, where the fee and right is in the person to 
whom the surrender is made by the livery of a glove, the surrender would be 
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sufficient and would be valid in perpetuity.304 It has been found by the assize 
that the said Christine had sufficient seisin of the said land by the surrender of 
the said Joan as of her right and inheritance and also she acknowledges the 
said charter to be her deed, it is adjudged that Christine is to take nothing in 
relation to a moiety of the said land by this writ. And Joan her sister is to 
recover her seisin of a moiety of the said land against the said Henry.305  
Hence it was adjudged that, no matter how short the time during which a person had 
seisin, it would be sufficient to grant an estate. Therefore, Christine’s charter was 
legally binding, no matter how hard she argued that her mother, Joan, had forced her to 
make the enffeoment because Joan wanted to benefit her son from another marriage, 
Henry. Although Christine eventually took nothing, fortunately Joan, the other co-
heiress, had not made any action in relation to the disputed land, so she was allowed to 
recover her seisin. It is particularly noticeable that the law did not remove both of the 
heiresses’ rights to recover land just because they had made a false claim together. 
Hence Christine was allowed the opportunity to have her share once her sister, Joan, 
recovered the inheritance.  
      Similarly, the following case shows how an heiress attempted to make her 
enfeoffment void to regain her inheritance. In 1293, Alice, who was underage, and her 
sister, Joan, brought a writ of mort d’ancestor on the death of their father against one 
B. The representative of B. admitted that their father died seised, but afterwards the 
sisters enfeoffed B. of a tenement. Moreover, they released and quitclaimed the land to 
B. To prove his statement, B. had put forward a charter made by Alice and Joan as 
confirmation. The representative of the sisters firstly admitted that the charter was their 
deed, but said that they were never seised of the questioned tenement so they could not 
have enfeoffed B. Therefore, the charter was void.306 Although the outcome of the case 
is not recorded, it is thought that, if the charter were valid, there would be little chance 
of the sisters winning. The strategy Alice and Joan used is reminiscent of Christine’s 
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case. The heiresses in both cases tried to void the enfeoffment by asserting that they 
had never been in seisin, and consequently should not have been liable for any 
enfeoffment which harmed their inheritances.  
      Unlike the above-mentioned cases, the following show how heiresses managed 
their inheritances. Between 1270 and 1271, Matilda, daughter and heiress of Adam de 
Stanborne, granted Adam Perceval of Portsmouth, for the sum of 8 marks, all her 
tenements with houses that she had inherited from her father. Adam was to pay half a 
pound of cumin or a halfpenny to Matilda every year.307 Another release made between 
1293 and 1294 shows that Emma and Edith, the daughters and heiresses of Robert de 
Merton, granted to Roger, vicar of Kingston, their right, by a rent payable to them, to 
land in Norbiton at Le Goldbeters and land in Kingston at Le Meydenelond.308  
      Women with inheritance, especially with real estates, could profit from their 
inheritance in miscellaneous ways. The two cases mentioned above suggest that by 
leasing or granting their land to others, heiresses received cash, grain and, more 
importantly, specific items that they required. These profits could continue not only 
during the woman’s lifetime but also during her heirs’.  
      As demonstrated earlier, the relationship between co-heiresses was often unfriendly 
because of disputes over inheritance, but some final concords of disputes between co-
heiresses show a capacity for mutual agreement. Isabel and Agnes went to court against 
each other for a moiety of one carucate of land in Aylesford, Sifleton, Ryarsh and 
Farleigh, which had belonged to their father, Ingram de Sifleton. Isabel claimed this to 
be her right, and Agnes admitted it. Therefore, Isabel granted Agnes, her husband and 
their heirs two thirds in demesne of the moiety of that carucate of land. In return, Agnes 
was to pay 20s every year during the lifetime of their mother, Lucy, who held the third 
part of the demesne in dower. After Lucy’s death, Agnes could have the third part. 
Together with the other two parts, Agnes and her heirs should, by then, render 30s 
yearly to Isabel and her heirs. By doing this, Isabel and her heirs would acquit the 
moiety of the aforesaid carucate of land against the chief lords of that fee and their heirs, 
from all services belonging to that moiety.309 This agreement made the obligations on 
both parties clear and demonstrated the significance of making inheritance profitable. 
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By granting the land to Agnes, Isabel received continuous income from Agnes yearly, 
not only for her lifetime but also for her heirs’ lifetimes. Moreover, she and her heirs 
would be exempt from the services of the moiety of the carucate. In addition, she would 
obtain more cash after their mother’s death, and was spared the inconvenience of 
dividing the dower share of Lucy as the sisters’ inheritance.   
      Whilst these cases show heiresses’ ability to manage inheritances, it should not be 
forgotten that, once an heiress married, her inheritance mattered not only to her, but 
also to her husband, her husband’s family, her heirs and even her natal family. In the 
case of families rich in real estate, the heiress’s husband was able to benefit from his 
wife’s inheritance, either financially or politically. The Beauchamp family, for instance, 
demonstrated just how much a husband could obtain from his wife’s inheritance. 
William (IV) de Beauchamp (c. 1238-1298), ninth Earl of Warwick, was the son of 
William (III) de Beauchamp of Elmley and Isabel Mauduit. Isabel inherited the earldom 
of Warwick when her brother was confirmed as dying without a direct heir. After her 
brother’s death, the earldom of Warwick fell on her son, William (IV) de Beauchamp. 
The inheritance from the Mauduit family made a significant impact on the 
Beauchamp’s family standing. William inherited the office of Chamberlain of the 
Exchequer, while through his father he became the hereditary Sheriff of Worcestershire 
and hereditary pantler310 at royal coronations. Between 1261 and 1268, William not 
only increased the family’s estate by succeeding to the earldom of Warwick, but also 
by marrying Matilda, daughter of John fitz Geoffrey (c. 1206-1258), who inherited a 
quarter of her father’s property and merged it with assets in the Beauchamp family.311  
     Expanding a family’s estates by marrying an heiress was commonplace within 
upper-class families. Apart from the Beauchamps, many families increased their lands 
by forming alliances with heiresses. The d’Abenon family are one such example. They 
were a knightly family who held lands from 1086 onwards. By extending their estates 
they became prominent in Surrey without needing to participate in national affairs. 
Around 1100, the family held some lands in Freston, Albury and West Molesey, Surrey. 
In 1234 the family already held numerous estates in Surrey and Bedfordshire, so that 
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by the time Gilbert d’Abenon (d. 1236) married Maud de la Lote, a neighbouring child 
heiress who brought lands at Headley close to Fetcham, they had acquired numerous 
estates. It seemed that the family were eager to expand their estates by marrying brides 
from adjacent families. For example, Gilbert’s son, John d’Abenon, married Avelina, a 
member of the Chaworth family, because he was interested in the lands they held in 
Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire.312 The Beauchamps and the d’Abenons exemplify 
how important an heiress was to her husband’s family and they also demonstrate the 
various marital strategies employed by the gentry and nobles. In essence, marriage was 
not about love, but about estates.  
Similarly, as Mitchell suggests in Portraits of Medieval Women, when William de 
Ferrers (c. 1193-1254), 5th Earl of Derby, and his wife, Sibyl Marshal (c. 1209-1245) 
arranged marriages for their seven daughters, they directly, or indirectly, linked them 
to the Marshal orbit of political and marital alliances, reinforcing the circle of the 
Marshal-Chester family. Mitchell points out that the family’s orbit was moving towards 
the maternal instead of the paternal side, which suggests that the husband’s family could 
share in and benefit from his wife’s status, which is the opposite of what historians and 
anthropologists tend to believe – that a wife shared the status of her husband.313 
      Once an heiress married, her inheritance became a family issue, not only for her 
natal family but also for that of her husband. Every legal action concerning her 
inheritance had to have her husband’s approval, and she could not manage it without 
his consent. Thus, every legal action that happened in relation to an heiress’s inheritance 
shows the will of a ‘unit’. A case in point is Isolda of Cardinham (c. 1235-1301), the 
heiress of the barony of Cardinham, who administered her inheritance alongside her 
husband. The Cardinham estates lay almost exclusively in Cornwall and even though 
Isolda’s father, Andrew of Cardinham, was one of the foremost barons in Cornwall, 
they had little influence outside of the county. Before Isolda succeeded to the barony, 
it had been inherited by males for seven generations, and was influential within 
Cornwall. Isolda married Thomas de Tracy (c. 1224-1266) at the age of nineteen, and 
following his death, she married William de Ferrers (c. 1225-1279) in 1267. The 
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following records show how she and her first husband, Thomas, administered her 
inheritance.  
Between 1259 and 1260 the couple came to court to make an agreement with Hugh 
of Cardinham. The two parties had been in dispute concerning two parts of the manors 
of Bodwithgy and Arrallas. The case was settled when Hugh granted them the said 
tenements in exchange for the manor of Ludgvan. There was one condition, that should 
Hugh die without a blood heir, the tenements he granted to Isolda and Thomas would 
revert to Hugh. Likewise, the manor of Ludgvan, which Thomas and Isolda granted to 
Hugh, would revert to them and their heirs forever. Furthermore, the agreement even 
mentioned the dower of Hugh’s wife, Amya. If Amya survived Hugh and Hugh had no 
blood heir, the manor of Ludgvan would become Amya’s dower. However, if Amya 
demanded the two parts of the manor of Bodwithgy and Arrallas as her dower, the 
manor of Ludgvan would revert to Thomas and Isolda.314 
Two years after this agreement was made, Thomas and Isolda made another 
arrangement concerning Isolda’s inheritance with Henry de Tracy (c. 1251-1311). 
Thomas and Isolda confirmed that they granted Henry one messuage and one 
ploughland in Arrallas as gift. If Isolda died without an heir from her body, the said 
tenements would remain with Henry forever. Yet, if Isolda had an heir from her body 
the tenements would descend to that heir after Henry’s death. Hence, Henry was able 
to enjoy the land during his lifetime even if Isolda had an heir.315 After the death of 
William, Isolda became a widowed heiress. During her widowhood the town of 
Lostwithiel and the castle at Restormel were acquired by Richard, Earl of Cornwall, 
and in the following year she sold the manors of Bodardle and Cardinham to Oliver de 
Dinham, lord of Hartland, Devon, which augmented the Dinham family’s estates. At 
about the same time, she conveyed Tywardreath and Ludgvan to Henry de 
Campernulf.316 Although her land management in her widowhood eliminated Dinham’s 
family’s lands, Isolda demonstrated that an heiress could remain active in managing 
estates both during her marriage and in her widowhood.  
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      The Basset sisters, from the barony of Headington also demonstrate how an 
inheritance went from ‘a business between sisters’ to ‘a business led by a husband’. 
Thomas Basset II (c. 1156-1220) died leaving three daughters as heirs: Philippa, Joan 
and Alice. Each inherited one-third of the barony. Philippa took Headington as her share 
and she died around 1265. Joan took the lands in Colynton and also died around 1265. 
Both their shares thus fell to Alice, who had originally taken Whitford in Devon as her 
share. Consequently, her inheritance increased from one-third to the whole barony. 
Alice married twice and had three daughters, Margery, Ela and Isabel, by her second 
marriage.317 The three co-heiresses had sufficient land – indeed far more than they 
would have expected to have. The allotment of their inheritance was arranged by 
Isabel’s husband, Hugh de Plessetis from the barony of Hook Norton, who gave lands 
to Margery and Ela in exchange for their share of Headington.318 It is not known 
whether Hugh managed his wife’s property on her behalf, or whether he acted on his 
own will; however, the records do show that he had acted in his family’s best interests, 
and that they had acted as a unit. This particular case appears to have been typical of 
the relationship between husband and wife when it came to managing the wife’s 
inheritance. The record also suggests that, after marriage, an heiress could not dispose 
of her inheritance for her own interests, but for the couple’s joint interests.    
 
3.6 Difficulties of claiming their inheritances in court 
      For an heiress, inheritance was not a birth right. She became ‘the heir’ when there 
was no male heir, and due to the equal division of inheritance between co-heiresses, as 
has been shown above, she was likely to encounter more obstacles than a sole male heir 
when claiming her inheritance and subsequently. What difficulties might an heiress face 
when demanding her inheritance in thirteenth-century England? The next section will 
examine those difficulties, as well as those faced by widows, and how women tackled 
them in court. 
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3.6.1 The clash between inheritance and dower 
The conflict between inheritance and dower often caused clashes between widows 
and heirs. A widow was entitled to her dower, which was one-third of her husband’s 
property, from the death of her husband until her own death. The husband’s heir could 
only obtain the dower share after the widow had passed away. According to Glanvill, a 
suit between the heir and the widow could be infinitely varied because the latter might 
claim her dower as either a nominated or reasonable dower. If the former, the heir 
should let her have her nominated dower; if the latter, the heir should assign her the 
third part of all the freehold tenements of her late husband who had held them in his 
demesne.319 Conflicts occurred when widows took legal action on their dower, because 
they might harm the heir’s interests, for example by alienating the dower. In such a 
situation, the Statute of Gloucester c. 7 regulated the recovery of dower by heirs: 
 
Likewise if a woman sells or gives in fee or for term of life the tenement that 
she holds in dower, it is established that the heir or other person to whom the 
land ought to revert after the woman’s death, shall at once have recovery to 
demand the land by a writ of entry made therefore in the chancery.320    
       
      The clash between dower and inheritance also occurred when there were male heirs, 
so what was the difference when an heiress and a widow were involved? If only one 
heiress appeared against a widow, their respective situations might not have been so 
different. When the heiress was married then she would attend court in her husband’s 
company. However, if there were multiple co-heiresses, the situation could vary. A 
coalition might be formed by co-heiresses against the widow. In other circumstances, 
it could prove to be a particularly hostile court room.   
      In 1242, Katherine, who had been the wife of Roger of Sudbury, claimed against 
William of Liketon the third part of twenty-acres of land with appurtenances in Newton 
as her dower. For this land, she demanded that William should call Christine and 
Beatrice, daughters and heiresses of the said Roger, to warrant him. The sisters, who 
were in the custody of Katherine, argued that they had no land which they were able to 
warrant because their father Robert did not die seised of the property except for one 
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messuage in Sudbury, which Katherine held in dower. In response to the sisters, she 
insisted that she ought to hold the said messuage for her lifetime as long as she remained 
unmarried, whether the heirs came of age or not, according to the custom in 
Sudbury’.321  
      William retorted that Katherine only held half of the messuage as her nominated 
dower and the other half she held through wardship of the heiresses. Contrary to 
Katherine’s statement regarding the Sudbury custom, he said the actual custom was that 
no woman would hold more than half a messuage in which her husband died seised 
after the heirs came of age. William pointed out that Katherine ought not to have her 
dower because Roger never held the ten acres that she demanded in his demesne, neither 
at the time of marriage nor afterwards, so he had not been able to endow her. A jury 
was summoned to testify whether Robert had been seised of the ten acres during the 
marriage and whether the custom mentioned in Sudbury was true, i.e., that a woman 
could hold the whole messuage for her lifetime after the death of her husband, even 
after the heir came of age.322 The record shows that the case ended with a concession, 
but it does not record the final judgment.  
      This case shows a widow withholding the heiresses’ inheritance according to local 
custom. If the local custom in Sudbury had actually been as Katherine indicated, it 
could be inferred that Christine and Beatrice might never have obtained their 
inheritance, which might have profoundly harmed their interests. This case also reveals 
the sometimes rocky relationship between the common law and local customs. The 
judges from the royal courts seemed to be unfamiliar with local customs, hence they 
needed a jury to confirm them. It is also obvious that, once the local customs were 
verified, the judges would prioritise them over the common law.  
      Heirs and heiresses in the thirteenth century did not expect the dower share to fall 
to them as an inheritance immediately on the deaths of their fathers, because widows 
would hold them for the rest of their lives. If an heir’s father had no wife to survive him, 
he or she would have a greater expectation of inheritance. Before 1290,323 Alice, Joan 
and Margery brought a writ of mort d’ancestor together as co-heiresses on the death of 
their brother, Robert, against the master of the hospital at Bedford.324 The master’s 
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lawyer argued that Robert was still alive so the co-heiresses could not claim the 
inheritance. The evidence of ‘living Robert’, however, lies in another litigation. A 
certain widow called Robert to warrant regarding the contended tenement, which she 
held in dower, and she was impleaded by this master. The ‘living Robert’ eventually 
defaulted, so the master recovered seisin. Robert’s default proved the master’s 
argument that he was still alive. However, this unknown Robert had assigned part of 
his inheritance as this widow’s dower. Apparently, the three sisters did not know their 
brother was still alive nor did they foresee that their inheritance had been assigned as 
dower for a stranger. This woman might well have been a total stranger to them. The 
case suggests that heirs’ and heiresses’ expectations of inheritance were easily 
demolished by widows, especially unpredicted ones, because they were not able to 
inherit the dower land until widows died. This created numerous uncertainties. For 
instance, the heir might die before the widow’s death, and have no chance to enjoy his 
or her inheritance.325 
Curtesy also posed a threat to an heir’s inheritance. A case recorded before 1290 
involved a man who had married a woman with a carucate of land with appurtenances 
granted in frank-marriage to their heirs. They had two daughters.326 After the man died, 
the woman remarried and had a son named Alan. After the woman’s death, the two 
daughters brought a writ of mort d’ancestor against the second husband. The 
representative of this second husband said he could not answer without the presence of 
Alan, the rightful heir, since the second husband held the land in curtesy.327  
In order to support the two co-heiresses’ rights, their representative argued that the 
second husband only had free tenements on the land, and the fee and right belonged to 
the sisters because the feoffment had been made to the woman, her first husband and 
their heirs, namely the two sisters. The final judgment is not recorded.328 In this case, 
the heiresses not only faced the withholding of their inheritance, but they were also 
threatened with losing it completely since the son born from the second marriage might 
have been regarded as the rightful heir. The sisters stood a better chance of winning 
back their inheritance if the said carucate of land with appurtenances was confirmed to 
have been given to their parents and the heirs of their bodies. Although both dower and 
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curtesy could delay the timing of inheritance, in theory, heirs were expected to receive 
it after people who held dower or property by curtesy had died. Nonetheless, the 
situation could be far more complicated than described here, creating a real threat of 
loss of inheritance.  
       
3.6.2 Requiring the presence of all the co-heiresses as a strategy  
      Obstacles impeded both male and female heirs, but there were some difficulties 
faced by an heiress that a male heir seldom encountered. The most obvious one is the 
demand for the presence of all co-heiresses in court. When an inheritance came to males, 
there was usually only one heir, since there were considerably fewer successions by 
plural male heirs than by co-heiresses. When a co-heiress came to court, without the 
other co-heiresses, to demand her right of inheritance, she might be rejected by her 
opponent.329 In 1274, Hervey of Boreham was summoned to answer Robert de Bracy 
and his wife Maud in relation to a plea that he had prevented them from presenting a 
suitable rector to a moiety of the church of Halstead. Maud had three other sisters, 
Eleanor, Joan and Idonea, all of whom were co-heiresses of their father, William, and 
they had divided the inheritance between them. However, Hervey said he was not 
obliged to answer them because the couple also acknowledged that Maud had three 
sisters as co-heiresses who were not named in the writ.330  
Likewise, the case mentioned on page 83-84 shows an unwillingness on the part 
of the defendant to respond because of the nonattendance of the parceners. When Agnes 
demanded her share of her inheritance against her grandaunt, Joan, she was refused an 
answer unless William, the heir of Margery, one of the co-heiresses in the case, was 
present.331 The presence of all co-heiresses was a double-edged sword because, in some 
cases, it brought a great advantage to co-heiresses. Referring to arguably the most 
powerful heiresses in the country at that time, the Ferrers sisters, Linda E. Mitchell 
suggested: 
Having multiple coheirs was an advantage for the defendant because by law, 
all of the heirs had to be listed in the writ and all had to appear before the case 
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could be heard in court. It must have been impossible for a plaintiff to win a 
case in which over thirteen powerful co-defendants were involved.332  
In the case of the Ferrers sisters, they were lucky in that no opponent was as resourceful 
and wealthy as they were. Although the chances of facing a group of powerful co-
heiresses, such as the Ferrers sisters, were slim, it would be extremely tough for a 
litigant. Even though they might not be noble women, a plurality of opponents suggests 
both resources and strategic superiority. Alternatively, though, requiring the presence 
of all co-heiresses was frustrating, resulting in delays that their opponents frequently 
used to their advantage.  
I suggest that requiring the presence of all co-heiresses often gave legal opponents 
a good reason not to answer their writ, and could be used as a tactic to delay the 
proceedings in order to have more time to equip themselves with effective strategies 
for winning the suit. The need for all co-heiresses to be present, therefore, was only 
beneficial for women if they were organised as a coalition.    
 
3.7 Legal remedies for inheritance if alienated by a husband  
As shown in earlier cases, marrying an heiress could be greatly advantageous to a 
man because women with inheritances possessed land and money. How did husbands 
control their wives’ land? A statement in Glanvill might go some way to answer this 
question. He states: ‘Husbands of any women whatsoever cannot alienate any part of 
the inheritance of their wives without the consent of their heirs, nor remit any part of 
the right of those heirs, except for the term of their lives.’333 Therefore, if a husband 
wanted to alienate any part of his wife’s inheritance, he did not need her agreement. As 
a consequence, once an heiress married, she lost her independence and control of her 
property, which was held jointly with her husband. The husband also became entitled 
to take the fruits and profits of his wife’s land during the marriage. Based on this right, 
he could alienate his wife’s estate to another.334 Although such rights only extended for 
his lifetime, the husband’s alienation often caused trouble if his wife wanted to deny 
this disposition after his death.  
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A husband was able to sell, lease, alienate, grant and give land away without 
consulting his wife.335 The only instance where land was prevented from being given 
away was if the consent of the heir was not given, not that of the wife. The Statute of 
Gloucester c.3 states: 
It is likewise established that if a man alienates a tenement that he holds by 
the law of England, his son shall not be barred by the deed of his father, from 
whom no inheritance descended to him, from demanding and recovering his 
mother’s seisin by a writ of mort d’ancestor, even though his father’s charter 
states that he and his heirs are bound to warranty. And if an inheritance has 
descended to him from his father, then he shall be excluded from the value of 
the inheritance that has descended to him. And if an inheritance descends to 
him from the same father at a later date, then shall the tenant recover from him 
his mother’s seisin by a judicial writ that shall issue out of the rolls of the 
justices before whom the plea was pleaded, to resummon his warrantor, as has 
been done in other cases where the warrantor comes into court and says that 
nothing descended to him from him by whose deed he is vouched. In the same 
way the son’s issue [shall recover] by writ of ael, cosin and besael. Likewise, 
in the same way the heir of the wife, after the death of his father and mother 
shall not be barred from an action by his father’s charter, if he demands the 
inheritance or marriage of his mother by a writ of entry that his father alienated 
in the time of his mother, of which no fine is levied in the king’s court.336 
To elaborate on c.3, if the heir has no inheritance passed on to him because of his 
father’s alienation of his mother’s land, he or she could recover the mother’s seisin by 
the writ of mort d’ancestor. Similarly, the writ of entry could help the heir recover his 
mother’s inheritance, alienated during her lifetime by her husband, provided there were 
no fines levied in the king’s court. This condition denotes that if a fine was made for 
the alienation, then the heir would be incapable of recovering the mother’s inheritance, 
because, when the fine was levied, it indicated that the wife not only showed her consent 
to the alienation, but might also have been examined separately from her husband in 
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order to express her true opinion on the alienation. Therefore, only when the woman 
had truly agreed to the alienation could the fine be levied. 
If chapter 3 of the Statute of Gloucester only encompassed alienated land that 
could be recovered by the heir, was there any remedy for the wife to recover her land 
after the husband’s disposition? According to Bracton, she could bring a writ of entry 
saying the disputed land was ‘her right and inheritance (or her maritagium) and into 
which the aforesaid337 had no entry except for the aforesaid, her former husband, who 
demised it to him, whom she could not gainsay in his lifetime.’338 By the end of the 
thirteenth century, chapter 3 of the Statute of Westminster II further stipulated that, 
provided the wife survived her husband, she might have a chance to recover her land 
when the husband lost it by default, including being absent himself and refusing to 
defend his wife’s right or wishing to surrender it against his wife’s will. Chapter 3 
therefore enabled the wife to bring a writ of entry, cui ipsa in vita sua contradicere non 
potuit, which meant that during the husband’s lifetime she could not contradict his 
willingness to recover her land.339 However, she could only do this when she had been 
widowed, so she could only recover her land if she survived her husband. If she did not, 
her alienated inheritance could only be recovered by her heir if the heir was willing to 
do so.  
      While Bracton suggested that the writ of entry was a good strategy for a widow to 
recover the alienated land, the defendant had numerous ways to deny her rights. Bracton 
also suggested several possible defences that could be used against the wife. Firstly, it 
could be argued that the land was acquired through the wife before the marriage, or 
after the death of the husband. Secondly, a defendant might admit that he had obtained 
the land through the husband, but the wife had confirmed her husband’s alienation in 
widowhood. Thirdly, a defendant could answer that the widow was personally in the 
king’s court with her husband when the disputed land was alienated, and willingly 
agreed to the gift, because the king would not allow any coercion against her will in his 
court.340 The first and second arguments that Bracton suggested reveal that a woman’s 
control over her property dwindled after marriage. Ironically, when her single status 
bestowed on her full control of her property, it could at the same time function as an 
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effective defence for her opponent – full control, full liability. Bracton also noticed this, 
so he provided the above-mentioned arguments, considering a woman’s single status as 
a strong and effective tactic against women themselves. It was coercion by her husband 
that gave a woman the right to recover her property, because during the marriage she 
could not act of her own free will. As a married woman could only act as femme covert 
in courts, she was rendered effectively voiceless in legal proceedings. Significantly for 
this case, it concealed her identity as a free agent; maybe she had agreed to the gift, but 
still claimed that she had been coerced as a strategy. The truth remains hidden beneath 
a shroud of secrecy.  
      In response to such an unscrupulous tactic, Bracton advised another course of action 
for the defendant – to prove that a woman’s consent was shown in the royal court. If 
her consent was taken in private, then there was a high possibility that she succumbed 
to coercion; however, according to Bracton, the king did not permit any violence in the 
royal court, so if the defendant could prove that she gave the consent there, she would 
fail to recover her property.341 However, it was unthinkable that a woman would freely 
express herself in the royal courts. Furthermore, wives were often coerced into 
surrendering their property by their husbands out of fear of the threat of physical 
punishment. Glanvill clearly stated that wives could not gainsay their husbands’ 
alienation. However, such protection was limited and the husband’s desires were 
always a priority. This reflected women’s subordinate status during the Middle Ages. 
In addition to this kind of exploitation, an heiress could be exploited by her guardian, 
or the person holding her wardship. The next section will examine wardships over 
heiresses and their legal status in thirteenth-century England. 
 
3.8 Wardships and the legal status of heiresses 
      As stated in Glanvill, upon the death of their ancestors, the heirs of sokemen were 
placed in the custody of their nearest kindred. If the inheritance descended from the 
paternal side, custody fell on the maternal side; likewise, if the inheritance came from 
the maternal side, custody fell on the paternal side. However, if the heirs were female, 
they remained in the custody of their lords. If they were minors the custody would last 
until the wards were of age, during which time the lords were responsible for finding 
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them suitable marriages and assigning them their reasonable share of inheritance. Even 
if they were of full age, they still needed to remain in the custody of the lords until their 
lords assented to their marriages; otherwise, they could not marry. If a man had only a 
daughter or daughters and married them without the consent of his lord, he would be 
deprived of his inheritance forever. A father could also demand the licence to marry his 
daughter from the lord, who ought to either consent or show a just reason for rejection, 
and then the daughter could be married with her father’s advice contrary to the lord’s 
inclination.342  
      Unlike heiresses of sokemen, the heiresses and heirs of barons were not only under 
the custody of their lords but also had to pay relief to the king. Glanvill clearly states 
that ‘upon the death of a baron holding of him in chief, the king immediately retains 
the barony in his own hands, until the heir has given security for the relief, although the 
heir should be of full age’.343 Furthermore, the king had control over the marriage of 
barons’ daughters. In 1100, he issued a Charter of Liberties, which states in chapter 3: 
If any of my barons or other men should wish to give his daughter, sister, niece, 
or kinswoman in marriage, let him speak with me about it; but I will neither 
take anything from him for this permission nor prevent his giving her unless 
he should be minded to join her to my enemy. And if, upon the death of a 
baron or other of my men, a daughter is left as heir, I will give her with her 
land by the advice of my barons.344  
One hundred and twenty-five years later, the crown again showed its control over 
the heirs of nobles, and profited from them in chapter 2 of the 1225 Magna Carta, 
which states that:  
If any of our earls or barons or others holding of us in chief by knight service 
dies, and at his death his heir be of full age and owe relief he shall have his 
inheritance on payment of the old relief, namely the heir or heirs of an earl 
£100 for a whole earl’s barony, the heir or heirs of a baron £100 for a whole 
barony, the heir or heirs of a knight 100s, at most, for a whole knight’s fee; 
and he who owes less shall give less according to the ancient usage of fiefs.345 
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The crown’s interests were mostly limited to women of nobility or the rich because they 
held land. When arranging marriage for an heiress, the king had power over his men, 
so the husband would only be someone he thought acceptable. At the most basic level, 
the intended husband should not be the king’s enemy and should be financially or 
politically acceptable. 346  In order to secure his right of consent over heiresses’ 
marriages, the king would make sure that, if the heiress married without his permission, 
her inheritance would be forfeited to him as punishment.  
The following case shows how Margery, heiress of the Earl of Warwick, presented 
herself to Henry III at court. She promised that if she was betrothed before Ascension 
Day, or if she married without the king’s permission, all the lands she held in demesne, 
together with Warwick Castle, would be forfeited to him. Thus, marrying without 
permission was clearly profitable for the king, and could enable him to obtain more 
lands.347  
      The king and the lords were eager to retain the right to arrange wards’ marriages. 
Not only was this profitable, but it also created social alliances through the promotion 
of the lords themselves or their family members. In The Lordship of England - Royal 
Wardships and Marriages in English Society and Politics 1217-1327, Waugh points out 
that a successful bid for a wardship could result in substantial economic or social 
improvement. It did not always matter who the ward was, so long as he or she had 
ample land to strengthen the position of the potential partner. In landed families at least, 
the choice of partners for wards or widows was thus neither random nor accidental; it 
was aimed specifically at forging more powerful family alliances. Wardship was an 
important acquisition.348 
      For a lord, holding custody not only implied power over his men but also increased 
his dignity, by marking him as ‘a lord’. An intriguing case in 1211 tells of a lord’s rage 
when the eldest daughter of a knight married without his consent. The lord in question, 
Robert Maudit, complained that Robert Morin, the knight, coerced the eldest daughter 
of John Maudit into marriage without his consent. He would not accept the fine of 100 
marks and, furthermore, accused Robert Morin of using force to prevent him from 
entering his land.349 The lord’s consent to the ward’s marriage was not only a sign of 
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dignity, but was also of great value, since the wardship was treated as movable property. 
Guardians could sell, lease, bequeath, or apply them as collateral for loans. In the 
thirteenth century, the demand for land was rising, so money could easily be raised by 
leasing lands held in wardship, which caused wardship prices to increase substantially. 
In 1248, for instance, in Canterbury, the wardship of Cecily, the heiress of Michael 
Tanet, originally in the custody of Margaret, Countess of Lincoln, was later sold to one 
Joan for 100 marks.350 
Heiresses in custody could be vulnerable. A case in 1220 shows how one heiress 
was disinherited by her guardian. Geoffrey de Burnevill had two daughters, Maud and 
Alice. He gave their custody to John de Littlebury, who married his eldest son and heir, 
John, to Alice, and his younger son, Saer, to Maud. John and Alice had four children. 
John, the elder brother, wanted the whole inheritance, so he put Maud in Sopwell Priory, 
in an attempt to make her a nun.351 The guardian had obtained the sisters’ inheritance 
by marrying both of them to his sons. Even worse was the attempt to annex Maud’s 
share by making her a nun. This resulted in Maud quitclaiming her share in favour of 
Alice.352  
Custody equated to property, and property that a guardian could sell for profit at 
that. For example, a case in 1241 reveals that one particular guardian, Gilbert of 
Bereham, held the custody of Denise and Christine, the daughters and heiresses of 
Philip de Guestlings, when they were minors. He sold the right to the eldest daughter’s 
husband, John de Hores, who would return her reasonable share when she came of 
age.353 Another example occurred in the Somerset barony of Curry Malet. When Baron 
William Malet II died in 1194 he left three daughters, Helewise, Mabel and Bertha, as 
his heirs. In 1211, Bertha’s inheritance went to her two sisters (she was probably the 
youngest).354 In the same year, Nicholas Avenel, Mabel’s husband, claimed against a 
man named Henry for an intrusion in the manor of Kelve, which was under the custody 
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of Hugh Pointz, husband of Helewise. Nicholas said that Pointz had no right to hold the 
manor in custody because Pointz had married the younger daughter, and he, Nicholas, 
had married the eldest. Moreover, he had been assigned service from Pointz so he 
should hold the custody not Hugh.355 
A woman could be an heiress for her lifetime, but there was a big gap between 
being an unmarried heiress and a married one. An unmarried heiress had to remain in 
the custody of her guardian, whether she was of age or not, until, with the consent of 
her lord, she married. Prior to being married, she could present at court on her own; 
afterwards she and her husband would be regarded as a ‘family unit’. All the married 
heiresses mentioned in this chapter were recorded as ‘coming to court with their 
husbands’. Thus they had lost the status of femme sole, which they would not regain 
until they became widows.       
 
3.9 Conclusion  
      Female succession was not uncommon in thirteenth-century England. Between 
1086 and 1327, 146 baronies – about 71 per cent of 204 English baronies – were 
succeeded to at least once by heiresses.356 Sisters also stood a chance to inherit. English 
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Baronies: a Study of their Origin and Descent 1086-1327 records 74 baronies – about 
36 per cent of 204 English baronies – being inherited by sisters following the death of 
male heirs.357 When a male heir died without issue, his inheritance would fall to his 
sisters, which made every daughter a potential heiress. These women had to be creative 
and constructive to ensure the division of partible inheritance, in ways that male heirs 
did not have to be.  
      Heiresses differed to their male counterparts both in gender and the manner of their 
succession. After 1130, when the equal division of inheritance between daughters 
became the norm, every heiress and her husband was entitled to a share. It was this rule 
that made heiresses differ from a sole male heir and which became the source of 
numerous inheritance conflicts which saw co-heiresses bringing litigation to court for 
their rights. The records show disgruntled heiresses not satisfied with their shares; 
heiresses coveting others’ shares; co-heiresses obtaining nothing because others had 
taken it all; alliances of co-heiresses; and co-heiresses as rivals. All such examples, and 
more, appeared in the medieval courts as a consequence of partible inheritance. As 
Mitchell points out, when co-heiresses formed alliances, they could be invincible, but 
this only worked when they were rich, resourceful, litigious, and determined. The fact 
that all co-heiresses were required to appear, together, could be significantly 
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disadvantageous, since the rule was often used by their opponents as a delaying tactic 
which would allow them more time to prepare their cases.  
      While heiresses were highly valued in the marriage market, they were also highly 
vulnerable, often becoming the pawns of their guardians, some of whom sought various 
means to disinherit them, such as placing them in convents, where they were compelled 
to make a profession and become nuns. This vulnerability even extended to noble 
heiresses, especially those who were widowed and had enormous wealth, since they 
were exploited by the crown, coveted by a myriad of ill-meaning suitors, and were often 
at risk of abduction and extortion. 
      The purpose of primogeniture was to keep inheritances intact, but multiple female 
succession and equal division resulted in a weakening of this concept, since whole 
inheritances ended up being split into several pieces – the more co-heiresses there were, 
the smaller the share they received. Furthermore, it was almost impossible to secure 
equal division, since the value of a piece of land might vary in different parts of the 
country. Thus, it was hard to satisfy every co-heiress and many disputes resulted. 
Numerous sources illustrate disputes where co-heiresses would become severely 
antagonistic towards each other, whereas others indicate collaborative alliances, such 
as that of the extremely powerful Ferrers sisters, who came together to fight off their 
enemies. Although these sisters had fought each other over some disputes, they walked 
into court arm in arm to defend each other’s conflicted land. Compared to their male 
counterparts, co-heiresses faced more disputes over inheritance. In many instances, 
therefore, co-heiresses were bound together, since, as with symbiosis, one could not 
completely exclude another. The dynamics that played out as a result have never bored 
historians.  
      Through exchanges, grants, leases, purchases and other legal actions, thirteenth-
century heiresses showed that they could manage their inheritances to a greater or lesser 
extent. However, after their marriages, when their husbands gained control over their 
inheritances, many heiresses attended court with them. Twenty-five per cent of the 
cases examined in this chapter show that the heiresses came to court with their husbands, 
which not only suggests that married women were not permitted a voice but also that 
they were denied any agency and authority in court. Thus, the question arises of whose 
court case was being represented. Perhaps a woman’s husband was there simply as a 
companion, as the law required he should be, or he might have initiated the litigation 
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against his wife’s wishes. What is clear is that entering marriage was often part and 
parcel of a woman’s disempowerment. After marriage, a husband could dispose of his 
wife’s land without her approval, which often led to numerous disputes and litigations. 
Nevertheless, the women’s agency differed from places and jurisdictions. Some places, 
such as London, allowed a wife to act as femme sole to some extent. If she owned her 
own shop and craft in the city of London, she could rent a shop, answer the debt, sue 
and to be sued as a single woman in court.358 Thus, outside the king’s court, women’s 
agency differed and was affected by local customs.  
Despite women’s loss of control over their property, the common law law did give 
them some rights to protect their inheritance. They could either show that there had 
been no consent to the husband’s alienation or could recover the land after he died, 
using that lack of consent as just grounds for a claim. Nevertheless, if consent was 
confirmed, a woman had no chance to recover her lands. The protection of the wife’s 
lands was demonstrated clearly in the Statute of Gloucester (chapter 3), but it was 
enacted for the benefit of the wife’s heir rather than for her. Both Bracton and chapter 
3 of the Statute of Westminster II confirmed the widow’s right of recovery if her 
property had been alienated against her will by her husband, but she could only do this 
after her husband’s death, that is, if she survived him.  
Despite being a subordinate group in medieval England, women were still able to 
go to court to pursue their inheritances. The resulting court cases reflect the various 
dynamics between and within families. Consequently, with or without their husbands, 
women were able to make themselves visible, at least in the court records. As Barbara 
A. Hanawalt states, ‘the right of women to inherit was never questioned’. 359 
Nevertheless, heiresses fought for their inheritance even when the law put them into 
subordinate and dependent positions and gave them limited resources to protect their 
own rights.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
358 Caroline Barron, ‘The “Golden Age” of Women in Medieval London,’ Reading Medieval Studies, 
15 (1989), 40.  
359 Hanawalt, The Wealth of Wives, 54.  
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Chapter Four: Maritagium as Women’s Land? 
 
Of course, inheritance was not the only source of women’s property. While 
primogeniture prevailed across the country, there remained many sons and daughters 
who would never be heirs or heiresses and stood to inherit nothing. There were many 
alternative options for non-heirs, including marriage. How could a non-heiress make 
herself attractive to men in the marriage market if she possessed no property? Part of 
the answer was maritagium, known as marriage portion or dowry, which, to a greater 
or lesser extent, compensated non-heiress daughters for their dim prospects – not only 
as a financial attraction and guarantee for her new family but also as a hedge against 
her possible widowhood. This chapter will consider how maritagium developed in 
thirteenth-century England. It will introduce maritagium and show how women 
pursued it in court and managed it thereafter. Twenty-three court cases will be discussed 
in total, and at the end of the chapter, the common belief that maritagium was ‘women’s 
land’360 will be challenged by suggesting that maritagium was actually more akin to 
‘family business’ rather than property that concerned daughters or women only. 
 
4.1 What is maritagium? 
      Maritagium, the Latin for marriage portion, refers to the money, rent, or property 
that a bride brings to her husband.361 Also known as a dowry, ‘it was usually given by 
the father of the bride to the groom and the groom’s family, and was initially intended 
as a contribution towards the upkeep of the bride’.362 In England it was customary for 
a financial arrangement to be agreed upon by the families of the bride and the groom 
before betrothal. Although this was not a legal obligation, a woman was expected to 
bring either real estate, movable property or cash to her new family – although land was 
preferred.363  
      According to Glanvill:  
                                                
360 In some senses, maritagium was women’s land because it was usually granted to brides rather than 
grooms. However, I suggest that in a broader sense, maritagium had more of the features of ‘family land’ 
than ‘women’s land’, an argument which I will address in full later this chapter. Claire de Trafford and 
Henrietta Leyser, for instance, are among the scholars who believe maritagium to be ‘women’s land’.  
361 Maritagium can refer to marriage, and the right to give in marriage and marriage portion in thirteenth-
century England. See ‘Dictionary of Medieval Latin for British Sources,’ accessed on 14 September 2016, 
http://logeion.uchicago.edu/index.html#maritagium   
362 Peter Fleming, Family and Household in Medieval England (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 37.  
363 Leyser, Medieval Women, 107.   
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Every free man who has land may give a certain part of his land with his daughter, 
or with any other woman, as a marriage-portion, whether he has an heir or not, and 
whether the heir if he has one is willing or not, and even if he is opposed to it and 
protests.364  
Initially, maritagium referred to the property a man’s father granted to his son and the 
son’s wife. Although it was not common in thirteenth-century England, a few cases 
show that the grooms’ fathers, rather than their brides’ fathers, granted maritagium to 
their sons and their wives. Some men gave endowments called ‘ad se maritandam’ to 
their daughters or sisters who were not heiresses in order to attract potential husbands, 
because women who were not heiresses found it difficult to attract suitors. However, 
such a grant was usually in fee, so was not technically maritagium, since if the woman 
was not married, or she had no issue, or no issue survived her, the grant would go to 
her nearest collateral heir.365  
Claire de Trafford suggests in ‘Share and Share Alike? The Marriage Portion, 
Inheritance and Family Politics’ that unlike dower, ‘maritagium was a strong customary 
pressure instead of a legal obligation to a family’. The custom effectively protected 
daughters as it was a father’s right to pass on an inheritance to his daughters, even if 
the heir opposed it, reflecting the significance of dowry.366 Dowry, therefore, was not 
only a property of the bride and groom, it was also a settlement to help the newly-wed 
couple sustain their future family.  
      Marriage in medieval England had to follow certain formalities. Firstly, even before 
the betrothal the maritagium had to be arranged between the bride and groom’s families. 
The significance of maritagium can be seen at a very early stage prior to the marriage, 
since a betrothal ceremony could not be held until a settlement was agreed.367 Jennifer 
Ward points out that marriage was inextricably linked to property and wealth, and 
consequently the choice of marriage partners would influence a family’s future. This 
applied to the nobility in particular. Concerns over money and land were usually 
underlined in marriage contracts.368 From the point of view of the groom, maritagium 
meant the addition of new property for his family. It might seem that the bride’s family 
                                                
364 Glanvill, 69. 
365 J. M. Kaye, Medieval English Conveyances (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 136.    
366 de Trafford, ‘Share and Share Alike?’ 36.  
367 Leyser, Medieval Women, 107-111.  
368 Ward, Women of the English Nobility and Gentry 1066-1500, 107.   
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suffered a great loss in this exchange, but the specificities of maritagium meant that the 
bride’s family did not necessarily lose the land since, under certain conditions, the 
property could revert to the donors. 
From the twelfth to the early thirteenth century a grant of maritagium was often 
made to a husband and his heirs, which meant that his wife had nothing, except for her 
dower, if she survived him. After the 1190s, grantors started to add limitations, for 
example stipulating that the grant was for the wife, the husband and their issue only, 
and that if there was a failure to produce an heir the grant would revert back to the donor 
and his heirs. Such a condition meant that maritagium did not descend like a normal 
fee.369  
Maritagium granted in marriage and in frank-marriage had different features. 
Glanvill describes two kinds of marriages – one was free from performing homage and 
service, and the other was liable for the performance of services but not homage. When 
marriage was called free, a free-man gave a certain part of his land with a woman in 
marriage to her husband, and such land was decreed: 
‘free of all services, which shall be discharged by the donor and his heirs to 
the chief lords. The land shall remain free in this way until the third heir, nor 
shall the heirs meanwhile be bound to do homage for it. However, after the 
second heir the land shall again be liable for the service due from it, and 
homage shall be taken for it; and if it is part of a military fee, it will bear the 
service of the fee in proportion to its size.’370  
On the other hand, if the land was not given in frank-marriage, the woman’s 
husband and his heirs needed to perform service, but not homage, until the third 
generation. 371  In 1212, for instance, John de Wahull was accused by Ellis de 
Beauchamp and his wife, Constance, of performing neither homage nor the service of 
two knights in the tenements of Maulden. John argued that the said tenements were 
given to his grandmother, Rose, as maritagium, which descended to his father, Simon, 
and then to him. He was only the second generation after the woman to whom the 
property was given in maritagium. He asked for a judgment as to whether he owed 
homage and relief.372 Although the case did not show in which form the maritagium 
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was given, it was probably not given in free marriage because the claim that Ellis and 
Constance made clearly indicates that John owed them homage, service and relief. 
However, John cleverly avoided mentioning service by only arguing that he should not 
do the homage and relief. Such features of maritagium sometimes made litigation more 
complicated and confusing than it really was.  
      For a medieval woman, marriage was as much a negotiation concerning lands and 
money as a ceremony of love. Particularly for a noblewoman, it involved choosing a 
man from a family of similar wealth and status in order to create a strong, wealthy 
alliance. Consequently, marriage was subject to political debate. 373  If a woman’s 
potential husband was of higher social status or greater wealth, a larger dowry might be 
expected. Peter Fleming calculated the average value of dowry given by baronial 
families between 1300 and 1500 to be in excess of 100 marks. By the fifteenth century, 
a woman whose father could afford a dowry of 800 marks might expect to attract a 
husband of knightly rank.374  
      Fleming also suggests that, up to the mid-thirteenth century, a marriage portion 
usually consisted of land, but in later times, landed dowry was more likely to be 
replaced by money, partly as a result of an increasingly commercialised society which 
gave rise to a new ‘cash rich’ class.375 Moreover, giving land as a marriage portion 
meant that the father of the bride might not be able to keep his real estate intact. 
However, by the fourteenth century, the old form of maritagium and dower was 
replaced by jointure, a single estate limited to a couple and their issue, which was 
defined as ‘a competent livelihood of freehold for the wife of lands and tenements, to 
take effect upon the death of the husband for the life of the wife at least.’376  If a jointure 
was set on the bride and the groom, the bride’s father provided a similar sum of money 
as maritagium. In return, the groom’s father promised the couple some land or income 
from the land to help the bride survive widowhood. 377  Since this study is only 
concerned with the thirteenth century, jointure, which did not prevail until the following 
century, will not be explored in this chapter. Nevertheless, because its early 
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development took place towards the end of the thirteenth century it will be mentioned 
in the later part of this thesis. 
 
4.2 Literature review 
      As Kathleen Hapgood Thompson pointed out in ‘Dowry and Inheritance Patterns: 
Some Examples from the Descendants of King Henry I of England’, dowry has not 
received much attention from medieval historians compared to dower. 378  Most 
information about dowry is usually only marginal to studies of medieval women. 
Nevertheless, some exceptional works do consider maritagium.  
      In Claire de Trafford’s ‘Share and Share Alike? The Marriage Portion, Inheritance, 
and Family Politics’, she examined several cases and cartularies in order to discuss the 
transmission of maritagium during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Unlike dower, 
she found maritagium was a strong customary pressure rather than a legal obligation 
and suggested that many mothers passed their maritagia onto their younger sons, 
because inheritance from the father’s side would pass to the eldest son, leaving the 
younger with nothing.379 Sometimes, the heir himself assigned his mother’s maritagium 
to a younger brother. Or alternatively, she could choose to keep seisin and let her son 
live on the land.380  
      De Trafford further suggested that although some widows granted their maritagia 
to their daughters, it is still unclear why they chose daughters over sons. One possibility 
de Trafford put forward, is that martitagium was expected to be used as ‘women’s 
land’.381 An illuminating example can be found in The Cartulary of the Wakebridge 
Chantries at Crich, which shows a piece of land had been passed through three 
generations for women as maritagium.382  
      Granting maritagium to daughters rather than sons might happen when a daughter 
was not granted any maritagium before her father’s death, and her brother was probably 
unable or unwilling to grant her maritagium. Therefore, her mother granted her own 
maritagium to her daughter as maritagium again.383 Moreover, in Bracton the question 
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was asked whether a mother with several daughters should, in her widowhood, give her 
whole maritagium to just one. This suggested not only an expectation that it should be 
shared between all her daughters, but also an expectation that daughters had a special 
claim to their mothers’ maritagia.384 However, de Trafford found plenty of evidence of 
widows granting maritagia to non-inheriting sons, rather than to daughters, which she 
regarded as a surprising in light of the belief that maritagium was often reused to 
provide for a daughter.385  
As mentioned earlier, most maritagia would revert to the grantor in the event that 
the woman had no issue, but de Trafford has cast doubt on this practice. She suggested 
that it was not a firmly established fact that the land reverted because that required 
women to keep in contact with distant kin.386  
 De Trafford was of the view that the use of maritagium within families had two 
ramifications. Firstly, a woman’s ability to dispose her own maritagium diminished 
patriarchy. Although a husband was free to make grants from his wife’s maritagium, 
he always had to be aware that she could negate the gift during her widowhood. 
Similarly, heirs had been aware that their mothers could alienate lands permanently in 
their widowhood, making them unable to inherit their maritagia. However, widows’ 
power was affected by De Donis,387 because they were no longer able to alienate their 
maritagia. Consequently, a woman’s status within the family may have become more 
precarious.388 The second ramification was the nature of inheritance in the early Middle 
Ages. Numerous families in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had been comparatively 
generous towards their daughters, providing them with different forms of marriage 
portion, including land, rent, or goods, but this seems to have dwindled, resulting in the 
enactment of De Donis. In de Trafford’s opinion, prior to this period, rather than 
enforcing primogeniture, it would appear that families used various strategies, 
including maritagium, to continue to provide land for as many descendants as 
possible.389 
                                                
384 Ibid., 45. Bracton’s answer to it was negative. See Bracton, vol. 2, 224.  
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of this chapter.  
388 de Trafford, ‘Share and Share Alike?’ 47-48.  
389 Ibid., 47-48.  
		
	
116	
Unlike de Trafford, who examined many cases of maritagium in ‘Share and Share 
Alike?’, Kathleen Hapgood Thompson used the descendants of King Henry I of 
England as examples to discuss the relationships between dowry and inheritance. Her 
study concluded that among the princely and magnate families of England and Western 
France in the twelfth century, dowry was comparatively widespread and became one of 
the most common forms of estate strategy. For example, Henry I, by granting his 
daughters substantial dowries, rendered his daughters more attractive to suitors.390  
One example is that of Constance, Henry’s daughter, who married Roscelin, 
Vicomtes of Maine, whose family held territory at Beaumont-sur-Sarthe in 
Normandy. 391  The Roscelins were also masters of the southern approaches to 
Normandy, and Henry I needed their family’s support against the Angevins. In order to 
consolidate the alliance, Henry I prepared a considerable dowry for Constance’s 
marriage, including the particularly valuable great royal manor of South Tawton in 
Devon, which could ‘support fifty ploughs’. Constance’s dowry not only presented the 
de Beaumonts with a substantial stake in England, but it would also help to unite Henry 
I’s Anglo-Norman realm. This property was held by the family for years and in 1175, 
Constance’s granddaughter, Constance, took it with her as her dowry when she married 
Roger of Tosny at Sees. After being in the de Beaumont family for two generations, the 
maritagium was held by the Tosnys until 1309. The dowry of the two Constances had 
not only served as worthy dowry for both women, but it descended through the family’s 
female line as dotal property.392 
A similar case is that of Matilda, Henry I’s illegitimate daughter, who married 
Rotrou, Count of Mortagne, whose family’s land lay between southern Normandy and 
Chartres. Although details of her dowry are unknown, the property was probably 
located in Sussex.393  The couple’s benefactions were situated in the neighbouring 
manors of Aldbourne and Wanborough on the Wiltshire and Berkshire border.394 In 
1086, Aldbourne was in the king’s demesne, and it was assessed at forty hides. Rotrou 
was to grant 20s from his revenues to the priory at Lewes. In 1066 and 1068 
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Wanborough had been assessed at nineteen hides and Rotrou had paid £18. Matilda 
herself was to grant a hide of this manor to the priory of Lewes.  Both manors had been 
in the hands of Rotrou’s son, Count Rotrou III, since the late 1160s, and had remained 
in his family for a hundred years before being lost in 1204 following a political 
disaster.395 
Thompson suggested that Matilda’s maritagium was a watershed moment in the 
history of dowry, since in 1120, her daughters, Philippa and Felicia, became co-
heiresses. Philippa married Helias of Anjou, younger son of Fulk, Count of Anjou and 
brother of Geoffrey le Bel. Helias would have succeeded to Aldbourne and 
Wanborough if Rotrou had not married again and fathered three sons from the second 
marriage, the eldest of whom ought to have inherited Aldbourne and Wanborough. 
However, the record of the Aldbourne lawsuit shows that the Rotrou family members 
were not the sole proprietors of Matilda’s dowry. In the mid-twelfth century, a son of 
Wanborough, the Count of Puntun’, possessed authority in Aldbourne. The king 
ordered John of Ponthieu (c. 1140-1191) to ensure that the priory of Lewes was held in 
peace, thanks to the hide of land at Wanborough that the Countess Matilda had given 
in the time of the king’s grandfather.396  
John’s tenure of Aldbourne and Wanborough was an isolated holding, a 
considerable distance from his main landed interests, and he owned these because of 
his wife Beatrix, who was the child of Rotrou II’s eldest daughter, Philippa. Therefore, 
Wanborough and Aldbourne were assigned as Beatrix’s dowry.397 The couple held the 
two manors until the 1160s, when they were either surrendered, exchanged, or sold 
back to the Rotrou family. They remained as dotal property and were reused to endow 
the heirs, or rather heiresses, of the woman who had first brought them to the family. 
Dotal property was often regarded as extraneous to the family’s main estate strategy 
and therefore might be used for any purpose that protected the core of the family’s 
property for the main line. Indeed, dowry, as ancillary property, was frequently 
endowed on a younger son or as a daughter’s dowry. 398  
Both de Trafford and Thompson examine landed marriage portions and focus on 
a few specific examples. However, as mentioned above, marriage portions consisted of 
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either estates or movable goods, and preference for the form may have differed from 
place to place. For instance, Barbara A. Hanawalt offered another insight into the 
marriage portion in medieval London in The Wealth of Wives: Women, Law, and 
Economy in Late Medieval London. Chapter 3 thoroughly examines the development 
of the granting of marriage portions. For fathers with daughters, providing a daughter’s 
marriage portion was essential. The London Mayor, Gerard Bat,399 famously made a 
bad joke about how securing the dowry for his daughters might cost him his job400 
Hanawalt also suggests that the preferred form of dowry, for those who could afford it, 
was real estate, which usually belonged to the mother’s dowry. Not all families could 
afford real estate and the alternative was paying the dowry in cash and valuables. Some 
even converted real estate into cash. Cash was advantageous to some husbands because 
they could use the hard currency in trade or merchandising. However, dowry in real 
estate was preferred as its transfer was recorded in the city records, which could be 
referred to should there be any dispute. Movable goods, including cash, were not 
usually recorded and were easily disposed of in private transactions. All in all, dowry 
was considered a necessary condition for an honourable marriage, no matter how low 
its value.401  
As time progressed, maritagium evolved into jointure, and from the fourteenth 
century onwards, jointure became a prevalent form of marriage portion.  Regarding the 
development of jointure, in ‘Politics of Family: Late Medieval Marriage Contracts’, 
Payling addresses three important issues: (i) maintaining the bride in her widowhood; 
(ii) guaranteeing the groom’s inheritance; and (iii) ensuring the finances of the couple’s 
children. In order to address these issues, Payling examined three medieval marriages 
in light of the changing form of maritagium and dower and found that, from the point 
of view of brides’ fathers, the marriages of non-inheriting daughters played a crucial 
role in extending their families’ political and social horizons, in that the father would 
be compensated if he acquired a successful son-in-law who would add to both his 
political capital and his worldly reputation.402  
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The emergence of jointure, a new kind of settlement, deprived the crown of the 
wardship of valuable lands because, when a tenant-in-chief died leaving an under-age 
heir, the crown lost the wardship of those lands, together with the dower lands bestowed 
on her by common law, in which the widow had a joint interest. The bride’s father, 
however, would have preferred to keep his estates intact and, instead, raised a money 
portion, thereby creating a more stable inheritance.403 If the bride died young and 
without issue the cash her father had paid would be returned to him. As Payling pointed 
out, ‘it was the bride being childless rather than the mere fact of her premature death 
that justified repayment.’404 The bride’s father would also place restrictions on the 
groom’s father for disinheriting his son, so the bride could fully enjoy the jointure after 
the death of her husband. If the groom survived to inherit, the wife was entitled to a 
common law dower and jointure, which was a large part of his inheritance.405 
Payling suggested that jointure evolved, not from dower, but from maritagium and 
emerged out of its decline. Another significant question is put forward in Payling’s 
article: why did jointure not replace dower until the end of the thirteenth century, while 
the money portion replaced landed maritagium in the mid thirteenth century? It was not 
until the first chapter of the Statute of Westminster II in 1285, commonly known as De 
Donis Conditionalibus, that jointure became a form of settlement that addressed the 
concerns of the fathers of brides. As mentioned previously, before De Donis a groom 
could disinherit the daughters of his wife of any jointure settled upon them, in favour 
of his son by his second wife; whereas, after De Donis, he was not entitled to do so. De 
Donis, therefore, led to the decline of maritagium, since the bride’s daughters would no 
longer be disinherited from their mother’s maritagium.406   
In addition to the above works, two other books discuss maritagium, marriage and 
inheritance. In Family and Inheritance, Jack Goody looked at the relationship between 
women, property and inheritance. In England, dowry could involve the bride’s father 
building a house for the couple; however, he stated that daughters in England rarely 
received land as dowry, a statement with which I disagree and will disprove later in this 
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chapter.407  Peter Fleming’s Family and Household in Medieval England spends a 
chapter explaining marriage settlements. Fleming stated that dowry was generally given 
in land until the mid-thirteenth century, but thereafter it usually took the form of money, 
which, if the bride predeceased her husband without leaving children by him, resulted 
in a repayment of part of the dowry.408 The author also points out that a wise father 
would have been reluctant to leave any of his daughters unwed, since each one would 
have been a lost opportunity, or ‘a wasting asset if not used to tap into networks’. 
However, the original purpose of the marriage settlement was intended to safeguard a 
wife if she became widowed, because if she was not an heiress she might be left without 
any means of support until she could claim dower.409 
As Kathleen Hapgood Thompson pointed out, there has been little research into 
dowry, and the findings of this study support her view.410 I believe that medieval 
historians ought to pay more attention to maritagium, since by doing so it will not only 
cast more light on women’s property rights, but also by proxy on their relationship with 
various of their family members. Both Thompson and de Trafford suggested that 
maritagium was regarded as ‘women’s property’, and was often reused as grants to 
either younger sons or daughters. Thompson, however, believed that dotal property was 
reused to endow the heirs, or heiresses, and the cases she presents indicate that 
maritagium was more often reused as maritagium for daughters, at least in noble 
families; whereas, de Trafford’s research shows an opposite perspective, in that she 
believes that grants of maritagium were made more frequently to younger sons than to 
daughters.411 
 This raises several questions. Firstly, in noble families in the thirteenth century, 
was it true that there was a preference for granting maritagia to younger sons rather 
than daughters? Secondly, if this were true, was it an ‘unspoken rule’? Thirdly, when 
de Trafford points out that the reversion of maritagium was not necessarily enforced, 
does she mean that maritagium had more often descended in the marital family rather 
than being returned to the bride’s original family? Fourthly, apart from reforming dower 
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or dowry for future generations, what other functions did maritagium have? Fifthly, 
there is a discrepancy between Goody’s argument and that of other authors. He suggests 
that daughters in medieval England seldom received land as dowry, but other authors 
suggest that land was widely used as marriage portion and was in fact the preferred 
form of dowry, at least before the rise of jointure. Does Goody’s argument only refer 
to women from the lower classes, whose parents did not own real estate at all?   
In order to answer the above questions, in the rest of this chapter I will examine 
cases related to maritagium from various thirteenth-century sources, revealing the 
difficulties a woman might have faced when she was disposing of her maritagium both 
before and after De Donis, and how disputes over maritagium were tackled in court.  
  
4.3 Claiming land as maritagium as a strategy 
      Due to its ‘reversion’ feature maritagium differed from an ordinary fee in that it did 
not descend like normal inheritance. A maritagium was often granted to the couple and 
their issue only, so if an heir was not produced, or any other condition was not met, that 
could lead to reversion. At first sight, maritagium gives the impression that it was not  
as strong and stable a right as the right to inheritance, because of the probability of 
reversion. Numerous court cases, however, suggest otherwise. Claiming disputed land 
as maritagium became a highly-used strategy by litigants, implying that maritagium 
was seen as a powerful right. 
      In 1208, Alice de Lundresford defended her right to maritagium when William 
Gulafre and Maud, his wife, pleaded against her, contesting two parts of land in 
Holbeam Marsh.412 The couple said that Alice had more in dower of the tenements than 
she should have, and the said tenements had belonged to Richard, Alice’s late husband 
and Maud’s brother (Maud was the nearest heir of Richard). Alice argued that she did 
not hold the tenements in dower but as her maritagium, which she had received from 
the donor, Alfred de St. Martin.  Moreover, she had a writ as proof of the grant, showing 
that Alfred had given the tenements to Richard, son of Hugh de Lundresford, with Alice, 
daughter of Mabel de Cantewrthe, in maritagium, to hold from the monastery to which 
Alfred did service by rendering one-pound of pepper every year. Alice presented 
another writ made by Hugh de Lundresford in which he confirmed that the Lord Alfred 
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de St. Martin gave the tenements in question to Richard with his granddaughter Alice 
in maritagium. If Alice and Richard had heirs, those heirs would remain in the 
tenements, but if there was no heir, the tenements would remain with the monastery.413  
      This case clearly shows the different strategies of the two parties. Maud and 
William thought that claiming the disputed land as Alice’s dower would give them a 
better chance of winning, since the dower for a widow was one-third of the property, 
and Alice could claim no more unless she had a nominated dower. However, Alice 
retorted that she held the tenements as her maritagium instead of dower, so she was 
capable of enjoying the entire holding and not just one-third. This case can also be seen 
as a clash between an heiress and her husband, on the one hand, and a widow, on the 
other. From the point of view of Alice, claiming the land as her maritagium had a 
greater advantage, because maritagium was property for ‘a woman and her family’, 
which would remain with her and her issue until reversion.  Dower, on the other hand, 
was ‘a right of women but from men’s land’, which should descend to the husband’s 
heirs. Although the final decision is not recorded, it can be deduced that Alice retained 
the disputed lands if they were confirmed to have been her maritagium.414       
        In 1242, another case also demonstrates how useful claiming land as maritagium 
could be. John de la Lee and his wife, Alice, claimed against Henry Crok and Beatrice, 
his wife, for one messuage and fifteen acres of land with appurtenances in Gomshall as 
her reasonable share of the inheritance from William Crok, Alice and Beatrice’s father. 
Henry and Beatrice defended themselves by saying that William had given the disputed 
messuage and appurtenances to them in marriage two years before his death, and 
Beatrice had a charter to prove this statement. John and Alice, on the other hand, 
insisted that William died seised of the messuage. A jury was summoned afterwards in 
order to confirm whether the messuage had been given in maritagium.415 (I shall deal 
with the possible outcomes of this and the following case below, once I have described 
both.) 
A year later, a very similar suit was brought in Suffolk when William de Pyrho 
and his wife Margery claimed against Hervey Bude and Maud, his wife, for eighteen-
and-half-acres of land with appurtenances in Barham, which Fulk de Barham, father of 
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Margery and Maud, had held. Maud and Hervey argued that the land has been given as 
maritagium to them. Margery and William retorted that Fulk died seised of the land. 
The above two cases not only raise the issue of maritagium, but also demonstrate the 
dynamics created by co-heiresses. The defendants in each of these cases argued that the 
disputed land was their rightful share of the inheritance and not the other sister’s 
maritagium, so that they could have a share in the disputed lands.416  
      It is not known whether Beatrice and Maud received land as maritagium from their 
fathers, but one thing is sure – their sisters, Alice and Margery, were trying hard to deny 
Beatrice and Maud’s claims that the disputed land was maritagium. If Beatrice and 
Maud succeeded in proving the disputed land as their maritagium they would definitely 
have had a greater chance of winning their suits.  
The above two conflicts echo the idea I suggested in the previous chapter, that 
equal division could never truly be equal because some co-heiresses found their fellow 
co-heiresses’ share more appealing than their own. This might have been because one 
piece of land was more fertile, thus yielding a better harvest, or because it was nearer 
to other land held by the family, or simply because a maritagium was greater than a 
post-mortem share might have been. Diverse reasons such as these cannot be 
ascertained, but it seems certain that they ignited disputes which eventually led to court.       
      In 1249, Parnel, daughter of Roger de Molendin’, claimed against Richard Cruc for 
ten acres of land and two acres of meadow in Corsley, which Christina de Molendin’, 
Parnel’s mother, gave her as maritagium when she married Richard. It was argued that 
this should now revert to Parnel because they were later divorced.417 Richard argued 
that the land was not Parnel’s maritagium but had been acquired by him from one 
Rocelin Hose three years after he married Parnel. The jurors confirmed that the land 
was Richard’s acquisition instead of Parnel’s maritagium, so it was adjudged that she 
should receive nothing.418 This case shows that a husband could only enjoy his wife’s 
maritagium when they were married. Once the marriage was annulled, the wife would 
regain full control over her maritagium. Parnel must have recognised this fact and 
claimed the lands as her maritagium, which would have increased her chances of 
                                                
416 CRR, vol. 17, n. 1191. 
417 Civil Pleas of the Wiltshire Eyre, 1249, ed. M. T. Clanchy (Devizes: Wiltshire Record Society, 
1971), n. 53. The definition of divorce in this research is not the same as that of modern divorce. 
Divorce in the Middle Ages meant an annulment.	
418 Ibid.  
		
	
124	
winning her suit. However, unfortunately for her, the jurors confirmed that the disputed 
lands were indeed an acquisition made by Richard during their marriage, and Parnel 
lost the suit.419   
      Also in 1249, Gilbert of Walcote and his wife Agnes claimed against William 
Bissop and his wife Lucy one virgate of land in Upham as Agnes’ right.420 They said 
that William and Lucy had no entry other than by one Christine, who had nothing except 
the wardship thereof while Agnes was under age. William and Lucy denied Agnes’ 
right, saying that Christine did not have wardship; on the contrary, the disputed land 
was Christine’s inheritance and she, as was her right, had given the land in frank-
marriage to Lucy and Thomas, son of Hugh, Lucy’s former husband. Both parties 
afterwards offered the king half a mark to have an inquest to decide whether this was 
the case. As with the previous case, the defendant declared that the contested land was 
her maritagium, believing this to be a good strategy.421  
      Claiming land as maritagium did not always prove advantageous. The case 
mentioned in chapter 3 of this study demonstrates that such a claim could create a crisis 
if it related to the division of inheritance between co-heiresses. In 1290, when Agnes 
and her husband, John du Boys, demanded Agnes’ share of inheritance, the other two 
co-heiresses, Juliana and Lucy, argued that Agnes and John had been granted some 
tenements in frank-marriage as maritagium. Therefore, unless they put the maritagium 
back into the hotchpot, they were not able to demand a reasonable share of the 
inheritance.422 Agnes and John retorted that the disputed tenements had been granted to 
John and his heirs in fee simple instead of maritagium.423 It may be seen from this case 
that claiming land as maritagium could act as a double-edged sword. Sometimes it 
earned claimants a greater chance to win, but it could also give the defendant a right to 
insist on her maritagium being returned so that it could be divided between all the 
heiresses. 
      Putting maritagium back into hotchpot sparked a vehement debate about whether it 
was inheritance or a special gift. The defendants’ argument in the du Boys case was 
clearly based on ‘maritagium as inheritance’, and they stuck to this notion in order to 
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gain an advantage. However, if maritagium was regarded as part of an inheritance, it 
would be disadvantageous for a woman who wanted to have her share of an inheritance 
after she had been granted maritagium. Nevertheless, maritagium was more often 
deemed to be a special fee tail than part of an inheritance. For instance, Bracton says 
that maritagium could be revoked by a wife after the death of her husband if he had 
wilfully alienated it, which implies that Bracton saw it as a fund for the conjugal unit. 
Bracton also pointed out that if a husband granted his wife’s inheritance or maritagium 
to his son or daughters as gift, then such alienation would be regarded as irrevocable 
because it was made in ‘an honest cause’.424 Moreover, maritagium was mostly granted 
with a condition – it was for the bride, the husband and their heirs, and consequently it 
functioned as an entail. Chapter 1 of the Statute of Wesminster II 1285 was proof that 
people were demanding that maritagium should descend only to the wife’s heir. I will 
discuss the impact of the Statute of Wesminster II (De Donis) on maritagium in more 
detail later in this chapter. 
      A woman had every right to claim her maritagium because it was the property 
arranged for the bride and her new family. In theory, she had rights over her maritagium, 
as her property, but in practice, it was her husband who managed the maritagium during 
the marriage. She became legally dependent on him, and he could alienate it without 
her concurrence.425 Therefore, how did wives manage their own lands when they were 
placed in a tight corner by both their husbands and the laws? What difficulties did they 
face when their lands were disposed of by their husbands, or by others? The following 
section will examine how wives used their maritagia and the various crises brought 
about by others’ alienation of their maritagia.    
  
4.4 Women’s management of maritagium 
      A wife could not dispose of her own lands without her husband’s consent until his 
death, that is, she could only dispose of it in her widowhood. However, numerous 
sources record land disposition not only during widowhood but also during marriage.  
      A medieval woman, however, generally found that she had more freedom and 
power once she entered widowhood because she no longer required her husband’s 
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consent when she disposed of her land.426 It was common for women, especially women 
of the nobility and gentry who often held large estates, to grant their property to others. 
For instance, at the end of the twelfth century, Hawise, Countess of Gloucester, granted 
part of her maritagium at Pimperne, Dorset, to Nuneaton priory during her widowhood. 
In her charter she said:  
I wish also that they should have and hold the aforesaid lands and rents freely 
and quietly, peacefully and honourably, in pure and perpetual alms, as my lord 
William Earl of Gloucester ever held them or my father who gave that manor 
to me in free marriage, in meadows and pastures, roads and paths, waters and 
ponds and mills, wood and plain, and in all places, with all liberties and free 
customs.427 
Because rich and noble women had sufficient lands, there are numerous sources 
showing them making grants to religious houses and not asking for money or services 
in return. Nonetheless, they might expect some intangible returns, such as reputation or 
ecclesiastical salvation of the soul. Besides granting their maritagia to others, more 
ordinary women could still transfer their dowry. In 1220, Philip de Ulecote and Maud 
de Coinners, John Chaplain, Oger le Daneys, Thomas le Despenser and Reynold Reeve 
were summoned to the assize to answer an allegation that they had unjustly disseized 
Elizabeth, wife of William de Rue, of a free tenement in Dinsdale. Maud de Coinners 
argued that the land was her maritagium, and that she had transferred it to Geoffrey de 
Coinners, her brother, for his lifetime. After his death, the land should have reverted to 
Maud. To prove her argument, she presented a chirograph made between them. In 
response to Maud, William and Elizabeth said that Geoffrey gave the land to her in 
maritagium when she was betrothed to her first husband, who held the land while he 
was alive. The jury found that Maud had significant lands, all of which were part of her 
maritagium. She later transferred all the land to Geoffrey, for his lifetime only, and 
Geoffrey gave six bovates of the land to William as maritagium with Elizabeth, his 
daughter. The final decision was that William and Elizabeth eventually recovered their 
seisin and Maud was in mercy.428 
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      Had Maud foreseen that her brother would grant part of her maritagium to his 
daughter, Elizabeth, and her husband, also as maritagium, she might not have 
transferred it to Geoffrey. The reason why she transferred her maritagium to her brother 
remains a mystery, but it seems unlikely that she anticipated her brother would grant 
the maritagium in maritagium again. Her statement shows that she believed that 
Elizabeth and William unjustly disseised her. Her transfer led to the dispute with her 
niece, which saw her lose her seisin temporarily. When these two women’s maritagium 
rights clashed, in this case, the law favoured Elizabeth, whose maritagium had been 
granted more recently.  
      The reason why Elizabeth and William were successful was probably because 
Elizabeth had been disseised by Philip, from whom Maud had then gained possession 
of the land. Maud might have had a title to the land but needed to sue for the land rather 
than benefit from Philip’s wrongful disseisin. Another point to emphasise is that it is 
unknown if Maud had transferred her maritagium when she was a widow. If she had 
transferred it when her husband was still alive she would have needed his consent for 
the alienation. This case shows that women could transfer their maritagia to another 
person, at least for their lifetime, and that if that person granted the maritagium to 
another, again as maritagium, such a deed was lawful and would allow the grantee to 
retain the maritagium. 
      In the thirteenth century, protection for grantees’ right of maritagium was powerful, 
even though in this instance Maud, the woman who first granted it, lost part of it to 
Elizabeth as a result. In 1249, another case highlights the law’s solid protection of 
women’s right regarding maritagium. The jury had to testify whether William of 
Bremhill unjustly disseised William of Coleville of two acres of meadow in Cove. They 
said that the meadow was the right and inheritance of William of Coleville, who 
enfeoffed Agnes de Suhwude of that meadow, so that Agnes was in seisin for a long 
time. Agnes later gave that meadow to William of Bremhill in free marriage with her 
daughter, Agnes. Therefore, William of Bremhill and Agnes were in full seisin for more 
than three weeks. Afterwards, William of Coleville ejected them, holding the meadow 
in seisin himself because William of Bremhill and Agnes had refused to render him the 
service that they owed. The jurors stated that William of Coleville enfeoffed Agnes de 
Suhwude of the meadow in full, and Agnes later enfeoffed William of Bremhill of the 
same land and gave it to him in frank-marriage with her daughter, Agnes, in return for 
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the aforementioned service. Thus, it was adjudged that William of Coleville had no 
rights in the holding except the services owed to him.429 
      Because William of Coleville enfeoffed Agnes de Suhwude of the disputed meadow 
in full power, this meant that it was not a maritagium with conditions attached. Agnes 
had complete control over the land and the right to dispose it. After the meadow was 
granted in maritagium to her daughter and her husband, William of Bremhill, the couple 
also had full rights, so William of Coleville could only ask for their service. However, 
if William of Coleville had not enfeoffed but granted the meadow as maritagium to 
Agnes de Suhwude, and she granted it again as dowry to her daughter, could William 
of Coleville have claimed his seisin? The first thing to be clear about is the difference 
between enfeoffment and the granting of maritagium. To enfeoff someone meant to 
invest with a fief, to put a person in possession of the fee-simple or fee-tail of lands, 
tenements, etc.430  The feoffee would have hereditary right in the estate, while land 
granted in maritagium might revert to the donor in the future. Assuming that this gift 
of maritagium to Agnes de Suhwude had a condition of reversion should she and her 
husband have no issue, as was the case with most maritagia in thirteenth-century 
England, William of Coleville would have had no right to enter the granted land because 
Agnes de Suhwude had a daughter. However, if the condition was that the land would 
descend only to the heirs of Agnes’ husband, William of Coleville might have had 
justification to enter the land.  
      A wife could manage her own maritagium by various means, which are sometimes 
not clearly recorded in legal documents. For instance, an early thirteenth-century 
notification shows that one Simon Coc obtained a house which had been maritagium 
for one Florence, but it did not clarify how he received it.431 Florence might have 
enfeoffed or granted the house to Simon in fee. The notification was in fact made by 
Walter Trainel in order to confirm that he had given to his brother, Roger Trainel, part 
of the house in which Griffin the Smith lived. Walter bought it from Simon Coc, who 
obtained it from Griffin’s widow, Florence, whose maritagium it had been, and the sale 
was witnessed by many citizens of Worcester as well as by Florence herself. Roger held 
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it from Florence, paying her 19d annually.432 This case indicates that there were many 
ways for a woman to give her maritagium permanently to others. In similar cases 
discussed in this section, most women disposed of their dowry in their widowhood since 
they had more freedom to do so. As previously explained, it was difficult for a wife to 
dispose of her maritagium whilst her husband was still alive, and even if she could, we 
cannot guarantee that this action was reflective of her own thoughts and actions as her 
husband would accompany her to court. Hence, we cannot know whether such 
dispositions were motivated by the wife or the husband.   
Nonetheless, some women, more usually from noble and rich families, showed an 
extraordinary capacity to manage their maritagia during marriage. This is especially 
notable given women’s generally limited social freedom and lack of money to resort to 
the law in order to fight for their or their families’ interests. However, the ability to 
grant maritagium in a woman’s widowhood threatened the status of maritagium as a 
kind of entail, and before De Donis, a number of cases suggest that the court would 
rather protect the right of a grantee, who received a widow’s maritagium, than the right 
of the woman’s heir or heirs.433  
With regard to a widow’s ability to grant her maritagium, Paul Brand points out 
that chapter 27 of the Petition of the Barons (1258) did not proritise the will of the donor, 
which most legal historians believe, but dealt with the more uncommon circumstance 
of a widow, who had no issue by her late husband, granting or selling her maritagium 
of her own free will.434 Brand also states that the specific details given in the petition 
suggest the possibility that there might be a particular case behind it. Chapter 27 
mentions that if someone granted a carucate of land in marriage with a daughter or sister, 
the heirs of the donor could regain the gift if the daughter or sister had no issue, and 
such a gift was not absolute but conditional. A surviving transcript of 23 July 1259 
supports Brand’s theory. William of Ditton granted one carucate of land to his son, 
William, and his wife Margery, the daughter of Alan of Maidstone. William, the son, 
died without issue and Margery granted the land to her father, Alan, a transaction which 
was confirmed by a final concord made at the 1256 Kent eyre. After Margery’s death, 
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William’s brother, Ralph of Ditton, claimed the carucate of land, saying that it should 
revert to him as the heir of William of Ditton. Afterwards, Ralph withdrew from the 
writ and reached an agreement with Alan. Alan had quitclaimed the land to him in 
return for payment of 22 marks. Chapter 27 of the Petition of the Barons reveals concern 
about the alienation of land granted in maritagium after the death of the husband, where 
there was no issue from the marriage. The quantity of land in this case – one carucate 
– corresponds to that in chapter 27. Moreover, the timing seems to be right: Margery 
died after 1256 and Ralph might have filed his complaint at Oxford in 1258. He 
launched another suit in 1259.435 
      Declaring land to be maritagium brought numerous advantages to claimants, but it 
also threw up clashes of interest. When a father granted part of his inheritance to his 
daughter as maritagium, his heir lost that land as his inheritance. It is not unreasonable, 
therefore, for an heir to have begrudged the granting of maritagium. A case in 1199 
demonstrates an heir’s complaint regarding the large dowry his sister had received. 
William de Cowley pleaded against Alice, his sister, for five virgates of land in Cowley 
as his right and inheritance. He complained that his father had given the said land to 
Alice, and the grant was so substantial that it had left him with no land at all. He asked 
for judgment as to whether his father was able to give all of his land in maritagium, 
thereby disinheriting his rightful heir. Alice defended herself by saying that she held no 
more than one virgate of the land, and William actually held other lands from their 
father. William afterwards complained that Alice had alienated her maritagium after 
the start of the plea. Alice, however, disagreed, retorting that when she alienated her 
maritagium the plea had not begun. In the end, it was confirmed that Alice did not hold 
as much land as William had asserted, and consequently she won the suit.436  
The question of whether a father could grant so much land in maritagium that it 
disinherited his heir may perhaps be answered by Glanvill, who stated that any free man 
could give a certain part of his land to any woman even if his heir did not consent to 
it.437 Although he did not comment explicitly as to whether giving an entire inheritance 
to any woman was allowed, he did say ‘a certain part of his land’, possibly indicating 
that granting all of a man’s land to a daughter was not allowed, or even if it was, it was 
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a very rare occurrence. The final decision in this case recorded that Alice went without 
a day because she did not hold the whole inheritance. If Alice, on the contrary, had held 
the whole inheritance, would she have needed to render to her brother his reasonable 
share? I suggest that this would have been likely, because Glanvill states that only a 
part of the inheritance, rather than the whole, could be granted to a woman. Given this, 
the judges might have adjudged that Alice needed to give some of her maritagium to 
her brother. Another method for dealing with the dispute would have been resorting to 
private agreement. This would have given more space for the siblings to negotiate an 
arrangement which could satisfy both of them.  
Notably, Isabel de la Brome came to court to defend herself against her brother, 
Robert of Skyteburn, who claimed one virgate of land in Serge de Huse from her as his 
right. Robert argued that the virgate was in his mother Alice’s right, so it should have 
descended to him. Isabel replied that Robert could claim no right because their mother 
gave that land in maritagium to her daughter when she married Alexander de la Brome. 
She also presented a charter recording Alice’s grant. Although Robert acknowledged 
the charter, he retorted that Alice have given the land to Isabel while she was married 
to John Mikelfot, and was under his authority. Robert clearly believed that Alice’s grant 
to Isabel was coerced by John Mikelfot. Afterwards, the judgment stated that Robert 
should recover his seisin against Isabel because it was recognised that Alice was 
married to John before she gave the land to Isabel.438 Robert’s argument suggests that 
a woman’s alienation of her own land might be the result of her husband’s coercion 
rather than her own intention, but also shows how reluctant he was to have part of his 
inheritance alienated. It was better to keep an inheritance intact and complete, and the 
grant of maritagium harmed his right to it.  
 
4.5 Maritagium in legislation in late thirteenth-century England and the early 
development of jointure 
 
4.5.1 Maritagium: reversion 
      As mentioned, dowry was more of a strong customary pressure than a legal 
obligation. Most maritagium agreements were conditional, often reverting to the donor 
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and his heirs if there were no issue. Maritagium was also often alienated during the 
marriage for various purposes and this frequently affected the rights of the donors, 
causing dissatisfaction. A case from 1284 illustrates such disapproval when a donor 
attempted to void the alienation of a maritagium. 
      Hugh le Deen came to court against Simon of Londonthorpe and his wife Isabel for 
the tenements that Hugh’s father, William, had granted to Alan of Winwell and his wife 
Cecily and the heirs of their bodies as maritagium. Hugh pointed out that Alan and 
Cecily had died without a blood heir so the tenement should have reverted to his father, 
William, and then descended to him. Simon and Isabel argued that Alan and Cecily had 
a son and a daughter. What makes this case so crucial and interesting is the arguments 
made by both parties’ representatives.439  
      When the justice, William of Saham, asked whether the issue attained to any estate, 
Simon and Isabel’s representative concluded that they had no obligation to answer and 
contended that since the couple had issue, the will of the donor was accomplished. 
Therefore, as long as Alan and Cecily had issue, their alienation could always bar the 
donor and all others from an action, no matter whether the heir was dead or alive on the 
day of alienation. Essentially, Alan and Cecily had had issue, so they did not die without 
an heir of their bodies. The justice responded that the writ brought by Hugh said ‘that 
they died without heir begotten of their bodies,’ and did not say ‘that they had no heir 
of their bodies (as your argument supposes).’440   
      To clarify the justice’s response: the resolution of the case lay between the terms 
‘they died without heirs begotten of their bodies’ and ‘they had no heir of their bodies.’ 
The former meant the couple might have had heirs begotten of their bodies, but those 
children had died before their own death. The latter meant that the couple had no heirs 
from their bodies for the whole of their lives. To elaborate upon the argument, Simon 
and Isabel’s representative thought that, as long as Alan and Cecily had issue from their 
bodies, the alienation of maritagium would be valid whether or not an heir was alive 
when the alienation was made. However, Hugh’s representative insisted that if the heir 
died before Alan and Cecily’s death, the alienation should have been void.  
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      As the case proceeded, the justice seemed to be siding with Hugh’s argument, so 
Simon and Isabel’s representative changed his strategy. Instead of emphasizing that the 
alienation of maritagium was legal as long as the grantee had issue, he insisted that 
Alan and Cecily had a daughter, Alice, who survived them. Alice had entered into part 
of the disputed land and alienated a messuage of it. Alan and Cecily did not die without 
(living) issue, making the alienation by Alice valid. Confronting this argument, Hugh’s 
representative also adjusted his strategy, insisting that the alienation was made before 
Alan and Cecily had any children. In the end, Hugh was adjudged to take nothing and 
was to be amerced.441  
      A telling fact can be discerned here. The donor did not want the gift to be alienated 
if there was a failure of issue, whether this was because the grantees had had no children 
or because of the early death of a child. Even alienation before the birth of a child 
seemed not to be accepted, since Hugh’s representative regarded such an alienation to 
be contrary to the terms of the gift. On the one hand, the condition of the maritagium 
insured that maritagium could only be enjoyed by the family with surviving issue, and, 
on the other hand, it limited the newly-wed couple’s right to manage their maritagium.  
      It is important to recognise the aim of the conditions attached to maritagium and 
the disapproval expressed by donors in relation to its alienation before examining the 
late thirteenth-century legislation. From the end of the thirteenth century onwards, two 
significant pieces of legislations dealt with dowry. Although chapter 3 of the Statute of 
Gloucester was not specifically about maritagium, ‘the inheritance’ that an heir could 
recover loosely covered the mother’s maritagium,442 in that chapter 3 clearly gave an 
heir the right to recover his, or her, mother’s inheritance and dowry if they had been 
alienated by the father. At the same time, the regulation reflected the fact that a wife’s 
inheritance, or dower, was frequently alienated by her husband, thereby disinheriting 
the heirs. 
 
4.5.2 De Donis 
The Statute of Westminster II was issued in 1285, and the first chapter, known as 
De Donis Conditionalibus (De Donis), regulated the recovery of maritagium and the 
restriction of its alienation. It was common to have conditions in thirteenth-century 
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marriage contracts that said the gift was for the bride, the groom and their issue only, 
and that if the bride and the groom should die without issue, the gift so given would 
revert to the donor. The rule of reversion, therefore, indicates the donors’ wish that they 
would prefer to keep the land intact should the function of the maritagium, which was 
to support the wife and her new-formed family, fail. Hence, if a donor’s original 
intention was to keep the land intact, they would not be happy to see the given land 
alienated by the couple. Moreover, if the feoffees alienated the land, it could disinherit 
their own issue, which would also contradict the wishes of the donor. Therefore, in 
order to protect donors’ intentions, the later part of De Donis states: 
In such wise that those to whom the tenement was thus given upon condition 
shall not have the power of alienating the tenement so given and thereby 
preventing it from remaining after their death to their issue, or to the donor or 
his heir if issue fail either because there was no issue at all or because it has 
failed by death, the heir of such issue failing. Neither shall, henceforth, the 
second husband of such woman have anything by the curtesy after the death 
of his wife in a tenement so given upon condition, or the issue of the woman 
and second husband have hereditary succession, but instead immediately after 
the death of the man and woman to whom the tenement was so given, it shall 
revert after their death either to their issue or to the donor or his heir as it 
aforesaid.443 
This enactment illustrated a problem that had long haunted donors and their heirs, 
specifically that it was highly possible that granted land would be alienated to the 
detriment of the donors. Worse, though, was the possibility that the grantees might 
alienate the land without having a legitimate heir, so the donor’s rights would be further 
infringed upon, since the land should have reverted to him or her entirely. De Donis 
gradually proved popular since it limited a newly-wed couple’s rights to alienate 
granted land.  
    A clash between the Statute of Gloucester 1278 and De Donis can be seen in a case 
from 1304.444 Robert de Tony and his attorney came to court against Thomas of St 
Omer for one messuage, two carucates, thirty virgates, a fifty-four-acre meadow, a 
forty-acre pasture, and £6 6s 2d in rent, in Britford and Bramshaw. Robert argued that 
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his ancestor, Ralph de Tony, held these lands and rent in his fee and right, which 
descended to Roger, his son and heir, then to Ralph, Roger’s son and heir, and finally 
to Robert, the plaintiff. That is, Robert was demanding the land his grandfather once 
had held. In his defence, Thomas stated that Parnel, the wife of Ralph de Tony, had 
survived Ralph and enfeoffed him with the land in the king’s court in Salisbury on 30 
September 1281. A fine was also levied between Parnel and Thomas by which Parnel 
recognised the right of Thomas, by her gift, to hold the land with warranty for himself 
and his heirs from her and her heirs, by rendering a bunch of roses at Midsummer. This 
fine was made before De Donis, when it was still lawful for the tenements to be 
alienated in frank-marriage or fee tail.445 
      Robert said he should not be excluded from claiming his right because according to 
the Statute of Gloucester 1278:  
It is likewise established that if a man alienates a tenement that he holds by 
the law of England, his son shall not be barred by the deed of his father, from 
whom no inheritance descended to him, from demanding and recovering his 
mother’s seisin by a writ of mort d’ancestor, even though his father’s charter 
states that he and his heirs are bound to warranty. And if an inheritance has 
descended to him from his father, then he shall be excluded from the value of 
the inheritance that has descended to him. And if an inheritance descends to 
him from the same father at a later date, then shall the tenant recover from him 
his mother’s seisin by a judicial writ that shall issue out of the rolls of the 
justices before whom the plea was pleaded, to resummons his warrantor, as 
has been done in other cases where the warrantor comes into court the same 
ways the son’s issue [shall recover] by writ of ael, cosin and besael. Likewise, 
in the same way the heir of the wife, after the death of his father and mother 
shall not be barred from an action by his father’s charter, if he demands the 
inheritance or marriage of his mother by a writ of entry that his father alienated 
in the time of his mother, of which no fine is levied in the king’s court.446 
This meant that the heir was not barred from claiming the seisin of his ancestor on one 
side by the deed of his ancestor on the other side, from whom there was no inheritance. 
In this case, the disputed land had been granted to Parnel and Ralph and Ralph’s heirs 
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in frank-marriage. 447  De Donis similarly implied that an individual would not be 
excluded by a mother’s deed from claiming his mother’s inheritance. In order to protect 
his right, Thomas retorted that the heirs were excluded, even though nothing descended 
to him by hereditary right, and that Robert, as Parnel’s heir, ought to warrant him.448 
However, it is impossible to know who won the case in the end because Robert 
subsequently failed to appear in court, so Thomas went without a day.449 
      The lands and rent in Britford that Robert de Tony claimed were actually the 
maritagium of Parnel, his ancestor and Ralph de Tony’s wife. In 1232, Walter de Lacy 
granted the manors of Britford in Wiltshire and Yarkhill in Herefordshire to the same 
Ralph in frank-marriage with Parnel his daughter, to hold to him and his heirs, and free 
of all services save the king’s. If Parnel should die without children and heirs, the 
manors would revert to Walter and his heirs. The dispute was obviously caused by 
Parnel’s alienation of the disputed lands and rent. Thomas was trying to make his 
enfeoffment by Parnel lawful, therefore he argued that a fine had been made between 
them in the king’s court, before De Donis. The later part of De Donis stated that: 
it is to be understood that this statute applies to the alienation of a tenement 
contrary to the form of a gift made after this, and does not extend to gifts made 
before it. And if a fine is levied hereafter on such a tenement, it is not to be 
legally binding, and the heirs or they to whom the reversion belongs will not 
be bound to lay their claim if they are of full age.450  
Did Robert have the right to recover the contested land according to the Statute of 
Gloucester 1278? Thomas’s representative argued that the Statute of Gloucester only 
stated that the heir could recover a tenement his ancestor held by ‘the law of England’, 
which exclusively referred to curtesy tenants in thirteenth-century England. Tenants in 
frank-marriage could alienate the enfeoffment after they had issue to their 
disinheritance, and this was supported by De Donis. Thomas also argued that the fine 
and the enfeoffment were made before De Donis so he had the right to retain the 
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enfeoffed property. Although the final decision is not recorded, Thomas might have 
been able to retain the lands and rent in Britford, which had been Parnel’s maritagium. 
One possible explanation is that De Donis was enacted later and articulated that it could 
only apply to the alienation of a tenement in the form of a gift made after De Donis was 
issued. Hence, because Parnel had granted her maritagium long before De Donis, the 
law did not apply retrospectively.  
      The later part of De Donis, which concerns the second husband’s inability to 
disinherit the heirs of a woman’s first husband, was intended to protect the rights of the 
groom’s family. Such a restriction probably arose from the frequent disinheritance of 
the heirs of a first husband. A case in point is a suit from 1231, in which Joan de Bosco, 
through her attorney, pleaded against Ralph de Bray for one carucate of land with 
appurtenances in Gazeley as her right.451 She said Ralph had no access to that land other 
than through her mother, Alice. Moreover, the questioned land was given in maritagium 
to William de Bosco, with Alice, and to her heir. Joan said she was the heir of William 
and Alice, so she claimed the said land as her right. However, Ralph argued that the 
land was the inheritance of his wife, the aforementioned Alice, and ought to remain 
with her for her lifetime. According to custom and law, he had young sons by Alice, 
which gave him a right to retain the disputed land for life. Furthermore, he denied that 
the land was given to William and Alice and their heirs, but to William and Alice and 
the heir from Alice,452 which meant that the sons of Ralph and Alice fell into this 
category. The argument was that these boys had a right to Alice’s maritagium, and so 
did Ralph, though for him it was during his lifetime only.   
The phrase ‘according to the custom and law’ in Ralph’s argument refers to a 
husband’s curtesy which allowed him to hold his deceased wife’s maritagium for his 
life if they had children.453 This case happened about fifty years before the enactment 
of De Donis, when there was no regulation prohibiting the second husband and his heirs 
from enjoying the wife’s maritagium. The dispute demonstrates the crisis faced by the 
first husband’s heir when the mother remarried and had a sibling from her second 
marriage, since this compelled any children from the first marriage to divide the 
maritagium of the mother with the heirs from the second marriage. 
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After De Donis the first husband’s heir no longer faced such a threat, since it 
deprived the heir from the second marriage of the right to enjoy the mother’s 
maritagium. From the point of view of the wife, one of the functions that maritagium	
should serve was to provide protection and support for her own issue, no matter which 
husband had fathered them. It is evident that De Donis protected the three parties’ rights 
- the donor, the woman to whom the land was given, and the first husband of the woman. 
Although the ideal purpose of maritagium was to support and help the bride to survive 
when she entered widowhood, especially for non-heiress women, maritagium meant 
more to them. As previously mentioned, marriage in medieval England was a matter of 
negotiation with another similar match, since both sides wanted as much benefit as 
possible. De Donis protected the donor’s right, usually the bride’s family, but also 
assured the groom’s family that the maritagium, which was settled upon the couple 
themselves, would not be disposed of by others if the groom died before the bride, or 
the bride remarried. When De Donis declared that the issue from the second husband 
had no hereditary right to their mother’s maritagium, maritagium lost its initial purpose 
– to protect the bride and her own issue. Nevertheless, this situation could be prevented 
by granting land to a woman in fee tail, which enabled her issue to enjoy the land.  
      Such remedies were usually found in marriage contracts. A case in 1307 suggests a 
gift was made to the issue of one of the donees only. One R. brought the writ against 
Thomas Launf claiming certain tenements as his right. He said that Ralph, his 
grandfather, was seised in his demesne as of fee of the tenements, and that he gave the 
tenements to on Adam, with Janette in frank-marriage. They later died without issue so 
the right to the tenements reverted, and ought to revert, to Ralph, as donor, according 
to the contract. He also showed a charter which said, ‘Ralph enfeoffed the said Adam 
and Janette in frank-marriage, to have and to hold to Adam and Janette and to the heirs 
of the body of Janette begotten, and bound himself and his heirs to warranty.’ Adam 
died without issue by Janette and she took another husband, with whom she had a son, 
Thomas, who was now tenant. Thomas asked for a judgment as to whether R. could 
demand anything from him, because R. was the heir of Ralph, and by this charter R. 
was bound to warrant him.454 Moreover, the charter articulated that the fee should 
descend to Janette’s heir, which implied that no matter which marriage the heir had 
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been produced from, as long as the heir was Janette’s child, he or she had every right 
to enjoy the said tenement. This case explicitly shows how conditions were used to 
exclude the potential exploitation of the maritagium by the groom, saving the 
maritagium to the bride and her issue. 
 
4.5.3 De Donis and the early development of jointure   
      Every statute was enacted for particular reasons, and De Donis was the result of the 
early development of jointure. Although jointure did not prevail until the fourteenth 
century, during the last twenty years of the thirteenth century, numerous sources began 
to refer to it. A good example is a case at the Leicestershire eyre of 1284 when one John 
brought a writ of mort d’ancestor upon the death of his uncle, Thomas, against Geoffrey 
of Stapleford and his son, Richard. The disputed tenements were held at that time by 
Geoffrey, his wife, Joan, and their son, Richard. John claimed that the tenement was 
maritagium granted by one Robert to Joan, Joan’s ex-husband, Thomas, and the heirs 
of their two bodies. After Thomas died, Joan had two husbands and a son by each of 
them; nonetheless, neither of these husbands had the right to enjoy the curtesy of the 
maritagium, which had been granted to Joan and Thomas and their heirs alone. 
Consequently the fee should have reverted to the heirs of Robert.455   
      This case not only shows the background to the emergence of De Donis but also the 
law protecting wives. Joan was actually absent from the assize as the case proceeded, 
and the presiding judge, Siddington, stated: ‘If we were to take the assize in the absence 
of Joan we would be doing wrong to Joan because she would lose free tenement without 
bring warned and this would not be proper’. The other legal practitioner, Lisle, 
suggested ‘That would be true if Joan was in possession but now it is Geoffrey alone 
who has warranted and, if the land being claimed is lost, Geoffrey will provide 
exchange from his own land’. Although Geoffrey was asked to present his wife, Joan, 
to the assize, she eventually essoined.456 The legal practitioners’ statements suggest that 
the law gave protection to the wife if she lost her maritagium through her husband’s 
mismanagement of it. They also suggest that she could obtain other land in 
compensation.  
      As settling jointures on couples became prevalent from the end of the thirteenth 
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century, the old forms of maritagium and dower declined. Likewise, recorded disputes 
concerning maritagia were replaced by those relating to jointures. The word 
‘maritagium’ became used less frequently, while the word ‘joint-feoffee’ was seen 
more often. The former is found in cases of a bride holding a landed marriage portion 
from her father or her relatives when she married; and the latter is seen in cases of 
jointure, where the father of the bride did not give her maritagium but paid cash to the 
groom’s family in order to have a piece of land granted by the groom’s father to the 
bride and the groom jointly. What effect did this change have on women and their legal 
status?       
      In 1294 one A. brought a writ of entry against a T. le Charer and Joan, his wife, for 
a house in Westminster. Le Charer and Joan defended themselves by saying that the 
father of A. had never been seised of the house, and then defaulted at the next court 
session. Afterwards, they were summoned to hear the judgment, but T. le Charer did 
not attend court and only his wife, Joan, was present. Joan argued that she wished to 
defend her own right before the judgment was announced. 457 One of the legal 
practitioners, Berwike, stated in her defence, ‘The Statute458  states that where the 
husband makes default or will not answer or faintly defends the right of his wife, if she 
comes before judgment and pray to be received’. However, the other practitioner, 
Suthcote, disagreed. He counter-argued that, ‘The Statute aids you only where the 
husband alone is impleaded; and this may be understood from the first words of the 
Statute, which says, “When the husband being impleaded &c.”; Judgment if she ought 
now to be received and answered singly, inasmuch as she heretofore pleaded together 
with her husband.’459  
      In response to Suthcote, Berwike argued ‘if her husband had lost these tenements 
by defaults, she, after her husband’s death, would have had recovery by writ of entry; 
whereby it appears that if she come before judgment she ought to be received to defend 
&c; and we tell you that R. the father of A. was never seised in such wise that he could 
be disseised, ready &c.’460 
      In the end it was decided that Joan should recover her land because for a wife who 
was a joint-feoffee of land, chapter 3 of the Statute of Westminster II provided her with 
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a remedy to recover her land. If her husband absented himself, refused to defend her 
right or wished to surrender it against his wife’s will, the wife should come before the 
judgment to defend her right.461 However, this case also proves another important point 
in the development of common law: it evidences the increasing importance of physical 
presence in court. This echoes the Stapleford case mentioned above, where justice 
Siddington believed that it would be ‘doing wrong to Joan’ to take the assize in her 
absence.  
 
4.6 Maritagium as ‘women’s land’?  
      As I suggest in the introduction of this chapter, this study will challenge the idea of 
‘maritagium as women’s land.’ In a sense, maritagium was indeed women’s land, but 
not in every sense. This discussion will be divided into two parts. Firstly, I will unpack 
the central idea of de Trafford’s argument that, in medieval England, daughters were 
possibly regarded as having a special claim to maritagium. Furthermore, the reason that 
a widow granted her maritagium to her daughter instead of to her male heir was 
probably because maritagium was used as ‘women’s land’.462 De Trafford sampled rich 
and well-landed families as examples, omitting the very different social-cultural 
structures that governed ordinary and middle-class families. Moreover, she believed 
that a widow could grant her maritagium to her children, usually her sons. Although it 
is hard to prove that granting her children her maritagium increased their dependence, 
I would suggest that it did, at least, lead to an increased expectation of receiving their 
mother’s maritagium.  
Secondly, returning to an issue I addressed in the introduction, does de Trafford’s 
argument mean that there was an unspoken rule that a mother would rather grant her 
dowry to her younger sons than to a daughter? Or, was there a social consciousness of 
‘daughters’ special claim to maritagium’, which meant that maritagium was regarded 
as ‘women’s land’? 
      If it is true that medieval mothers in England more frequently granted their 
maritagia to younger sons than to daughters, then the social expectation of daughters’ 
special claim to maritagium would not have existed. On the other hand, if there was an 
unspoken rule about a daughter’s special claim to maritagium, then there should have 
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been more evidence of granting maritagium to daughters than to younger sons. When 
a woman had several male and female children, would she save her maritagium for her 
younger sons or grant it to her daughters?  
 
4.6.1 Maritagium: son or daughter?  
      In 1200, when Walter de Scoteny married Helen, daughter of William, Helen 
brought lands in Roxby and North Willingham as her maritagium, which were then 
given as maritagium to her elder daughter, Agnes, although they had two other sons 
and one daughter.463 On the contrary, in 1232, Walter de Lacy granted the manors of 
Britford in Wiltshire and Yarkhill in Herefordshire to his daughter, Parnel, and her 
husband Ralph de Tony as maritagium. This maritagium instead of either descending 
to their heir, Roger, or being granted to their daughter, Constance, was granted to 
someone outside the family, namely Thomas of St Omer, his heirs and his assigns by 
Parnel, which caused the dispute in 1304.464 In 1241 in York, Eda de Baylloil enfeoffed 
her maritagium to her two sons, Hugh and Robert, in her widowhood, who afterwards 
delivered it back to Eda for life so that she could use it as farmland for 40s rent.465 In 
this case, it does not tell us whether Hugh and Robert were Eda’s younger sons, so it 
would be careless to assume that this was the reason for granting her maritagium to 
them. Nevertheless, one thing is certain – maritagium was a significant asset that could 
support a family, especially if the wife became widowed. The sons in this case 
cooperated with their mother to gain the best possible outcome by using maritagium 
well.  
      The above three case studies suggest that maritagium was not necessarily saved for 
one particular child ‘begotten from the couple’. According to surviving cartularies and 
charters in thirteenth-century England, maritagium was more often descended to heirs 
over daughters or younger sons. Alternatively, it was simply disposed of by the wives 
themselves, as Parnel did, or by their husbands. For instance, the Hungerford Cartulary 
only states one case where a mother’s maritagium was entirely passed on to her 
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daughter as maritagium.466 Likewise, there are nine charters related to maritagium in 
the Basset Charters, and only one mentions that a mother’s maritagiumwas granted to 
her younger son.467 This particular charter, which was made between 1180 and 1182, 
shows that Thomas Basset granted the vill of Compton Basset, which was his wife’s 
maritagium, to her younger son, Alan of Wycombe, with the consent of the eldest son 
and heir, Gilbert.468 Similarly, in the Hungerford Cartulary, there are fifteen charters 
showing gifts granted in marriage; fourteen suggest that maritagia were from the 
fathers’ inheritance rather than the mothers’ maritagia. 469  In other words, 
approximately 93% of all cases concerning maritagium in the Hungerford Cartulary 
do not indicate a recycling of maritagium. A reasonable explanation is that maritagium 
was often alienated during the marriage for various reasons, including financial 
concerns. This also reflects the purpose of De Donis, which allowed an heir to demand 
limits on a grantee’s right to alienation, especially for those grantees who had no heirs. 
  
4.6.2 Maritagium not recycled as maritagium       
      When Claire de Trafford points out that it is possible for maritagium to be recycled 
again as ‘women’s land’, she mentions the Wakebridge Chartulary.  In it, she found a 
‘recycled maritagium’ stretching over four continuous generations, the longest chain 
on record. 470  However, there is only one charter relating to maritagium in the 
Wakebridge Chartulary, which is the one she used as an example.471 Likewise, she 
detailed a charter listed in the Chartulary of Healaugh Park where a mother granted 
her maritagium in maritagium to her daughter again.472 Whilst these charters evidence 
the grant of maritagium, only one suggests that the maritagium was granted ‘in 
maritagium’ repeatedly, and only two show the widows granting their maritagia to 
others.473 It is true that some mothers would save their maritagia as maritagia for their 
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daughter one fore-earth and one acre of land in Heytesbury which her father gave Emma on the day of 
her marriage. 
467 These nine charters are Basset Charters c.1120-1250, ed. William T. Reedy (London: Pipe Roll 
Society, 1995), n. 6, n. 47, n. 78, n. 137, n. 178, n. 179, n. 164, n. 182, n. 200.  
468 Basset Charters, ed. Reedy, n. 178.  
469 Except for The Hungerford Cartulary, pt.1, ed. Kirby, n. 526, which shows maritagium was saved 
for maritagium again.  
470 de Trafford, ‘The Contract of Marriage,’ 243-244.  
471 The Cartulary of the Wakebridge Chantries at Crich, ed. Saltman, n. 99.  
472 The	Chartulary	of the Augustinian Priory of St. John the Evangelist of the Park of Healaugh, ed. J. S. 
Purvis (Wakefield: Yorkshire Archaeological Society, 1936 for 1935), 147-148.   
473 Ibid., 30, 38, 80-81, 98, 147-148, 194.  
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daughters, but compared to those who did not do so, the numbers are very limited. De 
Trafford’s proposal that in thirteenth-century England maritagium was treated as 
‘women’s land’ relies on only a very few cases and ignores the fact that more cases 
show the inverse. Therefore, the idea that maritagium was women’s land because of 
‘recycled maritagium’ is not very convincing.   
      A more reasonable explanation could be that only rich families were capable of 
recycling maritagium onto the next generation because they did not need to alienate 
maritagium for financial reasons. However, in some rich families, or among the upper 
classes, a maritagium was easily alienated. A good example is Maud de Clare (c. 1223-
1289), Countess of Gloucester and Hertford. Between 1249 and 1250 Maud de Clare 
transferred a large part of her maritagium – namely the manor of Navesby, 
Northamptonshire – to Isabel de Forz, Countess of Aumale, also the niece of Maud’s 
husband, Richard de Clare (c. 1222-1262), and her husband, William de Forz. 
According to the suit Maud launched after the death of William, she claimed that it had 
been demised against her will and she had therefore been reluctant to alienate her 
maritagium. Isabel challenged Maud’s argument by pointing out that, according to the 
law, before a fine was levied, a woman should be examined separately. If Maud had 
been reluctant to transfer her property, she should have disagreed to it in court, a place 
that was free of coercion. Isabel produced a chirograph which showed Maud’s consent 
to the demise, and she won the suit.474 Maud’s case also reveals that, even a high status 
woman could succumb to the coercion by her husband. This placed both her and her 
property in a precarious position. As suggested in chapter 3 (see p. 102), it is too naïve 
to believe that the king would not allow any coercion against a woman’s will in his 
court as Bracton suggested.475 A woman was never truly free of coercion, even in the 
king’s court, because of a wife’s social subordination whilst married. If she disagreed 
with her husband, she risked the relationship becoming hostile, which would only bring 
disadvantage to her. Noblewomen were not afforded more independence than their 
counterparts amongst the lower classes – all were inferior to men in the eyes of the law 
and society.     
 
 
                                                
474 Mitchell, Portraits of Medieval Women, 36.  
475 Bracton, vol. 4, 31.  
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4.6.3 Maritagium as family business    
      Although most maritagia in the thirteenth century were granted by the fathers of 
the brides or by close male relatives to support women, their heirs and their marriage, 
it is misleading to regard maritagium as ‘women’s land.’ Apart from there being 
insufficient cases to prove the practice of ‘maritagium as maritagium again’, plenty of 
cases show that maritagia were more often than not disposed of by wives’ husbands, 
heirs, and relatives, because they had easy access to a woman’s dowry. Between 1220 
and 1257 a confirmation was made by Eustace Rospear to the monks of Rufford of all 
the gifts made by his great grandfather, grandfather and father. In addition, he gave his 
land in Shirebrook, the maritagium of his wife, to them, with the assent of her brother, 
Sir Nicholas de Meynell.476 It is curious why the alienation needed the wife’s brother’s 
consent, but it may have been because he was the person to whom the maritagium 
would revert.		
Another good example in the early thirteenth century is a maritagium granted by 
Richard of Grafton Manor to his daughter Petronilla and Walter of Kingsford. Richard 
granted 20s rent from the tenement that was held by Osbert, son of Robert, and his 
brother, Richard. Petronilla granted part of the rent from her maritagium to her son, 
John, before 1241, who quitclaimed 10s of the rent to William de Beauchamp (III) of 
Elmley Castle.477 Another case, which may have been heard in the fourteenth century, 
also indicates that even a maritagium completely preserved and passed to the second 
generation was easily disposed of by the heir. One Richard granted a certain amount of 
land to Osbert de Lay with Emma, his daughter, in frank-marriage to hold to him and 
his heirs by Emma, with reversion to Richard and his heirs. Part of this maritagium was 
granted again to Emma’s daughter, Alice, who quitclaimed it to Robert de Berton in 
her widowhood.478 
 
4.6.3.1 Alienation of maritagium by husbands   
      Heirs were not the only ones who might not commit to the preservation of 
maritagium. Husbands also posed threats to their wives’ maritagia. A key group of 
people who had the right to enjoy women’s lands were husbands, who gained access to 
                                                
476 Rufford Charters, ed. C. J. Holdsworth (Nottingham: Thoroton Society, 1972-1981), n. 366, 208.  
477 The Beauchamp Cartulary 1100-1268, ed. Emma Mason (London: Pipe Roll Society, 1980), n. 133- 
n. 135, 81-83.  
478 The Hungerford Cartulary, pt. 1, ed. Kirby, n. 1, n. 11.  
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and control over maritagia during their marriages. It is clear that a husband could 
alienate his wife’s inheritance without her concurrence, but in the case of maritagium, 
his ability to do so was restricted, because his control over her maritagium might be 
referred to as wardship.479 As mentioned, maritagium often had a proviso saying that it 
reverted to the donor if there was no heir from the donees’ bodies. Consequently, the 
husband’s control over his wife’s maritagium was often magnified if they had a child, 
because this enabled the husband to enjoy his wife’s land for the whole of his life. In 
consequence, plenty of cases reveal that women went to court for maritagia alienatedby 
their husbands.  
A case in 1249 reveals just how a woman’s maritagium could be alienated by her 
husband. Galiena, wife of Robert Malebise, presented herself against Gillian and 
Christian of Worth for one messuage in Highworth as her right and maritagium, into 
which Gillian and Christian had no entry except by Richard of Widhill, to whom Robert 
Malebise, Galiena’s former husband, demised it. However, Galiena said she could not 
contradict his alienation in his lifetime. Afterwards, Gillian and Christian did not attend 
court and a summons was issued. In the end the messuage was taken into the king’s 
hand by default, and they were summoned to appear again on the octave of Trinity.480  
Likewise, in 1293, in Norfolk, one Margaret, widow of Nicholas, made a claim 
against Roger Barefoot to four acres of arable land with appurtenances in Oxwick as 
her maritagium. She argued that Roger had only gained the right of entry from Nicholas, 
whom she could not gainsay during her lifetime. In response to Margaret, Roger 
retorted that the disputed tenements had been a gage481 from William de Bec, who had 
promised six marks payable at a certain term as a maritagium, and Nicholas could only 
hold the said tenements until William paid him the said six marks. Subsequently 
William paid the money when the term for payment came, so neither Margaret nor 
Nicholas had a right to the disputed tenements. Despite Margaret’s insistence on the 
disputed land as her maritagium, the jurors said that the four acres had not been given 
                                                
479 Hudson,	The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol. 2, 789. 	
480 Civil Pleas in Wiltshire 1249, ed. Clanchy, n. 149. The final result is not recorded.  
481 Something valuable deposited to ensure the performance of certain action, and liable to forfeiture in 
case of the failure of the action. See ‘OED,’ accessed on 14 June 2018, http://0-
www.oed.com.catalogue.libraries.london.ac.uk/view/Entry/76016?rskey=B7B6sq&result=1&isAdvanc
ed=false#eid 
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in maritagium. Thus, Margaret took nothing through her writ and was amerced for the 
false claim.482  
Two points deserve discussion here. First, from Margaret’s point of view, she was 
reluctant to let her husband lease the maritagium to Roger, but, as the record suggests, 
she was in no position and no right to contradict his deed, which meant that she only 
tried to recover her maritagium after the death of her husband. Secondly, it explicitly 
states that Margaret was trying to claim the four acres of land as maritagium instead of 
a gage, which echoes the argument I put forward earlier in this chapter that claiming 
disputed land as maritagium gave female litigants a better chance of winning. Her 
strategy might have succeeded if the land had been confirmed as maritagium instead.  
Not all husbands disposed of their wives’ maritagia without the wives’ consent, 
even though they did not need it. The following case shows how a husband obtained is 
wife’s consent when he alienated her maritagium. Early in the reign of Henry III, a 
notification was made in Worcester by Walter the weaver that with the assent of his 
wife Matilda he had sold her maritagium for 20s to John, Matilda’s brother. The 
maritagium had been given to Matilda and Walter by her father, Roger de la Hulle. The 
phrase ‘with the assent of Matilda’ should always be doubted, because, according to 
Glanvill, a wife should not contradict her husband’s disposition on her land. 483 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that husbands rarely clearly mentioned their wives’ 
assent when their land was being alienated. It can be deduced that the mentioning of 
the wife’s assent was to prevent her recovering it after her husband’s death. It is 
unknown whether Matilda was forced to give her consent, but the case highlights a 
wife’s dilemma. She could not contradict her husband’s action, but once she gave her 
concurrence she could not negate that action after his death.  
 
4.6.3.2 Maritagia taken away from women 
Property was not only threatened by husbands, but also by other people. One 
example was mentioned earlier in this chapter, when Maud transferred part of her 
landed maritagium to her brother Geoffrey and lost the said property because of another 
grant made by by Geoffrey. Disputes over maritagia resulting from alienations by the 
wives’ siblings, relatives, or family members were not uncommon. For example, in 
                                                
482 Year Book of the Reign of King Edward I, ed. Horwood, vol. 2, 620.  
483 CRR, vol. 1, 309, 317, 378. 
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1208 one Hersenta found that her maritagium had been sold to others by her son, 
Lawrence, while she and her husband had been overseas. Therefore, Hersenta and her 
husband, Reynold, went to court against Philip, to whom her son, Lawrence, had sold 
the land. According to the contract between Philip and Lawrence, Philip should give 
the land back when Hersenta and her husband returned. However, Philip showed a 
confirmation stating that he had been delivered one virgate of land with appurtenances 
in Sugestaple by the service of two years and through an agreement by Reynold and 
Hersenta.484 It seemed that Hersenta’s maritagium was so valuable that even her son 
wanted to make some profit from it. If the agreement Philip showed was true, it could 
be inferred that Hersenta and Reynold might have accepted that the maritagium had 
been alienated, but later regretted this and launched the suit.  
Sometimes wives’ maritagia were not disposed of by others but were simply 
disseised. In 1201, a final concord in Lincolnshire suggests that Alice de Amundeville 
was disseised by her brother of her maritagium. Alice claimed that her brother, Jollan 
de Amundeville, disseised her of the maritagium given to her by their father, Ellis, 
while Alice was in his wardship. Afterwards, an agreement was made between them, 
whereby Alice returned half a knight’s fee in Winthorpe, which she had claimed as her 
maritagium, to Jollan and his heir in perpetuity. In return, Jollan conceded to her two 
carucates of land and seven bovates of land with toft and croft, in Winthorpe. He also 
gave Alice and John de Hocton’ and their children four crofts and the third part of one 
mill-house in the same place. John and his heirs would hold the said tenements of Jollan 
through the free service of the third part of one knight. If, by chance, Alice died before 
she had heirs by John, the said tenements would revert to John and his heirs. Jollan 
would have the homage of John, and Alice gave her fidelity to him as well. In the end, 
Alice returned their father’s charter to Jollan.485 Although Alice had been disseised of 
her maritagium by her brother, it seems that through an agreement she managed to 
compensate herself. The reason why Jollan disseised his sister remains unknown, but it 
may have been the result of frustration over his imperfect inheritance, part of which had 
been given as maritagium to Alice. He may well have regarded this as damaging for his 
inheritance.   
                                                
484 CRR, vol. 5, 289. The final decision is not recorded.  
485 Feet of Fines in Lincolnshire, ed. Walker, n. 37, 19-20.  
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A case in Norfolk in 1206 also shows the disseisin of maritagium. Hugh de 
Polstede and Hawise, his wife, sought from Walter de Grant Curt one carucate of land 
with appurtenances in Burnham. They said the land belonged to Ascelin, Hawise’s 
mother, and had been granted as maritagium by Ascelin’s father, William de Grant Curt. 
The defendant, Walter de Grant Curt, was accused of intruding on Ascelin’s 
maritagium by force while she was sick. However, Walter refused to respond unless 
Hawise’s sister, Julia, was presented.486 Afterwards, the jury confirmed that William de 
Grant Curt gave the disputed land to Hugh de Candos, with Ascelin in maritagium, that 
that she held the land as maritagium until her death, and that Walter intruded into her 
maritagium fifteen days before her death. It was therefore adjudged that Hugh de 
Polstede and his wife Hawise and Julia and her husband, William de Gimigham, had 
the disputed land as co-heiresses.487 Walter de Grant Curt might have been the relative 
of William de Grant Curt, and Walter may also have been be Ascelin’s relative. This 
case is uncommon because maritagium land was seldom intruded into by force, which 
suggests that the woman in this case had faced a bigger threat than other people who 
had disputes over their maritagium.  
      As has been described elsewhere, because landed maritagium was more profitable 
than movable property, in the thirteenth century, it was unusual to see maritagium 
remain intact for several generations within families. Hence, various kinds of legal 
actions – such as enfoeffments and grants – were often found attached to them. For 
instance, the Hungerford Cartulary includes fifteen charters related to grants of 
maritagium in frank-marriage or marriage, and only one suggests that the same 
maritagium was saved as maritagium for the next generation.488 The rare examples of 
keeping mariatgium intact suggest how important maritagium was to a family’s finance. 
Another point worth mentioning is that the rent from landed maritagium could function 
as ‘liquid capital’, allowing the family to manage it with more flexibility.  
      In the case of rich and noble families, maritagium was neither necessarily saved for 
the next generation nor used as liquid capital for their financial need. Maritagia could 
be used for ecclesiastical purposes. In the Earldom of Gloucester Charters: The 
                                                
486 Again, the defendant’s requirement of all co-heiresses’ presence acted as a strategy to delay the 
proceedings.  
487 CRR, vol. 4, 80-81, 102.   
488 The Hungerford Cartulary, ed. Kirby, n. 1, n. 6, n. 81, n. 88, n. 102, n. 189, n. 190, n. 444, n. 919, n. 
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Charters and Scribes of the Earls and Countess of Gloucester to A.D 1217 only two 
charters are recorded that relate to maritagium, and both of them were granted to 
religious houses by Hawise, the Countess of Gloucester. She granted land from her 
maritagium at Pimperne to Fontevrault  Abbey and St. Mary, Nuneaton.489  
      Another significant piece of proof which renders the idea of ‘maritagium as 
women’s land’ impotent is the debate on whether it was a grant or a pre-mortem 
inheritance. When Biancalana suggested the similarity between female inheritance and 
maritagium he supported his contention by saying that, if maritagium was regarded as 
a grant, no one could ask a daughter to put her maritagium back into the pot (hotchpot). 
Nevertheless, when maritagium was seen as a pre-mortem inheritance, the daughter 
needed to ‘hotchpot’ upon the death of her father for the division of inheritance. 
Therefore, from this point of view, maritagium shows no hint of being ‘women’s land’. 
The curia regis also supports this argument when it states that, if a daughter with 
maritagium sued to share her father’s inheritance, she should put her dowry back into 
the pot for division; however, her sister was not eligible to force her to do so by suing 
her for a division. Thus, the king’s court favoured the idea of ‘maritagium as a pre-
mortem inheritance’. However, to some extent, it also protected her right by only 
enforcing the return of the dowry to the pot when the woman brought forward the suit 
concerning the inheritance by herself.490  
 
4.6.3.3 De Donis and donors’ interests  
      De Donis also contradicted the idea of ‘maritagium as women’s land’ by ensuring 
the law’s protection of grantors and restricting women and their husbands from 
alienating maritagia as they wished. At the same time, it protected the first wife’s issue. 
From maritagium to De Donis and then onto jointure, a maritagium has never been 
considered a particular generous gift to the newly-wed couple. Its purposes had always 
been both to support the new family and act as a guarantee to the widow. Ironically, 
maritagium had always been granted with conditions, hence it had come to be regarded 
as part of the inheritance. Therefore, maritagium became an arrangement that 
concerned the family’s interests, which frequently caused disputes within families. This 
                                                
489 Earldom of Gloucester Charters: The Charters and Scribes of the Earls and Countesses of Gloucester 
to A.D. 1217, ed. Robert B. Patterson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), n. 67, n. 68.   
490 Biancalana, The Fee Tail and the Common Recovery in Medieval England, 52-53.  
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further supports my notion of it being a ‘family’s business’ rather than ‘women’s land’.  
      I also contest the statement by another scholar, Jack Goody, who asserted that 
‘daughters in England rarely got land as dowry’. He did not provide any references to 
support the statement or explain the reasons for his assertion.491 In fact, landed dowry 
was still more prevalent than the gift of movable objects in England throughout the 
whole of the thirteenth century. Peter Fleming believes that, from the mid-thirteenth 
century onwards, maritagium in cash had gradually been replacing landed maritagium. 
However, this might be inaccurate because the development of maritagium in cash was 
more closely related to jointure, which did not become popular until later in the 
fourteenth century. For instance, in the Basset Charters, seven charters explicitly 
mention gifts granted in marriage, all of which were landed maritagia.492 Likewise, in 
the Hungerford Cartulary, which covers the thirteenth century to the early fifteenth 
century, of the fifteen charters that relate to grants in maritagium, only one of them 
included rent.493 In the Cartulary of Worcester Cathedral Priory, of three charters that 
involve grants in marriage, all are maritagia in real estate.494 
      Was the notion of ‘maritagium as women’s land’ in thirteenth-century England as 
suggested by Claire de Trafford ever justified? It was well acknowledged that once a 
woman entered marriage, her maritagium became a valuable asset to her husband’s 
family and was easily disposed of even before being granted to her younger sons or 
daughters. Sometimes, it just simply descended or reverted to the heir of the donor when 
there was no heir begotten of the woman. Even though maritagium was the property 
granted to a wife with her husband and their children, it was mostly disposed by her 
husband, children, or relatives. It would be misleading to believe that most people and 
families had the expectation of ‘maritagium as women’s land’, in part due to the high 
probability that maritagia would be alienated by husbands and others.  
      A wife’s management of her own maritagium was rather limited to herself as the 
woman of the first generation. Similarly, her daughters were barely able to manage their 
mother’s maritagium because it was often disposed before they had a chance to benefit 
from it. Therefore, this study has shown that, in thirteenth-century England, maritagium 
                                                
491 Goody, ‘Inheritance, Property and Women,’ 10-30.  
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functioned much more as family’s land than women’s land. 
  
4.7 Conclusion 
      Maritagium, as a gift and means of support for the conjugal unit and their children 
in thirteenth-century England, was never regarded as a normal fee. With its special rule 
of reversion, it created numerous disputes within families, yet it provides a fascinating 
insight into a woman’s natal family and her newly-formed family. For the family of the 
bride, maritagium was part of their inheritance, and they usually expected this property 
to revert to the family after her death if she had no children. However, the principle of 
reversion meant that claiming a piece of land as maritagium became a useful strategy 
for the donor, or the heir of the donor, against the woman’s heir, or, if she took one, her 
second husband. An advantage to the receiver of maritagium, was that, by having it 
confirmed to be her right in maritagium, should her right be disputed, she could fully 
and completely have a title to enjoy the land, even though she barely had a right to 
dispose of it because of the limitation on alienation.   
      From the point of view of the woman’s opponent, he or she ran more risk of losing 
a suit if the woman could prove that the disputed land was her maritagium. Nevertheless, 
the act of claiming her land as maritagium created a crisis for a woman who had been 
granted land as maritagium should there be a demand for her share to be divided 
between co-heiresses. This situation arose because of the rules of ‘hotchpot’, which 
meant that a woman had to return her maritagium in order to obtain her inheritance 
share. Furthermore, for a woman, the advantage of claiming land as maritagium was 
limited, as she was the original grantee. Her heirs usually faced various opponents – the 
donor, the donor’s heir, the second husband, or the heir of the second husband. This 
was particularly true prior to De Donis, when the second husband could still enjoy the 
curtesy of the woman’s maritagium from the first marriage. Nevertheless, after De 
Donis, women found they had more restrictions regarding the disposal of their 
maritagia because De Donis prioritised the rights of the grantor.  
      Did the enactment of De Donis really result from a decrease in generosity towards 
daughters of families, as de Trafford suggests? She cites no reference to prove her 
statement. Also, to what extent could we call a family’s granted maritagium generous? 
To take one example, if we compare a man who granted all his inheritance (say, one 
flour mill) to his daughter as dowry, and a rich man who granted only one-tenth of his 
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inheritance (say, three virgates of land), which one should be considered more generous? 
Judging from the size of the property, the rich man might win in terms of generosity, if 
generosity is based on sheer value; whereas, a man who granted all his inheritance 
should perhaps be regarded as being more generous given the actual cost to him. 
However, the enactment of De Donis does not emanate from an ambiguous definition 
of generosity, but from the gradual development of maritagium as an entail, as 
Biancalana and Kaye suggest.  
      From this point of view, maritagium never served as ‘women’s land’ because, in 
the end, it protected the grantor’s right and will through the recognition of ‘maritagium 
as pre-mortem inheritance’. Furthermore, maritagium was so often disposed of by a 
woman’s husband and heirs before the woman was able to exercise any control over it. 
The majority of people did not expect to save maritagia for their daughters because, 
before De Donis, maritagium was intended to provide support for a new conjugal unit 
and act as inheritance for the grantor’s family.  After De Donis, it was more usually the 
grantor’s inheritance. The passing on of maritagium to subsequent generations was 
extremely rare, and even when it did occur it was only in very rich families. I suggest 
that the use of maritagium by women very much depended on their families’ interests 
and that there was no preference for granting maritagium to younger sons, or saving 
them for daughters. Some maritagia were passed on to younger sons, some to daughters, 
but more were purely for financial purposes. All of the examples given here show that 
there was no principle, or norm, for managing maritagium in the sense of ‘one size fits 
all’, but rather, it was characterised by diversity.  
      Nevertheless, before De Donis, in the eyes of the bride to whom it was granted, 
there was no doubt that maritagium was her land and her property, and property played 
a hugely important role in running a family, particularly a new one. It may be seen from 
the records that a woman had the ability to manage her maritagium, through exchanging, 
granting, and enfeoffing. For rich and noble women, it was even common to grant their 
maritagia to religious institutions in their widowhood for the salvation of their souls. 
After De Donis, however, the ability to manage their own maritagia drastically declined, 
for the law favoured the grantors’ rights and introduced a standardisation for managing 
them that had previously been missing. In early medieval England, maritagium could 
not be described as ‘women’s land’ because it was sometimes granted by a groom’s 
father to the groom and his heirs only, and left the bride with nothing. By the end of the 
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thirteenth century, maritagium fully became an entail serving the grantors’ interests. 
Maritagium was already functioning as ‘family’s land’ because De Donis circumvented 
women’s capacity of alienating their maritagia.   
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Chapter Five: Widows in Court 
 
While inheritance and maritagium were both property that women obtained either 
before or during their marriage, dower could only be obtained upon a husband’s death. 
Dower, a life interest for a widow, did not pass to her heir, but reverted to her late 
husband’s heir, although her heir and her husband’s heir were often the same. It gave 
the widow sole control over property. Such a right gave the widow a certain degree of 
power as she had no right to dispose her husband’s property while he was alive. 
According to the common law, dower was one-third of the land held by the widow’s 
late husband. However, the rule differed in local customs or tenures. A Wilton widow, 
for instance, was able to choose between her ‘free bench’ (a share in her late husband’s 
dwelling) or a £5 dower.495 The dower share in Tittleshall in Norfolk was a half because 
it was crown land.496 Local customs will generally be excluded in this chapter as it will 
focus on common law dower cases, which followed the rule of one-third. 
      However, some local customs will be discussed in order to demonstrate a range of 
options which allowed women to exercise their rights over dower, and to illustrate the 
significance of local customs during the development of a common law system.497 
While this thesis is primarily concerned with estates, it is important to keep in mind that 
if a husband had no land, then the dower of his widow could include his money and 
chattels.498  
 
5.1 Literature review        
      Dower, the most sought after right by women in medieval England, has been widely 
discussed in scholarship. The publications mentioned below constitute the most 
important research on dower. They are grouped by author, as follows.  
(i) Joseph Biancalana. 
      A comprehensive illustration of how dower developed can be seen in Joseph 
Biancalana’s ‘Widow’s at Common Law: The Development of Common Law Dower’. 
Two significant findings were proposed by Biancalana. The first was the redefinition 
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496 Flower, Introduction to the Curia Regis Rolls, 1199-1230 A. D., vol. 62, 239.	
497 The local customs of Winchester, for instance, will be discussed in this chapter.   
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of dower asserted by royal jurisdiction in 1176. Dating back to the tenth century, dower 
referred to the specific endowment by a husband at the time of marriage. After the death 
of her husband, the widow could have one-third of a life interest in his acquired land, 
i.e., her customary entitlement.499 Dower was not the only endowment a widow could 
have. In 1176 the Assize of Northampton established that the royal judges had 
jurisdiction over dower claims from the widows of free tenants. The endowment was 
emphasised in a public ceremony, and a tenant’s seisin at death.  
      The 1176 Assize denoted that a widow’s entitlement to acquisition had to be read 
into the endowment at marriage.500 It also denoted that a son needed to have land in the 
first place in order to assign the widow her dower. Therefore, the distinction between 
acquired land and inherited land was blurred as a result of the difficulty of 
distinguishing widows’ different entitlements. Inevitably, a widow’s customary 
entitlement became one-third of the land which descended to her.501 Chapter 7 of the 
1217 Magna Carta articulated the redefinition of dower – it was either specific land 
given at the church door on the marriage day or one-third of the land her husband held 
during the marriage.502 
      The second prominent finding Biancalana had is the misreading of Chapter 7 of the 
1217 Magna Carta, which he called ‘the reinterpretation of Magna Carta in the mid-
1230s’.503 The document has often been misinterpreted as stating that a widow could 
choose between her nominated dower and common law dower, but this is not the case. 
This misreading was caused by the particular requirements of pleading and proof, and 
the logic of proof.504 The royal judges required the widow who claimed her nominated 
dower to produce witnesses, something which was also required of the defendant. As 
Biancalana noted, the proof of witnesses was symmetrical: if one party produced 
witnesses, the other party could do likewise.505 This method was meant to implement 
Chapter 7. However, as Magna Carta came to be understood as the authoritative 
statement of English common law, the royal judges became conscious that they were 
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administering a distinct body of law. They further regarded the specific endowment at 
the day of marriage as an agreement, a grant, or a local custom. In contrast, one-third 
of the share was common law.506  
      In consequence, the widow who claimed her common law dower did not need to 
produce witnesses, which prevented a defendant from calling witnesses in order to 
prove that she was endowed with other land at the marriage.507 If the defendant wanted 
to deny her claim of common law dower, he had to prove that she had accepted the 
nominated dower after the death of her late husband.508 Once the defendant could not 
plead that the widow had been endowed at the church door, the widow who, in fact, 
was endowed with a nominated dower at the church door, was able to elect between her 
nominated dower and common law dower. Consequently, it was recognised by the royal 
judges that the widow could waive her nominated dower in order to choose her common 
law dower.  
      Biancalana’s article not only clarified how the definition of dower developed 
because of certain political and judicial changes, but also discussed the procedural 
development of dower litigation, painting a clear picture of dower in the years between 
the 1176 Assize of Northampton and the mid-1230s. Biancalana was also aware of the 
discrepancies between legal treatises and legal practice. This supports the focus of my 
thesis, which investigates the gap between the theory of statute law and what really 
happened in practice.  
  
      (ii) Sue Sheridan Walker 
      In her article ‘“Litigant Agency” in Dower Pleas in the Royal Common Law Courts 
in Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Century England’, Walker stressed a woman’s role 
in litigation by posing the following important questions: (a) Can a woman’s role as 
litigant be accurately interpreted if the legal documents show her speaking through a 
representative? (b) What kind of lawyers were there? And (c) how were they used in 
dower pleas? Although Walker thought having a lawyer tended to distance the client 
from the proceeding of the suit, widows who went to the royal courts to secure their 
dowers would usually have had professional legal practitioners to speak for them, such 
                                                
506 Ibid., 315.  
507 Ibid.  
508 Ibid., 325.  
		
	
158	
as attorneys or serjeants.509 If a court case was likely to be lengthy, appointing an 
attorney would have been very useful. Furthermore, by the end of the thirteenth century, 
attorneys, serjeants, justices, and even court clerks were professionals who were able 
to manage the business of royal courts.510 In Walker’s opinion, the fact that so many 
widows sought justice at the royal courts in order to secure their dower showed that 
they had access to those courts; and the voices of women in the Common Bench were 
heard through the professional attorneys, judges and serjeants.511  
      In another article, ‘Litigation as Personal Quest: Suing for Dower in the Royal Court, 
circa 1270-1350’, Walker suggested that ‘the common practice of going to the law was 
a compelling personal experience that called forth an active and competent response by 
the women’, because alone of all civil pleas, dower required a woman to be a 
plaintiff.512 She explored widows’ experiences of defending their dower in the royal 
court, and identified the objections that a widows frequently faced: (a) they were not 
validly married to the man from whom they demanded dower; (b) they were accused 
of adultery; (c) they had not reached the age of nine, the legal age for receiving dower, 
when they were endowed; (d) they had accepted a lesser portion of land as their 
nominated dower; (e) their husband had committed a felony and (f) their late husband 
was not seised of the land at the marriage or afterwards.513 
      Walker showed the same opinion as she had in “‘Litigant Agency’ In Dower Pleas 
in the Royal Common Law Courts in Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Century England’, 
suggesting that widows had agency to some extent, and even if a widow did not have 
an attorney, she would have a serjeant to speak for her. The court records tell us that he 
was speaking on her behalf.514  
 
      (iii) Janet Senderowitz Loengard 
      While Walker focused on women’s agency in court by examining their dower 
pleadings, Janet Senderowitz Loengard focused on medieval English women by 
exploring the relationships between widows and heirs in “‘Of the Gift of Her Husband’: 
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English Dower and its Consequences in the Year 1200’.515 Loengard, who considered 
dower as a family affair rather than an abstract right, pointed out that few families could 
afford two women each claiming a third of the property, and it would be even worse if 
the two women were of the same generation, because such an expense would cripple a 
family for more than a generation. Thus, dower made it more difficult for an heir to 
acquire his inheritance because, even when a widow died, the land was not immediately 
and automatically returned to the heir.516  
      In Loengard’s other article, ‘What did Magna Carta Mean to Widows?’, she touched 
upon different issues by querying the impact of the 1225 Magna Carta on widows, in 
particular in the thirteenth century. First, she discussed the most frequent difficulties 
widows encountered when demanding their dowers, and drew on the numerous possible 
strategies their defendants used. For instance, more often than not, defendants used 
procedural responses to delay the proceeding of suits, such as asking for a view.517 
Views were abused during the reign of King John, culminating in chapter 48 of the 
Statute of Westminster II in 1285. Loengard pointed out that the more serious objection 
to which a defendant might have recourse was to deny that they were the warrantor of 
the woman’s dower and therefore refuse to answer. This could lead to numerous 
conundrums. What if the warrantor was not in England but overseas? What if even the 
woman did not know whether he was alive or not? And, what if he had taken to a 
religious life?518  
      Some objections to dower were exceptional, for example, if the husband was a felon 
or still alive, or even if he was on pilgrimage or a crusade. On the other hand, some 
objections were commonly used, including that the husband was not seised of the land 
for which she asked when he married her, that the land was the inheritance or 
maritagium of her late husband’s first wife, or that the husband had sold the land before 
the marriage. 519  Another frequent objection to dower came from the husband’s 
father.520 Loengard explained that when the husband died young and childless, in order 
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to prevent the widow from taking the dower to her second husband’s family and future 
possible disputes, the father would swear that he had not been present at the wedding, 
nor had he given his consent to it. However, Loengard pointed out that such a bargain 
usually failed, especially when the woman’s father presented a charter setting out the 
endowment.521 
      Loengard believed that dower was a strong concern for families in general because 
heirs were frequently reluctant to assign widows their dowers even if their dower rights 
were written in the 1215 Magna Carta. The result was usually a compromise between 
the heirs and the widows, or between the tenants who held the dowers and the widows. 
Some widows quitclaimed their dower and some gave up only a part of it. For a widow, 
dower was her bargaining chip, and through conceding her dower to the heir of her late 
husband she gained benefits for her second husband or her other children.522 
      Loengard also discussed the disputes that maritagium caused in thirteenth-century 
England. She noticed, as I have described in the previous chapter, that some male heirs 
complained about the vast amount of maritagium, which effectively left them 
disinherited. Consequently, a prudent father would acquire the heir’s consent before 
granting the land as maritagium and record it in the charter. Loengard was of the view 
that maritagium was usually saved by the woman for her daughter or younger sons.523  
      Loengard analysed how and if the 1225 Magna Carta made any difference in the 
short run to widows. She suggested that it did not have an immediate impact on widows. 
According to Susanna Annesley’s research, some widows still paid fines not to be 
pressured into remarrying, and for obtaining their inheritance, dower and maritagia.524 
Moreover, contrary to what Glanvill and Bracton suggested, i.e., that the defining date 
of dower was the day of the wedding, the 1225 Magna Carta articulated that a widow 
could claim her common law dower from any land that her husband held during the 
marriage. People did not, however, recognise this right after Magna Carta 1225. The 
long-term effect of the Charter was that, by 1311, it had become the rule that a woman 
could claim a third of all lands that her husband had held at any time during the 
marriage.525  
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      Loengard posited that as a result of the 1225 Magna Carta, the climate became more 
favourable to dower throughout the thirteenth century. For instance, the 1275 Statute of 
Westminster I widened the ability to use the writ of unde nichil habet by allowing a suit 
to go directly to the king’s court.526 
      As for maritagium, Loengard suggests that the impact of the 1225 Magna Carta was 
more indirect. It was only in the first chapter of the Statute of Westminster II in 1285, 
namely De Donis, that the law explicitly limited the alienation of maritagium so that it 
could only descend as a specific fee to the issue of a husband and wife or revert to the 
grantor. As Loengard suggested, although De Donis did not mention widows, it 
compromised a widow’s ability to dispose of her lands because she was legally barred 
from doing so to protect future heirs. The situation was even more disadvantageous 
should the marriage portion be paid in cash because the money would go to the husband 
directly, and if he died first, it went to the heir rather than to the widow. Loengard 
described this as ‘a blow to the bride and potential widow’s independence’.527 
 
(iii) Paul Brand 
      Paul Brand investigated both established and more recent views concerning dower. 
In “‘Deserving” and “Undeserving” Wives: Earning and Forfeiting Dower in Medieval 
England’528, he points out that the age requirement for demanding dower is unclear, 
which might imply that a widow had to reach a minimum age, for example being old 
enough to bear children when the marriage was contracted. However, a husband who 
was underage could still endow his wife, and even if he died before reaching his 
maturity, she would have her dower. Thus an under-age husband seldom became an 
objection to widows claiming dower in court. It seems, therefore, that before 1250 it 
was unthinkable that a widow would not have received her dower – no matter her age. 
However, there was a shift in opinion, leading to a belief that a widow should have to 
‘earn’ her dower before she was allowed to claim it. Along with being under age, 
widows who had not been endowed at the church door were disqualified from claiming 
dower, although this requirement was gradually abandoned in the second half of the 
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thirteenth century. Lastly, if a wife committed adultery she was not entitled to dower 
although the second part of chapter 34 of the Statute of Westminster II stipulated that 
if her husband was willing, without the coercion of the church, to take her back and live 
with her, her right to dower could be restored.529 Brand also points out that a very small 
number of widows admitted they had been living in adultery, with such admissions 
frequently being followed by reconciliations. Alternatively, couples might become 
estranged for good reasons, such as economic necessity. Brand concluded by stating his 
belief that the provisions of the 1285 Statute confirmed changing opinions about dower. 
Before the statute, the older position was that dower was an automatic entitlement 
arising from a valid marriage. However, after 1250, dower was regarded as a reward 
for services rendered. Once those services failed to meet the expectations of the 
husband, the reward could be forfeited.530 
 
(iv) Susanna Annesley 
In ‘The Impact of Magna Carta on Widows: Evidence from the Fine Rolls 1216- 
1225’ Annesley explored an immediate impact of Magna Carta on women, by studying 
the Fine Rolls.531 She discussed its impact in three prominent areas: remarriage, dower 
and wardship. She found that although Magna Carta 1215 did show an improvement in 
widows’ lives, they still paid for their freedom of remarriage. The crown kept exploiting 
widows by having them pay a fine when they either married without consent or chose 
to stay single. Therefore, Annesley argued that a widow’s payment of a fine for her 
freedom did not breach chapter 8 of Magna Carta 1215, which said ‘no widow shall be 
forced to marry so long as she wishes to love without a husband, provided that she gives 
security not to marry without our consent if she holds of us, or without the consent of 
her lord if she holds of another.’532 It is clear that the the provisio of chapter 8 to some 
extent justified the fine widows paid for their freedom.533 
                                                
529 Chapter 34 of the Statute of Westminster II contained three main issues: (i) the rape of women; (ii) 
women’s adultery; and (iii) the abduction of nuns. See English Historical Documents, ed. Douglas and 
Rothwell, vol. 3, 447-448.  
530	Brand, “‘Deserving”and “Undeserving” Wives,’ 1-20.	
531 Susanna Annesley, ‘The Impact of Magna Carta on Widows: Evidence from the Fine Rolls 1216-
1225,’ ‘Fine of the Month’ (November 2007). See ‘Henry III Fine Rolls Project,’ last accessed on 6 
April 2019,  https://finerollshenry3.org.uk/content/month/fm-11-2007.html#fn53 
532 English Historical Documents, ed. Douglas and Rothwell, vol. 3, 328.  
533 Annesley, ‘The Impact of Magna Carta on Widows’. 
		
	
163	
      Regarding dower in the Fine Rolls, Annesley defied an idea put forward by 
Loengard that ‘many or most dower actions were begun in earnest and were vigorously 
litigated’.534 She argued that widows’ dower rights were, in fact, enshrined within the 
laws and customs of the kingdom, in that some cases show the heir assigning dower to 
the widow without reluctance.535  
      Annesley continued to examine the impact of the 1215 Magna Carta on wardship, 
a previously highly profitable privilege for the crown. Only five fines indicating 
widows’ payment for securing their children’s wardship were found in the Fine Rolls 
between 1215 and 1225. This is considered a significant decline, and an improvement 
in widows’ right when compared with the high frequency of widows paying fines for 
wardship during the reigns of Richard and John.536 Nevertheless, Annesley has been 
aware that the Fine Rolls cannot tell us about the complicated relationships and 
negotiations which might happen behind the scenes when arranging a wardship.537  
      In short, from the analysis of these three categories in the Fine Rolls, Annesley 
believed that after Magna Carta 1215, the crown still used widows’ dower as a 
bargaining tool for their remarriage, and there were still many loopholes in the 1215 
Magna Carta that the king could exploit. Despite of the predicaments that widows 
continued to face after the 1215 Magna Carta, the Charter itself did improve their lives. 
As Annesley pointed out, the Fine Rolls show some non-baronial widows fiercely 
pursuing their rights in court.538  
      The above works widen our understanding of widows’ lives, from the pleading of 
dower to how the statutes affected dower right in the thirteenth century. Building on 
this research, this chapter will add to knowledge about dower by referencing sixty-five 
court cases to illustrate an individual widow’s experiences at court. It will primarily 
examine the difficulties encountered in the courts when women demanded their dower, 
and move on to discuss the gap between the theoretical law and what really happened 
in court. Alongside these cases, the following significant legislation will be described 
and discussed in terms of its impact on dower: the 1225 Magna Carta, the Statute of 
Merton, the Statute of Gloucester, and the Statute of Westminster II. This chapter also 
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stresses both the alliances and disputes between widows and heirs and how widows 
actually managed their dowers.  
Sue Sheridan Walker posited that dower was ‘women’s business’. However, in 
this chapter I suggest that dower was women’s business with their family’s interests.539 
A widow could only enjoy dower for her own lifetime, as the right would then descend 
to her late husband’s heirs rather than her own. This meant that not only widows 
themselves, but also their husbands’ heirs, could claim dower, thereby creating 
difficulties for widows when demanding it.  
When Annesley suggested that dower cases might not have made the relationship 
between widows and heirs as hostile and frustrating as Loengard believed, she was also 
aware that the sources she utilised, the Fine Rolls, were not designed to record enough 
detail to tell us the extensive arguments that might have been involved. Although this 
thesis agrees with Annesley that not all dower cases caused the relationship between 
the widow and the heir to sour, it subscribes to Loengard’s idea that dower was a family 
affair.540  From one glimpse at the bench rolls, it is clear that they contain more detail 
than Fine Rolls. In this chapter, then, I will look at the dower cases in depth, trying to 
understand the influence that it brought to families.  
While dower may have been regarded as ‘women’s business’ it must not be 
forgotten that it also affected the heir’s inheritance. Consequently, it stirred up a copious 
amount of disputes within families. This chapter will also examine the family dynamics 
arising from disputed dower. To conclude, two well-known widowed heiresses will be 
examined in order to demonstrate how capable, powerful, influential, but at the same 
time vulnerable they were. By looking at their active involvement in dower suits, this 
chapter will reveal some fascinating insights into widows in court.  
 
5.2 The Coronation Charter and Magna Carta   
      Women with property had always been attractive to the crown. As early as the 
Coronation Charter, made by Henry I (c. 1068-1135)541 in 1100, the crown declared its 
right over widows in the later part of Chapter 3:  
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And if, on the death of her husband, the wife is left and without children, she 
shall have her dowry and right of marriage, and I will not give her to a husband 
unless according to her will.542  
Chapter 4 states:  
But if a wife be left with children, she shall indeed have her dowry and right 
of marriage so long as she shall keep her body lawfully, and I will not give 
her unless according to her will. And the guardian of the land and children 
shall be either the wife or another of the relatives who more justly ought to 
be. And I command that my barons restrain themselves similarly in dealing 
with the sons and daughters or wives of their men.543  
In the Charter, Henry I only mentioned the widows of his barons and his other men, but 
it did, in fact, cover all the widows in his kingdom.544 However, the differences between 
noble women and non-noble women should be noted because non-noble women usually 
had too little land to be attractive to the crown. As a result, non-noble women are very 
much absent from the records. As time progressed, the crown’s interest in and 
protection applied to widows in the kingdom was restated. For instance, in the 1215 
Magna Carta, chapters 7 and 8 state respectively:  
Chapter 7: At her husband’s death, a widow may have her marriage portion 
and inheritance at once and without trouble. She shall pay nothing for her 
dower, marriage portion, or any inheritance that she and her husband held on 
the day of his death. She may remain in her husband’s house for forty days 
after his death, and within this period her dower shall be assigned to her.545 
Chapter 8: no widow shall be compelled to marry, so long as she wishes to 
live without a husband. Provided she gives security that she will not marry 
without royal consent, if she holds her lands of the Crown, or without the 
consent of whatever other lord she may hold them of.546  
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Chapter 7 not only stressed that widows could obtain their marriage portion and 
inheritance without interference, but also that they would be assigned their dowers as a 
right. Although chapter 8 gave widows the right to remain unmarried, it also gave the 
king a legal excuse to exploit them. When Magna Carta was reissued in 1225, chapter 
8 was combined with chapter 7, and they differ slightly from the 1215 version. It 
read:547 
A widow shall have her marriage portion and inheritance forthwith and without 
any difficulty after the death of her husband, nor shall she pay anything to have 
her dower or her marriage portion or the inheritance which she and her husband 
held on the day of her husband’s death; and she may remain in the chief house 
of her husband for forty days after his death, within which time her dower shall 
be assigned to her, unless it has already been assigned to her or unless the house 
is a castle; and if she leaves the castle, a suitable house shall be immediately 
provided for her in which she can stay honourably until her dower is assigned to 
her in accordance with what is aforesaid, and she shall have meanwhile her 
reasonable estover548 of common. There shall be assigned to her for her dower 
a third of all her husband’s land which was his in his lifetime, unless a smaller 
share was given her at the church door. No widow shall be forced to marry so 
long as she wishes to live without a husband, provided that she gives security 
not to marry without our consent if she holds of us, or without the consent of her 
lord if she holds of another.549 
The 1215 Magna Carta, therefore, reassured widows of their right to obtain dower. 
However, they still encountered various obstacles when claiming it because, as 
court proceedings demonstrate, there were dilemmas one could face as a result of 
the clash between the legislation and the common law. Before looking at widows’ 
experiences, however, it is important to look at the meaning of ‘dower’. Here 
Glanvill stated what it was in theory:  
That which a free man gives to his wife at the church door at the time of his 
marriage … when a man endows his wife either he nominates certain property 
as dower, or he does not. If he does not nominate dower, then one third of the 
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whole of his free tenement is deemed to be her dower, and the reasonable 
dower of any woman is one third of the whole of the free tenement of which 
her husband was seised in demesne at the time of the marriage.550  
According to this, four elements must be fulfilled to render it valid: (i) the husband 
should be a free man; (ii) he must endow his wife at the church door; (iii) the property 
he endows should be his free tenement; and (iv) he must be seised in demesne at the 
time of the marriage. These four elements, however, led to numerous disputes, thereby 
impelling widows to bring dower writs to court.  
 
5.3.1 Difficulties of claiming dower: villeins and villeinage 
The first requirement, that a husband should be a free man meant, therefore, that 
if a widow’s husband had been a villein she was not entitled to dower. In 1211, a woman 
named Remilda brought a dower writ to court against one Henry for her reasonable 
dower. She claimed that she was endowed by her late husband, Nigel. Henry retorted 
that Nigel held the said land in villeinage so he was not able to assign dower. Both of 
the parties asked for a jury verdict .551 In 1200, one Edith faced the same problem. Her 
opponents, Baldwin and Ralph, argued that she and her husband were holding the land 
in question in villeinage.552 Did widows whose husbands were villeins ever have a 
chance to claim their husbands’ land as dower? Edith’s case may offer an insight.  
Edith made an agreement with Baldwin and Ralph that she quitclaimed her right 
to them and, in return, they gave her 20s on the feast of Saint Andrew, and 10s on the 
day of Saint Thomas as compensation.553 Since Baldwin and Ralph did not legally have 
to compensate Edith, why did they make an agreement with her and compensate her at 
all? The reason is not recorded, but this agreement conveyed an important message: the 
widow could receive compensation, such as money, even if she was not legally entitled 
to her dower. Edith lost her dower because her late husband was a villein, but she 
received money as compensation. However, not every widow whose husband had been 
a villein was so lucky as to strike a private deal with her opponents. More often than 
not, if a widow was confirmed as a villein, or the wife of a villein, she lost her right to 
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claim dower in the king’s court. Sometimes the situation could be the other way round 
and a widow claimed dower against a villein. In 1211, one Agnes failed in claiming her 
dower against Ralph, her tenant, who was a villein. Instead, she had to bring action 
against the lord, not the villein.554 Making an agreement with her opponent was not the 
only option for the wife of a villein. If she could prove that her husband held the land 
in free tenement, she stood a good chance of restoring her dower. For instance, in 1244 
one Margery faced the defence of her late husband’s landholding in villeinage when 
she claimed her dower, but the sheriff determined, with the statement of the jury, that 
her late husband held the claimed land and the mill freely, thus Margery recovered her 
dower.555  
To complicate matters further, holding land in villeinage did not always mean that 
the tenants were villeins. Some free men could possibly hold land in villeinage, which 
led to a failure of claiming dower. In 1290, one Emma claimed her dower from Robert 
de Vere, the Earl of Oxford. She insisted that she and her late husband, John Tamewade, 
held tenements of the earl by fixed services. These services were an arguing point for 
Emma because it was typical for land held by villeins to have undefined services instead 
of defined services, which meant that villeins had to do anything the lords asked of 
them. However, the earl retorted that Emma and her late husband had held the land in 
villeinage and they had nothing in the said tenements except at his will. Afterwards, the 
jury said on their oath that the said John had held the land in villeinage, thus the earl 
won the suit.556  
Several points in this case are worth mentioning. Firstly, what does ‘at his will’ 
suggest? If a man was a villein, it meant that he held his tenement at the will of his lord, 
and thus the earl was able to eject him any time. However, in practice, the lord would 
be rather reluctant to do so since the villein’s possession of land was protected by the 
custom of the manor. For instance, if or when a villein succeeded to land in the 
possession of his predecessor, he had to go to the manorial court and pay a fine – called 
gersum – to his lord, rendering to the lord a heriot, namely the best beast of the deceased. 
Once he had performed this act of fealty to his lord, then his seisin in the tenure was 
legally protected. Hence, once he fulfilled the three duties of fine, beast and fealty, his 
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land would be guaranteed to be descended from generation to generation.557 Secondly, 
although Emma lost the suit, she could still claim some kind of women’s entitlement 
under manorial custom, which was known as ‘free bench’. Therefore, widows who were 
villeins, or who were married to them, were not entitled to dower rights in common law, 
but were entitled to some rights through manorial custom, which varied from place to 
place.558 
In some places, for instance in Newington in Oxfordshire and in Bucksteep in 
Sussex, widows were able to keep all of their husbands’ tenements since the tradition 
was that widows should hold them until the heir came of age. Once the heir was old 
enough, the widow could freely take a part of the tenement as her ‘free bench’. This 
was usually half, or two thirds, and the rest was surrendered to the heir. In other places, 
for example in Bramford in Suffolk, women were entitled to all of their husbands’ 
tenements as their ‘free bench’ but ceased to have half if they remarried or fornicated. 
Although this condition only held in very few manors in England, other manors’ 
customs allowed women to keep their dower even if they married again.559 
A husband’s villein status indicated that the widow was not entitled to her dower 
in common law, but it also relays a significant message – that a widow possessing her 
dower depended greatly on her husband. Glanvill articulates that, when a husband 
endowed his wife, it ‘should be his free tenement and he shall be seised in demesne’. 
Free tenement, or ‘freehold’, meant that such an estate should be transferred to the 
owner’s heirs and assigns, and it could only be transferred through lineal descendants. 
As a consequence, the widow’s plea for dower would be rejected if her opponent 
claimed and proved that her husband did not have his free tenement and was not seised 
in demesne. 
 
5.3.2 Difficulties of claiming dower: her husband should be in seisin of the dower land  
According to Glanvill, a widow’s dower portion was also based on how she was 
endowed on the day of marriage, a factor that became an often-argued point by 
opposing parties. In the following case, the defendant argued beyond that point from 
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‘whether she was endowed’ to ‘whether the widow’s husband had the capability to 
endow her’. In Essex, one Agnes, the widow of William Baker, brought a suit against 
Richard de Gardino for a messuage with appurtenances in Barking as her nominated 
dower from the gift of William Pistor, her former husband. Richard put to the jury 
whether William Pistor had his messuage in demesne on the day he was betrothed to 
her, thereby querying if he was he able to endow her at all.560  
The removal of land held in seisin could sometimes be traced back to the 
husband’s ancestor. In 1200, for instance, Gilbert Avenel came to court with his wife, 
Amice, to claim her dower from her late husband, John de Eston. Amice insisted that 
she was entitled to have her dower, arguing that it had been granted to her with the 
consent of John’s father, who on the day that she married gave and granted that land to 
his son in order to endow her. Furthermore, he gave seisin by way of a broken knife.561  
Matthew, the son and heir of John, on the other hand, said John’s father never 
granted that land to his son, nor was his son seised thereof. He went on argue that John’s 
father was not present at that wedding, nor could he grant or give that land because it 
was the inheritance of John’s mother, which fell to her as her reasonable portion. After 
the death of John, his wife, Matthew’s mother, held it for twelve years; and he, Matthew, 
had now been holding it for ten years since his mother’s death. She also afterwards 
made an agreement with his aunts so that the whole of the land, which belonged to the 
said sisters, remained with him. Since John’s father had not been seised of the said land 
when John endowed Amice, John by no means had a right to give Amice the questioned 
land.562  
In theory, Amice might have been the step-mother of Matthew, who was reluctant 
to give Amice her dower share, so he argued that the land in question was from his 
mother, whilst his father, John, had only the right of curtesy, i.e., the land was not 
entitled to be considered as dower. The claim he put forward meant that neither Amice’s 
late husband, John, nor John’s father had been in seisin of the disputed land. By 
claiming this, Matthew justified his right over the land because no free man could 
endow his wife with land of which he was not seised. More importantly, Matthew’s 
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argument indicates a possibility of distinguishing between the mother’s land and the 
father’s land in order to bar a step-mother’s dower claim.  
 
5.3.3 Difficulties of claiming dower: the church door issue 
Glanvill noted that a wife should be ‘endowed at the church door’, that is, she 
should be endowed from marriage. This peculiar wording became a point of contention 
that the opponent of a widow could use as a means of attack.563 For instance, in 1203, 
one Euticia, claimed her dower against the Abbot of Nutley of one virgate with 
appurtenances in Winchendon, with which Gervase, her late husband, had endowed her 
in front of the church door.564 Indeed, prior to 1243 fourteen cases appear in the series 
of Curia Regis Rolls that describe widows coming to court to prove that they were 
endowed ‘at the church door’, which suggests that proving the church door issue was 
decisive, not only for pursuing dower but also when an opponent claimed that a woman 
had not been legally married.  However, by the end of the thirteenth century, ‘marrying 
in front of the church door’ became less essential. On this issue, Paul Brand pointed out 
an argument unearthed in the last decade of the thirteenth century, suggesting that, 
‘Even if she was not married to him at the church door but at home by words of marriage 
in his death bed she will be held his wife.’565 This argument might have been influenced 
by Bracton, which suggests that, if a man took several wives and none of them could 
be confirmed as his lawful wife, the law must consider the one who remained with him 
at his death as the lawful one.566     
The wording ‘with the consent of the husband’s father’ likewise became proof in 
dower suits. Although this did not become a highly-argued point, it is still occasionally 
found. For instance, in 1233, Hugelina claimed her dower against Nicholas Chese for 
the third part of thirteen acres of land with appurtenances. She stressed that William, 
her late husband, had endowed her with the consent and good will of his father.567 
Similarly, Ida, whose late husband was Simon de Thomewell, declared that she was 
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endowed by Simon at the church door ‘with the consent’ and the good will of Simon’s 
father, Roger.568  
Why did the widows stress that they were endowed with the consent of their 
fathers-in-law? As mentioned earlier, Loengard pointed out that the statement ‘without 
the father’s consent’ was frequently used in dower cases as an objection to the widow’s 
dower, because the family of the husband, in particular the husband’s father, did not 
want the dower to go beyond the initial family when the widow remarried.569 To put it 
into a broader context, as Biancalana suggested in ‘Widows in Common Law: The 
Development of Common Law Dower’, the widow’s emphasising of consent to the 
endowment from her late husband’s father indicates the secular law’s attitude towards 
marriage – it should be held in public and have approval from the families, especially 
the groom’s.570 Furthermore, acquiring consent from the father of the groom indicates 
that marriage was a ‘family business’, and should be under the control of family because 
of the future redistribution of property.  
 
5.3.4 Difficulties of claiming dower: when was the dower endowed?  
Among the requirements for obtaining dower, the timing of the endowment was, 
if not the most important, definitely the most complex one. Before Magna Carta, if a 
husband did not endow his wife at the time of marriage, the wife would probably lose 
her dower. In 1200, Cecily de Bensinton claimed her dower against Thomas de 
Bensinton. Thomas claimed that her late husband, William, was not seised of the 
disputed land on the day that he married her.571 Thomas’s statement echoes Glanvill’s 
definition of dower, which could be either nominated dower or one-third of the land 
that a woman’s husband held at the time of marriage. One might consider ‘one-third of 
the land at the time of the marriage’ to be unfair to a widow, because during the 
marriage the husband might have obtained extra land by purchase and inheritance. Thus, 
after his death, his wife could only claim for one-third of the land her husband was 
seised of on their marriage day, even if the couple ended up holding more lands 
subsequently.  
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Chapter 7 of the 1225 Magna Carta more or less solved this problem. It stated that 
a widow should be assigned for her dower a third of all her husband’s land, which he 
held in his lifetime, unless a smaller share was given to her at the church door. As long 
as the husband held the land at any time during the marriage then the widow was entitled 
to claim her share. It is clear, therefore, that Magna Carta established a different 
standard for obtaining dower; certainly it was a more generous standard than Glanvill 
had set. In fact, chapter 7 bestowed even more rights and protection on women than 
before. Not only did it set a more generous standard for claiming dower, it also 
guaranteed that a widow need not pay anything to obtain her inheritance, maritagium 
and dower, which meant that she did not have to pay fines for obtaining her property as 
had previously been the case.572 
Although chapter 7 of the 1225 Magna Carta was designed for all widows in the 
country, there were still some places that favoured their local customs over the new 
regulation. In Scarborough, for instance, widows were only able to claim the tenements 
of which their husbands had died seised.573 Likewise, Lincoln had its own local liberties. 
According to Bracton, in 1220, a widow in the city of Lincoln could only claim her 
dower from the land of which her husband had died seised,574 in contrast to Glanvill’s 
description that dower could only be claimed from the land her husband held on the day 
of the marriage. The following case regarding custom in the city of Lincoln confuses 
things further. In 1238, Maud, who had been the wife of one Grene, made a case against 
Thomas Anand in court for half of half a messuage as her dower. Thomas was called 
as the warrantor of his brother, Wigot Anand, so this dower litigation had originally 
been between Maud and Wigot. Coming to the court, Thomas argued that Grene was 
neither seised of the contested messuage on the day he married Maud, nor during their 
marriage, so he could not possibly have endowed her. A jury consisting of twelve 
citizens of Lincoln was summoned to confirm whose statement was true. The jury 
confirmed that Grene had been seised of the land after he married Maud. Consequently, 
it was adjudged that Maud should recover her dower from Thomas.575  
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In this case, the assignment of dower in the city of Lincoln did not comply with 
the standard described in Bracton, that a widow could only claim the tenements of 
which her husband died seised. Instead, it seemingly followed the standard of common 
law. Was this due to a discrepancy between Bracton and the court record? On closer 
examination of Maud’s case, her dower was not addressed as ‘one-third of her late 
husband’s land’. Instead, she claimed for specifically half of half a messuage, which 
should be her nominated dower.576 It could be inferred that, in the city of Lincoln, if a 
widow was endowed with nominated dower, then her husband should have held it when 
they married; if her husband did not endow her nominated dower, then she could only 
claim the dower from the land of which he died seised.  
Excluding persistent local customs, chapter 7 of the 1225 Magna Carta did in fact 
bring numerous advantages to widows, which can be discerned from the following case. 
In 1243, one Maud came to court to claim her nominated dower by showing her 
husband’s charter of endowment. However, it was alleged by the defendant, Robert de 
Sunder, to have been granted long after their espousal.577 Robert’s argument clearly 
stated that Maud had not been endowed at the church door at the time of marriage and 
therefore she was not entitled to claim her dower. This accords with chapter 7 of the 
1225 Magna Carta, which stated that a widow was entitled to one-third of her late 
husband’s land during the marriage, or the nominated dower endowed at the church 
door. Maud could not deny this, and thus she changed her strategy from claiming 
nominated dower to her common law share. She was finally adjudged to have a third 
share of the land because she waived the specific dower. Had it not been for chapter 7 
of the 1225 Magna Carta, would Maud’s case have been adjudged differently? She still 
would not have been able to claim her nominated dower, since it was given during the 
marriage, and she could still only acquire one-third of the land her husband was seised 
of on the day of their marriage. Although the record does not reveal to us whether 
Maud’s husband held more land after the marriage, or if he, in fact, held less land than 
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when he married, the wider definition of common law dower, as it appears in chapter 
7, gave Maud and other widows more room to argue for their dower. 
If chapter 7 did not apply, what would have happened to widows who claimed 
their dower from the land their husbands acquired during the marriage? The answer 
may be found in some cases dealt with prior to Magna Carta 1225. In 1212, one 
Margaret came to court to demand her reasonable share of dower, namely the third part 
of all the free tenements held by her late husband, Hugh. The attorney for the defendant 
retorted that Hugh had not been seised of the land on the day of the marriage, nor had 
it descended to him, so he had not been able to endow her. Despite this fierce charge 
from the defendant, Margaret’s attorney said that on the day Hugh had married 
Margaret he had endowed her with the third part of the land that he had been able to 
acquire. In the thirteenth century this argument was not common, so there could have 
been a specific promise from the owner of the disputed land that Hugh would be able 
to acquire it in the future. It was only later that Hugh actually acquired the land. 
Consequently, Margaret’s attorney claimed the third part of the tenements as her 
reasonable dower.578 Instead of admitting that Hugh was not seised of the questioned 
land on the marriage day, he stressed Hugh’s future ability to acquire it. However, 
Margaret’s attorney afterwards changed his strategy from claiming a third share to 
claiming the specific endowment.  
 
5.3.5 Difficulties of claiming dower: land-to-be-acquired as dower 
Under what circumstances would a man promise his wife that he could acquire 
some specific land in the future? Inheritance might be one possibility. According to 
Bracton, ‘the husband could endow his wife with his parents’ inheritance if he had their 
consent by a written document, or had them granting the consent at the church door, 
publicly’.579 In 1220, Nicholas and his wife, Crecia, sued Robert Cotel for Crecia’s 
nominated dower from her late husband, Richard Cotel, specifically one-third of all the 
land he had held, one third of all the land which might come to him and land that came 
after his father’s death, which had been assigned to his mother in dower. In reply, 
Robert argued that Crecia’s late husband, Richard, had not been in seisin of the disputed 
land when he endowed her, and neither had Robert’s mother, Leticia, held it in dower. 
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Richard had in fact given the said land to him for twenty years before he married Crecia 
and he had taken his homage. Moreover, Robert said that Leticia had once been seised 
of the land in question, but later gave it up to him, so Richard’s father did not die in 
seisin. Robert’s argument was that that Richard had no legal grounds for inheriting the 
land. The jury was therefore summoned to adjudge whether the husband held the 
disputed land at the time of marriage, or whether he might have acquired it afterwards. 
In the end, the couple withdrew the claim of one-third of the land that might have been 
held in dower by Leticia.580  
The above case shows that the law recognised ‘land to be acquired as dower’. As 
stated in Bracton, dower could be constituted from lands and tenements which were to 
be acquired, but such ‘promised land’ should be acquired during the lifetime of the 
husband. If the land was acquired after the death of the husband, then the wife’s dower 
claim would fail, because she could not claim anything of which her husband had never 
been in seisin, unless the ‘promised land’ had a condition saying that it was to revert to 
the husband after the tenant’s death.581 Bracton’s statements echo Robert’s argument, 
which attempted to convince the judges that the disputed land had never been Richard’s 
‘to-be-acquired’ land. Thus, Crecia had no legal grounds to claim it as her dower. It is 
noteworthy that Robert mentioned that he had acquired the disputed land long before 
Crecia and Richard married, because it presupposes that, by arguing the land was 
acquired before the marriage, his claim would be successful. If Robert had argued that 
the land was acquired after the marriage, it might have been assigned to Crecia as dower, 
as the 1225 Magna Carta declared that widows could claim dower from the lands of 
which their husbands were seised during any point of the marriage. Consequently, 
arguing for disputed land that had been alienated by husbands after the marriage became 
a pivotal strategy for widows. The following case provides a perfect demonstration.  
In 1225, one Edith, whose late husband was Henry le Corviser, demanded her 
dower against a Richard, concerning one messuage with appurtenances in Ashburn. 
Richard said that he had purchased half of the said messuage before Henry married her 
and the other half after they married. He conceded the third part of the half he bought 
after the time of the marriage, and Edith accepted it.582 But Edith further claimed a third 
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part of the other half messuage by arguing that her husband had, in fact, sold this other 
half to Richard after they married rather than before the marriage. Both parties asked 
for a jury.583 This case draws a distinction between land sold before and after the 
marriage. Edith’s tactic is clear – she went to court to recover her dower, which had 
been alienated by her husband.584 Perhaps Edith’s version was true, but this could never 
have been confirmed. Nevertheless, arguing that the disputed land had been alienated 
after the marriage was certainly advantageous to widows, chiefly because they stood 
no chance of demanding dower if land had been alienated before the marriage.  
 
5.3.6 Difficulties of claiming dower: he was never seised of the land. 
      All in all, by the late thirteenth century, the new standard of claiming dower seemed 
to have become a normal part of legal proceedings. Both legal practitioners and 
defendants had developed arguments stating that a widow’s late husband had not been 
seised of the disputed land either on the day they married or during the marriage. In the 
Plea Rolls, many dower cases that were rejected show that this argument had become 
formalized, since it was repeated frequently.585  
      The frequent use of the phrase ‘the husband had never held the land’ in the late 
thirteenth century not only echoed chapter 7 of the 1225 Magna Carta but also placed 
the litigant in a disadvantaged position against the widow. As long as the husband had 
held the land at any point during the marriage, the wife would be entitled to demand 
dower thereafter. Subsequently, legal practitioners needed to stress that the widow’s 
husband had never been in seisin of the disputed land so that the widow would have no 
legal grounds to claim her dower. 
 
5.4 Two women, one dower. 
The disputes that widows encountered did not only arise from the conditions of 
claiming dower, but also from miscellaneous allegations that their rivals put forward in 
court. Sometimes the widow found herself facing a threat from another woman. In 1212, 
when Margaret brought a writ of dower to court to demand her reasonable share of 
                                                
583 CRR, vol. 12, n. 633.  
584 The law refers to the Statute of Westminster II 1285, which will be discussed in detail in the later 
part of the study.  
585 ‘quodam vir ipsius die quo ipsam desponsavit nec umquam postea fuit inde in seisina ut de feodo ita 
quod eam inde dotare potuit.’	 For a few examples, CP 40/82, AALT, IMG 3418, IMG 3425. 
		
	
178	
dower from her late husband, Geoffrey, she was confronted with a complicated 
situation. The jury had to ascertain whether Geoffrey had been able to endow her or not. 
They discovered that Geoffrey had been married to one Maud before his marriage to 
Margaret. When Geoffrey married Maud he had been given the disputed land by 
Maud’s father, William, from whom Margaret claimed her dower. However, Geoffrey 
had returned the land to William afterwards. Therefore, William’s wife, Maud’s mother, 
had her dower from that said land. The judgment was made that Geoffrey had not been 
able to endow Margaret, so she would hold nothing.586  This judgment created an 
interesting situation. Although it squashed Margaret’s hope of obtaining dower, it did 
protect the other woman, Maud’s, right to dower. In fact, the case has more intriguing 
points than merely dower. Although the document does not reveal whether the disputed 
land given by William was maritagium, or simply a normal gift, the fact that the land 
had been returned to William means that it might have been maritagium, with a 
condition that if there was a failure of issue it should revert to the donor. Two further 
questions arise. The first is whether Margaret could have claimed her third share of the 
land as dower if the land had not been returned to William. The answer is quite clear – 
she could not. Second, assuming that the land had been given in maritagium, under 
what circumstances could the donors keep it? Since there must have been a legitimate 
heir or heiress the land would not have reverted to the donor. Therefore, if the land had 
not reverted to William, and Margaret pursued her case further, she might have been 
opposed by the heir and faced further rejection, since all Geoffrey would have had was 
curtesy, rather than being seised of the land.  
The following case also concerns two women’s rights to dower. In 1292, one Alice 
brought a writ of dower against Beatrice in the Hereford eyre. Alice and Beatrice were 
married to two different men, but their dower shares were from the same land, which 
led to the dispute. The serjeant, Henry Spirgurnel, said, ‘she (Alice) is not entitled to 
have dower; for the reason that Beatrice against whom the writ of dower is brought, 
was first endowed of the tenement of the endowment of her husband Robert’.587 A case 
in 1284 presents a similar set of circumstances, except that the women’s husbands were 
brothers. Avice and Denise married two brothers, Alexander and Andrew respectively. 
After the deaths of both men, the women found their dower was from the same land, 
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since their husbands both died in seisin. Denise was the claimant because Avice, at that 
moment, was in possession of the dower. The jurors said that Alexander was first seised 
of the tenements which Denise sought as dower, and endowed Avice before Andrew 
was seised of them. As a consequence, Denise was amerced for a false claim.588 The 
sisters-in-law deserved sympathy because of their husbands’ negligence. The only way 
in which Denise could have been recompensed would probably have been for her to 
come to a private agreement with Avice and try to enjoy the same dower land together.  
In the Calendar of Inquisitions of Post Mortem, vol. 1, six cases between 1236 and 
1272 show different women’s dowers being settled on the same land.589 One case even 
suggests that three ladies had been dowered on the same fee. Unfortunately, the record 
does not provide enough detail about how they sorted out the predicament. The 
difficulty might have been worked out easily when the widows were endowed with 
common law rather than nominated dower. For example, one case reveals that after the 
death of one Roger, his mother had been holding one third of his land in dower, and his 
wife should be dowered from a third of the residue.590  
Six out of 107 dower cases in CIPM, vol. 1, suggest this predicament. It may not 
seem a large proportion but it reflected the difficulty some women faced. Dowers on 
the same land may have been caused by the early death of a son, which inevitably led 
to a dilemma for his mother and his wife. It could also result from the negligence of 
husbands, who endowed their wives on the same land. There could be two 
consequences from this. First, if the son had an heir, it might seriously harm his right 
to his inheritance, two thirds of which was occupied by the two widows in the family. 
Second, it might result in a dower suit between the women who had their nominated 
dowers on the same land. In this case, one of the women would always lose her dower.  
This second consequence could affect two women who married the same man. 
Marriage in medieval England was a life-long contract. Unless the first wife died or the 
marriage was nullified, the second wife would almost always not be endowed, other 
than in very rare circumstances, such as when the land containing a dower portion was 
given to the husband and his heir. In that situation the second wife could obtain the 
dower because, even the first wife was still alive, she was excluded from dower. 
                                                
588 The Earliest English Law Reports, ed. Brand, vol. 1, 163.    
589 CIPM, vol. 1, n. 2, n. 156, n. 218, n. 235, n. 426, n. 756. There are 187 dower cases in CIPM, vol. 1 
590 Ibid., n. 218. 
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Therefore, in most cases where a woman found her dower portion to be exactly the 
same as the other woman’s, the other woman would usually be her mother-in-law, or, 
as in the case of Avice and Denise, their husbands appeared to hold the land together.  
      How, then, did legal practitioners tackle these situations? The following case may 
cast some light. In 1292, one Joan came to court to demand her reasonable dower 
against William, the heir of her late husband. She was challenged by William’s 
representative as follows:  
She is not entitled to have dower; for the reason that these tenements whereof 
she demanded dower, were wholly in the seisin of Robert de Molcastre, father 
of her husband Walter, and the father endowed his wife, named Mabel, of the 
entirety, and which Mabel is now bringing her writ of dower against us for the 
entirety, an action for dower having accrued to her first.591 
The priority of assigning dower was based on who was endowed first. Therefore, even 
if there were two women, for instance, a wife and her mother-in-law, competing for 
the same piece of land as dower, the mother-in-law would not necessarily be assigned 
the dower. Bracton stated that if a son endowed his wife and his father later remarried, 
his father could not endow his second wife what had been endowed to his daughter-
in-law. 592  In the above case, obviously Mabel was endowed earlier, hence the 
defendant’s representative tried to deny Joan’s rights. In 1294, a note made by a legal 
practitioner refers to the judgment of ‘Joan’s’ 1292 case:  
And note that the son’s wife cannot recover dower out of the tenement which 
was previously charged with dower to another woman, unless her husband has 
made satisfaction to that woman for her dower, so that he was seised of the 
entirety; as was alleged in the plea above.593   
That is, the interests of the woman endowed first came before the woman endowed late. 
The husband did, however, have an obligation to compensate the former with other land, 
or sufficient cash to satisfy her for wielding her dower share. This should have 
happened before the husband died, but it is doubtful if this would indeed have happened 
and have been executed by the son. 
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The next section concerns a second wife. Since she was not the first to be endowed, 
how did she defend her right to dower? A further case from 1294 explains the 
circumstances under which she could obtain her dower. 
Note that, where land is given to a man and this wife and the heirs of their 
two bodies begotten the husband’s second wife shall not have dower; but if 
land be given to a man and his heirs, his second wife shall have dower.’594 
The above statement clarified what the second wife could claim when the first wife died. 
It depended on the exclusion of the land on the grounds that the first wife, for whom 
the dower had been set, could not, or did not, claim it. Again, the law shows its limited 
power to protect women’s dower. Once there was a dispute between two women 
concerning dower, it could only be assigned to one woman. Consequently, when the 
law failed to protect a woman’s dower, she might try to obtain it by intrusion. One such 
case was that of Alice de Mohun, a Somerset widow, who was accused of intruding 
into a knight’s fee in Somerset. She intruded into the land which the grandmother of 
her late husband held in dower.595  The above cases all suggest that the law only 
protected one woman’s dower right when two women were competing for it. This 
notion can be seen in Bracton, which stated: 
Dower may be constituted by one husband to several wives as well as to one, 
while all are live, or successively, when they die or after a divorce has been 
had for some reason, in the same realm or county or in different ones, but in 
an action of dower one will be preferred to the others, it having been 
established in the ecclesiastical court which of them is his lawful wife.596  
What happened if none of the women could be confirmed as a man’s lawful wife? 
Bracton stated that in this instance none of them could obtain dower, or the one who 
remained with the husband when he died would be the lawful wife. The statement 
indicates that an unlawful wife did not deserve dower even if it was the fault of her ‘so-
called’ husband, and there was no remedy for these women who believed themselves 
entitled to the dower.  
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5.5 She had too much dower.  
There was always the risk that a widow would win nothing at court. Sometimes 
she might have even been refused dower because she already had property worth more 
than its value. In the 1285 Northamptonshire eyre, Thomas Malekak came to court with 
his wife, Alice, to claim her dower from Gerard de Lisle and his wife, Alice. Gerard 
and Alice defended themselves by stating that, after the death of this Alice’s father, she 
got his inheritance, which did not amount to more than £30 in total. However, Thomas 
and his wife, Alice, had dower from Alice’s father of £15. She had more than her dower, 
and thus they wrongfully refused the admeasurement of dower.597  
      It can be inferred that Thomas’s wife, Alice, had married the other Alice’s father. 
As an heiress, Alice, Gerard’s wife, inherited the property whose value did not amount 
to more than £30, but Thomas wife had wrongfully acquired her dower, whose value 
was £15, which was more than a third of the standard dower share.598 Two more similar 
cases are recorded in the series of Curia Regis Rolls before 1243. It was usually 
concluded that ‘she should be satisfied with what she has now’. Such a charge also 
appeared frequently when a widow had already obtained her nominated dower, but she 
subsequently claimed her one-third as well. 
 
5.5.1: She had too much dower: common law dower vs. nominated dower      
      One Avice, widow of William, faced this predicament in 1221 when she claimed 
the third part of one messuage with appurtenances in Stamford as her reasonable dower. 
The defendant, Clement, argued that Avice already held half of a messuage in the vill 
of Stamford as her nominated dower. It is possible that Avice insisted that the half 
messuage was her maritagium because the court had to decide whether that half 
messuage was her nominated dower or maritagium.599 Another widow, Egelina de 
Curtenay, had the same issue with Richard de Camville and his wife, Eustacia, 
concerning a free tenement. Richard and Eustacia said Egelina had already held a 
specific manor as her dower and asked whether she could claim the tenement as well. 
Egelina replied that the claimed tenement was actually the appurtenances for that 
specific manor, and so she was admitted to hold the said tenement.600  
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      It was thought that a widow should be contented with either nominated dower or 
common law dower, and if she failed to obtain dower by one means, she could always 
turn to the other option. The reality, however, was that whatever option she sought she 
might face a lengthy and weary negotiation. In 1272, Beatrice, Queen of Germany, 
made a claim against Edmund, Earl of Cornwall, for one-third of the manor of Eye, its 
castle and honour and a serjeanty in the Exchequer with appurtenances. Edmund 
contested that Beatrice was endowed on the day she was married with a fixed dower of 
4000 marks and she had agreed to this. He asked for judgment as to whether she could 
claim any dower other than that assigned to her.601 Going back a long way, Glanvill 
stated, ‘If he does not nominate dower, then one third of the whole of his free tenements 
is deemed to be her dower’,602 suggesting that a widow could claim her common law 
dower if her husband did not assign her a nominated dower. But there was no hint that 
the widow could claim both.  
      Edmund even showed a deed made by Beatrice, which contains the following 
passage: ‘I, Beatrice of P, while yet unmarried, have remitted and quitclaimed to the 
said lord Richard earl of Cornwall, all right and claim which might come to me as dower 
on all his manors, and tenements in England, unless I have issue by the said Richard’. 
Beatrice fought back, saying, ‘it would be dangerous and deleterious not just to her but 
to all ladies claiming dower in the future if such proofs as the earl offers are admitted 
without good reason to defeat their claims to dower contrary to the common law of 
England and the provisions of Magna Carta 1225’.603 
      Beatrice insisted that she had not accepted the King of Germany’s offer of the said 
4000 marks, nor did she agree to this. She stressed that every widow after the death of 
her husband should, under the terms of the 1225 Magna Carta and the law of England, 
be endowed in the normal way unless she was endowed with specific land or tenements 
at the time of the marriage. What is interesting is how Beatrice questioned her so-called 
nominated dower:  
The earl has said that the king of Germany endowed her at the door of the 
church when she married her with a fixed amount, that is with four thousand 
marks … such a form of endowment is both conditional and uncertain. Thus 
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he cannot say that it was fixed in amount since this is logically incompatible 
with a conditional endowment.604 
Here, the queen cast doubt on the said 4000 marks and regarded them as uncertain and 
conditional. Indeed, what the king of Germany had promised her was cash instead of 
real estates; compared to land, it is reasonable to consider cash as ‘uncertain’. Beatrice 
and Edmund made an agreement: she eventually remitted and quitclaimed to the earl 
and his heirs whatever right she had, or could have, by way of dower in all lands and 
tenements with appurtenances which belonged to Richard, her late husband, in England. 
In return the earl granted Beatrice lands to the value of 500 marks in Lechlade and 
Langborough, and so on.605  
      One justice in the 1289 Wiltshire eyre made a clear statement concerning the issue 
of ‘specialty endowment or common entitlement’ when Edward of Wyke came to court 
against John English and his wife, Edith, for a plea of mort d’ancestor. Edward’s 
representative said that Edith, the widow of Edward’s father, was not entitled to claim 
the one virgate of land as dower for she had already brought the writ of dower against 
Edward and recovered her dower everywhere. Edith and John’s attorney retorted that 
Edith’s late husband, William, had endowed her with one-third of all his land and this 
one virgate of land as well. The other serjeant questioned Edith as follows: 
On which do you wish to rely: the specialty or the common entitlement? For 
you cannot have both, as Magna Carta 1225 says ‘that the wife is to have a 
third share etc. as her dower unless she is endowed of less etc.’606 
The justice concluded by stating, ‘when you brought your writ of unde nichil habet607 
at common law you waived the specialty. When the wife chose one, the other became 
unjustifiable surplus, and all the surplus was regarded as usurped’.608  The justice 
clarified the rule on the issue of special endowment or common entitlement by 
addressing a clear idea that ‘you cannot claim more than you should deserve’.  
      The writ of unde nichil habet sometimes exempted women from going through long 
proceedings in court. In 1233, Maud came to court against Bartholomew and his wife 
Maud for her reasonable dower in Buckland. The defendants delayed the session by 
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calling their warrantors. The court decided to shorten the postponement, because Maud 
claimed she had nothing in dower (nichil habet de dote).609 Maud’s claim might have 
been interpreted as an inability to present herself properly to the court. This potentially 
disrupted the plan the defendants had made to delay the proceeding. This case shows 
that under the architecture of the law, there was still some space for flexibility. It also 
made suing in court more user-friendly.  
 
5.6 No valid marriage, no dower 
Meeting all the requirements of dower that the law demands did not automatically 
entitle a widow to her dower. One of the easiest ways to thwart a widow was to prove 
that her marriage had been invalid, since only a lawful wife was eligible to have dower. 
In 1201, one Agnes, widow of Philip de Dive, claimed her dower against Philip son of 
Philip de Dive. She asserted her right to the free tenement which belonged to her late 
husband in Holywell, Witham and Thenford. Philip, the son came to court and claimed 
that Agnes had not been lawfully married to his father.610 A marriage could be deemed 
invalid for a number of reasons, for example marrying a man on his sickbed could 
render the marriage invalid. In order to prevent women from taking advantage of dying 
and sick men, the law deprived women of dower if they married men who were not in 
a clear state of mind. In another case in 1201, Cecily de Cressy demanded her dower 
against William de Cressy, and William said that Cecily married her late husband, 
Roger de Cressy, in his sickbed.611 In 1225, Alice claimed her reasonable dower against 
the Bishop of Lincoln and was refused for a similar reason, because her husband 
married her for the salvation of his soul when in peril of death and not in church.612 
Moreover, between 1242 and 1243, four cases recorded in the Curia Regis Rolls show 
widows who were facing the charge of ‘invalid marriage’ or being ‘not properly 
married’. Hence, if a widow could not prove that she had been legitimately married, 
she would lose her dower.613  
An annulment of marriage could also block a widow from claiming dower. The 
modern concept of ‘divorce’ did not exist in the Middle Ages and a failed marriage in 
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medieval England was simply annulled. Any mention of ‘divorce’ in the records was, 
in fact, an annulment declaring the marriage invalid. Medieval church law stipulated 
only a few specific reasons to ask for a divorce, including: (i) one of the conjugal 
parties had already made a marriage with another individual; (ii) there was a blood or 
spiritual relationship between the two individuals, such as a godfather and his 
goddaughter; (iii) impotence; (iv) using force or fear to obtain the other party’s consent 
to the marriage; (v) carrying out a crime, such as adultery; (vi) clandestine marriages; 
and (vii) entering marriage under false pretences.614 In consequence, the word ‘divorce’ 
as used in this thesis is not to be compared with the modern definition.615 
In 1268, Geoffrey Fresel and Joan, his wife, made a dower claim against Herbert 
de Bexville through their attorney. Herbert asserted that Joan was not entitled to dower 
because she and John, her late husband, had divorced six years before John’s death. A 
note was made in the report as follows: ‘Note that a wife is not entitled to dower when 
she and her husband have divorced during her lifetime’.616 
Accusing a widow of having lived in adultery in her husband’s lifetime was 
another way to make her lose dower. In 1300, William Paynel and his wife Margaret 
petitioned parliament in Westminster for her reasonable dower of one manor from her 
late husband, John de Camoys. Nicholas of Warwick, who sued on behalf of the king, 
said that Margaret ought not to have the dower because she had lived in adultery with 
her current husband for a long time before John’s death. According to the king’s statute, 
women living with their adulterers who did not reconcile of their own accord and 
without ecclesiastical coercion before their husbands’ death would have their petitions 
rejected.617 The following reference is to the Statute of Westminster II, chapter 34: 
If a wife willingly leaves her husband and goes away and stays with her 
adulterer she shall be barred forever of action to claim her dower which she 
ought to have of her husband’s tenements, if she is convicted thereof, unless 
her husband willingly and without the coercion of the church takes her back 
and allows her to live with him, in which case action shall be restored to her.618  
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A case in 1290 demonstrates chapter 34 in action. One Maud found herself facing two 
challenges when demanding dower.619 Her first challenge was that the defendants said 
one third of the dower she claimed had actually been surrendered by her late husband 
to her mother-in-law, Sibyl, so Maud ought not to claim against them. The second 
challenge was that she was accused of living in adultery, so that she was not eligible 
for demanding a third of two thirds of the land.    
      Confronting this accusation, Maud’s answer was rather evasive. She had been living 
with her late husband, William Lamberd, and was with him when he died. She did not 
directly deny her adultery; instead, she claimed she was with him at his death and ‘in 
seisin of [her] husband at death’. What does this phrase mean? It is frequently seen in 
Bracton when discussing a relationship between a man and a woman.620 If one is 
described as ‘in possession of the other’, it not only indicates that they were a conjugal 
couple de facto, but also reveals that they were entitled to the rights a lawful spouse 
could claim, such as dower. Therefore, when Maud insisted that she was in possession 
of her husband, it indicated that William had taken her back and they had reconciled 
without the coercion of the Church. If this was indeed the case and her first challenge 
could be resolved, she might have every right to claim her dower.621  
      Widows could not claim all types of land and immovable property as their dower. 
Glanvill stated that a widow’s dower share should exclude the chief messuage, which 
should descend to the heir. This is reminiscent of female inheritance: the daughters 
should divide the father’s inheritance, except for the capital messuage. For example, in 
1225 Margery came to court to demand her dower, namely one and a half messuages. 
The defendant, Roger, however, asserted that the disputed messuage was the capital 
messuage so he ought not give it to her. In the end Margery received another piece of 
land in compensation.622  
 
5.7 Husbands’ control over dower 
      Thirteenth-century legal documents recorded various issues that pushed widows to 
bring their writs of dower to court. The predicaments to a great extent arose from their 
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husbands. A husband might alienate his land and thus diminish his wife’s dower share. 
According to Glanvill, a wife was not allowed to refuse if her husband wanted to 
dispose of her dower: 
His wife is bound to obey her husband that if he wishes to sell her dower and 
she opposes him, and afterwards the dower is in fact sold and purchased, she 
cannot when her husband is dead claim the dower from the purchaser if she 
confesses, or it is proved against her, in court that it was sold by her husband 
against her will.623   
It is evident that the wife’s consent did not matter because she could only agree to her 
husband’s action. Bracton also subscribed to this view, stating ‘nor could she gainsay 
her husband if he wished to sell, or alienate her dower; if she did so she lost her dower 
de jure’.624 The common law indicated that a wife had to obey her husband’s decision, 
and if not, she lost her entitlement. Fortunately, in practice, the consent of the wife did 
play a significant role in relation to an alienated dower portion. However, if she had 
consented to her husband’s wish to alienate the property containing her dower, she 
could not claim it back afterwards. As early as the first half of the twelfth century, when 
the custom was still relatively new, a grant made between 1138 and 1150 reveals how 
a wife stood to lose her dower should she consent to her husband’s action regarding his 
land. Robert, the butler of the Lord of Clare, gave the church of Thurlow with all its 
appurtenances to the monks of the priory of Stoke-by-Clare, along with the land in the 
said vill, to possess by perpetual right, with the consent of Mabel, his wife, and his 
sons.625  
      Although showing the wife’s consent to the alienation of her dower compromised 
her rights, it also ensured the safety of the land transaction. It is, however, unclear what 
kind of behaviour would have been recognised as inidicating consent. Proving that a 
wife had given her approval for the alienation of her dower was a contentious arguing 
point in the litigation of women’s property rights. The definition of ‘showing her 
consent’ varied from place to place. Local custom in Winchester, for example, showed 
a different standard for recognising ‘consent’. 
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5.7.1 Local customs: Winchester, Lincoln and Nottingham       
      In Winchester a husband was able to sell his wife’s inheritance, maritagium and 
dower provided she was present with him when the alienation was made. Her presence 
amounted to implicit consent and she did not need to verbalise it. In 1249, one Christina, 
a Winchester widow, demanded her dower from Edmund Silvestar. She failed because 
Edmund pointed out that her late husband, Robert, had sold the disputed messuage in 
her presence. He also stressed that the custom in Winchester was that the husband could 
sell his wife’s inheritance, maritagium and dower with her consent if the alienation was 
made out of necessity, and thus, she could not recover it after her husband’s death.626 
In the same year, another woman, Alice la Burgeise, suffered a similar fate to Christina. 
Although it is not recorded whether the land she demanded was dower, maritagium or 
inheritance, the fact that she had been present when her husband sold it, and she was 
not able to deny this, meant that she lost the suit.627 
      In the above cases, the wife’s presence was taken to mean her implicit consent but 
what made the cases more intriguing was the definition of ‘made out of necessity’, 
mentioned in Christina’s case. The custom in Winchester stated that if the alienation 
was made out of the couple’s necessity, then the wife would not be able to recover her 
right. However, the word ‘necessity’ is ambiguous. What exactly did it mean? It is 
reminiscent of the argument over ‘maritagium as inheritance’ and ‘maritagium as a 
gift’. Bracton discussed whether the alienation of maritagium could be revoked by the 
wife after the death of her husband. If the maritagium was alienated because it benefited 
the couple and their children – namely, in an honest and necessary cause – then it could 
not be revoked. Conversely, if the alienation was ‘wilful’, then it should be revoked.628 
Although this case does not tell us whether the alienation of the dower was out of 
necessity or not, it could be inferred that Christina’s dower was alienated for the 
couple’s common benefit, since the custom was confirmed by the locals and Christina 
was adjudged to take nothing. Nevertheless, the case remains ambiguous to some extent 
for the following reasons. Firstly, it is unclear whether her assent was examined 
separately at court according to law. Secondly, the dower that Christina demanded 
might have been from an earlier husband and not from Robert, as the record says ‘one 
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messuage with appurtenances in Bredenestrete as her dower’ instead of ‘from Robert’s 
land’.629 
      More details concerning Winchester customs can be observed in the following case. 
In 1229 one Eufemia came to court with her husband to demand dower from her late 
husband, against Richard and Andrew respectively. She argued that, although she had 
been present when her late husband sold her dower to Richard and Andrew at 
Winchester city court, she spoke against the transaction. Richard and Andrew retorted 
that Eufemia and her late husband, John Martin, had sold her dower in an urgent need 
(in magna necessitate). Furthermore, they contested that Eufemia had ever protested 
the sale. The jury was summoned and they said that the dower sold to Richard was 
originally sold to one Adam by Eufemia and John. The dower was later sold to one 
Thomas, and then to Richard. As to the dower sold to Andrew, they had sold it to him 
directly. Therefore, Eufemia and her husband lost the suit. Unlike the previous case, 
Eufemia argued that she had been vocal against the selling of her dower.630  
      If a wife’s presence at court without apparent opposition to the alienation of her 
rights equated to her consent, it could be inferred that the court might take her absence 
in court as an objection. In 1229, one Alienora was smart enough to do just that. She 
came to court against Roger Wascel, William Joberd and his wife, Eva, Hugh de 
Budeford and John Kipping, each for one messuage with appurtenances in Winchester 
as her dower. She argued that her late husband, Henry, had sold the property to the 
aforementioned parties. The jury found that Alienora had not been present so she could 
be deemed to have given consent, and therefore all parties had to relinquish her dower. 
The only exception was one Roger de Lavinton, who retained his seisin of one 
messuage because Alienora had been present and showed her consent at that 
alienation.631  
      In this instance it is not recorded whether the defendants raised the issue of necessity 
with regards to the alienation, as in the previous cases. The three cases I mentioned, 
namely the cases of Christina, Alice la Burgeise and Eufemia, all show that the widows’ 
opponents used the defence of ‘her husband sold her land out of necessity’, alongside 
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taking their presence as consenting to alienation to bar widows from recuperating their 
dower.  
A widow’s presence without any protest may have acted as a greater blow to a 
defendant’s case than it having been alienated out of necessity, which made women 
liable for the rejection of recovery. Alienora’s case contrasts to those of Cristina and 
Alice in that they both attended without any protest and lost their suits; while Eufemia 
did attend the city court but insisted that she had spoken against the alienation. Eufemia 
must have known the local customs of Winchester, so she clung to her argument, even 
though the jury did not confirm her protest.  
      Asserting that the property had been alienated by the couple out of necessity was 
often used as an objection when widows tried to recover their land or dower, but it 
seldom played as important a role as the custom of speaking out against the alienation. 
It hardly appears to have been examined by the court and jury was rarely called upon 
to determine the litigation results.  
When a Winchester widow, Cristiana, demanded her alienated maritagium by her 
late husband against Ailrich le Cordewaner in 1229, Ailrich said that the maritagium 
was sold in great need (magna neccessitate), but the argument was not examined or 
confirmed by the jury.632 Three out of the four cases concerning Winchester customs 
mentioned alienation as having been made out of necessity, but none of the litigation 
went further to define and confirm whether the alienation was made out of urgent need. 
In my opinion, claiming that the alienation was made out of necessity was definitely a 
strategy that was applied regularly in Winchester, but it appears not to have been 
effective, or at least not as effective as claiming that a widow was present with her 
husband when her land was alienated.  
      Winchester was not the only place with hostile dower customs. According to Louise 
J. Wilkinson, a man in Lincoln could sell his inheritance out of necessity, and his wife 
would not then be able to claim her dower in the property he sold. At first glance, 
although this custom in Lincoln was not as prohibitive as that in Winchester, it still 
harmed the wife’s dower right greatly, in part because her husband might have sold 
most of his land before his death, leaving his wife with so little that she could not sustain 
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herself. On the other hand, as Wilkinson suggests, this custom might have reduced the 
number of dower litigations over land held by burgage.633  
      Local customs in Nottingham were even worse for widows when it came to a 
husband’s alienation of dower. In 1290, one Alice claimed her dower against one John, 
who asserted that according to the customs of Nottingham, if the husband sold his lands, 
and the couple received money because of the alienation, she was not entitled to receive 
her dower. He further argued that Alice and her late husband had spent the money after 
her husband, Robert, sold the disputed land to him. In response to John’s argument, 
Alice argued that no profit from this alienation came to her, and the case went to the 
jury for confirmation.634  
      The custom in Nottingham created a more adverse environment for women who 
claimed dower because the alienation of land usually involved a financial transaction, 
and it was hard to prove that a wife had not enjoyed any profits from the alienation. In 
this situation, the wife’s consent was of little importance because her opinion played no 
role, either in the alienation or in claiming dower thereafter. Thus, even though she had 
not given her consent to the alienation she could not demand dower as long as she 
received some money from it.   
      However, in this case it can be inferred that the wife, Alice, might have approved 
the alienation because in common law a wife had a right to withhold her consent to the 
alienation of her dower, which would make her entitled to recover the dower after the 
death of her husband. Therefore, although the record does not reveal whether the wife 
consented to the alienation, since the dispute was brought to court, she might have 
consented to the alienation and received money in return. The local customs of 
Nottingham are reminiscent of those of Winchester, as both extended a husband’s rights 
over his wife’s land and her dower, placing the woman in a harsh situation whereby she 
barely had any say in her husband’s legal action over her property, or promised property 
– dower.  
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5.7.2 Alienation of dower by husbands 
For a widow, the alienation of dower by her husband was made worse by the 
involvement of multiple parties. In 1307 two women brought writs of dower to court 
because their husbands jointly purchased and jointly alienated the land. The judge 
reckoned that neither of their husbands died solely seised of the lands, so neither of the 
women were entitled to dower.635 A husband’s action could lead to difficulties for his 
wife in gaining her dower. Nevertheless, a wife could recover her dower through the 
common law.       
The following case elucidates how negligent a husband could be. Matilda, the wife 
of one Simon, claimed her nominated dower, namely one messuage and six acres of 
land with appurtenances, against German. German argued that the disputed land had 
been held in the hands of one Lauretta, as dower, and she gave it to her son, the said 
Simon, before her death. Afterwards, Simon gave the disputed land to German. For this 
reason, Matilda ought not to claim her dower from him.636 The dower land in this case 
had been used as ‘recycled dower’ by the husband, and he apparently did not take good 
care of his wife’s benefits since he alienated the ‘promised dower land’ to the said 
German.  
In 1276, a similar case involved a husband disposing of the wife’s dower share 
before his death. In 1276, Elizabeth de Pembridge demanded her dower, namely one 
third of the manor of Pembridge and one third of the advowson of the church of the 
same manor, with appurtenances. The defendant, Roger de Mortimer, vouched her 
husband’s heir to warrant that he obtained the free tenement in the said manor. An 
agreement was made between them that Elizabeth would remit and quitclaim to Roger 
and his heirs all rights, claims and her right of action to the manor by way of dower. In 
return, Roger granted Elizabeth his manor of Stoke Lacy in the same county. She was 
to hold this manor of Roger, the son of Roger, and his heirs for life by way of dower. 
After her death the manor and its appurtenances were to return to Roger and his heirs 
in perpetuity.637 In this case, although Elizabeth’s dower share was disposed by her late 
husband and was given in the free tenement, she made a concord with the defendant 
and held another manor for her lifetime in return.  
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      If a widow’s husband alienated her dower land to more than one person, the 
situation would certainly be disadvantageous to the widow because her opponent could 
delay proceedings by demanding the presence of all the assignees.  In 1201, a woman 
named Emma faced the crisis of losing her dower, namely a free tenement in Upton, 
Flore and Northampton, which was held by Robert, the defendant. Robert argued that 
the contested land was divided after the death of Emma’s husband into three by lot, 
including his part. Therefore, he queried whether he could proceed alone without the 
other two parties.638 Emma encountered a more complicated situation than she might 
have expected because she had to oppose two more people for her dower.  
      Of the various kinds of land alienation, the exchange of property could make a 
situation more complex because the object of the dower was no longer the same. In 
1284 Thomas Russell and his wife, Isabel, brought a writ of dower against Leonin of 
Leake. Leonin said that Nicholas, Isabel’s late husband, gave the disputed property to 
him and his wife in exchange for a virgate of arable land with appurtenances in Walton, 
which was subsequently given to Master Roger of Seaton. Furthermore, he insisted that 
Thomas and Isabel had impleaded Roger for one third of the said advowson and virgate 
of arable and he had satisfied them. In consequence, he asked whether they ought to 
have dower for what was given in exchange and what was received in exchange as well. 
Thomas and Isabel said they did not implead Roger and were not satisfied with the land, 
so a jury was called. Thomas and Isabel eventually obtained the dower.639 
In a 1285 Northamptonshire eyre, a justice clarified widows’ right to their 
exchanged dower. When Andrew Sparrow and his wife, Maud, came to court against 
Isabel of Panton, they demanded one messuage and a quarter of arable land with 
appurtenances in Grendon, to which Isabel gained title through Philip of Panton, to 
whom James of Panton, who had unjustly disseised Andrew and Maud, had granted it. 
Isabel said that she did not gain title through Philip. She held the tenements in dower 
from James who had endowed her with them. She continued to argue that the land she 
had held in dower had been exchanged, by her, for this land, and so she held this land 
in dower, as she had previously held the other. William of Saham, the justice, asked her 
whether the land was part of her husband’s inheritance, as was the other land she had 
given in exchange. Isabel answered positively. Saham made a judgment as follows:  
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‘then this is her dower just as much as the other which she exchanged for this land, for 
the title of dower applies as much to this land as it did to the other, and so … etc.’640 
The case proceeded after this judgment, and came to the opinion that land given in 
exchange for dower was the same, in law, as land assigned in dower. Hence her title to 
the land was derived from James, and the writ brought by Andrew and his wife Maud 
was defective.641  
There were many cases of restitution of dower during the period because wives’ 
property had been disposed of by their husbands. Therefore, in spite of women’s 
subordinate status, it was made possible for them to recover their dower, inheritance 
and maritagia. This right of recovery is clearly stated in chapter 3 of the Statute of 
Westminster II in 1285. However, the first chapter of the Statute of Merton in 1236 had 
established protection for widows who were expelled from dower that their husband 
held at death: 
Concerning widows who after their husbands’ deaths are expelled from their 
dower and cannot get their quarantine642 without suing for them, namely, 
whoever withholds from them their dowers or their quarantine out of the lands 
of which their husbands died seised and those widows afterwards recover by 
suing, those who are convicted of such wrongful deforcement are to pay those 
same widows their damages, that is to say the full value of the dower which is 
theirs from the times of their husbands’ deaths to the day when they recovered 
seisin of it by judgment of court. And the deforcers are nonetheless to be in 
the king’s mercy.643  
The Statute of Merton only articulated protection for widows who were expelled from 
dower of which their husbands died seised. Could a widow claim the dower which had 
once been hers, but had been alienated by her husband before his death? According to 
Bracton, if her nominated dower was alienated by her husband, she was entitled to 
claim it back against the tenant, whatever the reason for the alienation. Here, the 
difference between recovering her maritagium and inheritance and recovering dower is 
striking. As mentioned in previous chapters, Bracton stated that if the wife’s inheritance 
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or maritagium was alienated for the benefit of the conjugal couple, then she could not 
recover it after her husband’s death.644 However, Bracton believed that if the husband 
alienated her dower for the common benefit of the family, the wife would be entitled to 
recover it. One possible reason for this is that dower was a life interest, and a woman 
could only enjoy it for her lifetime. After the widow’s death, her alienated dower would 
eventually be returned to the intended person in order to ensure the stability of the 
transaction. On the other hand, inheritance and maritagium were rights rather than life 
interests, which could be claimed as held in demesne, so the law was careful when it 
came to the recovery of inheritance and maritagium. 
      The wife’s absolute right of recovering dower often harmed the grantee’s right, and 
from the tenant’s point of view the right was perceived as unfair. Therefore, Bracton 
stipulated that the heir had to provide escambium645  to the tenant from the heir’s 
inheritance. It was a different situation if the widow claimed her third share against the 
tenant – the tenant kept the disputed land, and the heir was obliged to provide an 
escambium to the widow.646 The following case illustrates Bracton’s statements about 
the recovery of dower and providing an escambium.  
Between 1242 and 1243, Petronilla, widow of Ralph de Tony, claimed her dower, 
namely the third part of a manor in Walthamstow, against John de Gizorz. John asserted 
that he had been bequeathed the contested manor for five years by Petronilla’s late 
husband, Ralph, by the confirmation of the king, so he ought not to give her dower. 
Furthermore, John called Ralph’s heir, who was in the custody of the king, to warrant. 
The king provided Petronilla with land elsewhere in exchange, until the end of John’s 
lease. When that happened her land would be relinquished and she would retain her one 
third of the disputed land. This case shows the heir’s obligation to compensate the 
widow for dower. Even the king, who had given his confirmation to the alienation, 
could not neglect the widow’s claim on alienated dower.647  
But what if the heir did not have sufficient land with which to compensate the 
widow? A case in 1242 might provide an answer. One Katerina demanded a third part 
of ten acres of land with appurtenances in Newton against William de Liketon as her 
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dower. William summoned Cristina and Beatrice, the heirs of Katerina’s late husband, 
Roger de Sudbury, to warrant him. It was adjudged that William should keep the 
disputed tenement, and Cristina and Beatrice should compensate Katerina for her dower 
land from their inheritance; provided their inheritance was sufficient. If it was not, 
Katerina could have what she demanded from William. 648  One can infer that the 
disputed ten acres of land might have been alienated by Roger, Katerina’s late husband. 
In consequence, she resorted to the law in order to recover it. This case also shows the 
law’s intention to protect both the assignee’s and the widow’s rights. Here the judges 
considered that William held the disputed land and that the heirs ought to be responsible 
for providing the widow with another piece of land in order to compensate her for the 
loss of dower. This result also echoes the principles that Bracton described regarding 
compensation for the loss of dower.  
      A much earlier case, in 1199, shows the right to recover dower in alienated land. 
Alice, the wife of one Ralph, sought her reasonable dower against Hugh, her son, and 
Adam and Robert Walensis. She recovered her seisin in dower from all of the 
defendants.649 A case in 1225 shows how a widow exercised her right after her dower 
had been sold. Alice, whose late husband was Ralph le Bret, claimed her dower of one 
third of a half virgate of land with appurtenances in Othorpe against Simon. Simon 
called another Alice, the sister and heir of Ralph, to warrant, but she did not want to 
warrant, claiming that Ralph had not died seised of the land and that she had no 
inheritance from him.650 
      Simon further argued that Ralph had given one virgate of land to him half a year 
before his death, so that he had a right of estover for the rest of Ralph’s lifetime. After 
Ralph death, he had been in seisin of the land until Alice (the heir) exchanged it with 
other land from Ralph’s inheritance. The judgment decided that Alice should recover 
the seisin against Simon.651 In this case, the crisis that the widow faced was caused not 
only by her husband but also her husband’s heir. Ralph’s land had been disposed of 
twice. Firstly, he had given one virgate of land to Simon before his death; and secondly, 
his heir, Alice, acquired it by giving Simon other land in exchange after Ralph’s death. 
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Did Alice consent to her husband’s alienation of that one virgate of land? Two points 
need to be stressed here. Firstly, although the record did not mention it, Alice might 
have not given her consent. Secondly, the reason why Alice was able to recover her 
dower from Simon is probably because the land that Alice (the heir) gave to Simon in 
exchange was also from Ralph’s inheritance; therefore, Alice (the widow) had the right 
to recover dower from her late husband’s alienated land. 
 
5.7.2.1 Legal remedy: Statute of Westminster II in 1285       
      Prior to the Statute of Westminster II there was no detailed law articulating widows’ 
right to recover their dower. What impact did the Statute have? In 1292, John’s second 
wife, Joan, demanded dower from one Walter, who had granted her late husband John 
certain tenements, whereupon John had entered into the disputed land and died seised 
of them. Joan brought a writ of dower against Walter, who subsequently yielded dower 
to her. After Walter’s death, his wife, Maud, demanded her dower against Joan. Joan’s 
representative said that the right to the dower should not be tried in this case as if it 
were before the Statute of Westminster II 1285. The other sergeant also agreed because 
under the common law if, ‘rightly or wrongly, one yielded to a woman her dower, or 
yielded up other tenements, she should hold it always, without the title to dower being 
tried’. However, such an opinion was opposed by Maud’s representative.652   
      By the time the Statute of Westminster II 1285 (chapters 3 and 4) was enacted, more 
complete regulations existed concerning wives’ ability to recover dower lost because 
their husbands defaulted a tenement. Chapter 3 stated that the wife might recover her 
land by a writ of entry cui ipsa in vita sua contradicere non potuit, whereby the husband 
had absented himself and refused to defend his wife’s right, or wished to surrender it 
against his wife’s will. The wife could later come before judgment to defend her right, 
and she should be admitted. On the contrary, if the defendant could prove that he had a 
right in the tenement he claimed, the wife would take nothing by the writ.653  
      The Statute of Westminster II 1285 chapter 4 also reflects the inconsistency, before 
1285, of judgments on the issue of recovering dower lost by the husband’s default:  
In the case where the husband loses the tenement demanded by default and 
the wife after the death of her husband claims dower, it is found that by some 
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justices dower is adjudged to her notwithstanding the default which her 
husband committed, while other justices are of the contrary opinion and 
adjudge the contrary.654  
After the Statue of Westminster II, defending a right was known as resceit. In the 
following cases recorded in The Year Books of Edward I, the effect of the Statute may 
be discerned. A note stated that ‘the wife would be received under The Statute when 
she and her husband are impleaded jointly’.655 The Statute was also frequently quoted 
by serjeants, attorneys and justices when it came to dower cases as may be seen in the 
following two cases.  
      At the 1292 Hereford eyre, a widow, A., through her attorney brought a writ against 
B. and C., his wife. B. appeared in court in person, while C. appointed an attorney to 
appear on her behalf. It seems that A. and C. were competing for dower on the same 
land, which B. and C. held jointly. B. and C.’s attorney argued that A. was never 
married to her alleged husband. The attorney of A. showed an official certification to 
the justice of the bench proving that she was legally married, and A. recovered her 
dower. Afterwards, C. came to court in person, saying that her husband, B., and her 
attorney ‘had faintly and badly pleaded’, so she argued that, by the Statute, she should 
be received to defend her right. However, when the judgment was given, C. was not 
allowed to recover her dower under the Statute because A. had to recover her dower, 
notwithstanding that the other side avowed that the husband was alive.656 This case 
clearly shows that theStatute had been applied by some women towards the end of the 
thirteenth century, or that they were certainly advised to do so by their legal 
representatives. Although their attempts did not always succeed, at least they could 
resort to the law if the loss of dower was caused by their husbands’ ‘passive attitude’ 
in court.  
       
5.8 Widows’ ability to dispose of property 
      Once a woman became a widow she had sole control over her dower. As a widow, 
she was a femme sole in court, so she was no longer subject to her husband when she 
wished to dispose of her inheritance, maritagium or dower. Her control over her own 
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inheritance and maritagium was incontestable and she could dispose of them as she 
wished. However, since dower was not ‘her land’, her control over it was not as absolute 
as with her inheritance and maritagium. Bracton stated that ‘the wife cannot dispose of 
any part of her specified dower during the husband’s lifetime’.657 Therefore, what kinds 
of actions over dower were considered to be legal for a widow? Before examining such 
cases, a look at the Statute of Gloucester chapter 7 (1278) may prove useful:  
Likewise if a woman sells or gives in fee or for term of life the tenements that 
she holds in dower, it is established that the heir or other person to whom the 
land ought to revert after the woman’s death, shall at once have recovery to 
demand the land by a writ of entry made therefor in the chancery.658 
This clearly addresses the right of the heir to recover an inheritance that had once 
belonged to the woman’s dower, but it also indicates that a woman might sell or give 
the property she held in dower. From this it may be inferred that women’s legal actions 
over dower were not uncommon, which would prejudice the heirs, or other persons, to 
whom the dower land ought to revert. Hence the regulation was made. The common 
law records probably offer us further insights into this issue.  
 
5.8.1 Leasing her dower 
The ensuing case has already been mentioned in the previous discussion of ‘no 
dower from dower’, but it also reveals a further area for dispute. Joan, who was the wife 
of Walter de Molcastre, brought a writ of dower against William, Walter’s son, whose 
representative argued that certain disputed tenements were held by Mabel, the wife of 
Robert, and Walter’s mother. Joan’s representative said that Walter’s father, Robert, 
and Walter made an agreement with Mabel in respect of her dower for twenty-seven 
marks every year, so that Walter was seised of the entirety of it. William’s 
representative presented the following statement: 
Mabel leased her dower to him (William) in consideration of the twenty-seven 
marks to hold to him and his heirs male of full age; but that if he should not 
have an heir male, or should at his death have an heir male under age, or should 
have an heir male of full age and should fail to pay the twenty-seven marks at 
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any of the times fixed for payment, then and in any such case it should be 
lawful for her to take her dower without let from them.659 
The plaintiff still insisted that Walter held her dower to him and his heirs at their 
pleasure as long as they chose to have it, in consideration of the twenty-seven marks. 
William’s representative used a metaphor to support his client, stating: ‘If I take a farm 
to hold at my will for a certain yearly sum, no one can compel me to hold at will, but I 
can throw it up at my pleasure, and he made composition only in the form aforesaid’.660  
The disputes in this case not only answer whether there should be ‘dower from 
dower’ but also what sorts of actions a widow could enact on her dower. It seemed that 
leasing her dower was acceptable, but Joan’s representative equated Mabel’s lease to 
William with a quitclaim. Mabel’s representative, on the other hand, regarded the lease 
as renting out your own property. It appears that, even if the widow was permitted to 
lease her dower share, she might have been at risk of losing her dower on the grounds 
claimed by Joan’s representative.  
For a widow, leasing her dower was perfectly acceptable and legal, but she could 
not ask the lessee to return the tenement before he or she finished the term of the lease. 
In 1303, a woman brought a writ of dower against a tenant, who, in return, called to 
court the warrantor, the heir of the woman’s late husband. The warrantor called the 
guardians who had wardship of the land, and all the guardians yielded the dower portion 
to the woman, except one, Richard de Midd, who argued that he had a ten-year lease 
for the tenements from this woman. The woman admitted it, so she recovered her seisin 
but Richard retained his portion for the term of his lifetime.661  
If it was legal to lease the dower, could women sell property, including the dower 
share?  
 
5.8.2 Selling and granting her dower 
A woman called Quenilla came to court in 1221 to claim her specific dower against 
Henry of Hodsock and his wife, Alice. Alice’s attorney argued that Quenilla had sold 
the whole land to William le Norris, Alice’s father. After Quenilla admitted that both 
parties had reached an agreement, Quenilla remitted her claim of dower in return for 
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5s.662 A case from 1227 shows how a widow, whose late husband was Reginald de 
Frowik, sold her late husband’s land to Andreas Bukerel, and thus disinherited William, 
Reginald’s heir. Andreas said that after Reginald’s death he acquired the land in the 
presence of two executors, Ralph and Roger, Reginald’s wife and the abbot of 
Westminster, the chief lord of the fee. The two executors admitted that they had sold 
the land for £10, and they further confirmed that Reginald’s widow had sold the land at 
the same time. Therefore, it was adjudged that the heir, William, should recover his 
father’s land from Andreas, who should consequently ask for compensation from the 
two executors and the abbot. As to the widow, she was adjudged not to be assigned her 
dower, neither could she have William’s custody.663  
Compared with selling dower, granting dower was more common and is well 
documented in the legal records. Statute of Merton c. 2 states: 
Also all widows can from now on bequeath the corn from their land, as well 
from their dower-lands as from their other lands and tenements, saving the 
service due to the lords for their dower-lands and their other tenements.664  
Although property in this thesis refers only to immovable property, it is worth looking 
at what the regulations say about a widow’s ability to grant her dower.  
Before this is explored, the meanings of ‘bequest’ and ‘grant’ should be 
established. These two legal actions had strikingly similar features. To ‘bequeath’ is to 
dispose of personal property, especially money, by a final will,665 whereas to ‘grant’ is 
to transfer property.666 The former usually happened when a person was dying, and took 
effect after death; the latter could happen at any time. However, for medieval English 
women, grants were made more often than not during their widowhoods. 
The regulations largely affected high status and wealthy women of the nobility 
and gentry because they held large amounts of land, which would often be granted to 
others or to the Church. The heir of a woman’s husband had the right to succeed to 
dower, so grants from a widow’s dower to religious institutions were a matter of family 
concern as they affected the family’s interests. Granting dower to others could prejudice 
                                                
662 CRR, vol. 10, 134.  
663 CRR, vol. 13, n. 223.  
664 English History Documents, ed. Douglas and Rothwell, vol. 3, 352.  
665 ‘OED,’ last accessed on 22 April, 2019, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/17854?rskey=PZZtlM&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid	
666 ‘OED,’ last accessed on 22 April, 2019, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/80766?rskey=f8AcIt&result=3&isAdvanced=false#eid 
		
	
203	
the husband’s heir, so such grants needed to be confirmed by a woman’s husband and 
son. To what extent could a widow grant her dower away. Was she, for example, able 
to grant all of it? These questions matter because granting away dower, of course, 
harmed the heir’s inheritance rights. To help answer this question, the following 
paragraphs describe situations that arose when several widows granted away their 
dower.   
Hawise de Beaumont (c. 1120–1197), Countess of Gloucester, gave the church of 
St James in Bristol in perpetual alms one burgage in the new borough of the meadow, 
namely the last one on the east side, free and quit of all service and custom, just as the 
earl, her husband, had given it to her.667 Thus, the property she granted away was a gift 
from her husband and probably part of her dower.668 We do not know how much dower 
she actually held, but the frequency and number of her land grants demonstrate the 
extent of her power to grant. For instance, the Earldom of Gloucester Charters records 
that she granted land ten times,669 seven of which were apparently made after the death 
of her husband, William Fitz Robert in 1183. She granted land in Pimperne (Dorset), 
Wareham (Dorset), Nurstead (Kent), and Bristol. It is only known that Hawise held 
Pimperne as her maritagium, while the others might have been her inheritance or dower. 
She granted part of her maritagium at Pimperne to Nuneaton priory during her 
widowhood and some tenements with services to religious institutions, giving Durford 
Abbey lands that Thomas Aylwin and Richard Makuhus held between 1189 and 1197. 
Before William’s death, she had also granted the same Abbey land held by Robert 
Wytrow, together with his annual service of 2s.670 Hawise’s successor, Isabel, Countess 
of Gloucester, also made numerous grants when she was in widowhood.671  
Although such grants could only be made by very wealthy people, Hawise’s case 
reveals how capable a rich widow was of disposing her own property. It also 
demonstrates that women could dispose not only of dower but also of maritagium, 
inheritance and gifts from donors. Some granted their dower without any financial 
return, as Hawise did to St James of Bristol, whereas others granted their property for 
                                                
667 Ward, Women of the English Nobility and Gentry, 93.  
668 Ward notes that the grant might have been Hawise’s dower. In the original charter, it does not say 
clearly whether the grant was part of her dower. Ibid.  
669 Earldom of Gloucester Charters, ed. Patterson. The ten grants made by Hawise are as follows: n. 2, 
n. 55, n. 56, n. 57, n. 58, n. 59, n. 63, n. 67, n. 78, n. 160; the grants she made after the death of her 
husband are as follows: n. 57, n. 58, n. 59, n. 63, n. 67, n. 78, n. 160.    
670 Ibid., n. 160.  
671 For examples, see Earldom of Gloucester Charters, ed. Patterson, n. 76, n. 114, n. 148, n. 149.   
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cash payments.672 For instance, between 1276 and 1289, a charter of Maud de Clare, 
Countess of Gloucester and Hertford (c. 1223-1289), shows that she made grants to the 
priory of Augustinian friars at Clare, amounting to two acres of meadow with 
appurtenances, which had been a gift and feoffment of one Susanna, and a meadow, a 
gift and feoffment of William Thurstan of Clare and Matilda, his wife. The charter 
records that ‘the friars and their successors could have and hold all the aforesaid 
meadow with its appurtenances of her, Maud, and her heirs or assigns in peace, freely 
and quietly forever by rendering yearly to the lords of the fee due and accustomed 
service for all services, aids, suits, customs and demands belonging to Maud or her heirs 
and her assigns’.673 Maud also made a promise that she and her heirs and her assigns 
would warrant, acquit and defend forever all the meadow with appurtenances so that 
her gift, grant and confirmation would have the validity of perpetual authority.674  
Maud did not grant the gift without rewards, and she still kept the fee due and all 
accustomed service.675 She disposed of the properties at her will, which demonstrates 
that widowhood bestowed such great power that she could dispose of her property 
independently. Unlike a grant without reward, a grant with fee or service in return did 
not hurt the interests of the heir; indeed, it brought profit to the heirs as the assigns. 
Granting from dower, though, could harm the interests of the husband’s heir through 
the loss of his or her inheritance. For instance, Giles and his wife came to court to 
respond to William de Waleton because William claimed he had been disinherited by a 
gift to a religious house of the lands held in dower.676  
There is no certain answer to the question of precisely how much dower a widow 
was able to grant away, because the above cases suggest that widows were seldom in a 
position to do so. Those who granted property without repayment granted it not from 
their dower, but from their own inheritance or land they had acquired from others. As 
was demonstrated in the case of Maud de Clare, the properties she granted were neither 
                                                
672 Although women who granted their property to churches did not ask for financial reward, there was 
always a purpose in mind. For instance, some of them granted lands to churches for their own salvation. 
From this point of view, they would always have reward.  
673 Ward, Women of the English Nobility and Gentry, 199.   
674 Ibid.  
675 Ibid. See also Mitchell, Portraits of Medieval Women, 40. Mitchell regards Maud’s grants to religious 
houses as ‘conspicuous piety’ because she wanted to compete with other noblewomen who devoted either 
sponsorship or themselves to religion. She even created a monument to memorialise her generosity and 
her significance to the local community. 
676 CRR, vol. 16, n. 789.   
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her inheritance nor her dower. Instead, they were the lands she acquired from others. 
For most widows, granting away their dower would put them in too precarious a 
situation, since it would trigger future disputes and harm the family’s interest. 
Consequently, it was better to keep their dower lands and to magnify them through 
benefits until they descended to the heirs of their husbands. From the point of view of 
heirs, dower constituted their inheritance and it involved every family member’s 
interests. The next section will look not only at a widow’s interests, but also at those of 
heirs. 
  
5.9 Dower as both women’s business and family’s business        
      Returning to the question posed in the early part of this chapter: did dower only 
serve as women’s business? Indeed, dower belonged to a woman for her lifetime and 
could only be claimed by women, so in that sense it was ‘women’s business’. However, 
women had little say in how their dower was used whilst their husbands were still alive 
because of the patriarchal superstructures delineating their unspoken authority. If a 
woman had a nominated dower and her husband was determined to alienate it during 
their marriage, then she could voice her objection. Otherwise, as discussed previously, 
she had little opinion or influence on how her dower was managed during marriage.  
      Dower descended to the husband’s heir. For a widow, dower was her special right 
and a marker of a newly-found independence; for her husband’s heir, it was his or her 
inheritance and could became a bone of contention which meant they were often 
reluctant to allow the widow to control it. Some charters show how heirs managed 
dower and the deals they made with widows which not only utilised dower fairly, but 
also prevented future disputes. For instance, an early thirteenth century charter shows 
how a son managed his mother’s dower. Adam de Scadewell, with the assent of his 
wife, Alice, granted to certain monks all the lands with rents that he held in the manor 
of Henwick, which was also his mother’s dower.677 The charter did not reveal whether 
Adam’s mother had died or not, so there are two possible explanations for what was 
going on: (i) his mother was still alive, but had granted her dower to Adam, who 
assigned it to Alice as nominated dower again; and (ii) his mother had died, so he 
inherited her dower. It is noteworthy that the granted land was also Alice’s dower, and 
                                                
677 The Cartulary of Worcester Cathedral Priory, ed. Darlington, n. 141. 
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her consent was required and then recorded, as this could possibly bar Alice from 
recovering her dower in the future. The reason I say ‘possibly’ is that there was no fine 
levied on the grant, that is, Alice was not examined separately in the royal court to 
check for any coercion, so she could argue that she only gave her consent under duress. 
 
5.9.1 The collaboration between widows and heirs       
      During 1230 and 1233 a grant was made by Alfred of Penhulle (Penn Hall in Pensax) 
to some monks. Alfred granted all of his land, with the services of those who held of 
him, and his mother’s dower. In return, the monks were to hand in a cronnock678 of hard 
corn, half wheat and half rye every six weeks, and half a mark annually until his mother 
died. After his mother’s death, the monks should pay 10s every year, and the house 
which belonged to his mother’s dower would revert to the monks after Alfred’s 
death.679 Alfred’s mother was still alive, so it is possible that she consented to the grant 
of her dower in exchange for things that she and her son needed. The case demonstrates 
that by managing and profiting from his mother’s dower, a son could arrange a long-
term interest until his own death.  
      For instance, during 1202-1203, one Walter made a deliberate agreement with Toke 
Dacun concerning his mother’s dower. Walter and his mother Emma granted the dower 
land to Toke, and in return, Toke and his heirs were to do the service of rendering 1lb. 
of cumin yearly to Emma and Walter, along with three quarters of corn, wheat, barley 
and rye and 2s at the four usual terms. The service of rendering cumin would not be 
quitted until the deaths of both Walter and Emma, while the service of submitting crops 
would be terminated when either of them died.680   
      The above cases show how some sons managed their mothers’ dower. For some of 
these men, long-lived widows or mothers barred them from receiving the entire 
inheritance as early as they might have wished, and they had to learn to manage the 
dower while the woman was alive in order to benefit from it effectively. Because any 
action a widow made concerning her dower might have implications for the heir, any 
decision relating to dower needed their consent. This was the case when Sibyl 
                                                
678 The measurement of corn.  
679 The Cartulary of Worcester Cathedral Priory, ed. Darlington, n. 283, 149.  
680 Calendar of Kent Feet of Fines, ed. Churchill and others, 32.  
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quitclaimed her dower to Walter Mercator for 11s, and David, the heir, was present in 
court and gave his consent.681  
 
5.9.2 Disgruntled heirs 
      However, not all heirs cooperated with their mothers in this way, and not all 
relationships were always harmonious. According to Glanvill, if the heir neither attested 
nor admitted the dower claim made by the woman against the tenant, then the plea 
would turn out to be between the woman and the heir:  
So if the heir denies to the woman all the rights she claims, by saying in court 
that she was never endowed with it by his ancestor, the case may be settled by 
battle if the woman has three persons who heard and saw, and one of them is 
a suitable witness who heard and saw her endowed by the heir’s ancestor at 
the church door at the time of her marriage and is ready to prove it against the 
heir. If the woman succeeded by battle against the heir, then he must deliver 
the land claimed to the woman, or else assign her equivalent lands in 
exchange.682  
Whether a widow could obtain her right depended on the heir’s cooperation, so a good 
working relationship was advisable.683 The cases that follow illustrate this well.  
      In 1242, Henry, son of William de Ho, complained that his mother, Godehold, had 
made waste, sale and ruin of her dower land and caused his disinheritance. Godehold 
had rendered her dower to Henry in court and quitclaimed her dower right. For this, 
Henry paid her 20s yearly for the rest of her life.684 Rather than wait for his mother’s 
death to inherit, Henry chose to retrieve his inheritance by making his mother relinquish 
her dower right. This case revealed the dower share to be as important to him as it was 
to her. Sometimes heirs launched litigation against widows who did not take good care 
of their dower, for example by leaving land uncultivated. This was known as 
                                                
681 Ibid., 53.   
682 Glanvill, 64-65. 
683 Even the king could not avoid assigning dower to his mother. For instance, King Edward I had to 
assign his mother her extensive dower. See Calendar of Charter Rolls, 6 vols. (London: HMSO, 1903-
1927), vol. 1, 218; 2: 192-193, 196. 		
684 Calendar of Kent Feet of Fines, ed. Churchill and others, 165-166.   
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‘disinheriting’. In such cases, heirs had every reason to feel disgruntled.685 Expectations 
and obligations were placed on widows to maintain their dower in good condition.686 
      In one sense, dower was women’s business, but as this thesis contests, dower was 
also family business. When they launched dower suits, widows often found themselves 
up against their own children, resulting in full-scale intra-family wars. A case in point 
is Felicia, widow of Philip de Beaumont, who claimed against John de Beaumont for 
the third part of seven virgates and four acres of arable land in Dorsington. John replied 
that Felicia already had half a hide of arable land in Marston as dower, and he even 
offered to give the third part of the other lands if she declined his other offers. Felicia 
then said that Marston had been given to the younger son, Walter de Beaumont, by her 
late husband, so that she held nothing in dower. John strongly denied this, insisting that 
Philip had died seised of that half-hide of arable land, and that Walter had been in 
Ireland for four years. Afterwards a jury confirmed that Philip had given the half-hide 
of arable land to his younger son Walter, but Walter had asked Philip to be its keeper 
before he sailed to Ireland. Therefore, it was adjudged that Felicia should have her 
dower in Dorsington.687  
      Another point worth mentioning is that although Philip managed Marston, he was 
acting as keeper for Walter, and he did not own the land. John was mistaken in thinking 
that Philip was the owner. John was probably Philip’s heir, so did not anticipate that his 
brother would harm his inheritance. These additional factors no doubt turned the case 
not just into a dispute between the heir and the widow, but into a family matter since 
everyone was equally invested and involved. This case clearly demonstrates that from 
the point of view of a son, dower was not only women’s business, but family business. 
      Relationships between heirs and widows have long been discussed among 
historians, and it is necessary here to address the question of whether blood kinship 
affected them. For instance, if a widow was an heir’s biological mother, might this have 
dispelled disputes over dower? It is reasonable to believe that, in some instances, this 
was the case. In contrast, if the widow was the heir’s stepmother, was their relationship 
more likely to be hostile? In Portraits of Medieval Women, Linda E. Mitchell stated 
                                                
685 For a few examples, see CRR, vol. 13, n. 588, n. 1748, n. 2559, n. 2664.  
686 Widows might have found many many difficulties in maintaining dower, such as the lack of labour 
and financial resources to keep the dower in good condition.   
687 Rolls of the Justices in Eyre: Being the Rolls of Pleas and Assizes for Gloucester, Warwickshire and 
Staffordshire, 1221-22, ed. Doris M. Stenton (London: Selden Society, 1940), pl. 257.  
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that a stepson’s antagonism towards a widow might provoke him to block her from 
obtaining her dower. 688  However, this does not necessarily mean that blood 
relationships were better or more harmonious. Whatever the nature of the relationship, 
the widow still represented a hindrance to the heir’s taking full control of their 
inheritance. In consequence, the heir might even turn their back on the widow who was 
their biological mother when it came to questions of dower.689 
      Mitchell takes Gladys Du ap Llewelyn ab lowerth as an example to demonstrate a 
hostile relationship between heirs and their stepmother. Gladys married, first of all, 
Reginald de Braose, who had four children by an earlier marriage. Gladys and Reginald 
produced no heir and Reginald died in 1228. Soon after his death, Gladys married Ralph 
de Mortimer and they had at least three children – Roger, Hugh and Joan. Ralph died 
in 1246, making Gladys a widow again. Afterwards, Gladys initiated a number of dower 
suits against her step-children, the co-heirs from the first marriage. Her step-children 
resented the ample dower she had from two men, and they were extremely reluctant to 
give up their inheritance. Consequently, they obstructed her attempts to obtain dower 
by various methods, for example by claiming outright trespass and by denying her profit 
and rent from the disputed property.690 Ralph’s heirs resented losing their inheritance 
to Gladys, a woman who was unrelated by blood yet had been able to control one third 
of their land simply because she had once married Ralph. Moreover, she had obtained 
a considerable portion of dower from her second husband. In this case, the lack of blood 
relationship goes some way to explain the antagonism towards Gladys.  
 
5.9.2.1 Disgruntled heirs and the long-lived widow: Maud de Braose and Roger 
Mortimer     
      The next case demonstrates how even blood relations could turn sour over matters 
of inheritance. Maud de Braose, daughter of Reginald de Braose, married Roger 
Mortimer, the son and the heir of Gladys and Ralph, in 1247, making her the step-child 
                                                
688 Mitchell, Portraits of Medieval Women, 169-189. See also Linda E. Mitchell, ‘The Lady is a Lord: 
Noble Widows and Land in Thirteenth-Century Britain,’ Historical Reflections / Réflexions 
Historiques, 18.1 (1992), 71-97.  
689 The Mortimer family had been highly involved in politics, and their relationship with the King was 
more than complicated. Here, I will only explore the dynamics between the widows and their children 
concerning dower.  
690 Linda E Mitchell, ‘Noble Widowhood in the Thirteenth Century,’ in Upon my Husband’s Death: 
Widows in the Literature and Histories of Medieval Europe, ed. Louise Mirrer (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1992), 169-189.  
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of Gladys as well as her daughter-in-law. During a series of adverse law suits 
concerning Gladys’s dower from Reginald, Maud and Roger were absent from the 
record. As Gladys’s daughter-in-law, Maud probably did not want to destroy her 
relationships with her mother-in-law and her husband, which would only have been to 
her disadvantage. Therefore, the relationship between Maud and Gladys remained 
harmonious. Ironically, however, Maud found herself involved in a series of time-
consuming and depressing legal cases over her dower with her own children, in much 
the same way as Gladys and her step-children, Maud’s siblings.691  
      Maud became embroiled in a new row over inheritance with her younger son, Roger, 
and Edmund, her eldest son. Roger seemed determined to hinder his mother from 
enjoying her dower. The disputes began in 1283 when Maud sued Roger and her 
daughter, Isabel, for dower in Shropshire, Worcestershire and Herefordshire. CP 40 
records tell us that Maud’s dower claim was extremely large; namely, (i) one third of 
the manors of Larkhope and Stowe in Shropshire against Roger; (ii) one third of the 
manor of Doddington in Shropshire against Isabel; (iii) one third of the manors of 
Clifton and Oddingley in Worcester against Roger; (iv) one third of the manors of 
Marden, Winforton and Willersley in Herefordshire against Roger; and (v) one third of 
a messuage, three carucates, thirty acres of meadow, 200 acres of wood, one windmill 
and £17 in rent in Bisley, Gloucestershire against Peter Cobet, the tenant.  
      Compared to her short encounters with Isabel and Peter Cobet,692 Maud’s disputes 
with Roger were relentless. When Maud asked for one third of the manor of Larkhope 
and Stowe in Shropshire in 1283, Roger firstly requested a view,693 which caused an 
adjournment. In the following year, Maud amended her request of dower to one third 
of a messuage and two carucates in Larkhope. What happened to make Maud change 
her request about the amount of the dower was not revealed, but it might be presumed 
that downsizing her objective could placate Roger and make it easier for her to obtain 
dower, on the assumption that she perhaps had claimed too much initially. Afterwards, 
a series of lengthy cases between her, Roger and Edmund were recorded. As the 
warrantor of Roger and Maud’s eldest son, Edmund defaulted several times, so even 
                                                
691 Ibid.   
692 CP 40/50, AALT, IMG 1647; CP 40/62, IMG 4306; CP 40/51, IMG 7479.   
693 It means the defendant was asking to view the disputed land in person.  
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his lands fell into the King’s hand as distraint.694 In 1286 Edmund finally came to court 
to confront Maud but he pleaded force majeure: in explanation he said that his attorney, 
William de Acum, had unfortunately been killed on his way to the court.695 No record 
of the closure can be found beyond this point, which suggests that the parties might 
have reached an agreement in private. 
      Maud’s pleas of one third of the manors of Clifton and Oddingley in Worcestershire 
went through similar litigation. Roger asked for a view and she again downsized her 
dower request, namely, one third of Clifton and one third of two thirds of Oddingley. 
Again, Edmund defaulted several times in Maud’s dower suits, believing he was not 
obliged to warrant his younger brother, Roger.696 Maud also changed her claim of 
dower concerning her pleas of one third of the manors of Marden, Winforton and 
Willersley in Herefordshire. Her claim on the first two manors remained the same, but 
she claimed only one third of a rent of 20s in Willersley, and Roger vouched Edmund 
for two weeks after Hilary.697  
      In 1285 Edmund queried why he should warrant Roger. Roger replied that his father 
had been seised of his homage and service and Edmund was in seisin of his service. 
Moreover, Roger was ready to do him homage. The court confirmed Edmund’s 
obligation of warranty because Edmund admitted that the land would revert to him if 
Roger died without a male heir. Despite the fact that he was obliged to warrant Roger, 
Edmund seemed to be reluctant to assign Maud’s claim. He argued that she was already 
in possession of six named manors in Herefordshire, one named manor in Shropshire, 
£6 of land in Berkshire and named lands in Wales from Roger.698 Edmund did not 
clarify whether the mentioned lands were her nominated dower or the dower he 
assigned to her when her late husband Roger died. The truth remains a mystery as there 
are no further court records concerning the matter. Edmund defaulted again in Hilary 
term in 1286, but when Maud and Edmund appeared at court during Easter term in 1286, 
Edmund claimed that his attorney, William de Acum, had been killed and that was the 
reason for his previous default.699  
                                                
694 The action of distraining. See ‘OED,’ accessed on 24 August 2018, http://0-
www.oed.com.catalogue.libraries.london.ac.uk/view/Entry/55745?redirectedFrom=distraint#eid 
695 CP 40/62, AALT, IMG 4306.  
696 CP 40/62, AALT, IMG 4229.  
697 CP 40/51, AALT, IMG 7479.   
698 CP 40/62, AALR, IMG 4253.  
699 CP 40/62, AALT, IMG 4306.	
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      Maud’s struggle with her own children over dower not only demonstrates that blood 
relationships did not necessarily reduce an heir’s reluctance to hand dower over to the 
widow, but also reveals each party’s tactics. In this instance, Maud did not stick to her 
claims throughout; instead she lowered her requests after Roger asked for a view. If 
Edmund’s statements about Maud’s holding numerous named manors and lands were 
true, it could suggest a degree of greediness on her part, and by reducing her initial 
claims she stood a better chance at winning – people take more risks to avoid a loss 
than to realise even a small gain.  
      Seeing the amount of land Maud had claimed, it is understandable that Roger and 
Edmund were loath to hand it over to her. In consequence, they used every mechanism 
in the legal system to delay proceedings by requesting views and defaulting. These two 
actions were both normal and appropriate for a defendant and a warrantor because the 
law awarded both parties enough time and sufficient method to seek justice. Numerous 
widows who launched dower suits went through time-consuming litigation, but Maud’s 
was an extreme case. Edmund’s unwillingness to cooperate and frequent defaults 
delayed the proceedings, and while this earned both parties time to come up with new 
strategies, it must have been exhausting both physically and psychologically for the 
widow who had to either appear at court herself or send an attorney intermittently for 
three years without securing what she originally desired. Mitchell believed that Maud 
certainly went into battle against her sons, but also that the inefficiency of the legal 
system exacerbated the problems.   
      There is no doubt that, under the medieval legal system, litigation sometimes 
appeared to be time-consuming. The longest dower suit considered in this thesis is 
Maud de Braose’s case, but there are also numerous short cases, which were usually 
resolved in one session. For example, the record of William de Ho’s case indicates that 
the dispute was dealt with in one court session.700 Numerous factors contributed to 
time-consuming dower litigation, and one of them, as Walker suggested in ‘Litigation 
as Personal Quest’, was probably that the defendants of dower suits were usually the 
tenants rather than the heirs.701 Most tenants summoned the heirs to court for warranty, 
so the court would have to adjourn until the next session. If the heir defaulted 
deliberately, the litigation would become lengthy, as Maud de Braose’s case shows. 
                                                
700 Calendar of Kent Feet of Fines, ed. Churchill and others, 165-166. See p. 207 of chapter 5.  
701 Walker, ‘Litigation as Personal Quest,’ 84-85.  
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The process of identifying and valuing lands could prolong litigation as well.702 By 
contrast, if a dower suit simply lay between the widow and the heir, who rendered her 
the dower immediately, then it would not be time-consuming, despite what Maud’s case 
suggests.703 Suits could be swift if the litigants just wanted to have a written court 
record affirming the transmission and quantity of the dower, which would be useful if 
any future dispute happened.704 
      Therefore, Mitchell’s statement that the legal system was inefficient may be an 
overstatement. Both asking for a view of the disputed property and defaulting were 
frequently used in order to bring an element of fairness into common law. Frederick 
Pollock points out that default did not cause the defendant to lose a case but amercement 
was used instead. The courts were reluctant to make a final decision simply because of 
default.705 Therefore, even if Edmund had defaulted to delay proceedings, the court 
would not automatically judge that Maud had won her dower. It did, however, take 
some of Edmund’s land away in distraint, which, incidentally, then went into the King’s 
hands.  
      The common law system could have worked in Maud’s favour if Edmund had 
cooperated and assigned her property without any objection. Unfortunately, Edmund 
decided to delay proceedings as much as the law would allow. Frustrated as he might 
have been, Edmund’s antagonism towards his own mother was not hard to understand. 
As one of the co-heiresses of her natal family, Maud inherited a quarter of one third of 
the barony of Miles of Gloucester and the lordship of Radnor, Wales. During her 
nineteen-year widowhood, she gained full control of her dower and inheritance which 
led Edmund, a titular lord, to have no income from her dower land for a prolonged 
period of time. After Maud’s death, Edmund finally gained full control over his 
inheritance, although it only lasted for three years since he died soon after Maud. The 
                                                
702 Flower, Introduction to the Curia Regis Rolls, 1199-1230 A.D., vol. 62, 246.  
703 As mentioned, Maud de Braose’s case was exceptional, but it also suggests that the dower case 
between the widow and the heir was not necessarily shorter than that between the widow and the 
tenant.			
704 The lengthy dower case raises a question here as to whether dower cases were more time-consuming 
than others. In my opinion, they were not necessarily more time-consuming than other civil pleas, 
because it depends on the extent to which the defendant cooperated. As mentioned, it could become as 
lengthy as Maud de Braose’s case, but it could be sorted out in just one session, as in other cases. 
Compared to maritagium or inheritance cases in this thesis, there appear to be more dower cases, but this, 
of course, does not mean they were more time-consuming. However, this issue is worth more attenetion 
and in-depth research in order to work it out.  
705 Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I, vol. 2, 591-592. 
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animosity which Edmund felt towards his mother proved that blood relationships did 
not necessarily prevent family hostilities where dower was involved.  
      It is impossible to describe a relationship between a widow and an heir in a few 
words, since it could be influenced by many factors over time. A household that had 
been peaceful at the point of a husband’s death might find itself in disagreement about 
how to arrange and dispose of dower. Wealthy widows and widowed heiresses, in 
particular, found themselves facing frustrated heirs because dower not only postponed 
their actual independence but also crippled them financially. When dower involved 
large estates, blood relationships mattered little, as the hostilities between Maud and 
her children demonstrate. This study has shown how the management of the financial 
interests that flowed from the person awarded the dower could either satisfy both the 
widow and the heirs, or, alternatively, throw the whole family into chaos.  
 
5.9.3 Claiming common law dower as a more flexible strategy     
     It is interesting to consider why Maud was claiming her dower in so many different 
places. She did not have nominated dower and claiming one third of her husband’s 
estates made the amount of dower surprisingly large. In fact, none of the three widows 
in the Mortimer family, namely Gladys Ddu, Maud de Braose and Margaret de Fiennes 
(Edmund’s wife), had nominated dower, which led to their having to take dower suits 
against numerous tenants for common law dower share after the death of their husbands. 
Had the Mortimer widows not been noblewomen and had they held as little land as a 
freeman, they would not have had to bring so many disputes between them and their 
tenants to court. Also, thankfully for us, records survive for more cases brought by 
noblewomen.  
      Compared to nominated dower, common law dower made a claim more flexible, 
particularly when a woman’s late husband had been so rich in land. Maud’s case 
demonstrates this well. Her husband held extensive lands in Shropshire, Worcestershire 
and Herefordshire, which motivated Maud to claim her one third share in every possible 
constituency. Changing her claims while the litigation proceeded shows the flexibility 
of common law dower, since it allowed some space for negotiation in order to obtain 
what both parties really wanted. This might include either going through the court 
and/or coming to a private agreement. As the results of Maud’s litigations were not 
recorded it may be presumed that a private agreement was reached, and whatever was 
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decided remains a mystery. Private agreements allowed all parties involved more space 
and better opportunities for solutions that would satisfy everyone. 
      Maud’s relationship with her sons was reminiscent of another Maud – Maud de 
Lacy de Clare (see also Chapter 4), who became the Countess of Gloucester by her 
marriage to Richard de Clare. She also had a depressing relationship with her son, 
Gilbert de Clare (c. 1243-1295), because of dower. Maud had obtained a sizable dower, 
including the Welsh castle of Usk and the family honour of Clare, Suffolk, but it was 
this very size that forced Gilbert to sue her when he came of age. This case also shows 
that, even if the heir and the widow were related by blood, they did not necessarily 
agree on the use and assignment of dower.706 Mitchell’s claim that blood relations 
might ease the tension between an heir and a widow worked in some cases, but, as 
shown here, there were just as many cases where it did not.  
 
5.9.4 Quitclaiming dower  
      While scholarship stresses the importance of dower to a widow, an intriguing 
phenomenon deserves more attention. The number of cases where dower was contested 
in court reveal its significance for women. Dower not only helped a woman to survive 
during her widowhood, it also reflected the whole family’s interest. The intensity with 
which dower claims were fought is clear indication of its importance, and most widows 
fought tooth and nail for their dower rights. Nevertheless, it was common to see widows 
quitclaiming their dower in exchange for cash or different kinds of crops. For instance, 
in the Calendar of Kent Feet of Fines, there are seventy dower cases, more than a third 
of which show widows quitclaiming their rights in return for other services. In 1236, 
Maud, the wife of William Dereby, quitclaimed all her dower right – a moiety of fifty-
four-acres of land in Stalisfield – to Reynold de Cornhull, who in return would give her 
four seams of grain, one seam of wheat and one seam of barley at Michaelmas and two 
seams of barley at Easter every year of her life.707 In the same year, a widow, Emma, 
quitclaimed her dower to an opponent, in return for which she would receive £21 10s 
                                                
706 Mitchell, Portraits of Medieval Women, 36. Mitchell also has a brilliant exploration of the frustrating 
relationship between Maud de Lacy de Clare and her mother, Margaret de Quency, in chapter 2 of this 
book. She argued that Margaret treated her own daughter Maud with indifference and carelessness, which 
led to their depressing relationship. Maud carried these discouraging factors through to the relationship 
with her own children, especially with Gilbert, who was more than disgruntled with his mother’s 
excessive dower.   
707 Calendar of Kent Feet of Fines, ed. Churchill and others, 141.   
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every year until her death. Moreover, she was to have four ells of dyed cloth, each ell 
being worth 2s, for a mantle furred with lamb every year at Michaelmas for the rest of 
her life.708  
      Why were widows willing to quitclaim their dower right if it was so essential for 
the rest of their lives? Most dower in the thirteenth century consisted of real estate, so 
it can be inferred that exchange of land for cash, food or other supplements was a good 
deal for them, especially for those who had neither sons nor recourse to other labourers, 
such as male tenants, to cultivate and manage their lands. Ploughing fields was men’s 
work, and pre-fourteenth-century English women were mainly engaged in spinning, 
brewing and milking.709 As Mate points out in Women in Medieval Society, apart from 
their child-care duties and housework, thirteen-century English women also worked in 
the fields, and undertook milking, shearing, reaping, and raising pigs and poultry.710 
However, some work remained exclusively male, that of the ploughmen, shepherds, 
carters and pigmen.711 A woman who did most domestic jobs might find herself taking 
up her late husband’s work in the lands and fields after his death.  
      The anxiety arising from the lack of male labour is evident in the lives of villeins. 
If a villein’s widow had not remarried within a few months of her husband’s death, she 
would be commanded by the lord to choose a husband. If she refused, a bailiff, or reeve 
would choose a man for her.712 A salient feature of society, therefore, was complete 
reliance on the availability of male labour, for fear that land would go to waste. 
Obtaining land by dower brought no advantage to a widow if she could not work it, and 
quitclaiming dower land in exchange for cash, food or commodities became a popular 
choice, as long as the land had been well maintained up to the time of its inheritance. 
Even in instances where remarried widows were able to obtain labourers, quitclaiming 
was commonly agreed with opponents. The same preference also applied to higher-
status women, who had never worked on the land but had lived instead on tenants’ 
rents.713  
 
                                                
708 Ibid., 145.    
709 Mavis E. Mate, Women in Medieval English Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 14, 28, 39-40. 
710 However, occupations open to women after the Black Death changed considerably. They were 
recruited to activities which had been done by men before the Black Death. Ibid., 27-31.		
711 Ibid., 28.  
712 Dyer, Standards of Living in the Later Middle Ages, 109-150.  
713 See, for example, Calendar of Kent Feet of Fines, ed. Churchill and others, 83.  
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5.9.5 The difference between urban widows and rural widows       
      Was there a difference between what urban widows and rural widows claimed? 
London, the biggest city in medieval England, developed a very different custom from 
other places. In that city, a widow derived more profit from movable property since 
much of her husband’s property was likely to have been in chattels and goods. She 
could also utilise goods and chattels more easily than landed property, for example 
through investments and bequests.714 The situation in other towns and cities was more 
varied.  
      In Kent, as recorded in the Calendar of Kent Feet of Fines, cash, as well as grains 
or cloth, was more likely to be exchanged for a widow’s quitclaimed dower land. In 
England’s fifth largest city, Lincoln, there are eight cases concerning widows 
quitclaiming their dower in Final Concords of the County of Lincoln from the Feet of 
Fines, AD. 1244-1272, and all of them show that widows either obtained cash, or 
enjoyed some lifelong rights to certain lands that were not in the name of dower.715 
Unlike the cases in Kent, the Lincoln records tell a rather monotonous story about what 
widows would exchange for their dower. Similarly, in the records for Norfolk and 
Suffolk, twenty-six cases clearly state that the final concords contain quitclaims of 
dower. All suggest that the widows received cash in return.716 Why were cash and 
commodities considered such an attractive replacement for dower by widows? One 
possibility is that some women had reached a later stage in their life-cycle when they 
became widows, and consequently working the land themselves would have been an 
impractical option. Some women, of course, became widows at a young age, so working 
on the land would not have been so difficult for them, but it is also possible that they 
had young children to raise and cash could serve as a faster and more immediate method 
for easing their financial need.  
                                                
714 Legitim, obtaining the third part of the husband’s goods and chattels, played an important role which 
could not be found in most other cities. Parliament denied legitim in common law, but according to the 
custom of London, claims to legitim persisted until 1725. Leyser, Medieval Women, 176-177.  
715 Final Concords of the Country of Lincoln from the Feet of Fines Preserved in the Public Records 
Office, A.D. 1244-1272, ed. C. W. Foster, vol. 2 (Horncastle: Lincoln Record Society, 1920), n. 6, n. 12, 
n. 25, n. 29, n. 43, n. 71, n. 89, n. 121.  
716 Feet of Fines for the County of Norfolk for the Reign of King John, 1201-1215; for the County of 
Suffolk for the Reign of King John, 1199-1214, ed. Barbara Dodwell (London: Pipe Roll Society, 1958), 
n. 39, n. 40, n. 41, n. 76, n. 97, n. 111, n. 112, n. 169, n. 171, n. 176, n. 202, n. 239, n. 258, n. 263, n. 278, 
n3. 02, n. 349, n. 387, n. 413, n. 431, n. 448, n. 469, n. 488, n. 551, n. 552, n. 555.  
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      All these records correspond with the argument put forward above that, for a widow, 
relinquishing dower did not always bring disadvantages. Instead, these agreements 
show that widows’ positions became more flexible. Having land as dower was no 
longer a necessity, since it had been replaced by the ability to obtain something much 
more useful, such as a regular cash income for the rest of their lives.  
       In summary, for widows, quitclaiming dower was not equivalent to losing their 
dower. Instead, it gave them an incentive to acquire for what they, or their families, 
needed for the rest of their lives. Quitclaiming an inheritance or maritagium did not 
happen as frequently as quitclaiming dower, which suggests that women used dower as 
a springboard for further agreements – it helped them to survive widowhood and 
brought advantages for their families. Through examining the agreements made by 
widows for quitclaiming dower, this study has found that each case contained different 
kinds of arrangement. Some asked for cash, some for food and others for various 
alternative needs to be met. Quitclaiming dower opened up other opportunities because 
women were able to act more flexibly to negotiate concords, and to request specific 
items that they needed.717  
  
5.10 English widows’ legal status and powerful widowed heiresses  
      Janet Senderowitz Loengard suggested that dower was not an abstract right but a 
family affair.718 Likewise, Sue Sheridan Walker regarded dower as an essential element 
in the reconstitution of the family because it provided land for children who did not 
inherit whilst also serving as a means to maintain widows.719 Why were widows so 
special compared to other women? Jennifer Ward mentions that when a woman became 
a widow she became entitled to make and take independent decisions and actions. 
Moreover, she no longer fell under the control of either her father or her husband.720 
The concept of femme sole emerged after the fourteenth century in England, later than 
the period covered by this research. However, by investigating dower cases in the 
thirteenth century, it is possible to see how the rights of dower changed over a single 
century, until the concept of femme sole was introduced at the beginning of the next. 
                                                
717 Such cases can be found in Calendar of Kent Feet of Fines, ed. Churchill and others, 83, 101, 107, 
116, 151, 240.    
718 Loengard, “‘Of the Gift of her Husband,’ 215-255. 
719 Walker, ‘Litigation as Personal Quest,’ 81-108 
720 Ward, Woman of the English Nobility and Gentry 1066-1500, 6, 19.  
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The remainder of this chapter will explore the development of a widow’s legal status 
during that period. 
Femme sole referred to women who had both economic and legal status. Widows, 
single women and women whose marriages had been annulled could all be described 
as femmes sole. According to Marjorie K. McIntosh, the concept of femme sole began 
in London, as well as in some parts of continental Europe, around 1300 and was used 
to describe a married woman who, to some extent, had independence from her husband, 
for example running her own business. Initially, only married women were entitled to 
be considered as femmes sole because single women and widows already enjoyed the 
same social status as men.721 However, in recent scholarship, femme sole could also be 
used to describe a woman’s independence in court. Hence, the following section will 
use this concept to examine women’s agency in court.  
 A widow appearing in court in the thirteenth century sometimes found herself 
defined as both widowed and married at the same time. Once women remarried, they 
lost their independence and the legal status of femme sole.  
In 1203, Euticia, who had been Gervase’s wife, claimed against the abbot of 
Notley through her son, Robert, for her reasonable dower, namely, one virgate of land 
with appurtenances in Winchendon. Ralph, the abbot’s attorney, stated that Euticia had 
a husband and would therefore not respond without him being present.722 Refusing to 
answer a widow who did not attend court with her new husband was a strategy used by 
counterparties to delay proceedings and earn more time to devise a better argument.  
      Almost a century later, in 1292, when one Alice brought a dower claim to court, 
Lowther, a legal practitioner, pointed out women’s subordinate status as follows: 
Sir, we see how a man can give a great advantage to his wife where the wife 
can give no advantage to him. For peradventure she may give to him all that 
she has, for we see that the husband may enfeoff another man, which other 
may enfeoff the wife if he take a fancy to advance the wife.723 
This passage shows how contemporaries regarded women’s legal status. From a legal 
perspective, women gave no advantage to men because they had no power to enfeoff 
them. This was because most women’s property was rooted in their husbands. This 
                                                
721 Marjorie K. McIntosh, ‘The Benefits and Drawbacks of Femme Sole Status in England, 1300 -1630,’ 
The Journal of British Studies, 44.3 (2005), 410-438.    
722	CRR, vol. 2, 87. 
723 Year Book of the Reign of King Edward I, ed. Horwood, vol. 1, 142.  
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concept is also evidenced in 1294 when a woman brought a dower case to court, and a 
legal practitioner stated that ‘if her husband survived he will have the whole; it is as 
much her husband’s right as her right’.724 Although the couple were joint feoffees of 
the property, it was stated that a wife’s present husband enjoyed the same right to her 
dower as her late husband. This had a number of effects for a woman: (i) if her husband 
had not died seised of the land containing her dower, she could not claim it; (ii) if she 
did not have a valid marriage, she lost her dower; (iii) if she was not endowed at the 
church door by her husband, she was not eligible for her dower; (iv) if her husband 
wished to make an action on his lands which would harm her dower right, she should 
obey him. 
      The extent of the obstacles preventing a widow from obtaining her dower reveal her 
subordinate legal status. Paul Brand questioned in his essay, ‘“Deserving” and 
“Undeserving” Wives: Earning and Forfeiting Dower in Medieval England’, whether a 
widow’s entitlement to dower was wholly automatic. 725  In order to meet various 
requirements in common law, widows had to earn their dower right in court, which, on 
the one hand, allowed them to enact their legal rights, but, on the other, revealed their 
subordinate legal status in thirteenth-century England – and, of course, for many 
hundreds of years thereafter.  
      A widow’s subordinate legal status, however, does not appear to have diminished 
her ability to manage property or her attractiveness to men, especially if she were a 
widowed heiress who had access to dower and inheritance. Widowed noble heiresses 
have been extensively studied by several scholars, such as Mavis E. Mate, Linda E. 
Mitchell and Louise J. Wilkinson, because they were so powerful, not only in wealth 
but also politically. In the following section I will discuss two prominent thirteenth-
century widowed heiresses, Isabel de Forz and Margaret de Quency, in order to 
demonstrate how this group of women used inheritance and dower to their own ends.726 
 
 
                                                
724 Year Book of the Reign of King Edward I, ed. Horwood, vol. 2, 342.  
725 Brand, ‘“Deserving” and “Undeserving” Wives: Earning and Forfeiting Dower in Medieval England,’ 
1-20. 
726 For a detailed discussion of Isabel de Forz and Margaret de Quency, see Wilkinson, Women in 
Thirteenth-Century Lincolnshire, 44-66. Mavis E. Mate, ‘Profit and Productivity on the Estates of Isabel 
de Forz (1260-92),’ Economic Historical Review, 33 (1980), 326-334; Mitchell, Portraits of Medieval 
Women, 29-42;  
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5.10.1 Isabel de Forz (c. 1237-1293) 
      Isabel de Forz is known for her long widowhood and ample property, which even 
attracted the attention of King Edward I. Isabel was Countess of Devon and Countess 
of Aumale and the elder daughter of Amicia (d. 1284) and Baldwin de Revières, Earl 
of Devon (d. 1245). She became the second wife of William de Forz (or de Fortibus), 
Count of Aumale (d. 1260), when she was still eleven or twelve years old. The de Forz 
lands lay in three blocks based on Holderness and Skipton in Yorkshire, and 
Cockermouth in Cumberland.727  
      When William de Forz died, his and Isabel’s children were all under age, thus the 
wardship of the heirs and estates passed to the king. Countess Isabel was granted her 
dower lands, namely, a third of Holderness and half the Barony of Cockermouth 
including the castle, and the custody (but not the marriage) of her sons Thomas and 
William. The remaining two-thirds of the estates and the marriage of the heir were 
granted to Lord Edward (later King Edward I). In 1266 her brother, Baldwin de 
Revières, died, and she became the heir of the Revières family. She was admitted to  
Baldwin’s lands in Devon, Hampshire, the Isle of Wight, and Harewood in Yorkshire, 
which made her one of the richest widowed heiresses in England. As the heir, she also 
took over the obligation of assigning the dower rights of Baldwin’s widow and his 
mother Amicia.728  
      After Isabel had obtained the dower land and her brother’s inheritance, her annual 
income increased to around £200 a year. However, were it not for her outstanding 
ability to manage such great amounts of land, her wealth would soon have dissipated. 
Mavis E. Mate examined all the land she held during her lifetime and how she profited 
from it. Like most landowners at that time Isabel exploited her tenants by increasing 
money-rents, tallages729 and entry-fines and benefited from the growing demand for 
                                                
727 ‘ODNB,’ accessed on 15 June 2017, http://0-
www.oxforddnb.com.catalogue.libraries.london.ac.uk/view/articleHL/47209?docPos=2&anchor=matc
h  
728 Ibid.		
729 Originally, it was a tax which was levied by the Norman and early Angevin kings on the towns and 
demesne lands of the Crown. It also refers to a tax levied on tenants by their lords. See ‘OED’ accessed 
on 26 August 2018, http://0-
www.oed.com.catalogue.libraries.london.ac.uk/view/Entry/197267?rskey=LUsUyz&result=1&isAdva
nced=false#eid  
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pasture and the charging of fees for the agistment730 of animals in her forests and parks. 
Moreover, she tallaged most of her manors every year and raised necessary funds when 
times were hard, although this money only formed a small part of her income, the bulk 
of which came from the sale of wool and grain.731  
      Due to a rise in wool prices, by 1277 the Holderness estate profits were about a 
quarter of her total income. Grain sales doubled and tripled in the 1280s and her reeves 
improved the fertility of her lands. Mate believes that Isabel’s success was largely due 
to her own efforts, although a rising national economy also played its part. She showed 
great flexibility by focusing on wool, pasture, or grain, as circumstances demanded. For 
instance, in the Isle of Wight she had legumes planted in thirty-nine acres of land in 
order to support more stock. She also shrewdly decided not to increase either the area 
under legumes or her animal numbers because the soil on her Midlands manors was 
already producing adequate yields.732 
      Her extreme wealth brought some disadvantages. Unsurprisingly, she attracted 
numerous suitors. Both the younger Simon de Montfort (c. 1240-1271), and Edmund 
Crouchback (c. 1245-1296), First Earl of Lancaster, had acquired marriage licences, 
although she rejected both. Indeed, Simon de Montfort pursued her and even tried to 
abduct her, which forced her to hide in Breamore Priory, Hampshire, and later in Wales. 
She eventually married her own daughter, Aveline, to Edmund Crouchback. Although 
Isabel remained a strong and successful widow she never had an heir who survived her, 
outliving all six of her children. When her last heiress, Aveline, died in 1274, she faced 
another threat to her lands, from King Edward I himself.733  
      Edward had always coveted Isabel’s land. Twice she had refused to sell her vast 
southern estates to him, and in 1281, she even won a case against him in court over 
control of the Isle of Wight. In 1293, she became seriously ill while travelling from 
Canterbury, and while she lay dying at her manor in Stockwell, London, King Edward 
I’s emissaries rushed to her bedside to persuade her to sell him the Isle of Wight. 
Numerous noblemen also craved her wealth, but it was only on her death-bed that she 
finally succumbed to the greatest pressure of all, from the king of England himself. The 
                                                
730 ‘A rate levied on or profit made from the pasturing of another person’s chattels.’ ‘OED,’ accessed 
on 26 August 2018, http://0-
www.oed.com.catalogue.libraries.london.ac.uk/view/Entry/4000?redirectedFrom=agistment#eid  
731 Mate, ‘Profit and Productivity on the Estates of Isabel de Forz (1260-92),’ 326-334.  
732 Ibid.  
733 Ibid.		
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charters were recorded in the Red Book of Exchequer, and although its veracity has been 
questioned by most historians, in this instance it illustrates the vulnerability of even the 
most politically powerful and strong-minded of widowed heiresses.734  
       
5.10.2 Margaret de Quency (c. 1206-1266) 
      Another exceptionally powerful widowed heiress was Margaret de Quency, the sole 
heiress of Robert de Quency (d. 1217), the eldest son of the Earl of Winchester, and 
Hawise, sister of Ranulph de Blundeville (c. 1147-1181), Earl of Chester. She inherited 
the earldom of Chester once her mother died in 1243. Likewise, her husband, John de 
Lacy (c. 1192-1240) had died earlier in 1240 leaving Margaret a third of his property.735 
Her new-found wealth made her extremely attractive to potential suitors and she had 
no difficulty finding her next husband, Walter Marshal, Earl of Pembroke (c. 1196-
1245) in 1242. Walter died only three years later leaving Margaret once again widowed, 
albeit with a large dower. She had a reasonable third of the Marshal estate, whose 
enormous inheritance fell on thirteen co-heirs, although what Margaret received, by law, 
outweighed any of them.736  
      Margaret’s share outweighed that of any of the thirteen heirs and she pursued her 
reasonable third in court. During the lengthy and complicated dower litigation she 
forced the Ferrers sisters, seven of the thirteen co-heirs, to give up most of their land, 
which caused Richard de Clare (c. 1222-1262), Margaret’s son-in-law, and also one of 
the co-heirs, to compensate them for what they lost for Margaret’s dower. Margaret’s 
suit had a veritable domino effect because, according to Linda E. Mitchell, the tough 
task of compensating the Ferrers sisters exacerbated an already fraught relationship 
between Margaret and her daughter, Maud.737 A closer look at the case reveals that 
Margaret had not been the only widow entitled to the dower. Two other widows, 
Eleanor de Montfort (c. 1215-1275) and Matilda de Bohun (d.1252), also had a share 
in the Marshal inheritance. However, according to the king’s order the dower Margaret 
received was far more than Eleanor and Matilda, which meant that she was one of the 
                                                
734 She did not have close relatives, so was probably easy to persuade. ‘ODNB,’ accessed on 15 June 
2017, http://0-
www.oxforddnb.com.catalogue.libraries.london.ac.uk/view/articleHL/47209?docPos=2&anchor=matc
h 
735 According to Wilkinson, Women in Thirteenth-Century Lincolnshire, 47, her dower from John was 
approximately £315 per annum.  
736 Mitchell, Portraits of Medieval Women, 29-42.  
737 Ibid.  
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wealthiest women in thirteenth-century England. Furthermore, due to the legal 
requirement for co-heiresses to divide their inheritance equally amongst themselves, 
Margaret’s dower also dwarfed the lands of the co-heirs: ‘the more co-heirs there were, 
the smaller share they could have’. This phenomenon was well illustrated in Margaret’s 
case, although the thirteen co-heirs were not all female, male heirs were outnumbered 
ten to three. In order to meet Margaret’s share of the dower, the king disinherited the 
Ferrers sisters from their property in County Kildare, Ireland, and consequently the 
sisters sought compensation from Richard de Clare.738  
      When Margaret set herself against the weaker co-heiresses she made a clean sweep. 
Not only had her political importance to the king helped her case, but also the 
architecture of the law had aided her accumulation of vast wealth. Combined with her 
inheritance and dower from John de Lacy, this made her very wealthy indeed. 
Undeniably, one-third of the property was a generous allotment for widows, because 
unless there was only one heir to inherit the other two thirds, more than two heirs could 
not hope to obtain as much as a widow.739  Although I have already discussed in this 
chapter the clash of interests between widows and heirs, the conflicts between Margaret 
and the co-heirs in relation to the Marshal estate overshadowed all other cases in the 
thirteenth century. However, it must be borne in mind that Margaret was a noblewoman 
armed not only with extensive wealth, but also with profound political intuition. No 
ordinary woman would ever be in such a position. Nevertheless, Margaret’s case 
demonstrated that when a wealthy, resourceful and influential widowed heiress’s 
manoeuvres were supported both by the law and by the king, she could easily gain the 
advantage.  
      Isabel de Forz and Margaret de Quency were the embodiments of the kind of power 
and influence that noble widowed heiresses could wield and were undeniably two 
towering female figures in thirteenth-century England. Interestingly, they had very 
similar marriage patterns: they were both widowed twice; they both suddenly became 
heiresses to excessive inheritances; they both accumulated enormous wealth, mostly 
from dower emanating from their second marriages; and they both demonstrated 
outstanding abilities in managing estates. Isabel’s case clearly shows the risk of being 
                                                
738 Wilkinson, Women in Thirteenth-Century Lincolnshire, 54-55.  
739 If there are two co-heirs, each could have one third of the inheritance, which was as much as a widow 
was entitled to. However, if the dead husband left three co-heirs, the share that each co-heir could obtain 
was less than that available to a widow.  
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a wealthy widowed heiress. Whilst her wealth attracted many suitors, it also led to an 
attempted abduction by an unscrupulous man and aroused a king’s covetousness, which 
led him to use every means to divest her of her property.  
      Margaret, on the other hand, made the most of an already prominent position during 
her second widowhood through the pursuance of her dower. Embodying all the 
advantages a widow and an heiress could possibly have, she fought and defeated 
thirteen co-heirs in court. She showed that when a noblewoman was in pursuit of a 
colossal inheritance and dower she could be invincible. However, she would not have 
been able to accomplish what she did without the architecture of the law, which 
conferred on her the right to one-third of her late husband’s property and aided her case 
against the heirs. Whilst we might marvel at the wealth a widowed heiress could acquire, 
it is easy to forget she had a whole legal system behind her. That is why widowed noble 
heiresses were the most powerful group of women in thirteenth-century England.740  
  
5.11 Conclusion  
      In thirteenth-century England, both common law and the regulations concerning 
dower underwent a gradual change. The 1225 Magna Carta, the Statute of Merton, the 
Statute of Gloucester and the Statute of Westminster II were all interwoven with the 
common law, forming a complex network that aided women to forge some agency from 
the scant civil liberties afforded to them. Through the case studies described, a 
comprehensive picture of the specific relationships between widows and their dower 
has emerged. Thirteenth-century widows were not automatically entitled to dower, 
since many were seen, as Paul Brand suggests, as ‘undeserving widows’ and many 
struggled to obtain their dues. The gap between the actual law and what happened in 
court reveals that obtaining dower was not a simple matter, since the courts had to take 
into account not only common law and all the additional regulations, but also local 
customs.  
                                                
740 Margaret’s outstanding talent for estate management is discussed in detail in Wilkinson, Women in 
Thirteenth-Century Lincolnshire, 47-49. According to Wilkinson, she was praised and represented in 
Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln’s, Les Reules Seynt Roberd, a treatise on the management of estate 
and household. Wilkinson suggests that Margaret acquired her ability to manage property and household 
during her first marriage to John de Lacy. Due to John’s long absence from home, Margaret dedicated 
more time to estate management. Her first intervention shown in the court record dates from 1226, when 
she appointed Hugh de Munhaut to be her attorney instead of her husband, John de Lacy, against Roger 
Martel.  
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      The right of dower depended on husbands. This is true for all four requirements 
needed to acquire dower in Glanvill, (i) that he should be a free man; (ii) he should 
endow his wife at the church door; (iii) the property he endows should be his free 
tenement; and (iv) he must be seised in demesne at the time of the marriage. Widows 
also had to tackle disgruntled heirs who were reluctant to assign them dower.  
      The increasing use and jurisdiction of both the 1225 Magna Carta and the Statute 
of Westminster II diminished the authority of texts such as Glanvill and Bracton. For 
instance, by the end of the thirteenth century, ‘being endowed at the church door’, as 
instructed in Glanvill, was rarely deemed a normal requirement for claiming dower; 
instead, a widow could claim dower from lands held by her husband at any point in the 
marriage. After the death of her husband a widow had a legal right to recover alienated 
dower land. Consequently, widows in the thirteenth century enjoyed rights that widows 
in the twelfth century did not.  
      It is obvious, therefore, that the law had been evolving to protect a widow’s dower 
right. Increasingly, widows would not be excluded from claiming dower from another 
man in a writ of unde nichil habet, and were entitled to recover their dower if a husband 
defaulted. The case outlined on p.185 shows that the court even shortened the 
postponement of litigation because a widow ‘nichil habet non dote’. Not only could the 
court be flexible, so too could be the claims made by widows and their representatives. 
For instance, as mentioned on p.174 and p.175, when one Maud failed to claim her 
nominated dower, she turned to her common law dower as an alternative. By examining 
different cases, this chapter has shown how varied dower cases could be, illustrating 
numerous difficulties widows faced in practice, no matter how simple obtaining dower 
should have been in theory. 
      The large number of dower case examined for the purpose of this study offered an 
important insight into how women acted independently in the courts, to the point where 
they did not necessarily need a man to be present. As Jennifer Ward stated, dower was 
the only area in which women could obtain independence. In my opinion, however, 
medieval English women were never truly independent, either legally or socially, since 
a large number of women still came to court with their second husbands to demand 
dower. Rather, what we see is ‘a conjugal couple as unit’ where we cannot distinguish 
whose voice was louder in the litigation. When widows remarried, they lost femme sole. 
Only on entering widowhood were women afforded greater powers to dispose of their 
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property independently, in particular their inheritance and maritagium. A woman’s 
dower was only awarded as a mere life interest, and every legal action she made affected 
an heir’s future, or more specifically, might cause family disputes and provoke the 
heir’s objection. To cap all this, disgruntled heirs in particular, who resented long-lived 
widows for retaining dower land, barred them from obtaining it without delay, as the 
dower litigation between Maud de Braose and Roger suggests.  
      Bracton stated that a widow’s role was ‘to attend to nothing except for the care of 
her house and the rearing and education of her children.’741 This concept summed up 
the status of medieval women. Such subservience affected how they were regarded in 
relation to family property, and their stories of struggling litter court records pertaining 
to dower. In this regard, I am more than happy to subscribe to Janet Senderowitz 
Loengard’s statement that ‘dower was not an abstract right but a family affair’.742 So, 
although dower played a significant role in a woman’s widowhood, it did not amount 
only to women’s business but it was also very much the family’s business.  
      Dower was as important to widows as to heirs, and therefore the disputes that 
ensued often turned mothers against their sons or daughters, making them into rivals, 
and sometimes even drawing them into full-scale dower wars in court. Since dower was 
also part of an heir’s inheritance, it was common to see a son managing his mother’s 
dower while she was still alive to boost the family’s interests. On these grounds, also, 
I suggest that dower was not merely women’s business but a family’s business.  
      Regarding the difference between inheritance, maritagium and dower, dower stands 
out due to its unique features. Dower was a right that a wife could only obtain as a life 
interest after the death of her husband. It was also the only derivative right dependent 
on a woman’s husband, whereas inheritance and maritagium were derived from the 
bride’s family.743 Therefore, although dower was a woman’s right, it was still linked to 
and dependent on men to administer. It was the most heavily contested charge in court, 
and the number of dower entries in the CP 40s significantly outnumbers those involving 
inheritance and maritagium, which were supposed to be absolute rights, and the rights 
they were able to be seised of in fee.744 In the thirteenth century, maritagium, especially 
                                                
741 Bracton, vol. 2, 281.  
742 Loengard, “‘Of the Gift of her Husband,’ 215-255. 
743 As I mentioned in chapter 4, although maritagium was initially granted by the groom’s family, this 
situation was rather rare in thirteenth-century England.  
744 When a woman claimed either her inheritance or maritagium, it was usually recorded as ‘ius suum’, 
which means her fee simple right in an estate. Therefore, it is hard to distinguish whether it was her 
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after De Donis, was conditional on the heir having been begotten by the wife and the 
husband, but it was still regarded as wives’ property rather than a derivative right. All 
the legal documents examined in the course of this study show a relatively small 
number of women going to court to seek their maritagia or inheritance because, I 
suggest, these had been disposed of by their husbands either for the benefit of the 
families or by their own ‘wilful’ action. Consequently, once married, the wife’s grip on 
her own inheritance and maritagium loosened and her opinion on how to dispose of 
them was limited to either agreeing or disagreeing with her husbands’ decisions.  
      Dower, on the contrary, could only be accessed in widowhood, which ruled out the 
threat of alienation by the husband. From this point onwards, a woman enjoyed almost 
full control of the property. (I say ‘almost’ because dower was technically the heir’s 
inheritance, rather than her own. The widow therefore had an obligation to take good 
care of it in order not to harm the heir’s right.) The 1225 Magna Carta, the Statute of 
Merton, and the Statute of Westminster II seemed to enshrine legislation that 
guaranteed a widow’s dower right. However, a mere glimpse at dower cases shows 
there to be a gap between what the law intended and what actually happened in practice, 
since the records give a detailed insight into the various obstacles women faced in 
obtaining their dower, with or without the help of their husbands and attorneys. We 
know, however, that these women were not afraid of confronting their opponents in 
order to pursue their property rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
inheritance or maritagium. The availability of detailed arguments would reveal which one it was, but 
most often it is not declared.  
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  Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
Bride, heiress and widow are all terms used to describe a woman’s legal and social 
status at various stage of her life. In terms of inheritance these not only delineate a 
specific identity, they also indicate the type of property a woman was looking to acquire. 
Some women fell into all these categories, while others could claim none of them. From 
heiress to widow, a woman might constantly have changed her role from womb to tomb, 
maintaining different identities for different roles. While her life hinged on her family 
and her husband, she was seldom the lead character in the household for it was the 
husband, as paterfamilias, who was almost invariably the head of the house. Despite 
their subservient role, medieval women were, in fact, highly visible. A glimpse at 
contemporary legal records reveals the surprising fact that women were frequently 
engaged in litigation. While medieval women did not go to common law courts as often 
as men, but they were just as likely to be involved in litigation, mostly in cases 
concerned with lands, including hereditas, maritagia and dos. By juxtaposing these 
three types of property rights, it is possible not only to draw out the differences between 
them, but also to gain a clear view of how women’s property rights developed during 
the thirteenth century.  
      So, what was the difference between thirteenth-century English women and twelfth-
century English women in terms of property rights? According to Glanvill, twelfth-
century heiresses enjoyed the same right of inheritance as thirteenth-century women – 
daughters should equally divide their father’s inheritance if there was no male heir.745 
When a daughter married, Glanvill articulated that she could be given a piece of land 
from her father as maritagium.746 Her right to maritagium remained the same in the 
thirteenth century, but from the end of the thirteenth century onwards, maritagium was 
gradually replaced by jointure, making marriage portions in cash more prevalent than 
those in land. Women in neither the twelfth nor the thirteenth centuries had control over 
their inheritances and maritagia during the marriage, and when they were widowed, 
they might need to pay a fine to recover their own lands.  
      However, after the 1215 Magna Carta, a widow did not need to pay a fine to have 
her inheritance, maritagium and dower. Moreover, she could claim her dower from the 
                                                
745 Glanvill, 76. 
746 Glanvill, 69. 
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land that her late husband held during the marriage, even if that land had been alienated 
to others (provided that she did not consent to the alienation). Women in the thirteenth 
century enjoyed a more generous right of dower, because women in the twelfth century 
could only claim their common law dower from the land which their husbands held on 
the day of the marriage. After Magna Carta, women were able to claim dower from the 
land which their husbands held during the marriage. If women’s dower right was a leap 
forward, then their control of maritagia was a step backwards, as De Donis limited 
women’s ability to alienate their maritagia. Specifically, it laid down that neither during 
the marriage nor in widowhood could women alienate their maritagia, and maritagia 
should either descend to their children or revert to the donors. The most salient changes 
between the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries were due to the influences of newly-
enacted statutes.  
      None of these changes could have been observed if it was not for the preservation 
of court records from the end of the twelfth century. Thirteenth-century England marks 
a pivotal moment for the development of English common law. Although neither the 
legal procedures nor, indeed, the legal profession were as yet well established, the 
nature of the law was gradually changing. Interwoven with newly enacted statutes, the 
common law, mainly as it appears in Glanvill and Bracton, together with the various 
local customs, created a burgeoning and complex legal system, which frequently 
confused litigants. At the same time, it meant that uncertainty about their rights led 
people to go to court, and this gave rise to a high degree flexibility in matters of 
litigation.  
      The thirteenth century was a primitive era without an efficient means to circulate 
information, and certainly one without a common knowledge of the law as we have 
nowadays. Therefore, the new legislation did not create certainty regarding the 
development of property rights, since the new statutes tended to produce ambiguities. 
To make things even more complex, the role of ongoing local customs compounded the 
legal uncertainty. For instance, when a Winchester widow demanded an inheritance 
that had been alienated by her husband, she might have been disappointed to find that 
Winchester customs allowed husbands to alienate their wives’ inheritance, maritagia 
and dower whenever they needed to. In Nottingham, the local customs similarly placed 
women at a disadvantage. It set out that, if a wife received money for alienating her 
property, even if the alienation was done by her husband, she could not recover her 
		
	
231	
property after her husband died. To counter the frequent clashes between the common 
law and local customs, the court usually summoned a jury to confirm the customs, 
allowing them to outweigh the common law. In consequence, some women were ruled 
out from the protection which the common law conferred on others, causing them to 
lose their property. Female litigants were sometimes faced with conundrums that the 
law had created, but more often than not, they took advantage of the still-developing 
law, with all its flaws, to fight for their property rights. For instance, the Statutum 
Decretum dictated that the pattern of female succession changed from a sole heiress 
inheriting to all daughters dividing the inheritance, and in the subsequent uncertainty 
about inheritance rights, daughters were encouraged to go to court, often with their 
husbands. Likewise, the discrepancy in the standard of demanding dower between 
Glanvill and the 1225 Magna Carta 1225, specifically that a widow could claim her 
common law dower share from any land her husband held in free tenements at any point 
during the marriage, encouraged widows and their representatives to use a variety of 
tactics to obtain dower. The ongoing development of the law inadvertently gave the 
litigants and their legal practitioners more options or loopholes to fight for their rights. 
      Women’s experiences affected legislation as much as the legislation affected them. 
In the Year Books, legal practitioners noted various issues that arose over dower and 
the alienation of maritagium, and this resulted in the enactment of De Donis. Thus, 
while the new legislation was slowly influencing women’s property rights, women were 
in return being compelled to turn to the courts in order to protect their rights. It is 
therefore important to analyse what happened in the courts in order to understand the 
reciprocal influences between women and the law. Numerous important developments 
concerning inheritance, maritagium and dower should be emphasized here: (i) the shift 
of female succession from one daughter inheriting to all daughters equally inheriting; 
(ii) the limits on alienating maritagium after De Donis; (iii) the more generous 
conditions of claiming dower, i.e., a widow could claim a third of any land of which 
her late husband had been seised rather than the land of which he died seised; and (iv) 
the rise of jointures, which replaced maritagium, indicating a move towards replacing 
land with money.  
      All of these changes and developments cannot be fully understood without case 
studies, which also reveal the law’s protection of women and legal practitioners’ efforts 
to fight for women’s property rights. The importance of legal practitioners cannot be 
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overemphasized. They contributed considerably not only to the development of 
inheritance, maritagium and dower, but also to the enhancement of women’s legal 
status. For instance, as mentioned in Chapter 4, some legal practitioners and judges 
refused to make a final judgment without the female litigant being present, considering 
it unfair to women, and declared that the Statute required a woman’s physical presence 
in court in order not to ‘do her wrong’. Furthermore, the law decreed that only when 
women had agreed to the alienation of their land and dower could the alienation be 
executed. However, this protection became an argument used frequently by women’s 
opponents in court, who often insisted that the widows had agreed to the alienation, 
which was often hard to prove. The protection that the law bestowed on women acted 
as a double-edged sword. Unless the final fine had been levied, it was hard to tell which 
party was lying. Levying a fine was a legal device designed to protect the stability of a 
transaction and women’s property rights. When levying a fine for a land transaction, 
the law demanded that the court examine a wife separately to verify that she was indeed 
willing to alienate the land and was not being coerced. However, even in the king’s 
court, no woman was ever totally free of her husband’s control and she knew that sooner 
or later outside the court she would have to face her husband. Women were possibly 
threatened with domestic violence if they disagreed with their husbands’ legal actions 
on their property rights, and that was a reason enough to comply. As demonstrated on 
p. 144 of this study, Maud de Clare argued that she could not gainsay her husband’s 
decision to transfer her maritagium to Isabel de Forz, even when she had been examined 
separately in court.  
      Of the many varied case studies consulted, well-preserved court records made 
women and their activities more visible than ever before, enabling historians to 
reconstruct not only women’s agency in court, but also the extent of their control over 
their property rights in practice.747  
We could argue that women’s agency is self-evident in their litigations concerning 
maritagium, inheritance and dower because it demanded their physical presence in 
court. The traditional anthropological view divides society into the dichotomous public 
(male) and private (domestic, female) realms, arguing that women lacked a public life. 
                                                
747 In fact, the preservation of court records made all kinds of people more visible than before, and left 
more sources for historians to reconstruct their lives.  
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However, recent scholarship considers this to be inappropriate.748 Linda E. Mitchell, 
for instance, argues that it is incorrect to remove women from conversations about 
public life merely because they did not wield public power. She notes that there is a 
distinction between the two and, using court records, she challenges the notion in order 
to show numerous medieval English noble widows involved in litigation. This study 
subscribes to Mitchell’s opinion about women as visible in public, as can be seen from 
the numerous records and cases examined in this thesis.  
For instance, a case mentioned on page 199 demonstrates how women pushed back 
when necessary. It featured the case of a woman forced to represent herself in court 
after her husband and her attorney put together a ‘faint defence’ on her behalf, affecting 
her right. This case strongly shows women’s visibility in public life.  
Partible inheritance among daughters also brought women into public contexts, 
since it required siblings to cooperate with each other in order to resolve inheritance 
issues in court. Likewise, dower litigation made women more visible in court as the law 
required them to be the plaintiffs. However, when widows remarried they once again 
became subservient to men in the eyes of the law. Nevertheless, court records show 
how women devised and used different tactics to pursue their property rights. If a 
widow found she was not entitled to her specific dower, she turned to her common law 
dower. Another case shows how one woman insisted that the disputed land was her 
maritagium in order to make it her ‘ius suum’,749  which was an absolute right as 
opposed to just a life interest. Similarly, some co-heiresses claimed against each other 
in order to obtain their reasonable share.  
Legal mechanisms, such as adjournment, essoin, and default, influenced women’s 
agency. The sheer length of the process, with its constant disruptions, decreased 
people’s willingness to settle disputes in court. Instead, many of them, as I have shown 
in this study, withdrew from the courts and made an agreement in private. This also 
indicates that women’s agency can be found both in courts and in private. Therefore, 
even though many of cases are off-record, a woman’s ability to manage her property 
privately should also be factored into our considerations. A few cases suggest that 
resorting to the courts was not the only way women settled disputes. If private 
                                                
748 A few scholars support the traditional view, for example David Lockwood and Michael Mann. For 
more details, see Mitchell, ‘A Lady is a Lord,’ 71-79.  
749 For example, see CRR, vol. 9, 67-68. 
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agreements could also be reached, they were good methods for working out disputes, 
since they were less expensive and cut out the need to go to the courts.750 As mentioned, 
numerous widows were also willing to quitclaim their dower for more useful and 
practical items in return, which suggests that, as long as both parties agreed, more 
satisfactory terms might have been arrived at than would have been dictated by a 
judgment in court.751 
However, women’s agency was by no means uninhibited in medieval England. 
During a woman’s life, she was mostly under ‘someone’s cover’. When she was a 
daughter, she fell under the authority of her male relatives or her lord, and when she 
married, she was subservient to her husband. Consequently, she acted as ‘femme covert’ 
in court, that is, there was someone constantly speaking for her. Widowhood activated 
a woman’s agency and independence by bestowing on her the legal status of ‘femme 
sole’, which meant that she could represent herself in court, increasing her visibility. 
Only when she came to court alone, either as an unmarried woman or a widow, acting 
as ‘femme sole’ without the company of her husband, can we see her acting as a free 
agent, independently making her own choices. When she did come to court with her 
husband, how much agency did a woman really have? Court records simply tell us that 
she was involved in the litigation, and sometimes they reveal her opinions, but more 
often they do not show them. The records also reveal the conjugal couple as a ‘unit’ in 
court, which fits the notion of marriage in medieval England. What the records do not 
reveal is whether an argument was a woman’s opinon or that of her husband. She might 
have come to court simply because the law required her to do so, but her husband was 
the one who initiated the suit; or, the argument might have represented both their 
opinions, and was for their common benefit. Unfortunately, these truths cannot be 
discerned from the records. What we can say with confidence is that a woman’s 
involvement in litigation was influenced by many factors which limited her agency and 
her decision. 
      When discussing medieval women’s agency numerous factors should be taken into 
account, in particular families. The relationship between a woman and her family, for 
instance, often affected her agency in court. When she changed her status, she had 
                                                
750 For instance, Maud de Braose and her son, Roger, might have reached a private agreement after years-
of litigation.  
751 For the cases of widows quitclaiming dower, see pp. 215-16 of this study. 
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different concerns in relation to her property rights, all of which involved family 
interests. As I mentioned in the Introduction, chapter 7 and chapter 8 of the 1215 Magna 
Carta were the only chapters concerning women’s property rights, yet they are of great 
significance because they affected not only women’s rights but also those of men. For 
noble families who owned extensive estates, dower issues always affected more than 
one family. When Margaret de Quency claimed her dower against her co-heirs, it had 
serious implications that eventually lead to the disinheritance of the Ferrers sisters. 
Similarly, the case of Maud de Braose perfectly demonstrated the clash of inheritance 
rights with dower rights and damaged the relationship between the heir and the widow.  
The dynamics between a mother and an heir were dependent on the context of the 
land, ownership and transmission, and there was not a general rule that could be applied 
to every family. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, blood relations did not necessarily make 
the relationship harmonious, because the heir might consider the dower land that the 
widow held to be an encroachment on his or her inheritance. However, as I suggested, 
there were just as many encouraging cases as disappointing ones, cases demonstrating 
cooperation between heirs and widows, who made the benefits of dower not only last 
for the lifetime of the widow, but also extended to the lifetime of the heir. These 
different experiences prove that there was no general rule dictating what relationships 
between widows and heirs should be. Only one thing is certain – no matter what the 
relationship was between the heir and the widow, all such cases demonstrate that dower 
was not only a woman’s business but also a family’s business. 
      Dower litigation demonstrates the entanglement of women’s property rights and 
families’ property interests, and the same notion can be applied to maritagium. While 
Claire de Trafford believes maritagium was ‘women’s land’, I would like to challenge 
this notion by stating that maritagium was in fact family’s land and family’s business. 
As shown in the cases I examined, maritagium was frequently alienated during the 
marriage for the benefits of the family rather than being saved to be used as maritagium 
again. Also, in thirteenth-century England, there was no common understanding that 
maritagium should be kept for daughters to be used as maritagium again. When Claire 
de Trafford used the Wakebridge Chartulary to be an example of ‘recycled maritagium’ 
over four consecutive generations as being the longest chain on record, she may have 
taken the exception as the general rule, because there is only one charter related to 
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maritagium in the Wakebridge Chartulary, which is precisely the one she used.752 
Likewise, in the Chartulary of Healaugh Park, only one charter shows a mother 
granting her maritagium as maritagium to her daughter again, while of the six charters 
showing the grant of maritagium, only one suggests that it was repeatedly granted as 
maritagium, and two show widows granting their maritagia to others.753 Indeed, after 
De Donis, when limitations were placed on the alienation of maritagium in order to 
abide by the grantors’ wishes, maritagium was transformed into ‘the land of grantors 
and women’ – in other words, family business.  
      In an age where romantic love played a very minor role in marriage, property was 
a huge factor when it came to choosing marriage partners. A bride with an inheritance, 
or maritagium, was attractive to suitors, and the property she brought to marriage would 
not be solely hers, but hers and her husband’s. The wife’s influence on her property 
rights plummeted after marriage and only returned to its height in her widowhood. It 
may sound ironic that control could not be strong until her husband died. A general rule 
of inheritance was that when there was no the male issue, daughters would succeed – 
thus it is clear that women only stepped onto the stage and played leading characters in 
the absence of men. This was commonplace in medieval logic, and consequently it is 
impossible to discuss women without either putting them into the context of family or 
with their menfolk. Therefore, all three types of property rights that I examined in this 
study are either derived from men or specifically designed for women with the interests 
of men in mind. In the end women managed them not only for their own interests but 
also for their families’ interests. The main concerns regarding property point to men, 
families and heirs. However, this has study discovered that real life was rather different 
from the picture suggested by the law. 
      In reviewing numerous court records it became evident that most women who came 
to court were referred to as someone’s wife or ex-wife. Seldom did I see anyone whose 
spouse’s or late spouse’s name was not mentioned, which suggests that disputes 
regarding women’s property rights revolved around marriage and that when entering 
marriage their control over their own property diminished. Of course, it also shows the 
significance of marriage in the Middle Ages. Marriage itself, in Charles Donahue’s 
                                                
752 The Cartulary of the Wakebridge Chantries at Crich, ed. Saltman, n. 99.  
753 The	Chartulary	of the Augustinian Priory of St. John the Evangelist of the Park of Healaugh, ed. 
Purvis, 30, 38, 80-81, 98, 147-148, 194.  
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words, was a social fact that concerned not only the couples but also their families and 
all other parties whose financial interests might have been affected. This meant that for 
upper-class families, marriage concerned politics, feudalism, and finance.754 For high 
status women such as the Ferrers sisters and Maud de Braose litigation was a precarious 
business. They would spend years resolving problems because the disputes involved 
the interests of the various noble families involved, and it was highly unlikely that when 
everyone was powerful and resourceful, anyone would easily give up their rights.  
Hereditas, maritagia and dos were the three types of property rights that drove 
women to courts. While pursuing property rights in court allowed women to be seen in 
public, medieval women only acted as keepers after all. Dower, according to S. F. C 
Milsom, was only ‘a dependent tenure within the inheritance’, 755  and a widow 
possessed it only as a life interest. A widow was expected to take good care of the dower, 
and not to cause waste or destruction that would harm the heir’s right to inheritance. 
Likewise, the nature of maritagium limited women’s management, especially after De 
Donis. While the law favoured the grantors’ interests rather than the grantees’, it too 
limited women’s capacity to use maritagium but assured that maritagium would 
descend to women’s heirs. Throughout a wife’s life, her role was that of a keeper, 
obliged to deliver the maritagium and inheritance to her heir and dower to her 
husband’s heir. Although in a sense both men and women were a means of transmitting 
property, women could not enjoy the same right of disposing property as men. Bracton 
described the ‘ideal role of women’ as follows: ‘she herself ought to attend to nothing 
except the care of her house and the rearing and education of her children’,756 which 
reflected where the law and society demanded women be part of the domestic sphere. 
Therefore, women were actually keepers of land for others rather than owners in their 
own right.  
      So, how does this particular study contribute to medieval women’s studies in 
general? Medieval women’s studies is by no means an uncharted field, but a study 
which juxtaposes the three significant women’s property rights has not been conducted 
thoroughly before. This study, therefore, compares and examines inheritance, 
maritagium and dower in an attempt to understand how these property rights evolved 
                                                
754 Donahue, Law, Marriage, and Society in the Later Middle Ages, 1-3.  
755 Milsom, ‘Inheritance by Women,’ 231-260. 
756 Bracton, vol. 2, 281.  
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and the reciprocal influence between them and women in the thirteenth century. While 
dower litigation appears most often in the records, this does not mean that it was the 
most important right to women. It does, however, mean that it caused the most disputes 
both in law and in the family. Though maritagium and inheritance may seem far less 
significant than dower from court records, they nevertheless played a significant role in 
family. As demonstrated in this study, numerous charters and fines show transactions 
related to and grants of maritagium and inheritance, which greatly influenced not only 
women themselves but also their families’ interests. However, it is undeniable that the 
sheer volume of dower litigation does suggest that, compared to inheritance and 
maritagium, dower was not only more accessible to women, but also the most sought 
after property right for women, at least in court. The law created an ironic situation for 
women whereby their grip on their own property was weak, but their control over their 
husband’s property rights reached an almost paramount status in their widowhood.  
      While the comparison of these three property rights is one of the contributions of 
this study, more importantly, it reveals ordinary medieval women’s individual 
experiences. This study, in particular, has presented the stories of a considerably wider 
group of women that is much more representative of medieval society as a whole. It 
does not just focus on wealthy or noble women, as scholars have predominantly 
previously studied, but on women from ordinary families too. Whilst such women are 
found neither in historic textbooks nor in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
their experiences deserve much more attention from historians than they have so far 
received. Their property claims could be just as fierce, strong, fiery, cunning, 
determined, or evasive, as their richer and more highly positioned counterparts. 
Only three types of property rights were investigated in this study, nevertheless 
every woman going to court to claim her property right has a different story to tell. Such 
a wide remit enables us to paint a very broad picture of the difficulties they encountered 
in court and how they tackled them. Going through each case and studying it in detail 
has also provided an insight into how medieval law operated in practice. It must be 
borne in mind that, as Charles Donahue points out, litigants often lied in court, and it is 
important not to accept all arguments at face value.757 Yet lying was an integral strategy 
used by litigants to defend their rights to property. What should be focused on is not 
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whether the litigants lied or not but whether the lie achieved its goal. Perhaps the reason 
for lying was their devotion to winning, therefore it must be assumed what they were 
aiming for was worthy of the lie. This research has attempted to make some of these 
women, who were considered to be nobodies, to be perceived, at last, as somebodies. 
If they are not generally visible in history, they are at least visible in this study.   
      This study also demonstrates that in discussing medieval English women it would 
be inappropriate to use the simplistic female/private and male/public dichotomy, 
because of the entanglements between women, men and family. There is no clear 
boundary indicating what property belonged to women or men, so inheritance, 
maritagium and dower featured more as family’s business, rather than exclusively as 
‘women’s business.’ Only when placing women in a family context could we 
understand the development of the female inheritance pattern, maritagium and dower 
through the thirteenth century and how they affected women’s agency both in court and 
in private. Women’s engagement in managing these three property rights, of course, 
reciprocally influenced their development.  
      Varied, is the word that represents the main idea of this study. This study 
demonstrates the multi-faceted means by which the common law evolved, and as the 
common law grew, so too did women’s property rights. By examining different cases, 
this study brings out the various distinct situations and difficulties that women faced in 
court regarding their property rights. Each case varies from the others, and so did the 
relationships between women and their family. For instance, the dynamics women 
created in court were stimulated not only by clashes between themselves and heirs, a 
clash caused by differences of age and ambition, but also by the complex relationships 
between women themselves and the way women were, and indeed are, mercilessly 
pitted against each other. A case involving dower might see two women competing for 
a same piece of land as dower; some co-heiresses formed an alliance in one suit but 
turned their back on each other in another suit. In fact, the law contributed considerably 
to such varied relationships – partible inheritance between daughters led co-heiresses 
to dispute each other, and they often went to court in order to claim their reasonable 
share. However, each co-heiress might have had her own subjective definition of 
reasonable, not to mention her husband’s interests, which usually led to a more complex 
division.  
		
	
240	
      Thirteenth-century common law and legislation sometimes contradicted with and 
varied from each other, causing confusion and uncertainty regarding property rights. 
For instance, while Glanvill and Bracton dictated what the common law should be, 
newly-made statutes often stepped in, imposing their strictures on people. This allowed 
litigants and their legal practitioners to have more flexibility to pursue their rights. The 
uncertainty that the budding law created gave legal practitioners an opportunity to 
utilise loopholes to help their clients win a suit, no matter how unscrupulous this was. 
For instance, if a transaction involving a wife’s land was carried out by her husband in 
private with her consent, after her husband’s death, she could always argue that she had 
not assented, and try to recover the land. The veracity of a deed made in private was 
hard prove. Likewise, the detailed record of legal practitioners’ arguments in the Year 
Books shows how complicated and evasive their arguments could be to protect their 
litigants’ rights. They used numerous methods, including refusing to respond to a writ, 
or asking the other party to provide evidence, considering it to be their opponents’ 
‘responsibility’. Legal practitioners were also cunning and flexible when they changed 
their strategies. As demonstrated on pp. 131-2, when a legal practitioner found the judge 
unconvinced by him, he immediately changed his arguments in order to turn the tide.758 
In all fairness, legal practitioners did not strive for justice but for their litigant’s victory, 
but as far as this study was concerned, this inevitably protected women’s property rights, 
and helped them to emerge from a private life to a more public one, making them more 
visible.   
What impressions do people have of medieval English women? With all that we 
have been shown about medieval women from literature, film and even our history 
books, you would be forgiven for thinking that women were absolutely subordinate to 
men, particularly their husbands, and that they held very limited rights in every aspect 
of the law and society. However, the ways in which they engaged with the law, as per 
this study, show that despite their limited rights they made their own history and did 
have agency.  
Nonetheless, medieval women, and in particular the part they played in the courts, 
still needs to attract more attention from historians. A glance at the myriad of un-
translated court records shows that there are a great deal of unexplored issues waiting 
                                                
758 The case concerns maritagium, and the representatives’ arguments centred on whether ‘they 
(plaintiffs) died without heirs begotten of their bodies’ or ‘they had no heir of their bodies.’ 
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to be discovered and discussed. Naturally, this study has its limits. Court records do not 
represent the experiences of all people, and as Linda E. Mitchell suggests in ‘The Lady 
is a Lord: Noble Widows and Land in Thirteenth-Century England’, using legal records 
as a sole source is misleading, because people who did not have disputes would not go 
to court.759 If we only took the cases presented in court as the whole story, we would 
miss out on a much more diverse version of events. Similarly, there were people who 
had trouble-free relationships regarding inheritance, maritagium and dower whose 
arguments have not been recorded, which should not be omitted by historians. Although 
this study examines a wide group of medieval English women, it does not include 
villeins, who owned even less property and were subject to manorial law rather than 
common law. In that sense there is more work to be done to examine their perspectives.       
Last but not least, since this study focuses on the common law, it does not examine 
local customs thoroughly and only a few specific customs have been mentioned. Local 
custom in medieval England is another significant area deserving of more research, 
specifically the relationship between common law and local customs and the dynamics 
this created, which considerably influenced not only women’s but also men’s property 
rights. Overall, this study provides some insight into the reciprocal relationship between 
women and the law in terms of property rights, and I hope this study will be of interest 
to other scholars and lead to further research into this fascinating field.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
759 Mitchell, ‘The Lady is a Lord,’ 96.  
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Appendix 1: Index of Cases 
 
Numb
er 
Year Plaintiff Defendant Claims Chapter 
/ Page 
Numbe
r 
Referenc
es  
Notes 
1 1218 The 
youngest 
daughter of 
William of 
Buckland 
The other 
two elder 
daughters of 
William de 
Buckland 
and their 
husbands 
The reasonable 
shares of the 
inheritance 
3 Milsom, 
‘Inherita
nce by 
women,’ 
236-237  
 
2 1226 Julia, 
Thomas 
Cusin 
Petronilla Disinherited by 
the eldest sister 
3 CRR, 
vol. 12, 
n. 1839, 
374. 
 
3 1220 Geoffrey de 
Saukevill 
Hamon de 
Gatton 
His mother 
share of 
inheritance 
3 CRR, 
vol. 8, 
387. 
 
4 1237 Christina 
(presented 
by her 
husband 
William de 
Forz, 4th 
Earl of 
Albemarle) 
Christina’s 
other sisters 
and their 
husbands 
Should the co-
heiresses hold 
the land directly 
to the king or 
not 
3 CRR, 
vol. 16, 
n. 136c, 
39. 
 
5 1227 Richard de 
Pirie 
Ralph Faber 
of Staunton 
and his 
wife, 
Reasonable 
share of 
inheritance / 
chief messuage 
3 CRR, 
vol. 12, 
n. 1861, 
379-380. 
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Avicia, and 
Julia of 
Staunton 
6 1226 Cecily de 
Swinetorp 
Thomas of 
Sandal’ and 
his wife 
Reasonable 
share of 
inheritance 
3 CRR, 
vol. 12, 
n. 1847, 
476. 
 
7 Pre-
1290 
Maud Roger of 
Grimston 
and his 
wife, Joan 
Disinherited due 
to being placed 
into a nunnery 
3 The 
Earliest 
English 
Law 
Reports, 
vol. 4, 
554-555.   
 
8 1195 unknown unknown Being coerced 
into a convent 
by the guardian 
3 V.C.H. 
Bucks., 
vol. 1, 
355. 
 
9 1276 Isabel de 
Lungeville 
John of 
Braybrooke 
and his 
wife, Joan 
Reasonable 
share of 
inheritance, 
because her 
sister took 
everything 
3 The 
Earliest 
English 
Law 
Report, 
vol. 3, 
46-47 / 
Earliest 
English 
Law 
Report, 
vol. 1, 
97-98. 
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10 1290 John du 
Boys and 
his wife, 
Agnes 
Lucy of 
Heswall and 
Juliana 
Nuper obiit 3 Year 
Books, 
vol. 2, 
398. 
 
11 1278 Agnes Joan Nuper obiit: 
reasonable share 
of inheritance 
between a niece 
and her aunt 
3 The 
Earliest 
English 
Law 
Report, 
vol. 3, 
53-54.  
 
12 1285 Maud Joan mort d’ancestor 3 The 
Earliest 
English 
Law 
Report, 
vol. 235-
244, 
 
13 1220 Roger de 
Sumervill 
Idonea, 
Margery 
and 
Elizabeth 
(sisters), 
with their 
husbands 
Intrusion of land 3 CRR, 
vol. 4, 
268-269. 
 
14 1236 Cecily and 
her sister, 
Agatha, 
Isabel Reasonable 
share of 
inheritance 
3 Calendar 
of Kent 
Feet of 
Fines, 
137.  
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15 1237 Isabel of 
Fleet and 
Gunnora of 
Fleet with 
their 
husbands 
Isabel of 
Fleet and 
Gunnora of 
Fleet 
appeared 
with their 
husbands 
Reasonable 
share of 
inheritance 
3 CRR, 
vol. 16, 
n256.  
 
16 1284 Christine 
and her 
sister Joan 
Henry de 
Somervill 
mort d’ancestor 3 The 
Earliest 
English 
Law 
Reports, 
vol. 3, 
133 
 
17 1293 Alice and 
her sister 
Joan 
B mort d’ancestor 3 Year 
Books 
vol. 2, 
456-458. 
 
18  Isabel Agnes Reasonable 
share of 
inheritance 
3 Calendar 
of Kent 
Feet of 
Fines, 48 
 
19 1259-
1260 
Isolda and 
Thomas 
Hugh de 
Cardinan 
Right to the land 3 Cornwall 
Feet of 
Fines, 
88-89. 
 
20 1242 Katherine William de 
Lykton 
Dower vs 
Inheritance 
3 CRR, 
vol. 17, 
n. 821, 
159. 
Christine and Beatrice. 
Co-heiresses, were 
summoned as the 
warrantors 
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21 Prior 
to 
1290 
Alice, Joan 
and 
Margery 
The Master 
of the 
hospital at 
Bedford 
mort d’ancestor 3 The 
Earliest 
English 
Law 
Report, 
vol. 4, 
511-512 
.  
22 Prior 
to 
1290 
Two sisters, 
the names 
unknown 
The second 
husband of 
the 
plaintiffs’ 
mother 
mort d’ancestor 3 The 
Earliest 
English 
Law 
Report, 
vol. 4, 
533-534. 
 
23 1274 Robert de 
Bracy and 
his wife 
Maud 
Hervey de 
Boreham 
Rector to a 
moiety of the 
church 
3 The 
Earliest 
English 
Law 
Report, 
vol. 1,19. 
 
24 1211 Robert 
Maudit 
Robert 
Morin 
Married the 
eldest daughter 
without the 
lord’s consent 
3 CRR, 
vol. 6, 
156. 
 
25 1220 Maud John Disinherited by 
the guardian 
3 CRR, 
vol. 9, 
65.  
 
26 1241 Matthew de 
Scotyny 
Gilbert Custody of an 
heiress’ custody 
3 CRR, 
vol. 6, 
n1573, 
304-305.  
 
		
	
259	
27 1212 Ellis de 
Beauchamp 
and his 
wife, 
Constance 
John de 
Wahull 
Homage in 
maritagium 
4 CRR, 
vol. 6, 
354. 
 
28 1208 William 
Gulafre and 
Maud, his 
wife 
Alice de 
Lundresford 
maritagium 4 CRR, 
vol. 5, 
207, 
289-290 
 
29 1242 John de la 
Lee and his 
wife, Alice 
Henry Crok 
and 
Beatrice 
Reasonable 
share of 
inheritance vs 
maritagium 
4 CRR, 
vol. 17, 
n. 585. 
 
30 1243 William de 
Pyrho and 
his wife 
Margery 
Hervey 
Bude and 
Maud, his 
wife 
Reasonable 
share of 
inheritance vs 
maritagium 
4 CRR, 
vol. 17, 
n. 1191.  
 
31 1249 Parnel Richard 
Cruc 
Maritagium or 
the acquisition 
4 Civil 
Pleas of 
the 
Wiltshire 
Eyre, 
1249, n. 
53.  
 
32 1249 Gilbert of 
Walcote 
and Agnes, 
his wife 
William 
Bissop and 
Lucy, his 
wife 
Inheritance vs 
maritagium 
4 Civil 
Pleas of 
the 
Wiltshire 
Eyre, 
1249, n. 
374. 
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33 1220 Elizabeth, 
wife of 
William de 
Rue 
Philip de 
Ulecote and 
Maud de 
Coinners, 
John 
Chaplain, 
Oger le 
Daneys, 
Thomas le 
Despenser 
and 
Reynold 
Reeve 
Disseisin of the 
maritagium 
4 CRR, 
vol. 9, 
190-191.  
 
34 1249 William of 
Coleville 
William of 
Bremhill 
Disseisin of the 
land 
4 Civil 
Pleas of 
the 
Wiltshire 
Eyre, 
1249, n. 
52, 42-
43.  
 
35 1259 Ralph of 
Ditton 
Alan The reversion of 
maritagium 
4 C 260, 
Class of 
Recorda. 
TNA at 
Kew. 
 
36 1199 William de 
Cowley 
Alice Inheritance vs 
maritagium 
4 CRR, 
vol. 1, 
87. 
 
37  Robert of 
Skyteburn 
Isabel de la 
Brome 
Inheritance vs 
maritagium 
4 Civil 
pleas in 
Wiltshire 
 
		
	
261	
Eyre, n. 
314 
38 1284 Hugh le 
Deen 
Simon of 
Londonthor
pe and his 
wife Isabel 
Reversion of 
maritagium 
4 Baker 
and 
Milsom 
Sources 
of 
English 
Legal, 
2nd edn., 
47-48 
 
39 1304 Robert de 
Tony 
Thomas of 
St Omer  
Reversion of 
maritagium 
4 The 
Hungerf
ord 
Cartular
y, pt. 2, 
n. 1001, 
13. 
 
40 1231 Joan de 
Bosco 
Ralph de 
Bray 
Land in 
maritagium 
4 CRR, 
vol. 14, 
n.1067.  
 
41 1301 R Thomas 
Launf 
Land in 
maritagium 
4 Year 
Books, 
vol. 5, 
493-494.  
 
42 1284 John Geoffrey of 
Stapleford 
mort d’ancestor 4 The 
Earliest 
English 
Law 
Report, 
vol. 3, 
136-141.  
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43 1294 A T. le Charer 
and Joan, 
his wife 
Jointure 4 Year 
Books, 
vol .2, 
342-344. 
 
44 1249 Galiena Gillian and 
Christian of 
Worth 
maritagium 4 Civil 
Pleas in 
Wiltshire 
1249, n. 
149. 
 
45 1293 Margaret Roger 
Barefoot 
maritagium 4 Year 
Books, 
vol. 2, 
620.  
 
46 1208 Hersenta 
and her 
husband, 
Reynold 
Philip Alienated 
maritagium 
4 CRR, 
vol. 5, 
289 
 
47 1201 Alice de 
Amundevill
e  
Jollan de 
Amundevill
e 
Disseiein of 
maritagium 
4 Feet of 
Fines in 
Lincolns
hire, n. 
37, 19-
20. 
 
48 1206 Hugh de 
Polsted’ and 
Hawise 
Walter de 
Grant Curt 
Disseiein of 
maritagium 
4 CRR, 
vol. 4, 
80-81, 
102. 
 
49 1207 Remilda Henry Dower claimed 
in villeinage 
5 CRR, 
vol. 6, 
147. 
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50 1200 Edith Baldwin 
and Ralph 
dower claimed 
in villeinage 
5 CRR, 
vol. 1, 
313.  
 
51 Prior 
to 
1222 
Agnes Ralph dower claimed 
in villeinage 
5 CRR, 
vol. 10, 
93. 
 
52 1244 Margery Her late 
husband’s 
tenant 
dower claimed 
in villeinage 
5 CRR, 
vol. 17, 
n349. 
 
53 1290 Emma Robert de 
Vere 
dower claimed 
in villeinage 
5 CP 
40/81, 
AALT, 
IMG 
2862 
 
54 1203 Agnes Richard de 
Gardino 
dower claimed 
in villeinage 
5 CRR, 
vol. 3, 
58.  
 
55 1200 Gilbert 
Avenel and 
his wife, 
Amice 
Matthew Dower, with the 
consent of the 
late husband’s 
father 
5 CRR, 
vol. 1, 
323 
 
56 1203 Euticia Ralph de 
Sparkeford 
Dower claimed 
being granted in 
front of the 
church 
5 CRR, 
vol. 2, 
87.  
 
57 1223 Hugelina Nicholas 
Chese 
Dower claimed 
being granted in 
front of the 
church with the 
consent of the 
late husband’s 
father  
5 CRR, 
vol. 15, 
n. 450.  
 
		
	
264	
58 1200 Cecily de 
Bensinton 
Thomas de 
Bensinton 
The timing of 
endowing dower 
5 CRR, 
vol. 1, 
192.  
 
59 1243 Maud Robert de 
Sunder 
The timing of 
endowing dower 
5 CRR, 
vol. 17, 
n. 1555.  
 
60 1212 Margaret  Arguing ‘to-be-
acquired land’ 
as her dower 
5 CRR, 
vol. 6, 
345-346.  
 
61 1220 Nicholas 
and his wife 
Crecia 
Robert 
Cotel 
Arguing ‘to-be-
acquired land’ 
as her dower 
5 CRR, 
vol. 9, 
368 
 
62 1225 Edith Henry le 
Corviser 
Arguing her 
dower was 
alienated after 
the marriage 
5 CRR, 
vol. 12, 
n. 633. 
 
63 1212 Margaret William dower 5 CRR, 
vol. 6, 
248-249.  
 
64 1292 Alice Beatrice dower 5 Year 
Book, 
vol. 1, 
114.  
 
65 1284 Avice Denise dower 5 The 
Earliest 
English 
Law 
Reports, 
vol. 1, 
163.  
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 1238 Maud Thomas 
Anand 
Specific dower 5 CRR, 
vol. 16, 
n. 736.  
 
Concerning the local 
customs in the city of 
Lincoln 
67 1292 Joan William Two dower on 
the same land 
5 Year 
Books 
vol. 1, 
114 
 
68 1217-
1218 
Robert de 
Newburgh 
Alice de 
Mohun 
An intrusion 
into dower land 
5 ‘Henry 
III Fine 
Rolls 
Project,’ 
n. 55, 
(1217-
1218), 
 
69 1285 Thomas 
Malekak 
and his wife 
Alice 
Gerard de 
Lisle and 
his wife 
Alice 
Excessive dower 5 The 
Earliest 
English 
Law 
Report, 
vol. 3, 
267.  
 
70 1221 Avicia Clement Excessive dower 5 CRR, 
vol. 10, 
238.  
 
71 1211 Egelina de 
Curtenay 
Richard de 
Camville 
and his wife 
Eustacia 
Specific dower 
vs common law 
dower 
5 CRR, 
vol. 6, 
123.  
 
72 1272 Beatrice, 
Queen of 
Germany 
Edmund, 
earl of 
Cornwall 
Specific dower 
vs common law 
dower 
5 The 
Earliest 
English 
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Law 
Reports, 
vol. 1, 
21-22.  
73 1289 Edward of 
Wyke 
John 
English and 
his wife 
Edith 
Specific dower 
vs common law 
dower 
5 The 
Earliest 
English 
Law 
Reports, 
vol. 4, 
439-440. 
 
74 1233 Maud Bartholome
w and his 
wife 
unde nichil 
habet 
5 CRR, 
vol. 15, 
n. 539.  
 
75 1201 Agnes Philip  The widow was 
accused of 
having invalid 
marriage 
5 CRR, 
vol. 1, 
41.  
 
76 1201 Cecily de 
Cressy 
William de 
Cressy 
The widow was 
accused of 
marrying her 
late husband in 
his bed of 
sickness 
5 CRR, 
vol. 1, 
63.  
 
77 1225 Alice the bishop 
of Lincoln 
The widow was 
accused of 
having invalid 
marriage 
5 CRR, 
vol. 12, 
n. 705.  
 
78 1268 Geoffrey 
Fresel and 
Joan his 
wife 
Herbert de 
Bexville 
Asserted being 
‘divorced’ 
5 The 
Earliest 
English 
Law 
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Reports, 
vol. 1, 1.  
79 1300 William 
Paynel and 
Margaret 
his wife 
Nicholas de 
Warwick 
The widow was 
accused of 
living in 
adultery 
5 Women 
of the 
English 
Nobility 
and 
Gentry, 
61-63.  
 
80 1290 Maud John de 
Tyngewykz 
and his 
wife, Roesa 
The widow was 
accused of 
living in 
adultery / no 
dower from 
dower 
5 CP 
40/82, 
AALT, 
IMG 
3529. 
 
81 1225 Margery Roger Capital 
messuage 
cannot be dower 
5 CRR, 
vol. 12, 
148.  
 
82 1225 Margaret  Roger de 
Aswell 
Capital 
messuage 
cannot be dower 
5   
83 1249 Christina Edmund 
Silvestar 
Dower was 
alienated by her 
late husband 
5 JUST 
1/776, 
AALT, 
IMG 
5781. 
Local customs in 
Winchester 
84 1249 Alice la 
Burgeise 
 Dower was 
alienated by her 
late husband 
5 JUST 
1/776, 
AALT, 
IMG 
5777. 
Local customs in 
Winchester 
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85 1229 Eufemia Richard  Dower was 
alienated by her 
late husband due 
to urgent need 
5 CRR, 
vol. 13, 
n. 1153.  
Local customs in 
Winchester 
86 1229 Eufemia Andre Dower was 
alienated by her 
late husband due 
to urgent need 
5 CRR, 
vol. 13, 
n. 1153. 
Local customs in 
Winchester 
87 1229 Alienora Roger 
Wascel, 
William, 
Joberd and 
his wife 
Eva, Hugh 
de Budeford 
and John 
Kipping 
Dower was 
alienated by her 
late husband 
without her 
consent 
5 CRR, 
vol. 13, 
n. 2018. 
Local customs in 
Winchester 
88 1229 Cristiana Ailrich le 
Cordewaner 
Dower was 
alienated by her 
husband due to 
necessity 
5 CRR, 
vol. 13, 
n. 1154. 
Local customs in 
Winchester 
89 1201 Emma Robert Dower 5 CRR, 
vol. 2, 
31-32. 
 
90  Matilda German Dower was 
alienated by her 
late husband 
5 CRR, 
vol. 12, 
143.  
 
91 1276 Elizabeth de 
Pembridge 
Roger de 
Mortimer 
Dower was 
alienated by her 
late husband 
5 The 
Earliest 
English 
Law 
Reports, 
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vol. 1, 
59-61.  
92 1290 Alice John Dower was sold 
by her late 
husband 
5 CP 
40/41, 
AALT, 
IMG 
2867. 
Local customs in 
Nottingham 
93 1307 unknown unknown The two 
women’s 
husbands 
purchased land 
jointly and 
alienated it 
jointly 
5 Year 
Books, 
vol. 5, 
512.  
 
94 1284 Thomas 
Russell and 
his wife 
Isabel 
Leonin of 
Leake 
Her late husband 
exchanged her 
dower land for 
another land 
5 The 
Earliest 
English 
Law 
Reports, 
vol. 3, 
152.  
 
95 1285 Andrew 
Sparrow 
and his wife 
Maud 
Isabel of 
Panton 
Dower was 
unjustly 
disseised 
5 The 
Earliest 
English 
Law 
Reports, 
vol. 3, 
223. 
 
96 1223-
1224 
Petronilla John de 
Gizorz 
Her late husband 
bequeathed her 
dower to the 
defendant 
5 CRR, 
vol. 16, 
n. 1625.  
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97 1199 Alice Hugh, 
Adam and 
Robert 
Walensis 
The recovery of 
dower 
5 Women 
of the 
English 
Nobility 
and 
Gentry, 
115 
 
98 1225 Alice Simon The recovery of 
dower 
5 CRR, 
vol. 12, 
n. 352.  
 
99 1292 Joan Walter The recovery of 
dower 
5 Year 
Books, 
vol. 1, 
148. 
 
100 1225 Katerina Roger de 
Subir 
Dower was 
alienated by the 
husband 
5 CRR vol. 
17, n. 
1585. 
 
101 1292 A widow, 
name 
unknown 
B and C his 
wife 
Default by her 
late husband 
5 Year 
Books, 
vol. 1, 
106. 
 
103 1293 Joan  Walter de 
Molcastre 
Dower, leased 
by the plaintiff 
5 Year 
Books, 
vol. 2, 
406. 
 
 
104 1303 A woman, 
name 
unknwon 
Her tenant, 
name 
unknown 
Dower 5 Year 
Books, 
vol. 3, 
458-460. 
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105 1221 Quenilla Henry of 
Hodsock 
and his wife 
Alice 
Dower, sold by 
the plaintiff 
5 CRR, 
vol. 13, 
50-51. 
 
106 1227 A woman, 
name 
unknown 
The 
executors 
Ralph and 
Roger 
Dower, sold by 
the plaintiff 
5 CRR, 
vol. 13, 
n. 223. 
 
107 1238 William de 
Waleton 
Giles and 
his wife 
The plaintiff 
was disinherited 
by a gift to the 
religious house 
of the land held 
in dower  
5 CRR, 
vol. 16, 
n789. 
 
108 1301 A woman, 
name 
unknown 
Richard de 
Midd 
Recovering her 
dower 
5 Year 
Books, 
vol. 3, 
458-460.  
 
 
109 1242 Henry Godehold Godehold was 
accused of 
making waste of 
the dower which 
caused 
disinheritance of 
the plaintiff 
5 Calendar 
of Kent 
Feet of 
Fines, 
165-166. 
 
110 1221-
1222 
Felicia John de 
Beaumont 
dower 5 Rolls of 
the 
Justices 
in Eyre: 
Being the 
Rolls of 
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Pleas 
and 
Azzizes 
for 
Gloucest
er, 
Warwick
shire and 
Staffords
hire, 
1221-22, 
pl. 257.  
 
111 1283 Maud de 
Braose 
Roger dower 5 CP 
40/50, 
IMG 
1647; CP 
40/62, 
IMG 
4306; CP 
40/51, 
IMG 
7479; CP 
40/62, 
IMG 
4306; CP 
40/62 
IMG 
4229.  
CP 
50/51, 
IMG 
7479 
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112 1203 Euticia Robert, 
abbot of 
Nutley 
 
 Dower 
5 CRR, 
vol. 2, 
87. 
 
 
113 1292 Alice  Dower 5 Year 
Books, 
vol. 1, 
142. 
 
114 1294 A woman, 
name 
unknown 
 jointure 5 Year 
Books, 
vol. 2, 
342 
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Appendix 2: Index of Personal Charters 
 
Number Year Name  Object Chapter 
and 
page 
number 
References Notes 
1 1130-
1133 
Matilda and 
her sisters 
Equal 
division of 
the 
inheritance 
between the 
sisters 
3 Women of 
the English 
Nobility 
and 
Gentry, 47-
48. 
 
2 1198 Beatrice and 
Maud 
The 
division of 
the 
inheritance 
of William 
de Say 
3 Women of 
the English 
Nobility 
and 
Gentry, 
100. 
 
3 1262 Grantors: 
Isolda and 
Thomas 
Grantees: 
Henry 
gift 3 Cornwall 
Feet of 
Fines, 88-
89. 
 
4 1242-
1243 
Margery, 
heiress of the 
Earl of 
Warwick 
  
Promised 
the king she 
would not 
marry 
without his 
permission 
3 CRR, vol. 
17, n. 234.  
 
5 1248 Cecily and 
Joan 
The grant 
of wardship 
3 Calendar 
of Kent 
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Feet of 
Fines, 205.  
6 Early 
thirteenth 
century 
Hawise, 
Countess of 
Gloucester 
granting 
part of her 
maritagium 
at 
Pimperne, 
Dorset, to 
Nuneaton 
priory 
4 Women of 
the English 
Nobility 
and 
Gentry, 95-
96.  
 
7 Early 
thirteenth 
century 
Simon Coc 
and Florence 
Granting 
maritagium 
to others 
4 The 
Cartulary 
of 
Worcester 
Cathedral 
Priory 
Cartulary, 
n.374.  
 
8 1232 Grantor: 
Walter de 
Lacy 
Grantees: 
Ralph and 
Parnel 
Granting 
maritagium 
in frank-
marriage 
4 The 
Hungerford 
Cartulary, 
pt. 2, n. 
1001.  
 
9 1200 Grantor: 
Helen 
(mother) 
Grantee: 
Agnes (one 
of the 
daughters) 
Granting 
maritagium 
as 
maritagium 
4 Feet of 
Fines for 
the Reign 
of King 
John, 
1199-1216, 
n. 5.  
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10 1232 Grantor: 
Parnel 
Grantee: 
Thomas of St 
Omer 
Granting 
maritagium 
4 The 
Hungerford 
Cartulary, 
pt. 2, n. 
1001, 
 
11 1180-
1182 
Grantor: 
Thomas 
Basset 
(father) 
Grantess: 
Alan of 
Wycombe 
(younger son) 
Granting 
maritagium 
as 
maritagium 
4 Basset 
Charters, 
n. 178.  
 
12 1249-
1250 
Maud de 
Clare and 
Isabel de 
Forz 
Transiting 
land to be 
maritagium 
4 Portraits of 
Medieval 
Women, 
36.  
 
13 1220-
1257 
Eustace 
Rospear and 
the monks of 
Rufford 
Granting 
the wife’s 
maritagium 
to a 
religious 
house 
4 Rufford 
Charters, 
n. 366. 
 
14 Prior to 
1241 
Grantor: 
Richard of 
Grafton 
Manor 
(father) 
Grantees: 
Petronilla 
(daughter) 
and Walter of 
Kingsford 
Granted the 
rent from a 
tenement as 
maritagium 
4 The 
Beauchamp 
Cartulary 
1100-1268, 
n. 133- n. 
135, 81-83.  
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15 In the 
early 
reign of 
Henry III 
Walter the 
weaver and 
his wife’s 
brother 
Giving the 
wife’s 
maritagium 
to her 
brother 
4 CRR, vol. 
1, 309, 
317, 378 
 
16 Prior to 
1241 
Grantor: 
Richard of 
Grafton 
(father) 
Grantees: 
Petronilla 
(daughter) 
and Walter of 
Kingsford 
The rent 
from a 
tenement as 
maritagium 
4 The 
Beauchamp 
Cartulary 
1100-1268, 
n. 133- n. 
135, 81-83. 
 
17 Prior to 
1241 
Grantor: 
Petronilla 
(mother) 
Grantee: John 
(son) 
Granting 
part of the 
rent from 
her 
maritagium 
to her son. 
4 The 
Beauchamp 
Cartulary 
1100-1268, 
n. 133- n. 
135, 81-83. 
 
18  Grantor: 
Richard 
(fahter) 
Grantee: 
Emma 
(daughter) 
Granting 
land in 
maritagium 
4 The 
Beauchamp 
Cartulary 
1100-1268, 
n. 133- n. 
135, 81-83. 
 
19  Grantor: 
Emma 
(mother) 
Grantee: 
Alice 
(daughter) 
Granting 
land in 
maritagium 
4 The 
Hungerford 
Cartulary, 
vol. 1, n.1, 
n. 11.  
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20 1138-
1150 
Grantor: 
Robert  
Grantees: the 
monks at 
Stoke 
Granting all 
his land to 
the monks, 
with the 
consent of 
his wife 
and his heir 
4 Women of 
the English 
Nobility 
and 
Gentry, 94.  
 
21 Late 
twelfth 
century 
Grantor: 
Hawise de 
Beaumont 
Grantee: the 
church of St 
James of 
Bristol 
Granting 
one last 
burgage in 
the new 
borough of 
the 
meadow, 
namely the 
last one on 
the east 
side, free 
and quit of 
all service 
and custom 
as the earl 
her husband 
gave it to 
her. 
5 Women of 
the English 
Nobility 
and 
Gentry, 93. 
 
22 Late 
twelfth 
century 
Grantor: 
Hawise de 
Beaumont 
Grantee: 
Nuneaton 
priory 
Granting 
part of her 
maritagium  
5 Women of 
the English 
Nobility 
and 
Gentry, 95-
96 
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23 Late 
twelfth 
century 
Grantor: 
Hawise de 
Beaumont 
Grantee: 
Durford 
Abbey 
Granting 
her land 
5 Earldom of 
Gloucester 
Charters, 
n. 160. 
 
25 1276-
1289 
Grantor: 
Maud de 
Clare 
Grantee: the 
priory of 
Augustinian 
friars 
Granting 
her land  
5 Women of 
the English 
Nobility 
and 
Gentry, 
199. 
 
26 Early 
thirteenth 
century 
Grantor: 
Adam de 
Scadewell 
Grantee: 
some monks 
Granting 
the land his 
mother held 
in dower 
5 The 
Cartulary 
of 
Worcester 
Cathedral 
Priory 
Cartulary, 
n. 141. 
 
The 
granted 
dower 
land 
might 
have 
been 
Alice’s 
(Adam’s 
wife) 
dower 
as well 
27 1230-
1233 
Grantor: 
Alfred de 
Penhulle 
Grantee: 
some monks 
Granting 
the whole 
of his lands 
with the 
services of 
those who 
held of him 
and his 
5 The 
Cartulary 
of 
Worcester 
Cathedral 
Priory 
Cartulary, 
n. 141.  
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mother’s 
dower 
28 1202-
1203 
Walter, 
Walter’s 
mother and 
Toke Dacun 
Walter and 
his mother 
Emma 
granted the 
land of 
dower to 
Toke, and 
in return, 
Toke and 
his heirs 
should do 
the service 
of 1lb. of 
cumin and 
render 
yearly to 
Emma and 
Walter 
three 
quarters of 
corn, 
wheat, 
barley and 
rye, and 2s 
at the four 
usual terms 
5 Calendar 
of Kent 
Feet of 
Fines, 32.  
 
29  Sibyl and 
Walter 
Mercator 
Sibyl 
quitclaimed 
her dower 
to Walter 
Mercator 
5 Calendar 
of Kent 
Feet of 
Fines, 53. 
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for 11s in 
return 
30 1236 Maud and 
Reynold de 
Comhull 
Maud 
quitclaimed 
all her 
dower 
right, a 
moiety of 
54-acre 
land in 
Stalesfeld 
to Reginald 
de 
Comhull, 
who in 
return 
would give 
Maud 4 
seams of 
grain, one 
seam of 
wheat and 
one seam of 
barley at 
Michaelmas 
and 2 
seams of 
barley at 
Easter 
every year 
for her life 
5 Calendar 
of Kent 
Feet of 
Fines, 141. 
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